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ABSTRACT
During the first quarter of the eighteenth century 
and long after, Bosome led a politically unexciting life. In 
contrast, the other two Akyera states, Abuakwa and Kotoku, 
pursued an aggressive foreign policy and tightly guarded 
their independence against hostile neighbours. Between 1730 
and 17^2 they acquired imperial domination over the eastern 
half of the Gold Coast west of the Volta. In 17^> however, 
Kotoku succumbed to Asante authority. Abuakwa resisted 
Asante but yielded to that power in 1783* The fall of the 
Akyem empire increased the area of Asante domination. The 
Asante yoke proved unbearable; consequently between 1810 and 
1831 the Akyem states, as members of an Afro-European alliance, 
fought a successful war of independence against that power.
The European co-operation, however, led to an Anglo-Danish 
rivalry for Akyem, Akuapem, and Krobo as spheres of 
influence: the rivalry ended in 1850. Continued threat from 
Asante and bitter intra-Akyem relations compelled the Akyem 
states to tolerate British protection. The invasion of 
Kotoku-Bosome territory by Asante in 1863 underlined the 
wisdom in remaining under the British canopy. In late l860s 
the Kotoku, for example, affirmed their loyalty to the British 
by helping to re-establish British authority in the Lower Volta 
District from which it had been withdrawn in i860. The Kotoku 
involvement in the Volta conflicts, traditional animosity, and 
Anglo-Dutch deal over Elmina inspired Asante invasion of Akyem 
and other parts of the Protectorate in late 1872 and 1873*
Close Akyem co-operation enabled the British to counter­
attack Asante successfully in 187^. The Akyem also incited
Juaben secession from Asante and promoted the founding of the 
New Juaben State in Akyem. But the price for all this was the 
subjection of the Akyem and almost every other Gold Coast 
people to British colonial rule as from mid-1874.
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PREFACE
This study examines relations between the Akyem 
states of Abuakwa, Kotoku, and to a less extent Bosome, on 
the one hand and their neighbours on the other, as well as 
intra-Akyem relations, during the period between about 1700 
and 1874. The aim is to determine the contribution, of the 
Akyem states to the political evolution of the Gold Coast.
The choice of period is not altogether arbitrary. 
During the first twenty-seven years of the eighteenth century, 
Abuakwa and Kotoku for example struggled to preserve their 
political independence and territorial integrity against, and 
if possible, achieve political ascendancy over, their 
neighbours. A successful attack on Akwamu in 1729 swept them 
into imperial domination over the states and peoples 
inhabiting the entire area between river Ayensu in the west 
and the Volta in the east. This ascendancy they enjoyed till 
1742: when a defeat by Asante shattered their empire. From 
then on the main concern of the two Akyem states was to ward 
off Asante overlordship. By 1744 Kotoku had submitted.
Abuakwa followed in 1783* Bosome, nestling in extreme western 
Akyem, was a political backwater.
Right from the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, Abuakwa and Kotoku started struggling to recover 
their independence. But they could only achieve this in 
1826 when they allied with other states, the British, and the 
Danes, to defeat Asante in war. In 1831 a formal peace treaty 
with Asante endorsed the recovery of independence.
However, the elimination of Asante authority only 
led to a situation whereby the Akyem states, and several
8 .
others, were subjected to greater European political 
supervision which was converted to colonial rule by the 
British in July 187^.
I am greatly indebted to a large number of persons 
who, in diverse ways, helped me in the course of my research: 
in England the archivists, librarians, and attendants of the 
Public Record Office, the British Museum, and the Commonwealth 
Society, all in London; also the officials of the various 
libraries of the University of London; in Denmark; the 
archivists and other officials of the Royal Archives and the 
Royal Library in Copenhagen; in Holland all the archivists and 
officials of the Rijks Archief, The Hague; and in Ghana the 
officials of the National Archives, and of the libraries of 
the Universities of Ghana and Cape Coast.
My stay in Copenhagen was made most enjoyable by 
Mr. amd Mrs. Bendsten who offered me lodging and boarding;
Miss Ingborg Stemann through whom I came to know the Bendtsens; 
Professor and Mrs. Jeppesen of the University of Copenhagen; 
and fellow researcher Ole Justesen, who all played host to me 
from time to time. Ole Justesen was additionally helpful in 
translating some of the Danish documents for me.
In Holland many Ghanaians there made my stay a 
happy one, particularly Professor Bamfo-Kwakye, now Vice- 
Chancellor of the University of Science and Technology,
Kumasi, who was then on sabbatical in Eindhoven. Dr. Albert 
van Danzig of the University of Ghana was most helpful in 
directing me to some of the Dutch sources. Besides, he put 
at my disposal some of his own material collected from the
Dutch documents. Mrs. Marion Johnson of the University of 
Birmingham was also very helpful in directing me to some of 
the Danish sources.
I also want to thank my cousin, Mr. S. K. Boateng 
and his family and the Okyenhene, Nana Ofori Atta III who 
readily came to my aid whenever I was faced with accommodation 
problem in London. In this respect my townsman Mr. I. E.
Offeh Burobey, and my brother-in-law, Mr. Amponsa Abedi and 
his wife were also helpful.
In many ways I owe a huge debt of gratitude to 
Professors A. A. Boahen of the University of Ghana, F.
Agbodeka and Morton-Williams of the University of Cape Coast: 
these elderly scholars read the drafts and offered useful 
advice.
My special and most sincere thanks, however, go to 
my supervisor, Mr. D. H. Jones, of the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, for his patient and 
meticulous supervision.
To the several typists who spared some of their 
time to help in typing out the drafts and the final thesis I 
say a big thank you, especially Mr. Paul Mensah and Mrs. V. 
Williams and her group.
Another special and great gratitude goes to my 
wife who, besides sharing with me the depressions and 
occasional joys of a research student, worked, in spite of 
her own studies, to supplement the financial support I 
received from the University of Cape Coast.
But for this support and the study leave granted 
me by the University of Cape Coast this study would have been 
impossible. To the University I owe a great debt of gratitude.
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INTRODUCTION
By the beginning of the eighteenth century Akyem
Abuakwa and Akyem Kotoku had been established as firmly
organized inland states for upwards of half a century. Bosome
appeared as a third state in Akyem in the first decade of
that century. The Akyem were then already well-known to
Europeans on the coast.
In 1702 William Bosman, who for several years had
been an official at Elmina Castle and was a shrewd observer
of the political situation in the Gold Coast, described "the
Akims” (Akyem) as the only neighbouring people who did not
fear ”the haughty, arrogant and warlike "Quamboe” (Akwamu).'*’
Akwamu then was a formidable imperial power in the eastern
2
sector of the Gold Coast. Bosman said further that the
Denkyera, a people with a "towering pride” in the western
3
sector, were feared by all except the Akyem and Asante.
When Bosman was writing, Asante had already
4
defeated Denkyera, in 1701. The post facto nature of his
1. Bosman, W., A New and Accurate Description of the 
Gold Coast of Guinea, London 1705* 19o7 ed. p. 6 5.
2. Wilks, I. G., Akwamu, 1650-1750, M.A. Thesis, Bangor 
1958 (unpublished); also his article, ”The Rise of the 
Akwemu Empire, 1650-1710”, in the Transactions of the 
Historical Society of Ghana (THSG), Vol. Ill Part 2 
(1957)* PP* 99-136; and his The Mossi and Akan States, 
1500-1800 , in Ajayi, J.P.A. & Crowder, M. (Ed.), 
History of West Africa, Longmans, 1971> Vol. One,
pp.365-9.
5 . Bosman, Description, pp. 73 & 77•
4. See Chapter 2, pp. 44 & 65 below.
assertion therefore tends to invalidate his view on 
Denkyera-Asante relations. But it is significant to note 
that the Asante defeat of Denkyera generated a series of 
Akyem-Asante conflicts which did not end till about 1874.
The hostile relations between these two peoples
became a major factor in the inter-states politics of the
Gold Coast throughout the period under review. Contemporary
observers are unanimous on this point. In the eighteenth
century the European traders on the coast constantly regretted
the prevalence of the conflicts as a hindrance to the smooth
flow of trade from the forest to the forts.■*" The situation
in the nineteenth century was basically not much different
from what it had been in the eighteenth century. George
Maclean, president of the British mercantile administration
at Cape Coast Castle, emphasized the importance of Akyem-
Asante relations in 1831 when he refused to conclude, on behalf
of ain Afro-European alliance, peace negotiations with Asante
unless Akyem leaders were present to assent personally to the 
2
peace terms. Horton, a Sierra Leonean medical officer in the 
service of the British establishment in the Gold Coast, also 
alluded to the hostile Akyem-Asante relations in 1868 when he 
described the Akyem as the only people who could challenge, 
with success, Asante "power when it was in its greatest 
glory” And in 1871 Salmon, then the Administrator of the
1. See Chapters 2, 5 & 4 below.
2. This issue is discussed fully in Chapter 5 below.
3* Horton, J.A.B., West African Countries and Peoples, London 
1868, p.126. His other work, Letters on the Political 
Condition of the Gold Coast, London 1870, is also cited 
elsewhere in this study.
12.
British possessions in the Gold Coast, made the perceptive
comment that "of all the states the Akims are the most
allied by kindred to the Ashantees and at the same time the
„1
most bitterly hostile to them.
All this clearly points to the Akyem states as an
important factor in Gold Coast history, thereby suggesting
that the Akyem provide a perspective from which the history
of the Gold Coast in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
can be discussed profitably. And yet up to the present time
this factor has never been considered at any great length in
the general histories. Only recently has it been touched
upon, in a peripheral manner, in monographic studies of
2
Akwamu, Asante, Akuapem and a few others. Nor has there 
been any specific attempt to write the history of the Akyem. 
The nearest one can think of are J. B. Danquahfs Akim 
Abuakwa Handbook, and Akan Laws and Customs: and the Akim 
Abuakwa Constitution. There is also M. J. FieldTs Akim 
Kotoku: An Oman of the Gold Coast. The first of Danquah's 
two works is nothing more than what it was meant to be, a 
mere guide book; and the second is just a brief though useful 
description of the Abuakwa constitution, customs and usages. 
Field's study on Kotoku is more of anthropology than history. 
Neither she nor Danquah touches on Bosome either directly or
1. Salmon, C. S., Cape Coast Castle (CCC), to Kennedy, E.A., 
Sierra Leone (SL), 30th October Io71,-C0 96/89* Public 
Record Office, London.
2. Wilks, M.A. Thesis; Fynn, J.K., Asante and Its Neighbours, 
1700-1807> Northwestern University Press Itout)* 19?1; 
Kwamena-Poh, M.A., Government and Politics in the Akuapem 
State, 1730-1850 (NUP 1973) Daaku, K.Y., Trade and Politics 
on the Gold Coast, 1600-1720* Oxford University Press COUP),
197o:
15.
in detail. This study is intended to fill the gap.
Information on the Akyem states in general is not 
lacking. They were an important centre of the gold digging 
industry of the Gold Coast. This fact, together with their 
political ambitions in relation to neighbours, obliged the 
European traders on the coast to pay considerable attention 
to them. In their reports to Europe the traders made fairly 
detailed observations on the Akyem states. European interest 
in the Akyem country received a new dimension in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, when the Basel Evangelical 
Mission Society selected it as a new field, in addition to 
Ga-Adangme and Akuapem, for evangelisation. The reports of 
the merchants and the missionaries'1' constitute a rich mine of 
information on the political, economic, social, and religious 
life of the Akyem. Also quite informative are the reports of 
the officials who were occasionally sent on missions to Akyem 
by the embryonic colonial administration which began to func­
tion in the Gold Coast as from 18^1.
It must be pointed out,however, that in terms of
state and chronology, there is a considerable imbalance in
the archival material and the secondary sources. For example
documentary evidence on Bosome is virtually nil. Nor does
oral tradition provide a satisfactorily detailed and useful
2
alternative source of information on this state. Consequently
1. The Basel Missionary sources used in this study largely 
derive from Paul Jenkins’s Abstracts of the Basel Missionary 
Correspondence on the Gold Coast. The Abstracts are avail­
able in the Balm Library, University of Ghana, Legon. They 
are referred to in this study as the Basel Mission 
Archives - Paul Jenkins’s Collection (BMA-PJC).
2. Ward,W.E., on the other hand says that Bosome has a full 
tradition, cf. A History of Ghana, London, 1957> ed. p. 111. 
There is not much in this work to Justify Ward's view.
Bosome has not received as full treatment as Abuakwa and 
Kotoku. On the whole this state has been treated as an 
appendage of Kotoku with which it was sometimes closely 
connected, on grounds of abusua (clan) ties: the relationship 
came into greater focus during the nineteenth century. 
Documentary evidence on Abuakwa and Kotoku is quite satisfac­
tory, but even here there is some regrettable deficiency.
For instance information on Kotoku during the period between 
17^2 and 1812 leaves much to be desired. Nothing of note 
seems to have happened in that state during that long period 
to draw the attention of the European traders on the coast.
In contrast, there is ample material on Abuakwa, because the 
traders on the coast were obliged to follow, with anxiety, 
its bitter conflicts with Asante, since the confrontations 
affected the forest-to-fort trade. But in the l860s 
documentation is more prolific on Kotoku than Abuakwa, 
owing to the former’s conflicts with Asante. On the whole, 
however, evidence from the written sources is sufficient to 
warrant a reliable reconstruction of the history of relations 
between the Akyem states and their neighbours.
Where the documents are not so helpful is in the 
matter of the origins and early history of the states. In 
this respect one has had to rely on oral tradition as the 
only alternative source of information. Otherwise tradition 
has been used sparingly. This is not due to one’s distrust 
of tradition as lacking worthy evidential value. Truth is 
either deliberately and easily distorted to suit the interest 
of the narrator1 or inadvertently glossed over.
1. Akinjogbin, I. A., Dahomey and Its Neighbours, 1708-l8l8
(oup) 1966, p. 4.
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The traditions of the Akyem Abuakwa provide a good 
illustration of this point. Under the patronage of Okyenhene 
Nanq Ofori Atta I (1912-1943)» the Divisional and other sub­
chiefs of the Abuakwa state committed the histories of their
1 2 stools to writing during the 1925-6 period. The existence
of this corpus should place the researcher in Abuakwa in a
better position than his counterparts elsewhere in Ghana or
other parts of West Africa. But as is well known to
specialists on oral history, traditions which crystalize
under the patronage of progressive traditional rulers, like
Ofori Atta I, tend to be distorted in ways which are extremely
difficult to detect.
The Akyem Abuakwa are not positively known to have 
buried the unsavoury aspects of their past, as the Asante for 
instance are said to have done, but sometimes certain 
assertions in their traditions point to efforts to distort or 
sheer ignorance. A case in point is the traditional view of 
Ofori Panin, one of their rulers. Many of the stools histories 
(there are at least more than twenty of them) claim that Ofori 
Panin led the Abuakwa from Adanse to settle in Akyem where he 
founded the Akyem Abuakwa state. All the traditions speak of 
only one Ofori. Therefore it seems reasonable to identify 
him with the Ofori whose reign European documentary sources
1. Among certain sections of Ghanaians, especially the Akan, 
the stool is the equivalent of throne; others have skin, 
for example chiefs in the Northern and Upper Regions.
2. The histories are available at the Palace, Kyebi. They 
are referred to in this study as Akyem Abuakwa Traditions: 
Kyebi, or as the case may be (AAT: Kyebi etc.), 1925-6.
5- Ward, History, pp. 62 & 140-141.
would date to about the 1704-1727 period.^" At least
circumstancial evidence from the European sources would also
suggest that the migration spoken of in the traditions may
have taken place in the middle years of the seventeenth
2
century or even earlier. Therefore unless the documents
are assumed to be wrong, tradition would seem to be telescoped
•3
in the matter of the migration from Adanse. There is thus 
the need for circumspection in the use of the Abuakwa 
traditional histories. Indeed this caution has been applied 
to the oral traditions of the other two Akyem states as well 
as those of the non-Akyem peoples consulted. For they all 
have their own bias.
Where possible I have relied more on documentary 
than traditional evidence. This is in no way to suggest that 
the written sources cannot be wrong. One is here more 
concerned about the degree of distortion. Though occasionally 
partisan in their local relations, the European traders were 
generally objective in their reports. Moreover, they provide 
the contemporary dating which enables the construction of a 
chronological framework that may be accepted with confidence.
1. See Chapter 2, below.
2. Cf. Chapter 1, pp.22-24 below.
3 . This subject is discussed fully in Chapter 1 below.
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CHAPTER 1
EMERGENCE OF ABUAKWA AND KOTOKU TO 0.1699
Hostility generally marked relations between the 
Akyem states and their neighbours during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The beginnings of the phenomenon, 
however, can be traced to at least the middle years of the 
seventeenth century when migrant lineages of the Asona and 
Agona mmusua (clans) from Adanse arrived in Akyem and 
succeeded in imposing themselves as rulers on the existing 
societies in the southern and northern sections of the 
district. From that time onwards the political and economic 
ambitions of the Asona rulers of Abuakwa1 and the Agona 
chiefs of Kotoku, as the two sections of Akyem generally 
came to be known, made it impossible for peaceful relations 
to prevail between the Akyem and most of their neighbours, 
especially those who were not prepared to promote Akyem 
interests.
The Akyem district today consists of roughly the
2
south-western third of the Eastern Region of Ghana. In 
area it is a little over seven thousand square miles. It 
is a characteristically hilly country. The highest point,
which is about 2420 feet above sea-level, occurs on the
1. There is the assertion that Akyem Abuakwa, Akyem Kotoku, 
and Akuapem were all,under rulers of the Agona abusua.
Cf. Wilks, in Ajayi % Crowder, History of West Africa, 
Vol. One p. 369. This is quite misleading. While it is 
true that the rulers of Kotoku were, and are still, of 
the Agona abusua, these of Abuakwa and Akuapem, since the 
seventeenth century, have always been of the Asona clan.
2. See Map. No. 1, p. 396
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Atewa-Atwiredu hill range. This thirty-mile range runs 
south-westwards from the Birem gap in the north to the 
Akanten-Osenase neighbourhood in the south. The gap, 
created by the river Birem (often spelt Birim or Birrim),
i
separates the range from the so-called Kwawu mountains.
About thirty-five miles to the south of the Atewa-Atwiredu 
is the Nyanao hill or Akyem peak.
Many rivers and rivulets drain the district.
Among these are the Ayensu, Densu, Akrum, Pompom (often 
spelt Pawnpawn), and the Birem. The last named river is the 
biggest and longest of them all. It rises from the Atewa 
near the town of Apapam in eastern Akyem and initially flows 
north-eastwards to create the gap to which we have already 
referred. After its loop round the northern tip of the 
Atewa, the river, at the town of Anyinam, turns to flow 
south-westwards till it joins the river Pra about seventy 
miles away in the Assin district, only a few miles west of 
Akyem Soaduro.
Available evidence shows that the size of the Akyem 
district today is considerably different from what it was at 
the beginning of the eighteenth century. The extent and 
and political divisions of the district defied European 
attempts to define them during the seventeenth and subsequent
p
centuries, owing to lack of reliable information. But a
1. The Kwawu mountains are actually a hill range of about one 
hundred and seventy miles long. It starts from Kintampo in 
the Brong Ahafo Region and runs south-eastwards through 
Ashanti Region to the New Juaben and Akuapem districts in 
the Eastern Region. The range is referred to as Kwawu 
mountains probably because of the picturesque scarps which 
it shows in the Kwawu area.
2 . Bosman, Description, p. 78; cf. also Barbot, J., f,A Descrip­
tion of the Gold Coast of the North & South Guinea”, in 
Churchill, Collection of Voyages and Travels (London 1732), 
Vol. 5> p. 184. Barbot wrote in the lbdOs.
correlation between oral traditional evidence and information 
from a map of the Gold Coast drawn by the Dutch in 1629,1 as 
well as other European sources, makes it possible to define, 
with a considerable degree of accuracy, the size and political 
divisions of the district during the second half of the 
seventeenth century.
The 1629 Dutch map of the Gold Coast delineates 
’’Akim” or ’’Great Acanij” as one of the biggest inland 
districts or states in the seventeenth century. Among its 
immediate neighbours were Agona to the south; Akwamu to the 
south-east and east; ’’Little Acanij” (?Assin) to the west;
Kwawu (or Kwahu) to the north-east; and ”Akan” to the north.
A hundred years later another European map of the Gold Coast
O
defined ’’Akim” almost in similar terms. In between the two 
dates there were several references to the district or its 
people. In 1660 Villaut mentioned ’’Acanis le Grand”,^ and 
in the 1670s Heerman Abramsz referred to the "Akimse Akannists” 
who lived ’’behind Craa” /Accra/. ^  Until 1730 when they 
migrated to the trans-Volta area, the Akwamu lived between
1. Chart 74-3, dated 25 December 1629, The Leupen Collection, in 
Rijks Archief, The Hague. The Chart is reproduced in this 
study as Map No. 2, p. 397
2. Anville, M.D.; ”A map of the Gold Coast from Issini to 
Alampi”, April 1729- It is reproduced as Map No. 3 on p. 
in this study.
3 . Nicolas Villaut, ”A relation of the coast of Africa called 
Guinea” (Trs. 2nd ed. London 1670), cited by A. A. Boahen, 
’’Arcany or Accany or Arcania and the Accanists of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’ European records”, in 
THSG Vol. XIV Part i pp. 100-112.
4. Heerman Abramsz to Assembly of Ten, 23 November 1679, in 
Albert van Danzig, Dutch Documents Relating to the Gold 
Coast and the Slave Coast, 1680-1710 (Legon) p. 5»
5- See Chapters 2 and 3 below.
the Akyem Abuakwa and the Ga (Accra). It is therefore
reasonable to identify "Akim”, Great Acanij or Acanis le
Grand, or ”Akim Akanny” (implied by Abramsz) with Akyem
Abuakwa.1 Akyem Abuakwa of the seventeenth century, in
broad terms, consisted of the territory between the Pra and
its tributary the Birem, plus the strip of territory between
2the Birem and the Atewa-Atwiredu hill range.
This was not all the Akyem country. The evidence
from Kotoku traditions, recorded since the l840s down to
the present, shows that the Kotoku, or at least the ruling
lineage, inhabited the district which is now known as Asante-
Akyem from about the middle years of the seventeenth century
up to the early 1820s when they migrated to Akyem south of 
■3
the Birem. This district was immediately to the north of
1. Cf. also Boahen, THSG Vol. XIV Part i p. 106.
2. This conclusion contradicts the view that seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries "Akwamu extended beyond the 
Atewa”, Cf. Wilks, "The Rise of the Akwamu Empire, 1650- 
1710”, in THSG Vol. Ill Part 2 (1957) PP- 99-100. Our 
contention here derives further strength from the fact 
that Wilks has recently had to change some of his views 
on the beginnings of Akwamu. Cf. Ajayi & Crowder,
History of West Africa, Vol. One pp. 364-367.
3 . Guineiske Journaler (GJ): 1800-1844, entries No. 329 
dated 18 December 1842 and No. 367 dated 10 February 
1843, Royal Archives, Copenhagen; Simon Sus (Gyadam) to 
Basel, II March 1859 (BMA-PJC); "Petition of Quabina 
Fuah, King of Nsuaem (i.e. Oda today) to the Governor 
(CCC), 17 July 1871, CO 96/88; Precis of Akim Claims to 
Ashanti-Akim: Kotoku, MP 212/93, MP 5718/94, Confidential 
MP 105/96, MP 559/96, MP 6974/96, MP 8661/97, MP 4964/98, 
MP 1588/0 0, MP 1205/01; Ag. Colonial Secretary (Accra) to 
the Chief Commissioner (Kumasi), 2 June 1908, all in 
File No. D 46, Kumasi Archives;! Willcocks (Fumso-Ashanti) 
to Chamberlain (London), 4 July 1900, CO 96/374; Governor 
Hodgson (Accra) to Chamberlain, 17 July 1900, CO 96/36I; 
K. Ameyaw, Akim Oda (Kotoku) Tradition, IAS acc. No. 
KAG/7, Institute of African Studies, Legon; Akyem Kotoku 
Traditions (AKT): Awisa, as told present author by 
Awisahene and Elders (1968). The migration to Akyem
south of the Birem is discussed in Chapter 5 below.
’Akim1. The 1629 Dutch map called the district immediately 
to north of "Akim" Akan, while the 1729 map named it Akam.
It thus stands to reason to identify Akan or Akam with 
Akyem Kotoku, i.e. present-day Asante-Akyem. That this 
district formed part of Akyem is further substantiated by 
Asante tradition which says that the name "Asante-Akyem" 
was given to the district by Asantehene Opoku Ware I 
(cl717-1750) after he had conquered it.1 It is interesting 
to observe that in 1679 Herman Abramsz spoke of the 
"Cocoriteese Accanists" who lived in "the interior north of 
Cormantyn" by which he of course meant Fante. 'Cocoriteese1 
is clearly a corruption of 'Kotokus' who were also known as 
the 'Kwadukros'^ during their Asante-Akyem days. Heerman 
Abramsz's description is fairly accurate because only the 
Assin lived between the Kotoku and the Fante. Seventeenth 
century Akyem Kotoku, according to tradition, broadly 
consisted of the territory between the Pra and its third 
largest tributary, the Anuru (often written Anum).
The ruling houses of both Abuakwa and Kotoku do
not claim to be aboriginal inhabitants of Akyem: their
ancestors, they allege, migrated from Adanse, now part of
2l
Asante, to Akyem. The claim is essentially confirmed by
1. Precis of Akim Claims: Abuakwa, Conf. 345/00, 1900, 
paragraph 6, File No. D.46, Kumasi Archives.
2. Van Danzig, Dutch Documents p. 5*
3 . Daaku, cited by Boahen, THSG. Vol. XIV Part (i) p. 106.
4. Reindorf, History p. 6l. AAT; Kukurantumi, Begoro, Kwaben, 
Wankyi, Pamen etc. (1925/6), and Kyebi (1968/9); Danquah 
J.B., Akan Laws p. 2-3 . Abuakwa Tradition, as-recorded by 
E. L. Meyerowitz, Akan Traditions of Origin (1950) p. 91; 
Ward, History, pp. 109-110.
Akwamu, Asante and Akuapem traditions.
The traditions do not say when the migrants from 
Adanse arrived in Akyem. There have been three attempts so 
far to date the event. Reindorf writing in the late nine­
teenth century says that the migration from Adanse "began at
p
a remote period and still continues." How long ago is what 
he does not explain. Danquah in 1928 implied that the Abuakwa
X
were already in Akyem before I660. In contrast Akuffo thinks 
that the migration occurred in 1660.^ Developments in 
Adanse indicate that both Danquah and Akuffo are fairly close 
to the truth.
The heartland of Adanse today is on the Twisa 
hills in southern Asante. Among its leading towns are 
Fomena, Dompoase, Akrokyere (Akorokerri) and the gold 
mining town of Abuasi. In the seventeenth century, however, 
the Adanse seem to have inhabited the territory between the 
river Of in and its tributary, the Oda. Adanse thus formed 
part of the Of in basin, which, by A.D. 1500, had been 
divided into important centres of "Akan culture and 
statedom’*.^  Perhaps it is in this sense that one must 
understand Adanse to which place the ruling lineages of
1. Akwamu Tradition, as recorded by Field, M. J. Akim Kotoku, 
pp. 2-3; Akuffo, B.S., Ahemfie Adesua (Exeter 1950) pp. 
vii-viii. Dompoase Tradition, as recorded by K. Y* Daaku, 
Oral Traditions of Adanse, esp. p. 5 *
2. Reindorf, History, p. 6l.
3* Danquah, Akan Laws, p. 2.
4. Akuffo, Ahemfi, p. viii.
5. J.D. Fage, A History of West Africa (CUP, 1969 ed.) 
p. 40.
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several Akan states trace their immediate origins: for 
example Agona, Denkyera, sections of the Fante, Kwawu (or 
Kwahu), Twifo, Wassa, and above all Abuakwa as well as 
Kotoku.
The Abrade rulers of Akwamu also once formed part
of the royal lineage of Twifo, one of the Of in basin states,
but they emigrated from the area because of struggle for
power. 1 By the second half of the seventeenth century the
secessionist Abrade from Twifo had built for themselves an
empire embracing what is now the Eastern Region of Ghana
2
and parts of the Lower trans-Volta region.
The power struggle which brought about the with­
drawal of the Akwamu rulers of the Abrade abusua from Twifo 
must have formed part of a general rivalry for predominance 
in the Of in basin. By the first half of the seventeenth 
century Adanse appears to have achieved supremacy over its 
rivals. Adanse, says Reindorf, achieved its hegemony through 
diplomacy and intimidation by means of its god Bona. But 
military conquest seems to have been another and perhaps
the most effective means. The rise of Denkyera, to which
4
the fall of Adanse is attributed, suggests this.
In 1659 the Dutch on the coast reported of wars
1. I. Wilks, "A Note on Akwamu and Twifo” in THSG. Vol. Ill 
Part (III), (1958) p. 217.
2. Wilks, Akwamu, 1650-1750, M.A. Thesis, Bangor 1958 
(unpublished); also article in THSG Vol. Ill Part ii 
(1957) PP. 99-156.
3 . Reindorf, History, pp. 48-9*
4. Reindorf, History, p. 49; J. K. Kumah, The Rise and Fall 
of Denkyera, M.A. Thesis, Legon 1965 (Unpublished);
Kumah, The Rise and Fall of the Kingdom of Denkyera”, in 
Ghana Notes and Queries (GNQ) No. 9* 1966 pp. 35-55*
in "distant Adansee", adding that Adanse had "disappeared"
i.e. had been defeated as a result of the wars.1 The
2
conqueror of Adanse was Denkyera.
The wars in Adanse and the subsequent rise of
Denkyera would seem to have had a far reaching effect on the
hinterland of the Gold Coast, especially the Akyem district.
Many lineages and groups of lineages were compelled to leave
the Ofin basin in order to seek peace and security elsewhere
by putting distance between them and the rising power of
Denkyera. Among these were the Adanse themselves who
decided to seek asylum on the mountain fastness of Twisa
after a sojourn in Akyem. Others were the royal Asona
4
abusua of Kokobiante and the royal Agona clan of Atoam in 
Twifo.^
Reindorf, apparently relying on tradition, ascribes 
the migration of the Agona abusua of Atoam from the Ofin 
area to Denkyera tyranny. On the death of Obenempon Akrofi, 
King of Atoam, he writes, the Denkyerahene demanded from 
Asiedu Apenten, successor to the Atoam stool, part of the 
estate of Akrofi. The demand would suggest Denkyera
1. Valckenburgrs Report, September 1659* cited by Daaku, 
Trade & Politics, p. 156.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 49; Kumah M.A. Thesis and in GNQ 
No. 9 p. 35.
3. K.Y. Daaku, Oral Traditions of Adanse; Ward, History, 
p. 54.
4. Meyerowitz, Akan Traditions p. 91; Akwamu Tradition, in 
Field, Akim-Kotoku p. 2.
5. Reindorf, History, p. 49. Reindorf renders Twifo 
’Tshuforo’.
suzerainty over Atoam.1 Apenten refused to oblige, an
indication of Atoam unpreparedness to recognize the
Denkyerahene as an overlord. In the war which ensued
Asiedu was killed. To avoid a fate similar to Asiedu’s,
but apparently still refusing to comply with the Denkyera
request, Ofosuhene Apenten, who succeeded to the Atoam stool,
and his subjects emigrated altogether from Twifo. The Atoam
emigrants ’’wandered to different places” including Ahuren
near Lake Bosomtwe in present-day Asante till they eventually
"settled in the Akyem country with the name of Akyem Kotoku.”
The Kotoku settled in northern Akyem i.e. present day Asante- 
■5
Akyem.^
A similar inability to tolerate the Denkyera 
domination would seem to have compelled the royal Asona clan 
of Kokobiante to leave Adanse. For Akwamu tradition, 
recorded by Margaret Field, relates that "the chief of 
Kokobiante, a stool in Adanse serving Denchera, is said to 
have offended against the Dencherahene and, to escape the 
penalty, fled with a handful of his followers to Nyanao 
where he threw himself on the protection of the King of 
Akwamu." The Akwamuhene then advised the Kokobiante migrants 
to go to his "hunters in the Birrim district (the Atwia of 
Asamankese and Kyibi)" who had plenty of land to spare.
1. Cf. the custom of Ayibuade. This custom which seems to 
have been universal among the Akan states, entitled an 
overlord to a portion or the whole of the estate of a 
deceased vassal or subject. The custom also applied in 
master-slave relations. Cf. Rattray, R.S. Ashanti Law 
and Constitution (OUP, 1929) Chapter XIV.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 49*
3 . Reindorf, History, p. 6 5.
Thus it was that the Kokobiante stool was set up in Akyem
and though "it became the paramount stool of Akim-Abuakwa
Oman, it did not own the land it settled upon."
The migration does not appear to have taken place
en masse, in one great sweep, but in petty and perhaps unco-
2
ordinated waves. For several other lineages of Asona and
■3
non-Asona abusua^ from Adanse claim to have joined the
Kokobiante later. An example is the Asona abusua of
Anyinabirem, also in the Ofin basin, who were eventually to
found Kukurantumi and become the headquarters of the Adonten
4
division of the Akyem Abuakwa state.
Who the leaders of the Kokobiante and Atoam 
migrations were it is not easy to establish with certainty. 
As already indicated, Ofosuhene Apenten is said to have led 
the Atoam migrantwhile Ofori Panin is supposed to have 
been the leader of the Kokobiante. These assertions seem 
doubtful, especially in the case of Ofori Panin. Virtually 
all Abuakwa stools traditions, as pointed out in the 
Introduction, know of one Ofori (Panin) who is given the 
dual credit as leader of the Kokobiante migration from
1. Field, Akim-Kotoku, pp. 2-3.
2. Ward, History, p. 109*
3 . There are seven major and seven minor mmusua (clans) 
among the Akan. Every Akan is supposed to belong to-one 
of these clans.
4. AAT: Kukurantumi (1925/6).
5. Reindorf, History, p. 49.
6. AAT: Kukurantumi, Begoro, Wankyi, Pamen etc. (1925/6), 
Kyebi (1968/9).
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Adanse and founder of the Akyem Abuakwa state.1 Normally 
the term ’Panin’, meaning the First, would imply a later
2
Ofori or more than one Ofori who ascended the Abuakwa stool.
On this occasion however, the term is used to distinguish
Ofori Panin from Ofori Kuma, i.e. Ofori the Younger, an
Akyem Abuakwa sub-chief of the Asona clan who was the founder
*5
of the dynasty which still rules in Akuapem. It is there­
fore reasonable to identify Ofori Panin of tradition with 
the historical Ofori whose reign is fixed by European
2i
sources to the period between about 1704 and 1727- For 
unless Ofori had a reign of more than sixty years, which is 
highly improbable, he cannot be said to have also led the 
Kokobiante migration from Adanse which seems to have taken 
place in the l650s or earlier. It is possible that the 
leader was another and an earlier Ofori whom tradition has 
forgotten, or even a leader of a different name who has been 
deprived of the credit. For the evidence is clear that 
Ofori of the European records sought to make Abuakwa great by 
pursuing an aggressive foreign policy. His aggression also
1. AAT: Kukurantum, Begoro, Wankyi, Pamen etc. (1925/6),
Kyebi (1968/9).
2. The Akan have stool instead of throne.
3 . See Chapter 3 PP« 86-89 below.
4. Cf. Chapter 2 below.
5 . Using ’sample” states, of which Abuakwa is one, D.H. Jones 
has arrived at thirteen (13) years as the average length of 
reigns in Ghana monarchical-systems up to the nineteenth 
century. Cf. ’’Problems of African Chronology” in Journal 
of African History (J.A.H.) Vol. XI No. 2 (1970) pp. l6l- 
179.
6. This subject is fully discussed in Chapter 2 below.
suggests the achievement of a considerable internal stability 
(consolidation of the authority of the paramount Asona 
abusua). This achievement probably explains why he is 
falsely regarded as having led the Abuakwa migration from 
Adanse and is also acclaimed founder of the Abuakwa state.
It is not uncommon fo>r tradition to eulogise, out of 
proportion, the achievements of whoever it is in its own 
interest to consider as a hero. Reindorf in fact implies 
at one point that the leader of the Kokobiante migration was 
Kuntunkurunku, though he eventually contradicts himself by 
saying that Kuntunkrunku was the first of the twelve Abuakwa 
rulers to have reigned during their Adanse days.1
Similarly if Ofosuhene Apenten of tradition is
2
identified with the Apenten of the European sources, then
he cannot have led the Atoam migration to Akyem. Of course
it is possible that Apenten of the records is quite
different from Ofosuhene Apenten of tradition. But an Asante
tradition recalls an Akyem Kotokuhene called ’Fusu Apenten’ -
perhaps the same as Ofosuhene Apenten - whom the Asante
killed in a war against Kotoku.^ This may well be a
reference to Apenten who, according to documentary evidence,
4lost his life in a war with Asante in 1717 • It seems 
reasonable therefore to reject Reindorf's view, already
1. Reindorf, History, pp. 6l & 348. Kuntunkrunku (spelt 
Kutukrunku by Reindorf on p. 6l but more correctly on 
p. 348) is further discussed on p. 33 below.
2. Cf. Chapter 2,pp. 45-46 below.
3. Tradition of Asumegya, in R. S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and 
Constitution (OUP 1929) P* 132.
4. See Chapter 2,pp.46 & 68 below for a full account of 
this war.
referred to above, that Ofosuhene led the Atoam migration 
to Akyem. The credit must be given to one of his pre­
decessors, of whom at least four are remembered.1 But our 
present knowledge makes it difficult to arrive at any 
positive assertion on this point.
Reindorf, apparently using tradition, says that 
it was in northern Akyem (i.e. present day Asante-Akyem)
that the migrant Agona abusua from Atoam adopted the name 
2
Kotoku. He may well be right, for a more recent version of 
Kotoku tradition asserts that the Atoam, after leaving 
Ahuren in the lacustrine district around Bosomtwe, directed 
their course to Bomfa in present day Asante Akyem, but later 
moved on to settle at a place very close to Dwansa on the 
Konongo-Agogo road.^ Here they adopted the name 'Kotokuom'
- now corrupted to Kotoku - in view of the relative
ii
isolatedness of the place. Soon they became the dominant 
authority in the area.
The Kokobiante or Abuakwa migrants, after reaching 
southern Akyem, settled at Banso, just to the north of the 
Atewa.^ Eventually Banso became the capital of the Akyem 
Abuakwa state that subsequently emerged. Banso is no longer
1. Ameyaw, Akim Oda (Kotoku) Tradition.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 49*
3. Ameyaw, Oda Tradition.
Ameyaw, Oda (Kotoku) Tradition. But yet another version 
says the Kotoku were fond of carrying 'Kotoku* (sack or
satchel) about them; neighbours therefore referred to
them as the 'Kotoku* people.
3. AAT: Kyebi (1968/9); AAT: Banso (1925/6).
the capital of Abuakwa. In or about the 1780s the capital 
was removed to Kyebi.^ But that Banso must have once been 
the Abuakwa capital is substantiated, though not perhaps 
conclusively, by the fact that it still serves as the place 
where the remains of deceased Abuakwa Kings are finally 
buried.
Lack of detailed and reliable evidence makes it 
impossible, to show how the invaders from the Ofin basin 
succeeded in subjugating the Akyem country in order to 
impose their authority on the existing societies there.
There is enough, however, to enable us to speculate as to 
why the winvaders” were successful. Fragmentation of the 
existing society appears to have helped the Adanse invaders. 
Akyem societies before the arrival of the migrants from
Adanse or Ofin basin, appear to have been made up partly
!«
of patritlonal Guan communities, and partly of matrilineal 
Akan groups. The Guan communities were probaly the earliest 
inhabitants of the district. Ward writes: "The tradition of 
Agog© in Ashanti-Akim relates that when the first settlers 
established their home there they had to fight against a power­
ful ruler called Otara Fuom or Otara Finam" whose name is
2
identified as Guan. Certain Guan Kyerepon of Akuapem recall
that their ancestors once lived in parts of what is now the
■3
Akyem Abuakwa district. These Guans probably lived under 
petty political authorities. For in Akuapem they lived in very
1. The change is fully discussed in Chapter 5 below.
2. Ward, History, p. 39 •
3- Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics, p. 125.
small chiefdoms until 1730s when the Akyem Abuakwa organized
them into a unitary state. 1 The other element in Akyem
communities was that of the matrilineal Akan who had
arrived in Akyem long before the Abuakwa and Kotoku rulers,
2but later than the Guan. Together the two ethnic groups 
seem to have been militarily weak because they lived in 
fragmentary communities. Asante-Akyem traditions lay stress 
on the fragmentation of society in the area, which enabled
fFrimpon Manso^ i.e. the invaders from Atoam (Kotoku) to
* . 4defeat and enslave them. This description seems to tie
in well with the Dutch view in 1629 that the Akims’ were a 
very delicate people. Delicate here probably means weak, 
especially when the TAkim’ are considered in relation to 
neighbours like the Agona who were prone to war, the Akwamu 
a "thievish people", and the Kwawu who were said to be a 
rascal people. The Akyem may have been an object of constant 
harassment for such powerful neighbours. The same weakness 
may have partly enabled the 'Adanse1 invaders to subjugate
1. Cf. Chapter 3, pp. 86-88 below.
2. Ward, History, p. 39*
3. Frimpon Manso was a Kotoku King from 1717-1741. Cf. 
Chapter 2 pp. 76-78 and Chapter 3 PP* 79-112 below.
4. Asante-Akyem Traditions (AS-AKT): Bompata & Juansa, 
recorded by the present author in 1960/9 * My informants 
were for Bompata, Opanin Tieku, son of a late nineteenth
century Bompatahene, and for IWansa, the head of the






But the relative homogeneity of the invaders
appear to have been a contributary factor. This was
especially the case with the invaders who eventually
founded the Akyem Abuakwa state. Several of the migrant
lineages were of the Asona abusua. Besides the Kokobiante
the lineages who founded Takyiman (and later moved to
Kukurantumi), Begoro, Kwaben, Wankyi were all of the Asona
clan; they all, or most of them, reportedly migrated from
Adanse. In Akyem they joined the Banso (later Kyebi) King
to subjugate the country. Kukurantumi tradition relates
that the nucleus of the Abuakwa state was formed by an
alliance between the Kokobiante and Anyinabirem migrant
1
Asona lineages from Adanse. In due course, other entrants
were admitted into the union. Eventually, besides the
paramount rulers of Abuakwa, four out of the five divisional
heads in the Abuakwa state which subsequently emerged were
of the Asona abusua. These were Kukurantumihene, alias
Adontenhene of Abuakwa, Begorohene, otherwise called
Benkumhene, Kwabenhene or Gyasehene, and Wankyihene or 
2
Oseawuohene. The preponderance of the Asona element in
the high echelon of the state in more recent times seems
to be a pointer to and proof of the use which the invaders
made of their Asona homogeneity for concerted action in
•3
subduing the Akyem country in the seventeenth century.
1. AAT: Kukurantumi and also Wankyi (1925/6).
2. Only the Mifahene, alias Asiakwahene, was, and still is, 
of the Oyoko clan.
3 . Compare with the achievement of the Oyoko abusua in 
Asante. Cf. A. A. Boahen, Topics in West African History 
(Longmans) p. 70 and in Ajayi & Espie, A Thousand Years 
of West African History, p. 168.
33.
The immigrants from Adanse also seem to have
gained support from some of the Akan communities already
existing in the area. Ward, apparently relying on tradition,
relates that before the arrival of the Adanse immigrants
there was ”a nucleus of Akim settlers under a certain
Kuntunkrunku,” but that Ofori Panin, i.e. the leader of the
Adanse immigrants, owing to his wisdom as a judge, was
”chosen to succeed Kuntunkrunku as head of the growing Akim
contingent.”^
When then did the migrants from Adanse arrive in
Akyem? Valckenburg1s dating of the fall of Adanse, and the
unanimity of the traditions in ascribing the fall to the
2
rise of Denkyera give considerable substance to the
suggestion, implied by Danquah and Akuffo, that the middle
years of the seventeenth century probably saw the arrival of
the Adanse migrants in Akyem. That the ’Adanse1 migrants
arrived in Akyem during the middle years of the seventeenth
century is further substantiated by an economic revolution
which seems to have taken place in Akyem during the second
half of that century. In 1629 the Dutch described the Akyem
•3
as very rich in slaves. The assertion is capable of two 
possible interpretations. Either the Akyem were owners of 
large numbers of slaves, or they themselves constituted a 
prolific source of slaves. The latter view may well have 
been the case, considering that the Akyem had powerful
1. Ward, History, pp. 109-110.
2. See p. 28 above.
Chart 7^3.
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neighbours, e.g. Akwamu, Agona and Kwawu who could subject 
them to slavery. The same source mentioned some of the 
districts or states of the Gold Coast as gold-producing, 
but did not find it justifiable to include the Akyem 
country. This suggests that Akyem either had no gold at all 
or that its production was too insignificant to warrant
mentioning. By the l660s, however, southern Akyem at
2
least, had become both a slave and gold producer. In the
1680s Akyem was better known as a source of gold.^ By the
turn of the century, Akyem, Bosman says, was producing ,fas
large quantities of gold as any that I know; and that also
the most valuable and pure of any that is carried from this 
i.4coast ... It is clear from these sources that an economic 
revolution had occurred in Akyem. This revolution had 
brought about a change from a slave-based economy in the 
first half of the century to one buttressed by gold in the 
second half.
It is pertinent to inquire into the causes of the 
revolution. Such causes may have been internal or external 
or both. There is reason to believe that they were more 
from outside than from inside, and had something to do with 
the arrival of the invaders from the Ofin basin.
1. Archaeological evidence suggests that alluvial gold in 
the Birem basin was already being exploited by the 
inhabitants there before the arrival of Europeans. Cf. 
Paul Ozanne in Peter Shinnie (ed.) The African Iron Age, 
Oxford 1971* P- 49.
2. 0. Dapper, in Ogilby, Collection, p. 44l. It is possible, 
however, that Dapper obtained his information from earlier 
works, as he never visited the West African coast. But 
one cannot be absolutely sure of this.
3. Barbot, in Churchill, Collection, pp. 182 & 189-190*
4. Bosman, Description, p. 7 8 .
As to "be expected, the immigrants had brought with 
them that gold-digging skill for which Adanse had 
already become well known by the first half of the seventeenth 
century.1 The intensification of the gold-digging industry 
by the Adanse migrants probably explains the orientation of 
Akyem from a slave-exporting economy to one based on the 
extractive industry. By the eighteenth century the revolu­
tion had become so complete that during that period as well
as in the nineteenth century the name Akyem was virtually
2
synonymous with gold.
The possession of gold strengthened the position 
of the Akyem states in their relations with some of their 
close neighbours. Akwamu, for example, was inclined to 
appeal to the Akyem for financial help. Prom the 1670s 
Akwamu embarked upon an expansionist programme to the south 
and south-eastern Gold Coast.^ By 1699 she had subdued the 
Ga and had emerged as a coast power. Initially Akyem 
(Abuakwa) tried to associate itself with the Akwamu 
expansion. For in 1677 the Akyem are said to have given
1. Fage, West Africa, p. 40, Daaku, Trade & Politics pp. 
145-1451
2. Bosman, op. cit., p. 7 8, L. P. Romer, Tilforladlig 
Efterretning om Kysten Guinea (Copenhagen, 1760) p. 164; 
Atlas Maritime de l'Asie et de l^frique No. 104 (Paris 
1764) cited by G. Macdonald, The Gold Coast Past and 
Present (London 1898) p. 121 Major W. F. Butler, one of 
the leaders of the British invasion of Asante in 1874, 
is quoted as saying that in Akyem gold was as plentiful 
as potatoes were in Ireland. Cf. H. Brackenbury, The 
Ashanti War, A Narrative (London 1874) Vol. II p. 357*
3 . I. G. Wilks M.A. Thesis, Chapters 1 & 2; also his 
article, ,fThe Rise of Akwamu, 1650-1710,” in THSG 
Vol. Ill Part 2 (1957) PP- 99-136.
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Akwamuhene Ansa Sasraku a loan to purchase arms in his war 
against the Ga."1" From the Akyem viewpoint, this was a 
sound diplomatic move, at once aimed at political and 
economic gains. The move would give the Abuakwa leaders, 
as recent immigrants, a free hand to pursue the policy of 
conquering, and consolidating themselves in, the Akyem 
country. At the same time the loan would be expected to 
influence Akwamu leaders to give Akyem traders free passage 
to and from the coast. The second objective may have been 
uppermost in the minds of the Akyem leaders since by the last 
quarter of the seventeenth century, the coast trade had 
become particularly attractive to the inland states and 
peoples.^
The alliance with Akwamu was, however, shortlived.
By 1689 Akyem (Abuakwa) was more inclined towards an 
alliance with Agona, also to the south, against Akwamu.
What brought about the shift in alliance is not altogether 
clear. It is likely that Akyem had become disappointed and 
frustrated in its expectations from Akwamu, especially in 
the matter of free passage for Akyem traders plying to and 
from the trade on the Ga coast via Akwamu. For by the end 
of the century blocking the routes against Akyem had become 
a habit of Akwamu.^ Apparently Akwamu did not find the Akyem- 
Agona Alliance in its best interest. Sasraku, the Akwamuhene 
swooped down on Agona in 1688-9 and defeated it.^ But
1. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, pp. 9-10.
2. Cf. pp. 37-39 below.
3 . Minutes of Council Meeting (EC), 10 March 1700, WIC 124.
4. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, pp. 23-4.
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Akwamu success against Agona did not stop threats from
Akyem. Before the century came to a close Akyem hostility
had forced Akwamu to erect a system of fortified positions
along its border with Akyem.^ Such a precaution suggests
something more than an occasional Akyem hostility merely
aimed at securing an uninterrupted passage for its coast-
bound trade and communication. It is probable that by now
the two Akyem states, particularly Abuakwa, had embarked
upon a southward political expansion that Akwamu felt was
detrimental to its political, territorial, imperial and
economic interests. This suggestion is made in the light of
that aspect of Akyem foreign policy which was conspicuous right
at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Hence the
differences between the two, which in turn hampered the
flow of trade from the Akyem country to the coast. The
volume of the trade, Bosman said in 1702, ’'would yet be
enlarged if the negroes of Aquamboe and Akim could agree
2
as they generally are at differences.”
By the last quarter of the seventeenth century the 
coast trade had become extremely attractive to the Akyem 
and other peoples of the forest belt, particularly because 
it was the only source from which they could obtain fire­
arms.^ The demand for firearms and ammunition by Gold Coast
4
ethnic groups had by then become very great, on account of
1. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, p. 22.
2. Bosman, Description, p. 6 9.
3 . For the most recent and useful discussion of firearms in
the Gold Coast, see Kea, R.A., "Firearms and warfare on
the Gold and Slave Coasts from the Sixteenth to the
Nineteenth Centuries,” in J.A.H., Vol. XII, No. 2, 1971> 
pp. 185-213.
4. Kea, in J.A.H. Vol. XII No. 2 p. 188.
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their effective role in inter-state (ethnic) politics. 
Probably firearms were first introduced into the Gold Coast 
by the Portuguese in the 1480s, but the Pope banned their 
sale in Africa, presumably for fear that they might increase 
the military strength of heathens and Muslims against 
Christian Europe.1 Whether or not the Portguese observed the 
Papal sanction to the letter, it is not easy to say. At any 
rate by the seventeenth century, Papal enunciations were 
losing their force on Europe. Protestant trading nations 
now had no respect for the Bulls of the Vatican, and began 
to sell firearms and ammunition to whoever cared to buy them, 
heathen or Muslim. By l601 the Dutch were selling firearms 
to the peoples of the Gold Coast seaboard and teaching them
o
how to use them. In 1610 the Portuguese and Dutch issued 
guns to their local supporters on the Gold Coast. By the 
last few decades of the century, the peoples of the Gold 
Coast were demanding firearms and ammunition with almost 
insatiable fervour. In 1680 the English reported that guns 
and ammunition had become T,a mighty drugTf here.^ So great
1. R.M. Wilten, Gold Coast Mission History, 1471-1880 p. 4, 
cited by Hans W. Debrunner, A History of Christianity in 
Ghana. (London 1967) p. 16, n.2.
2. P. de Marees, Beschryvinghe ende Historiche Verhael van 
het Gout Koninchrijck van Guinea enders de Gout-Custe de 
Mina genaemt liggende in het van Africa; Uitgegeven door
S.P. L'Honore Naber (S-Gravenhage 1912) pp. 95-96, cited 
by Kea, op. cit. p. 187 n. 16.
3 . S. Brun, Schifferten Welcher in ettjehen Ewe Lander etc. 
(Basel 1624) pp. 86-6, cited by Debrunner op. cit.p. 30 
n. 3-
4. Letter from Elmina Castle (EC) to the Assembly of Ten,
8 March 1684, WIC 124, in Van-Danzig, Dutch Documents, 
p. 28; Kea, op. cit. pp. 192-191!-.
5. Bradley & Council- (CCC) to the Royal African Company (RAC),
7 December 1680, T 70/20/20.
was the demand that the Royal African Company*^ was even
prepared to import Dutch guns for re-export to the Gold
Coast and other parts of West Africa, a move which aroused
2
strong protests from English manufacturers. It is clear
from the English reaction just referred to that the Dutch
■5
exploited the arms trade to the full. At the turn of the
century, Dalby Thomas at Cape Coast Castle reckoned the
Dutch were selling 20,000 tons of gun-powder annually and
large quantities of carbines and blunder-busses in the 
4
Gold Coast.
Since this period and subsequent centuries were 
full of inter-state wars, a connection between the heavy 
demand for guns and inter-state politics becomes obvious. 
Richard Gray has pointed out that the use of firearms made 
relatively little difference, in terms of military advantage, 
in politics in the Zambezi basin during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries. Contemporary Gold Coast does not 
provide as clear-cut an evidence as Gray uses to support 
his case against the overall importance of firearms in 
Africa south of the Sahara. But the eighteenth century 
evidence shows conclusively that heavy demands for firearms
1. For a good study of the RAC see K.G. Davies, The Royal 
African Company (London 1957)•
2. Petition against the importation of Dutch Guns, 17 
October 1684 (T 70/169/28), cited by Daaku, Trade & 
Politics, p. 157 n. 4.
3 . Kea op. cit. p. 195•
4. Sir Dalby Thomas (CCC) to RAC, 26 August 1705 (T 70/22/1).
5. R. Gray, "Portuguese Musketeers on the Zambezi," in 
Journal of African History (JAH) Vol. XII No. 4 (1971) 
pp. 531-555*
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always preceded wars in the Gold Coast.1 This suggests that
those making the demands were fundamentally the combatants,
as indeed they really were. It is reasonable to conclude
then that the warring parties recognized the effectiveness
2
of guns in their wars. Heerman Abramsz emphasized the 
connection between firearms and the wars in 1679 when he 
noted that "since rifles and gunpowder have been introduced 
things have become much worse, the natives having become
much more warlike .... Consequently the whole Coast has
come into a kind of state of war."^
The Akyem states stood in need of arms and ammunition. 
For besides their aggression against Akwamu, violent relations 
with Asante and others made the acquisition of firearms and 
ammunition even more imperative. From the second half of 
the seventeenth century the Abuakwa and the Kotoku, like 
others elsewhere in the Gold Coast, were engaged not only in 
state building but also in defending themselves against 
external attackers. The Denkyera hegemony had sent several 
ambitious Oyoko clan lineages from the Ofin basin to the 
districts immediately to the south of the upper reaches of 
that river.^ By 1699 these Oyoko clan lineages had conquered
1. See Chapter 2, 3 and 4 below.
2. Van Sevenhuysen to Assembly of Ten, 21 June 1700, WIC 124, 
cf. also Kea, op.cit. p. 207.
3. H. Abramsz to Assembly of Ten, 23 November 1679* Van Danzig, 
Dutch Documents p. 6. In peace time, however, the guns would, 
no doubt, be used for hunting. Cf. Chapter 6 pp. 219
below.
4. Boahen, Topics, p. 71* - in Ajayi & Espie, A Thousand Years, 
pp. 166, Fynn, Asante, Chapter Two; - "The Rise of Ashanti", 
in GNQ, No. 9 (19^6) p. 25.
the area and had virtually created the Asante Kingdom.
Reindorf recalls incessant Asante attacks on Kotoku.'1' This
was only to be expected. Both were pursuing similar policies
of territorial acquisition and expansion, and were only
separated by the Anuru river. That Akyem (Kotoku) and
Asante had become hostile to each other by the turn of the
seventeenth century is confirmed by the fact that in 1698-
1701 when Asante was at war with Denkyera the Akyem went to
2the aid of the latter. Obviously the exigencies of the 
current political situation had compelled Kotoku, and 
Abuakwa too, to forget about the mid-seventeenth century 
Denkyera tyranny. The thinking of the Akyem states would 
seem to have been that now the power to watch most was 
Asante.
Unfortunately for Akyem as a whole, relations
between Abuakwa and Kotoku do not seem to have been always
cordial. In the 1680s Barbot remarked that disunity
"rendered /the Akyem7 less formidable to their neighbours."^
Bosman must have been alluding to the same disunity at the
beginning of the eighteenth century when he noted that the
Akwamu knew "how, by fair words and presents, to sow„2l
dissensions betwixt the governing men of Akim. Barbot and 
Bosman may have been referring to differences between the
1. Reindorf, History, p. 49.
2. See Chapter 2, p. 65 below.
3 . Quoted by Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 172.
4. Bosman, Description, p. 6 9.
Akyem Abuakwa and the Akyem Kotoku, considering that during
the first quarter of the eighteenth century disagreements
1
existed between these two Akyem states. It is not certain
what the sources of the differences were. Probably the
desire of each to dominate the other was one of them; even
to this day, the Abuakwahene claims to be the Okyenhene i.e.
King of all Akyem. The differences, whatever the cause or
causes, weakened Akyem concerted action against its
2
neighbours during the eighteenth century.
By the end of the seventeenth century then Akyem 
Abuakwa and Akyem Kotoku had been founded. Like many other 
Akan states they were monarchical state systems. The one 
was sited roughly between the Pra and Birem, and the other 
between the Pra and Anuru. The ruling house of Abuakwa was 
of the Asona clan, and that of Kotoku of the Agona clan.
Each had already adopted a foreign policy geared towards the 
achievement of territorial expansion and the acquisition of 
wealth through trade, particularly the European trade on the 
Guinea coast. For among the commodities offered by the 
European merchants were firearms, a sure means of achieving 
military superiority. These policies necessarily meant a 
condition of continuous rivalry with neighbouring states 
like Akwamu and Asante which sought similar ends. Differences 
between the Akyem states themselves must also not be ruled 
out. Thus by the end of the seventeenth century almost all 
the factors which were to influence the history of the Akyem 
peoples for almost the next two hundred years were already 
present.




THE SEARCH FOR SUPREMACY AND SECURITY 
1700-1727
Commotion and a general sense of Insecurity were 
the hallmarks of the Akyem country during the eighteenth 
century.1 In the first ten years immigrants fleeing from 
enemies in Asante arrived to found Bosome. During the same 
period and the next seventeen years the older states, Abuakwa 
and Kotoku, engaged in a search for political supremacy over 
their neighbours and avenues to increase their material well­
being through trade. At any rate they were determined not to 
fall victim to neighbours pursuing a similar policy. 
Consequently alliances were as often and conveniently 
contracted as they were rejected. The various peoples of the
Gold Coast were participants, as it were, in an inter-state
2
game of supremacy and survival of the fittest. For Abuakwa 
and Kotoku the period as a whole was one of unfulfilled hopes.
The number of organized states in Akyem increased 
from two to three during the first ten years of the eighteenth 
century when the Bosome state was founded in Western Akyem.
The founders were immigrants from Boaman, a small state in 
the lacustrine district around Lake Bosomtwe in Southern Asante.
1. Compare with Ward's assertion that this century as well as 
the seventeenth saw great instability, movement, flux and 
change in the Gold Coast. Cf. A History of Ghana (1967 ed.) 
p. 104.
2. Others have studied this period and almost the same events 
from different angles. See for example I. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, 
and in THSG. Vol. Ill Part 2; Daaku, Trade and Politics, 
Chapter VII; Fynn, Asante Chapters Two and Three; Kwamena- 
Poh, Government & Politics Chapter One.
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The background of the migration from Boaman to
Western Akyem was conflict between the inhabitants of Boaman
and Kumasi, the foremost state in the Asante Union (or
confederation) formed during the last years of the seventeenth
century. The people of Boaman supported Denkyera and
suffered a defeat at the hands of Asante in 1701. 1 In spite
of defeat, Boaman continued to assist Denkyera in guerrilla
warfare against Asante. Clan affinity may have been a reason
for the Boaman support for Denkyera because the ruling lineages
of both were of the Agona abusua. Preservation of its
independence was probably another reason, since Boaman was a
2
small but ambitious state. At any rate its inhabitants 
were in the habit of infesting trade routes with a view to
■3
raiding and robbing traders and travellers plying the routes.
To put an end to their acts of banditry and predatoriness,
Asantehene Osei Tutu, in or around 1706, organized an armed
expedition against Ntow Kroko, the Boamanhene, and his
subjects. Ntow was defeated and, to escape further
punishment, migrated with some of his subjects to Western
4
Akyem where he founded a new state and called it Bosome.
1. Wilks, in Ajayi & Crowder, History of West Africa,
Vol. One, p. 374.
2. Ibid.
3 . Wilks, in Ajayi & Crowder, History of West Africa,
Vol. One, p. 374.
4. Elmina Journal, Letter from Landman, 11 April 1707 cited 
by I. Wilks, ”The Mossi and Akan States, 1500-1800, in 
Ajayi & Crowder (ed.), History of West Africa, Vol. I, 
p. 374. A. A. Kyerematen, Ashanti Royal Regalia: Their 
History and Functions” (Ph.D. Thesis, Oxford 1966),
pp. 219-22 1.
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The migration to western Akyem apparently did not
win the approval of all sections of Boaman society. Some
members of the ruling lineage and the subjects remained in
Asante till the 1818-1825 period when yet another clash with
Kumasi forced them to migrate, again to Western Akyem, to
join their kinsmen already settled there. 1
Until the l820s Akyem Bosome appears to have
remained a backwater to Akyem politics in particular and the
Gold Coast in general. Virtually nothing is heard of it
until the crisis of the nineteenth century. Even in that
century Bosome, from the point of view of European observers,
did not draw much attention until about i860 when it was
2
engulfed in a conflict between Abuakwa and Kotoku.
Before the nineteenth century, cordiality and 
co-operation on the whole dominated Abuakwa-Kotoku relations. 
Both seem to have reached a consensus as to what the 
objectives of their foreign policy should be; namely 
acquisition of imperial domination over neighbours (or at 
worst the preservation of Akyem territorial integrity and 
political independence), as well as a full uninterrupted 
Akyem participation in the European trade on the coast.
Which of these objectives was to be given priority was, 
however, the issue on which they never seem to have come to 
agreement throughout the first twenty-seven years of the 
eighteenth century.
Two Kotoku Kings and one Abuakwa monarch reigned 
during that period. For Kotoku they were Apenten and Frimpon 
Manso. Frimponfs reign actually went beyond 1727* It is not
1. See Chapter 5# P«193 below.
2. See Chapter 1, p . b e l o w .
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certain when Apenten ascended the Kotoku stool. European
traders on the coast noted that he was Kotokuhene in 17151
2
and recorded his death in 1717* Reindorf says the King of
Asante-Akyem (i.e. the Kotokuhene) in 1702 was called
Ofosuhene Apenten, adding that this Kotoku King was taken
■3
prisoner in a war with Asante. Contemporary records show 
that an Akyem Chief of the name of Apenten was killed in a 
war with Asante in 1717• It is therefore reasonable to 
conclude that Apenten of the contemporary records and 
Ofosuhene Apenten of Reindorf are most probably one and the 
same person.
Contemporary to Apenten was Abuakwahene Ofori.^
The exact date of his accession to the Abuakwa stool is not 
clear. His name, however, appears, apparently for the first 
time, in European records in 1704. In that year the Dutch 
traders on the coast sent him gifts which included guns and 
gun-powder as well as a scarlet cloth. Perhaps the presents
1. Doutreleau (Accra) to Director-General H.H. Haring (Elraina 
Castle (EC), 10 October 1715, NBKG, 82.
2. Cf. p. 68 below.
5 . Reindorf, History, pp. 65-6 6.
4. See note 2, above.
5 . Reindorf says Kuntunkurunku was the Abuakwahene at the time 
of Ofosuhene Apenten, cf. Reindorf, History, pp. 65-6 . 
Though generally an intelligent writer, it seems that 
Reindorf was confused as to who the Abuakwa rulers were in 
the early 18th century. On p. 3^8 he fixes Kuntunkurunku1 s 
reign in the l6th century.
6 . Director-General William de la Palma (EC) to Holland,
9 April 1704, cited by Fynn, “Akyem Abuakwa Kings", 
p. 2, n. 3 .
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symbolised Dutch congratulations to him on his enstoolment.
In any case available evidence (documentary and traditional) 
marks him out as being completely different from the Abuakwa­
hene who in 1702 was described as ,fyoung and betraying but too 
palpable signs of a cruel nature,” to the extent that part of 
the government of the chiefdom was taken away from him.1 
Probably this chief was deposed altogether in or about 1704
and Ofori put on the Abuakwa stool. Ofori of the records is
2
most probably the same as the Ofori Panin whom tradition 
remembers so much.^ Ofori (Panin) died in 1727 .^
Up to 1727 Ofori pursued a dynamic foreign policy.
He was, or was made to appear, aggressive to many of his 
neighbours, especially Agona, Fante, Assin, Gomoa, and above 
all Akwamu. His aim was two-fold: he was determined to achieve 
imperial domination over these neighbours and to share fully 
in the European trade on the coast. His Kotoku counterpart, 
Apenten, espoused similar objectives and generally showed 
willingness to co-operate with Ofori in realising these 
objectives. But in 1727 when Ofori died, neither Abuakwa 
nor Kotoku had attained to these goals.
1. Bosman, Description, p. 7 8.
2. The term 1 Panin1 in Akan means ‘The Elder’ as against 
*Kuma‘ i.e“ rThe Younger*. Panin is used to distinguish 
this Ofori from another Ofori (Kuma), an Abuakwa Prince 
who is generally remembered by tradition as the founder of 
the Akuapem state. Cf. Chapter 3 P* below.
3. See Chapter 1, p. 12 above.
4. Cf. p. 78 below.
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The fundamental cause of the failure of these two 
Akyem states to achieve their avowed objectives was 
disagreement between them regarding priorities in their 
programme. They had to choose between ensuring territorial 
security to their kingdoms and a quick achievement of imperial 
as well as economic greatness. The circumstances of the time 
and place did not allow them to pursue, with competence, all 
their objectives at the same time. Relations between them 
and neighbours during the first twenty-seven years of the 
eighteenth century show that they never on a single occasion 
reached a full agreement on this issue. Bosman was probably 
alluding to this disagreement in 1702 when he said the 
Akwamu for instance knew f,how by fair words and presents to 
sow dissensions betwixt the governing men of Akim.1,1 And in 
the l680s Barbot had said that disunity in the Akyem country
n
"rendered it less formidable to their neighbours."
Relations between Abuakwa and Kotoku on the one hand and 
their southern neighbours on the other fully justify both 
assertions.
What basically vitiated the concerted effort of 
Abuakwa and Kotoku was the difference in their geographical 
positions in relation to their neighbours. Located in 
southern Akyem, Abuakwa had comparatively weaker neighbours. 
Among these were Assin, Agona, Fante and Akwamu. In contrast 
Kotoku, situate in northern Akyem, had the rising power of 
Asante for a neighbour. Thus while Abuakwa thought the
1. Bosman, Description, p. 6 9.
2. Quoted by Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 172.
southern neighbours should be defeated in order to achieve
imperial domination over them as well as gain an uninterrupted
access to the coast trade, Kotoku was basically concerned
with protecting and preserving its very independence and
identity against Asante. This was the dilemma in the overall
Akyem foreign policy.
Right from the beginning of the eighteenth century
Abuakwa showed hostility towards Akwamu. Between 1699 and
1700 there were constant reports on the coast of Akyem
(Abuakwa) attacks or impending attacks on Akwamu.1 The
general opinion on the coast was that the Akyem Abuakwa
hostility was to compel Akwamu to pay a debt it owed to the
Abuakwa court. The Danes reckoned the amount involved to be
0
about 3*000 oz. of gold.
There are three different views as to how Akwamu
contracted the Akyem debt. One view suggests that the debt
was an annual tribute which Akwamu was obliged to pay to the
Akyem (Abuakwa Court) because the Abuakwa "pretended a feudal
right over" the Akwamu; the pretension raised differences
between the two because
"the Aquamboans will by no means submit to as
knowing very well that a concession of that nature 
may in time cost them their whole country".^
The second view is that the debt was in connection with a
compensation payable by Akwamu to the Abuakwa Court in a
1. CCO Day Journal, entry, 10 October, 1699* Vgk, cited by 
Fynn, Asante, p. 23 n. 6; Minutes of Council Meeting (EC), 
23rd February 1700, WIC 124.
2. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 64.
3 . Bosman, Description, p. 69; cf. also Barbot, in Churchill,
p. 182.
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marriage arrangement, which had apparently fallen through.1
The third and most recent opinion is that the debt resulted
from a loan which the Banso Court had given to Akwamuhene
Ansa Sasraku in 1677 when the Akwamu were about to go to war
against the Ga; Ansa died without paying the loan and so
2
bequeathed the liability to his successors. Of all these
views, Romer*s seems the least plausible. Neither Akwamu nor
Abuakwa recall a marriage between the two courts. Rather
there was one between Akwamu and Kotoku in the second decade
•3
of the eighteenth century. Romer was on the coast during
the 1730s, and may have been told of this marriage. Writing
in 1765* almost twenty-five years after his residence at
Christianborg Castle, he may have mistaken Kotoku for Abuakwa.
The view held by Barbot and Bosman also does not lend itself
to easy acceptance without misgivings: it raises the issue as
to when Akyem Abuakwa imposed its overlordship on Akwamu.
Available evidence does not suggest any Abuakwa conquest of
Akwamu during the seventeenth century to warrant feudal
relationship between the two. The loan theory is most
acceptable. In March 1700 Rohart thus commented on the Akyem- 
Akwamu conflict:
"The disruption of the trade at Accra has its 
origins in the claims the Akim Negroes pretend to 
have on the Aquamboes concerning gold and men 
supplied by them some time ago to the Aauamboe 
King called Ahinsang /i.e. Ansa Sasraku/ to help 
him defeat the Accra negroes.”
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 105.
2. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, pp. 9-10*
3 . See pp. 52 & 60 below.
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Rohart then goes on to say how the Akyem kept on extracting
monies from the Akwamu rulers even though the latter had
made several payments to the former in relation to the loan, 1
Apparently the Akwamu had merely been servicing the loan.
Hence the Akyem pressure on them to pay it.
Rivalry in trade was another source of friction.
In the 1700-1703 period Akwamu blockaded the trade routes
2against Akyem trade to and from the Ga coast. This ban
appears to have been very effective because it required Dutch
intercession with the Akwamuhene to get it lifted. Writing
in 1709 Sir Dalby Thomas at Cape Coast Castle said:
"Akim is a rich country /which/ lies mostly on 
the backside of the Quamboe country and Unguine 
^Tgona/ and are hindered by them from making trade 
they would do."^
In the first fourteen years of the century there 
was continual rumour of impending Akyem Abuakwa attack on 
Akwamu. Perhaps the Akyem aim was partly to gain an 
uninterrupted access to the coast trade. But it seems to 
have been all barking and no biting on the part of Abuakwa. 
The British in 1705 longed for the day the Akyem would 
actually descend "on the young and hair-brained king of 
Quamboe;" that, they said, would be "the best thing done on 
the coast for several y e a r s . I n  1706 the Dutch expressed
1. Rohart at Council Meeting (EC), 10 March 1700, WIC 124.
2. Day-Journal (CCO) entry, 21 May 1700 (Vgk 121); Minutes of 
Council Meeting (EC), 10 March 1700, WIC 124;-EC Journal, 
entry, 3 April 1703> NBKG 9 8.
3 . Daaku, Trade & Politics pp. 171-2.
4. Dalby Thomas (CCC) to the Royal African Company (RAC),
26 Nov. 1709, T70/175.
5 . Abstract of Letters from Cape Coast to RAC, 1 Jan. 1705 
T70/1184/4, quoted by Daaku, Trade and Politics, p. 172.
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similar sentiments, on hearing of an impending Akyem attack 
on Akwamu.1 But Abuakwa failed to convert threats to action.
Lack of allied assistance from Kotoku appears to
explain Abuakwa1s failure. Kotoku had two major reasons for
not co-operating with Abuakwa in the hostility against
Akwamu. These were marriage ties with Akwamu and tension
with Asante. As already pointed out, one of Apenten’s wives
was an Akwamu princess. Perhaps she was one of the 'gifts*
and ’fair words’ with which Akwamu succeeded in creating
differences among Akyem leaders spoken of by Bosman in 1702.
The marriage was bound to nullify any talk of Abuakwa-Kotoku
concerted action against Akwamu. Among the Akan, as among
others in the Gold Coast and elsewhere in Africa, marriage
was regarded as a bond between not only the two individuals
involved but also the families, towns and even states (in the
case of royal marriages) of the man and woman. That the
marriage ties were a barrier to Abuakwa-Kotoku co-operation
against Akwamu is proved by what happened in 1715• In that
year Apenten divorced his Akwamu wife, and immediately after,
2
there was an Abuakwa-Kotoku concerted move to attack Akwamu. 
The move adversely affected trade. Trade in the Ga area was 
no longer ”as voluminous as it used to be, which is caused by 
/the fact that/ Quamboes and Agonnas are on the alert1’ against 
the Akyem states.^ The Dutch gave 24th December 1715 as the 
zero hour of the expected attack of the Akyem on either Akwamu 
or any one of the southern states such as Agona. But at this
1. Peter Nuij (Accra) to Amsterdam, 24 June 1706 (WIC 115)•
2. Van Dyke (Accra) to Haring (EC), 26 December 1715*
3 . Van Dyke to Haring, 26 Dec. 1715J also Hendrix (Apam) to 
Haring, 3 Dec.; E.C. Journal, entry, 5 Dec. 1715* NBKG 82; 
E.C. Journal, entry, 5 Jan. 1716; ’Abren’ (Senya Breku) to 
Haring, 8 Jan.; Hendrix (Apam) to Haring, 15 & 30 January 
1716, NBKG 82.
crucial moment, tension between Kotoku and Asante1 obliged
the suspension of the southern venture till about 1729 when
2
it was taken up again.
Concurrent with the tension with Akwamu, were 
Abuakwa’s strained relations with other neighbours such as 
Agona and Akanny. There are conflicting views regarding the
■3
identity of Akanny. It is sometimes identified with Adanse,
4
at others with Assin. The second view seems more acceptable.
Until the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century
the Assin inhabited the territory between River Pra and the
Twisa section of the Adanse hills. It is therefore easy to
confuse them with Adanse.
In the nineteenth century Assin was divided into
two principalities. These were Apemanim and Atannoso.
Perhaps the division dated further back to the eighteenth
century. Whatever was the arrangement regarding Assinfs
political map, Abuakwa under Ofori threatened to, or did,
c;
attack it in the first half of 1715- A fundamental cause 
of the Akyem hostility appears to have been Assin’s friend­
ship with Asante, an enemy of the Akyem states, particularly 
Kotoku.^ It has also been suggested that a clash of
1. This theme is fully discussed on pp. 66-78 below.
2. Cf. Chapter 3pp79f below.
3 . Macdonald, The Gold Coast, p. 104; cf. also Fage’s note on 
Akanny in Bosman, (I967 ed.), p. 522.
4. Boahen, Topics, p. 62.
5. Zelot (Accra) to Haring, Director-General (EC) 17 & 30 
March; Van Visbeck (Kormantse) to Haring, 19 April; E.C. 
Diary, entry, 20 April; Henderix (Apam) to Haring, 19 June 
1715, NBKG 82.
6 . Fynn, Asante, p. 45.
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economic interests and bickerings characteristic of
neighbours were another set of causes.'1' What detracts from
the second suggestion is that it is based on the evidence of
0. Dapper in the middle years of the seventeenth century.
Times and situations had naturally changed by 1715•
Admittedly trade continued to be a source of inter-state
friction, but as regards Akyem-Assin (Akanny) relations
there seems to have been a weightier reason which, in the
light of available evidence, cannot be identified at present.
Perhaps Abuakwa's political and territorial ambitions were
the cause. Akwamu for example was so worried about this
aspect of Abuakwa foreign policy that she is said to have
2
fortified some sections of her border with Akyem.
Whatever may have been the cause, or causes, of 
the Akyem aggression, Assin (Akanny) admitted its inability 
to stand alone against the arms of Abuakwa and Kotoku by 
appealing to the Fante for assistance and protection.
The appeal to Fante seriously affected Ofori's war 
plans on Akanny because of the seemingly military strength of 
Fante. Up to about the end of the seventeenth century the 
Fante were inclined to be divided into many states, some of 
them not larger than a single town. These were individualistic
ii
in attitude and warred among themselves. By the first twenty
1. Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 16 9.
2. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, p. 22.
5 . Jan van Visbeek (Kormantse) to Haring, 20 August 1715* 
NBKG 82.
A. Margaret Priestley, ”The Ashanti Question and the British: 
Eighteenth Century Origins”, in J.A.H. Vol. 2 (1961), 
p. y? n. 9*
years of the eighteenth century, however, they had achieved
considerable unity by forming themselves into a kind of
confederation.1 This gave them a semblance of formidability.
This point, however, must not be overemphasized. The old
elements of disunity and internal bickerings were still
prevalent to some degree. What happened after the Akanny
appeal illustrates this view. They were all agreed that a
general meeting was required to consider the appeal from
Akanny. But they could not readily agree on where to
assemble. A Dutch report said
wthe Caboceers of Abrah summoned the Braffo to 
them, saying that they constituted the most 
powerful Fantyn and therefore the meeting must 
be held there .2
■3
The Braffo may well have been based at Mankesirrr at that 
time. Abora and Mankesim were thus vieing for political 
leadership in Fante. The Akanny request provided an occasion 
for this internal struggle for power in Fante to come into 
the open. For some time the Fante quarrelled over the venue 
for the meeting. Eventually the choice fell on Abora.
As soon as the debate on the venue was settled the 
Fante worked with purpose and alacrity. The confederation
1. S. Tenkorang, British Slave Trading Activities in the 
Gold and Slave Coasts and their Impact on African Society 
M.A. Thesis, (London 1864, Unpublished) pp. 145-7*
2. J. Van Visbeek (Kormantse) to Haring (EC), 20 August 1715* 
NBKG 82. Caboceer = Chief, Abrah = Abora, and Braffo was 
the title of the Commander-in-Chief of all Fante forces.
3. Mankesim was at least initially the religious capital 
of the Fante. Since among the Akan, religion played a 
part in war preparations, Mankesim could be a fitting 
place for the Braffo to reside.
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decided to help Akanny against Abuakwa, because, as they put
it, "if the Akannists were defeated, they /the Pante7 would
not go free".1
Ofori1s aggression had thus brought upon him war
with Fante. This additional hazard he sought to avert by
diplomacy. He sent an official embassy to tell the Fante
Confederacy meeting at Abora that Abuakwa had no war with
Fante; therefore Fante should not go to the aid of his
enemy. But if the Fante insisted on helping Akanny, they
would be doing so at the risk of an Abuakwa invasion of
2
their country. This threat annoyed the Fante. Their reply 
was terse and unequivocal: they informed the Abuakwa that 
the Fante
"and the Akannist were, and are still, one; if
the Akims  wanted to come and fight, they
^ante & Assin/ will welcome them."^
The Fante fortitude frightened Ofori, but not to
the extent of making him give up the Akanny venture. As a
counter to the Akanny-Fante alliance, a military co-operation
with Agona looked like a fine proposition, owing to Agona*s
geographical position in relation to Fante as well as Assin.
Agona was a neighbour to the south-west. By virtue of this
position Agona was also a neighbour of Akanny to the north
of it and of Fante to the west. An Abuakwa-Agona alliance
would thus be a thorn in the side of both Akanny and Fante.
Such an alliance might possibly force the Fante to reconsider
1. Van Visbeek’s Report of 20 August 1715.
2. Ibid.
J>. Van Visbeek's Report, 20 August 1715* NBKG 82.
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their relations with Akanny. Ofori therefore turned to 
Agona.
This country, like Akyem, seems to have divided
into two sections, each independent of the other. Nsaba was
probably the capital of the more southerly section, though
Agona Swedru appears to have been its chief commercial
centre. The more northerly Agona had its capital at
Nyarkrom. The King of Nyarkrom in early eighteenth century
was Nyarko Eku (Nyarko Ako as Reindorff calls him.)^  Nyarko
Eku seems to have been the most powerful of all the Agona
chiefs. In June 1715 “Akim Caboceer Afory /ptovl/ sent to
the said Jacconcoe /Nyarko Eku/ an empty bowl with the
promise to present it to him full of gold if he would join
him Afory against Acanists and Acrons.” The Abuakwahene was
clearly using Akyem gold and Acron to entice Agona into an
offensive alliance. Acron was no other country than Gomoa.
The records do not show that Ofori was at variance with
Gomoa at this time. But it was probably in this period that
there were differences between Nyarko Eku and Gomoa. Hence
Ofori*s proposition of an Abuakwa-Agona (Nyarkrom) attack on
Gomoa. It is even said that Akyem (Abuakwa) did actually sign
k
a treaty with Nyarko Eku.
Ofori had been too slow in making this diplomatic 
move. Confederate Fante was already an ally of Agona 
(Nyarkrom). Neither Akyem gold nor a joint attack on Gomoa
1. Reindorf, History, p. 6 3.
2. Hendrix (Apam) to Haring (EC), 6 June 1715* NBKG 82.
3 . Reindorf, History, pp. 62-65.
4. Fynn, Asante p. 46. The present author finds this doubtful, 
in view of Eku*s relations with Fante at that time. Cf below.
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could make Nyarko shift alliances. For to make sure 
that Nyarko Eku kept faith with them, the Fante had taken 
securities from Nyarkrom in the form of hostages who included 
Nyarko*s own son.1 Consequently in reply to the Abuakwa 
proposal, the Nyarkromhene said he was already committed to 
the Fante; besides, he even feared that in his hour of success
2
against Fante and Akanny, Ofori might turn on Nyarkrom itself.
The Nyarkrom stand contrasted with that of Agona- 
Nsaba. Swedru, as already stated, was the most important 
commercial town of this section of Agona. The commercial 
man’s desire for business and profits led Agona Swedru to 
contract a trade pact not only with Ofori of Abuakwa but also 
Apenten of Kotoku. In May 1715 it was known at Senya Breku 
that the
"Agonna large crom Soedoe /had taken/ oath with 
Caboceer Afory and Caboceer Apenten that they will 
not close the /trade/ routes, nor start any quarrel 
with Akim traders, but will sell to the Akims as 
much /gun-/ powder and /as many/ guns as the Akims
required. ^
The Dutch, and obviously the inhabitants of Agona Swedru,
enthused after the signing of the pact, because soon after it,
large numbers of Akyem traders arrived on the Simpa (Winneba) -
Senya Breku coast, bringing with them large quantities of
4gold to purchase arms and ammunition. But the advantages
1. Hendrix (Apam) to Haring (EC), 6 June 1715, MBKG 82.
2. Ibid.
3. Boerhaven (Senya Breku) to Haring (EC), 28 May 1715, NBKG 
82; cf also Hendrix (Apam) to Haring, 6 June 1715, NBKG 82. 
Crom or Kuro is Akan word for town.
4. Boerhaven to Haring, 28 May 1715, NBKG82.
of the pact were not one-sided. To the Akyem the greater
significance of the pact with Swedru lay in the alternative
access, vis-a-vis the Akwamu route, to the coast trade
which it gave them; it rendered the Akwamu blockade of
Akyem communication with the Ga coast ineffective.
Nyanoase, the Akwamu capital, may have
anticipated the Akyem diplomatic and trade move in Swedru
and found it a useful indicator to impending Akyem
bellicosity. For by March 1715 Akwamu too had joined the
Fante alliance. 1 Nyarko Eku of Nyarkrom had of course been
anticipating Akyem hostility. He too sought to strengthen
the Fante alliance by increasing its membership. By early
1716 it was known that he had composed his differences with
Acron (Gomoa) and had helped Gomoa to gain membership to the 
2Fante alliance. Of course a revelation of the Abuakwa
hostile proposals to Gomoa would be enough to drive Gomoa
too to join the alliance. Thus by the end of 1715 Ofori1s
aggressive foreign policy had raised a hornet’s nest in the
south. Akanny, (Assin), Confederate Fante, Agona (Nyarkrom,
eventually joined by Nsaba-Agona), Akwamu and Gomoa had all
formed one big alliance against Abuakwa. Could Abuakwa cope
with it? Certainly not. The Dutch for instance had no doubt
about this. They commented that even though Akim was
"great and powerful ..... the Fantyn, Accanists,
Acron, Agonna and Quamboes are no less, besides 
these districts are so vast that it will be 
impossible /for Akyem7 to fight them all at once,
1. Zelst (Accra) to Haring, 17 & 50 March 1715* NBKG 82.
2. Van Dyke (Accra) to Haring, 8 March 1716, NBKG 8 5.
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especially when Akira have no more allies
than the Cabes Terras and Adorns who have nothing 
to boast of but the mere existence of their
name ..... and the Juffer who, with the Warsaw
are expected to join the Ashantyns against 
Aoweens .....
Worse for Abuakwa was the difference in opinion bet­
ween her and Kotoku. The joint trade agreement contracted with 
Agona Swedru in May 1715 suggests that Abuakwa and Kotoku 
were now coming together. The Asante were campaigning in 
Aowin, far away in south-western Gold Coast. This obviously 
had given Kotokuhene Apenten a chance to turn his attention 
to matters in the south. The only barrier to an Abuakwa- 
Kotoku alliance was therefore Apentenfs marital links with
the Akwamu royal house. In late 1715# however, he divorced
2
his Akwamu wife. The event convinced Europeans on the coast 
that Akyem was now ready for a war against Akwamu or any of 
the southern states. The Dutch for instance said the 
impending attack of the Akyem would take place as from 
24th December.-^
The expected Akyem invasion, however, did not take 
place, apparently because Kotoku suddenly withdrew from the 
venture. The cause of the Kotoku withdrawal was tension with 
Asante. While the Southern Question continued to attract 
Abuakwa as a light draws a moth, the Northern problem, namely
1. Haring (EC) to Doutreleau (Accra), 5 November 1715 
(NBKG 82) Cabes Terra, according-to Bosman (p. 77) was a 
state, perhaps very small, between Akanny and Asebu.
*Adorns* were the Etsii. 'Jufferf i.e. Twifo; the 
Warsaws were Wassa; and Aoween were the Aowin.
2. Van Dyke (Accra) to Haring (EG), 26 December 1715# NBKG. 82.
3. Ibid.
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relations with Asante, pre-occupied Kotoku. This 
difference cropped up in 1715 to nullify the joint 
Abuakwa-Kotoku venture to the south. 1 Up to the end of 
December 1715 when the projected Akyem invasion of either 
Akwamu or Agona had not taken place, the coastal peoples 
began to speculate that there might have been, or there was 
going to be, a negotiated peace settlement between the Akyem
p
states and their southern neighbours. The speculation 
turned out to be correct. Left in the lurch, as it were, 
by Apenten of Kotoku, Ofori of Abuakwa could not go ahead 
confidently with the projected invasion of the south. And 
so he tried to settle his differences with Akwamu and Agona 
through negotiation. He is believed to have given Akwamu 
200 bendas of gold £1,600.00) as a peace price.^ This 
enabled Akyem traders to pass through Akwamu to the forts 
and castles on the Ga (Accra) coast to trade. But when he 
approached Agona with a similar peace proposal he met with 
a rebuff. The uncompromising attitude of Agona is capable 
of two possible explanations. The first is that Abuakwa 
refused to meet the demands Agona put forward as pre-
_ lL
conditions e.g. payment of £800. It is, however, possible 
that the Agona themselves were just not willing to come to 
peace terms with Ofori: for there is a suggestion, which may 
well be correct, that Agona was at this time flirting with
1. See pp. 67f. below.
2. Van Dyke (Accra) to Haring (EC), 31 December 1715>
NBKG 82.
3. Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 174. 1 benda = £8.00. But
see the figure he gives on p. 34.
4. Daaku, op. cit., p. 34.
Asante."^ Friendship with Asante would of course encourage 
Agona to adopt an uncompromising attitude towards the 
Akyem.
In the end Agona nearly paid dearly for its
intransigence. Ofori was furious with Agona. Though an
2
impending Kotoku-Asante war rendered his northern borders
very unsafe, in early 1716 he took the risk of invading Agona
•3
without any allied support. The Abuakwa attack on Agona 
brought trade to a standstill. Ironically some of the 
Europeans on the coast, especially the Dutch, were happy with 
this development. This was as to be expected. The Dutch had 
all along been looking forward to seeing such an Akyem 
invasion of the south. In fact the Dutch went one step 
further to increase the chances of Akyem success. The 
Akwamu Resident Commissioner for the Ga Province was Prince 
Amo, a member of the Akwamu royal house. Amo had his head­
quarters at 1 Dutch* Accra. The Akwamuhene sent him orders to 
raise a Ga contingent to join the Akwamu army that was about 
to go to the assistance of Agona. On hearing about the 
message from Akwamu the Dutch threatened that they would hand 
Amo over to the Akyem in the event of Akyem victoiy in the
2l
impending war. As a result of this threat Amo refused to 
raise the Ga contingent requested by the Akwamuhene.
1. Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 174.
2. See p. 65 below.
3 . Van Dyke (Accra) to Haring (EC), 8 March; EC Diary entry,
10 March 1716 (NBKG 82).
4. Van Dyke (Accra) to EC, 13 March 1716 (NBKG 82).
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The intention of the Akwamuhene to go and help 
Agona shows that the 200 bendas of gold gift from Abuakwa 
had failed to influence him to side with Akyem, unless of 
course the gift was meant only to purchase for the Akyem a 
free passage through Akwamu to the trade on the Ga coast.
The entire southern alliance prepared to go to the 
help of Agona.^ Then suddenly the Abuakwa invading army 
withdrew from Agona soil. Dutch reaction to the news of 
withdrawal was one of utter disbelief. They described it
p
as "very disgraceful and shameful." The truth was that
they were completely disappointed in the Akyem states. And
well they might be, in view of their strong moral support
for the Akyem. Besides, withdrawal meant the continuance
of the southern blockade of the trade routes against the
Akyem gold trade, which an Akyem victory would have allowed
to flow smoothly to the coast. The blocking of the trade
routes, the suspense, and the atmosphere of expectancy would
all prevent the southern states themselves from paying any
serious attention to trade because they would be on the
alert to defend their borders. Trade would thus be the
loser. This, was exactly what happened. The southern states
3
tightened the economic sanction against Abuakwa and Kotoku. 
And in the eastern sector of the coast, trade without the
1. Van Naerssen (Senya Breku) to E.C., 10 March 1716 
(NBKG 82).
2. Van Naerssen to Hendrix (Apam), 25 March; cf. also 
Hendrix to EC, 26 March; EC Diary, entry, 1 April 1716 
(NBKG 82).
3. EC Diary, entries, 10 March & 2 June 1716, NBKG 82;
Snoek (Accra) to EC. 25 August, 26 September & 9 October 
1716; Hendrix (Apam) to EC 19 December; EC Diary, entry, 
23 December 1716, NBKG 8 3.
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Akyem states was deprived of a major element. It is not
surprising that in December 1716 the Dutch complained
bitterly that rlif the Akims had attacked with gain or loss,
an agreement /among the states/ would have been reached.
But now the prospects are remote. 1*1 To Hendrix at Apam,
this was all the more damaging to trade because **Akim is
the fountain from which the trade in gold flows into these
countries /i.e. the coast states/ . * * 2
There were conflicting views at the time as to
reasons for the sudden and unexpected withdrawal of the
Abuakwa invading army. The Fante claimed that their
alliance with Agona had frightened away the Abuakwa
invaders. The weakness of the Fante claim is that it
suggests that Abuakwa was unaware of the possibility of
Fante aid to Agona. This was not the case. The second
view was held by some of the Dutch. They contended that
the withdrawal was to enable the Abuakwa to attend to their 
4farming. This view has something to commend it. But it is 
significant to point out that many wars in the Gold Coast, 
some involving Abuakwa, are known to have been fought in 
the farming season, which generally started from late 
February to May. For example, the Akyem-Asante war of 1742 
was fought in the farming season.^ The third view, also
1. Hendrix to EC, 19 December 1716, NBKG 8 3•
2. Ibid.
3 . Van Naerssen (Senya Breku) to EC, 25 March 1716, NBKG 82.
4. Hendrix to EC, 6 & 10 April 1716, NBKG 82; cf also Daaku, 
Trade & Politics, p. 175*
5. See Chapter 3> PP« H4f below.
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advanced by another section of the Dutch, was that pressure
from Asante necessitated the sudden withdrawal.^ This was
the most accurate view. During the period between October
and December 1715 reports reaching the coast said that
2
Kotoku was threatening Asante with an attack. By early
1716 aggression had passed from Oda to Kumasi. Instead of
waiting for Apenten to attack him, Osei Tutu decided to
carry the war to his adversary. As soon as his army returned
from the campaign in Aowin, the Asantehene ordered the
invasion of Kotoku. Of course an invasion of Kotoku was
also a threat to Abuakwa. Ofori might have a different
opinion regarding priorities in the over-all foreign policy
of Akyem, but a war in Kotoku could easily spill into his
territory. The sudden withdrawal of his army from Agona
was to enable him to re-deploy it in defence of his northern
borders, by joining Kotoku against Asante.
The tension between Kotoku and Asante dated back
to the very beginning of the.eighteenth century. By the
beginning of that century, Kotoku was as hostile to Asante
as Abuakwa was to Akwamu. In 1701 Akyem (Kotoku) assisted
■3
Denkyera in a war against Asante. Kotoku and Denkyera 
suffered a defeat at the hands of Asante. Bosman, on the 
coast, was informed that ,rof the Negroes of Akim only who 
came to the assistance of Denkirans there were about 30*000
1. Butler (Axim) to EC, 13 December 1715; Haring to Holland, 
15 December 1715* NBKG 82; cf also Daaku, Trade & Politics 
p. 175.
2. See p. 67 below.
3. This war is traditionally known as the Peyiase War. The 
war is well documented in the general histories and Pynn*s 
recent study on Asante.
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killed, besides a great Caboceer of Akim with all his men
were cut off. ”1
In spite of their defeat and the heavy losses in
men, the Kotoku were never forgiven for allying with
Denkyera. During the Peyiase war, Denkyera had been the
aggressor. Alliance with Denkyera therefore meant Kotoku
aggression against Asante. Kumasi resolved to punish Kotoku
further for the alliance with Denkyera. This seems to
explain, partly at least, why after 1701 Asante war-mongers
demanded total war with Kotoku. In or about 1702 Akyem
(Kotoku) was attacked directly by Asante and defeated, upon
which the Kotoku agreed to pay war indemnity of 2,000 bendas 
2
of gold. Before long, however, they repudiated both indemnity
and the implied vassalage to Kumasi. They continued to ally
with Denkyera. In 1712 for example it was known on the
coast that the two were allies.*^ Another cause of Asante*s
anger with Kotoku seems to have been that the Akyem Kotoku
also tried to defend others like Twifo against Asante. In
the same year of 1712 they leant both moral and material
4
support to Twifo in its conflict with Asante.
Probably there was a lull in the Kotoku-Asante 
tension between 1713 and late 1715* At least in 1715 the 
Asante army was campaigning in distant Aowin in south-western
1. Bosman, Description, p. 76 . Bosman felt the number given 
as Akyem losses may have been an exaggeration. For the 
significance of the war to Asante, see Fynn, Asante,
pp. 29-4-0.
2. Dupuis, op. cit. pp. 230-1; F. Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty: 
Ashanti (London 1921) pp. 22-3.
3. Haring (EC) to Amsterdam, 15 August 1712, WIC 101.
4. Fynn, Asante, p. 45.
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Gold Coast.’1' This suggests either a thaw in or suspension 
of the tension with Kotoku. The relaxation was, however, 
temporary. The absence of the Asante army from home implied 
a degree of an unprotected state in which Asante was.
Apenten seems to have decided to attack relatively weak 
Asante before its army could return from Aowin. Thus while 
during the first nine months of 1715» it was known on the 
coast that Ofori of Abuakwa was poised against Akwamu or 
Agona, some of the Europeans were also aware in the last 
quarter of 1715 that 11 Akim Caboceer Apintin is posing 
himself in a position to make war against the Zaay of 
Ashantys.” Haring, the Dutch Director-General, for 
example, expressed great surprise at the split in the Akyem 
objectives. But there it was. The Asante bogey had 
vitiated Abuakwa-Kotoku aggression against the southern and 
the coast states.
Osei Tutu reacted sharply to Apenten*s threat.
From Aowin he quickly recalled the army in order to redeploy 
it against perhaps the greatest of his enemies. In December 
1715 the Dutch at Axim noted that ”all the Ashantyns, Warsaws
  are on their way back home ^from Aowin7 at the urgent
request of the Zay who has summoned them very urgently, as 
the Akims ^/Kotoku/ are threatening him with a major war”.1'
1. Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 176; Fynn, Asante pp. 42-45*
2. Doutreleau (Accra) to Haring (EC), 10 October 1715 NBKG 
82. *Zaayf i.e. Osei (Tutu).
3. Haring to Doutreleau, 16 October 1715» NBKG, 82.
2. Butler (Axim) to Haring (EC), 13 December 1715» NBKG 82.
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For one reason or another the Akyem (Kotoku) - 
Asante war did not break out till 1717* It is possible that 
Apenten had not expected Asante to know of his hostile plans 
and react so quickly by recalling its army campaigning in 
Aowin. Hence his delay to attack. It is equally possible 
that each party spent the interval in getting allies, or 
at least to obtain the neutrality of other states. In fact 
there was an Akyem-Asante competition for alliance with 
Akwamu for example. 1
By 1717 aggression had passed from Apenten to 
Osei Tutu. In January that year information reaching the 
coast was that MThe Zaay of Ashanty has taken the field
p
against Akim ^Kotoku7 and Dinkiran".
By October 1717 the Akyem forces had inflicted
on Asante perhaps the greatest defeat^ it had ever suffered
or was to suffer. Among Asante losses were Osei Tutu
4
himself and the cream of Asante aristocracy. For Akyem it 
was a Pyrrhic victory: Kotokuhene Apenten lost his life.
But that did not radically detract from the Akyem victory.
1. Landman (Komenda) to EC, 13 January 1717* NBKG 84; cf 
also Johnson (CCC) to RAC, 26 May 1717* T70/6/48; Snoek 
(Accra) to EC, 29-May 1717* NBKG 84; Phipps to RAC,
25 September 1717* cited by Daaku, Trade & Politics, 
p. 176 n. 1 .
2. Van Alzen (Accra) to EC, 30 October; Letter from Apam,
5 November; EC Journal, entry, 7 November 1717* NBKG 84.
3. Van Alzen to EC, 30 October; Letter from Apam, 5 November; 
EC Journal, entry, 7 November 1717* NBKG 84.
4. Bowdich, A Mission, p. 233; Dupuis, A Residence,
pp. 231-2; Reindorf, History, pp. 66-7; Fuller, A Vanished 
Dynasty, p. 23; Fynn, Asante, pp. 48-50. Fynn discusses 
the conflicting views about the dating of Osei Tutufs 
death. The present author, in the light of his own 
researches, as demonstrated above, accepts Fynn’s 
conclusion that Osei Tutu died in 1717-
5 . Van Alzen’s Report, 30 October 1717*
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A number of factors contributed to this signal 
success of Akyem against the military might of Asante. The 
Asante themselves did much, though inadvertently, to contribute 
to the Akyem success. The Asante advance was relaxed and over­
confident. Asante tradition, as recorded by Bowdich and 
Dupuis more than a hundred years after the e/ent, recalls 
that Osei Tutu and the flower of the Asante aristocracy did 
not start off for the war front with the main army. He and 
his retinue tracked the army "at a leisurely pace". Moreover 
the Asante strategists had made no attempt to keep secret 
their proposed line of march. They confided their plans to 
the Akwamu who were supposed to have undertaken to direct 
the Asante army the best way to surprise the Akyem forces. 
According to Butler’s report,
"the Ashantees, depending on the friendship and 
alliance of the Aquamboe King, divided their 
forces to seek the supposed place of advantage 
which the Aquamboe King had chosen for them, but 
he in the meantime informed the Akims of it /the 
Asante move/."^
Excellent Akyem (Kotoku) sharp shooters stationed themselves
on the banks of the Pra near the village of Akromante or
Kormante, and there succeeded in assassinating Osei and
2
cutting down his retinue almost to a man.
Butler’s report implies a charge of treachery 
against Akwamu. It is therefore relevant to consider what
•3
must have obliged Akwamu to betray its traditional friend.
Though differences still existed between them, it 
appears that by February 1717 the Akyem states had reached
1. Butler to Van Naerssen, 3 November 1718, NBKG 8 5.
2. Asante tradition, as recorded by Bowdich, Mission, p. 233 
and Dupuis, A Residence, pp. 231-2 .
3 . Ward, History, p. 115«
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some kind of understanding with Akwamu. The passage of
Akyem traders through Akwamu territory to the Ga coast trade
suggests this: in that month, Prince Amo, the Akwamu
Resident Commissioner for Ga Province, led a group of Akyem
traders into Port Grevecoeur, and presumably other forts, to
purchase war stores. 1 Besides, Akwamuhene Akonno allowed the
Akyem states to send some of their women and children -
perhaps these were of the Akyem royal houses - to Akwamu for
2
asylum and protection. These were clear indications of some 
kind of an Akyem-Akwamu rapprochement. Thus there seems to 
have been a shift in Akwamu foreign policy in favour of the 
Akyem states against Asante. This would negate Butlerfs 
assertion of the existence of Asante-Akwamu friendship. But 
Butler's claim cannot be dismissed lightly, in view of the 
traditional friendship between Asante and Akwamu, starting 
from the time when Osei had not even ascended the Golden 
Stool. There is enough evidence to show that Akwamu had no 
intention of keeping faith with either party. There is the 
assertion that the treachery was Akwamu reply to Asante 
flirtation with Agona. This view is difficult to accept.
It does not tie in well with the common membership of Akwamu 
and Agona in the southern alliance. It can, of course, be 
argued that something must have happened between the end of 
1716 when the alliance still existed and October 1717 when the 
Akyem-Asante war took place.
There are two possible alternative and more plausible
1. Snoek (Accra) to EC, 23 February 1717* NBKG 84.
2. Van Alzen (Accra) to EC, 10 May 1718, NBKG 8 5.
3 . Daaku, Trade & Politics, p. 176.
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explanations to the Akwamu conduct. The first is the 
possibility that at long last Akonno allowed himself to be 
influenced by the 200 bendas of gold gift from Abuakwa 
in 1715*^ He may have even obtained more money, from the 
Akyem courts. Such 'gifts’ would secure Akyem’s southern 
borders while they were at war with Asante in the north.
Hence the courage the Akyem had in entrusting Akwamu with the 
protection of a section of Akyem citizens. The second possible 
explanation is Akwamu intentions to dupe both Asante and the 
Akyem states. This is suggested by the fact that Akonno
subsequently sold into slavery the Akyem refugees he had
2
undertaken to protect.
But all said and done Akyem war strategy and
military strength won the war for them. The philosophy of
their strategy would seem to have been to administer
surprises to achieve success. According to Van Alzen’s
report, already quoted extensively, the Akyem destroyed most
of their farms where the Asante invading army could have 
■5
foraged. Deprived of the source of adequate provisions, 
the invaders had relatively weak resistance to disease.
And diseases often broke out during or just after wars in 
the Gold Coast environment. Consequently when small-pox
4
broke out among them it took a heavy toll of their numbers.
Then there was the ambuscade. Its success in contriving the
1. See p. 61 above.
2. Van Alzen (Accra) to EC, 30 October 1717* NBKG 84.
3 . It was the practice of Akan armies in war front to find 
food in the territory of the enemy. Perhaps by now Asante 
had not evolved the practice of carrying ’Nkyewee’ (fried 
dried corn) in their havarsacks.
4. Van Alzen’s Report.
7 2 .
unexpected death of Osei Tutu administered a rude shock to
the Asante army, completely demoralising them to the extent
of making them decide to stop fighting at once and return
home. But when they
"were marching off, the enemies, the Akims ..... 
decided to pursue the fugitive army with energy.
They got into action  and victory went to
the Akims who did a great slaughter among their 
enemy.
The Akyem also were reported to have sustained considerable 
losses.^
All the same the Akyem victory had a great impact 
on the rest of the 'gold* coast. Akyem states and Asante 
were two political giants in the forest zone; both'also 
wielded considerable influence on the coast. This was 
because both were engaged in imperialistic provincial 
expansion with a southward orientation. States already 
defeated by Asante and reduced to vassalage, saw, in her 
defeat, an opportunity for rebellion and revenge. Among 
these were Aowin, Twifo and Wassa. As soon as these heard 
about the Akyem victory the Aowin and Wassa, for example, 
began to massacre all Asante subjects they could lay hands on 
in their territories.^ There were also rumours, perhaps 
exaggerated, that Aowin and Wassa had defeated Asante armies
ii
in set battles. It seemed that the Akyem states had at 
long last broken the myth of Asante invincibility, and that 
the moment had come, for a concerted attack by states which
1. Van Alzen*s Report.
2. Butler to van Maerssen, 3 November 17l8,NBKG 8 5.
3 . Monninkhoven (Axim) to EC, 21 March 1718, NBKG 8 5.
4. Boerhaven (Kormantse) to EC, 9 April; Van Naerssen 
(Sekondi) to EC, 17 April 1718, NBKG 8 5.
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had, in one way or another, suffered at the hands of Asante,
in order to orush her for ever. For example in April 1718
the Dutch at Komenda received information from
"Caboceer Acaffo of Juffer /Twifp/  that the
Ashantins have gone to their country, and that 
Dinkera, Warsaw, and Juffer, have requested Akim 
Caboceer Offoerij to join them in an attack on 1 
Ashantins in their own country and crush them. 1
All these were tributary states to Asante. In a way the
conduct of some of them were understandable. They had been
obliged to fight their master’s wars and had suffered much
in the process. Twifo and Wassa had fought for Asante against
Aowin in 1715-1716; they had apparently fought for her against
the Akyem states, because vassalage obliged that they should
join the overlords1 army in time of war. As for Aowin they
had had to pay as much as 250 bendas of gold, and a large
p
number of slaves to appease Asante in the 1715-16 war. But 
the proposed joint invasion of Asante does not seem to have 
materialized, even though as late as 1721 there were continued 
reports of massacres of Asante citizens by these states in the 
confines of their territories.
Fante reaction to the outcome of the war was to try 
and side with the victor. Like Wassaand Twifo, they quickly 
revised their stand in relation to Akyem (Abuakwa). Now they 
adopted a more friendly attitude towards Akyem, to the extent 
that immediately after the Asante defeat the two peoples 
exchanged courtesies. In his report of 30th October, Van
1. Barn (Komenda) to EC, 9 April 1718, NBKG 8 5.
2. Butler (Axim) to Ec, 5 & 27 November 1715» NBKG 82, cited 
by Daaku, Trade and Politics p. 177 n.2 Ibenda = £0 .
250b. = £2,00 0.0 0.
3. Muller (Axim) to EC, 15 & 18 November 1721, NBKG 8 8.
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Alzen said that the Akyem sent, as a present, "the head of a 
fallen Asante Caboceer to the Braffo of Fante." Among the 
people of the Gold Coast in general and the Akan in 
particular such a gesture was accorded only to friends. In 
view of the very recent hostile attitude of the Southern 
Alliance, led by Fante, towards Akyem, the Fante must have 
done something friendlier to deserve such a courtesy from 
Abuakwa and Kotoku. Probably they had been among the first 
to send words of congratulation to the conquerors. In any 
case the Fante appear to have returned the gesture. In 
April 1718 'Ausi Quansang' ^Awusi Kwansa7, the chief of 
Fante coast town of Kormantse, hinted that the Fante 
confederation "will together march on and defeat Agonna, 
Addemensa, Creman etc. so that the Akims can have free 
passage to help them bring gold, slaves and ivory to the 
forts. " 1 It is clear that the Fante were not actuated by 
genuine regard and friendship for the Akyem states. They 
anticipated the possibility of Akyem turning their victorious 
arms to the south, in which case they, after defeating Agona 
or Akwamu, could drive plenty of trade from the forest to the 
forts. Friendship with the Abuakwa and Kotoku Courts would 
thus enable Fante to do business with Akyem.
The change in the Fante attitude provides an index 
to the effect of the Akyem-Asante war of 1717 on trade. As 
the Dutch had noted in 1716 all the coastal states derived
1. Boerhaven (Kormantse) to Director-General Robberts 
(EC), 9 April 1718 NBKG 8 5. Addemensa and Creman are 
not easily identifiable. Probably by 1Addemensa' the 
Dutch meant Adamansa, and 'Creman' a mis-spelling for 
Breman, both in Asikuma. The Akyem would pass through 
Asikuma if they were going to Fante to trade.
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much of their livelihood from the middleman’s fees obtained
from the forest-to-forts trade. The war threw the entire
trade out of gear. For one thing the combatants were the
two major pillars of the trade: both were great gold
producers, and Asante, in addition, was an excellent ivory
hunter, as well as a powerful slave trader. Trade without
Abuakwa, Kotoku, and Asante lost its vitality. During the
period of the war and for some time after, the absence of
these three from the coast trade was greatly felt. For
another, even those states not directly involved were afraid
of an overflow of the Akyem-Asante war into their territories.
These were consequently not prepared to leave their borders
unprotected in order to pursue trade. In April 1718 the
Dutch summed up the economic situation by saying that trade
had been adversely affected
ftby the terrible inland war between the districts 
of Ashantee and Akim, which also keeps all the 
trading countries like Aowin Warsaw, Accany, Agona 
and Ouamboe in continual commotion, as they dare 
not leave their countries to come and trade with 
us on the coast because of fears of invasion /of 
their own countries/.
It was well that Agona and Akwamu were on the alert. 
With respect to Agona, Ofori of Abuakwa now had the chance to
p
finish the truncated invasion of early 1716. As for Akwamu, 
the speculation in October 1717 was that "Caboceer Afforiji
  will come and demand Akim natives whom Aquando
/Akonno/ had robbed and sold /into slavery/.”^
The fears of Agona and Akwamu, though understandable, 
were not borne out by immediate events. The Asante were a
1. EC Diary, entry, 1J April 1718, NBKG 8 5.
2. See pp. 62-3 above.
5 . Van Alzen’s Report of 30 October 1717* NBKG 8^.
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people of remarkable military resilience. 1 They quickly
recovered from the first shock of Osei Tutu's death which
had led to their subsequent defeat by Kotoku and Abuakwa.
They took the field once more, possibly under the command
of Opoku Ware, the heir-apparent. Frimpon Manso had succeeded
Apenten as the new Kotokuhene. He and Ofori continued the
war with Asante who would not accept defeat and vassalage.
By as early as the second half of 1718 strains and stresses
of the war had begun to tell on the combatants. The fact
was that the war had become protracted, and yet neither side
2
was prepared to make the first moves to end it. Eventually
weariness and realization that Akwamu had duped both of them
obliged Akyem and Asante to conclude that there was need to
end the war. In November 1718 the report from Elmina Castle
was that "the Ashantees and Akims, seeing themselves as
miserably duped by the Aquamboes, have agreed on an
armistice .....  Now it is said that they are friends and
have jointly decided to avenge themselves on the Aquamboes.*^
They turned the 1718 armistice into a formal peace settlement
in the early months of 1719* an arrangement in which neither
side seems to have accepted defeat and subservience. In March
1719 the report from Elmina said that "the long war between
Ashantees and Akims, after damage on both sides, has at long
« » 4last, been ended with a durable peace.
1. Cf the Asante apellation: Asante Kotoku, kum apem a, 
apem heba" (The Asante are as daring as the porcupine, 
they fight in thousands).
2. Van Alzen (Accra) to EC, 10 May; Muller (Axim) to EC,
8 June 1718, NBKG 85; Director-general Butler-(EC) to 
Amsterdam, 8 August 1718, WIC 104; Van Alzen to EC,
17 August 1718, NBKG 8 5.
5 . Butler (EC) to Van Naenssen (Axim), 5 November 1718, NBKG 8 5.
4. Butler to Amsterdam, 27 March 1719* WIC 108.
As far as Akyem-Asante relations were concerned
the 1719 Peace Settlement proved quite durable. It was not
until 1742 that the two peoples clashed in war again.1 But
in relation to the country as a whole there was no real
peace. The Dutch were aware of this. For in his despatch
of 27 March 1719* the Dutch Director-General at Elmina
Castle further observed that in spite of peace between the
Akyem states and Asante
“other quarrels have arisen. The Juffers, Warsaws 
and Aowins, during the aforementioned war lyi'tfj 
plundered the Ashantees of some of their women
  and burned down an Ashantee village called
Atwee. They must now account for it.”
2
And they did. By 1721 Asante had descended on those states.
Meanwhile rumours of imminent Akyem invasion of the 
south, especially Agona, kept circulating. But nothing very 
dramatic happened, except one or two sporadic raids Ofori 
Panin organized against Akwamu in 1722 and 1725. This 
continued to be the general pattern of relations between 
Abuakwa and Kotoku on the one hand, and the southern states 
on the other. The fundamental cause was Kotokufs lack of 
interest in the southern question, at least during the early 
1720s. In 1724 one Dutch report described Frimpon Manso, the 
new Kotokuhene, as a cautious ruler who was not too keen on 
Akyem aggression against Akwamu because he was not sure what
1. See Chapter 3 pp.112-117 below.
2. Butler & Council (EC) to Amsterdam, 1 November 1721;
Muller (Axim) to EC,-15 & 18 November 1721 (NBKG 88); cf 
also Daaku, Trade & Politics3 p. 172; Fynn, Asante -
pp. 55-56.
5 . Letter from Hortman, 7 May 1722, NBKG 89; de Crane &
L. Beun (EC) to Amsterdam, 17 September 1725# WIC 105*
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the reaction of Asante might be.1 Deprived of Kotoku 
co-operation Ofori of Abuakwa had no confidence to invade 
either Akwamu or Agona.
2
He died in 1727» leaving the Southern Question 
unsolved. The divergent views of the two Akyem states had 
militated against the achievement of their political and 
economic objectives.
Right from the beginning of the eighteenth century, 
Abuakwa and Kotoku, severally and jointly, pursued a foreign 
policy that was on the whole very aggressive to their 
neighbours. Political and economic ambitions dictated the 
policy. The same interests prevailed in the neighbouring 
states in varying degrees. Consequently there were wars 
and alarms of wars. Alliances were contracted, only to be 
lightly abandoned for immediate advantages. By the early 1720s 
the Akyem states had secured a relaxation in the political 
and military pressures from Asante in the north, through a 
peace arrangement. But the southern states continued to 
have a stranglehold on Akyem*s political and economic 
interests in the south, because fundamentally Abuakwa and 
Kotoku failed to organize a sustained and concerted action 
against them.
1. Beun & Council (EC) to Amsterdam, 8 January 1724,
WIC 105.
2. Phal (CCO) to Copenhagen, 14 April 1727 (Vqk 121: breve 
og dokumenter fra Guinea, 1717-1732).
CHAPTER 5
AKYEM ASCENDANCY IN THE SOUTH-EAST, 1728-1742
The main direction of the foreign policy of 
Abuakwa and Kotoku up to 1727 had been towards the coast.
But in 1727 when Ofori, the chief architect of this policy, 
died, it looked as if the Akyem states would never be able 
to break the stranglehold of Akwamu and other southern states 
on the coast-bound Akyem trade.
The situation, however, changed after 1727* 
Modification in Asante attitude was a factor which contri­
buted to the change. Pressure from Asante to the north had 
been a major adverse element militating against the efforts 
of Abuakwa and Kotoku to solve the southern question. Prom 
about 1727# however, Asante became more preoccupied with 
attempts to gain access to the European trade on the western 
sector of the coast.1 The diversion in the Asante drive to 
the coast had, by 1728, eased the pressure on Abuakwa and 
Kotoku and given the two Akyem states a good opportunity to 
deal effectively with Akwamu and thereby prepare their rise 
in the south-east.
A consequence of the relaxation in the Akyem-Asante 
tension was the change in the attitude of Kotoku to the 
southern question. During the early 1720s Kotohene Primpon 
Manso had been extremely cautious about joining Abuakwa 
leaders in solving it for fear of arousing unfavourable
p
reaction from Asante. In the late 1720s, however, he
1. Fynn, Asante, pp. 63-7*
2. See Chapter 2, pp. 77 - 73 above.
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became more favourably disposed to involvement in the south. 
Probably he was the Akyem ruler who in 1727 was reported to 
have nearly bought Asante neutrality in order to go to war 
against Akwamu.^ By 1729 he and Abuakwa leaders had reached 
complete agreement to make a concerted assault on Akwamu.
Events in Akwamu itself made an attack on her all 
the more attractive. Akwamu was experiencing political 
instability in both the metropolis and the provinces.
Trouble had been brewing since 1702. In that year Ga 
restiveness compelled Akwamuhene Akono to send a punitive
p
expedition to the Accra area. Again in 1716 the Ga refused
to serve in an Akwamu army detailed to go to the aid of
Agona against an invading force from Akyem Abuakwa.*^ The
attitude of the Ga so annoyed the Akwamuhene that he resolved
2l
to punish them after the storm from Akyem had subsided. But 
he was not able to do this before instability in the empire 
worsened.
Two provincial revolts occurred, and these combined 
with Akyem hostility to spell the doom of Akwamu. The 
tyranny of Nyanoase, the capital, contributed to the 
provincial revolts. The Akwamu rulers themselves habitually
Fj
raided the provinces for slaves. Provincial administrators
1. Roem (Apam) to EC, 10 January 1727, NBKG. 9b; Wilks, M.A. 
Thesis, p.-80 n.2.
2. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 6 5.
3 . See Chapter 2, p. 62 above.
4. Hendrix (Apam) to Director-General Haring (EC), 26 March 
1716, NBKG 82.
5 . Romer, Tilforladlig; ppL06 and 121-2.
like Amaga in Ladoku were wont to govern harshly. 1 Conse­
quently in 1727 the Ga and Akuapem revolted, and for the 
next three years fought a war of independence against their 
overlords.
Had the malaise been limited to provincial Akwamu
alone, perhaps the situation would have been less serious
for her. There was disunity in metropolitan Akwamu itself,
brought about by^succession dispute after Akono's death in
1725- There had been two leading claimants, one Ansa Kwao
and Amo. For many years the latter had been the Akwamu
Resident Commissioner for the Ga district. He had
apparently entertained high hopes of being chosen to occupy
the stool after Akonofs death. But the lot fell on his
rival. Disappointment, frustration, anger, and possibly
Dutch influence, drove him into the camp of the Akuapem-Ga
rebels. Dutch influence on Amo*s decision is suggested by
the enthusiasm with which the Dutch in the Ga area welcomed
a report from Amo in 1729 that Abuakwa and Kotoku had agreed
2to give military assistance to the rebels. Thus by 1729 
the Akwamu empire was on the verge of collapse. Both 
internal and external enemies had joined hands to bring 
about its fall.
It should be added, however, that with respect to 
the Akyem the request for military assistance from the 
Akuapem and the Ga merely acted as a spark in a powder
1, Phal (CCO) to Copenhagen, 14 April 1727* Vgk 122; de la
Planque (Accra) to EC, 30 July, 9 and 13 September 1729*
NBKG 95; Wilks, M.A. Thesis, pp. 87-90.
2. De la Planque (Accra) to EC, 13 September 1729* NBKG 95;
Phal (CCO) to Copenhagen, 30 August 1750; Waroe (CCO) to
EC, 30 August 1730, Vgk 122.
magazine. The Akyem states already had an axe to grind 
against Akwamu. Akwamu had not as yet accounted for the 
Akyem subjects whom the late Akono had sold into slavery 
in the 1717-1719 period. 1 Romer, a Danish official at 
Christiansborg Castle in the 1730s, thought that this was 
the immediate cause of the 1729-30 Akyem invasion of Akwamu. 2 
And of course in their conflict with Akwamu the Akyem states 
had imperial and economic motives. Knowledge about existing 
Akyem-Akwamu tension must have encouraged the Akuapem-Ga 
rebels to appeal to Baa Kwante of Abuakwa and Frimpon Manso 
of Kotoku for help.
By mid-1729 the Abuakwa-Kotoku forces were poised 
for the invasion. The sources so far consulted do not give 
any indications regarding the military strengths of the 
combatants. But the Akyem forces must have been formidable, 
considering that just when the war was about to begin a 
section of the Akwamu informed Gomoahene "Kujse Adoe” 1^Cusi 
Adu/ that they were afraid to face the army of the Akims and 
so they have decided to flee their country "as soon as fighting 
begins.Besides being powerful themselves, Abuakwa and 
Kotoku increased their fighting strength by obtaining allied 
assistance from Assin, while at one stage Agona and Fante 
also expressed willingness to join in the attack on Akwamu.
1. See Chapter 2, p. 75 above.
2. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 151.
3. Gawron (Apam) to EC, 6 October 1729* NBKG 95* Reindorf, 
History, p. 03, calls the Gomoahene Kusa Adu. It is clear 
that friendly relations existed between Akwamu and Gomoa.
4. Blittersdorp (Accra) to D-General Pranger (EC), 5 September; 
Gawron (Apam) to Pranger, 17 September, 1730,-NBKG 97*
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At least the last two had been friends and allies of Akwamu
in the 171Gs.^ Alliances were indeed fleeting and transient
in the political milieu of eighteenth century Gold Coast.
Just before the Akyem entry the rebels had their 
2
backs to the wall. The entry of Abuakwa and Kotoku saved
the Akuapem and the Ga rebels from imminent suppression. An
Akyem army, under the command of Safori, otherwise known as
Ofori Dua or Ofori Kuma,^ was sent to assist Akuapem directly.
The main Akyem force, under the joint command of Kotokuhene
Frimpon Manso, Abuakwahene Baa Kwante, and his heir-apparent 
4
Owusu Akyem, invaded Akwamu itself directly in September
1729. As soon as battle was joined,
Mthree principal ^Xkwamu/ Caboceers, with all their 
subjects, fled to the Crepee Country; but as they 
could not cross the Volta ^quickly/, the Hill 
people ^L.e. the Akuapem7 fell on them and killed 
many of them.^
These probably included that section of Akwamu who 
had disclosed to the Gomoa their intention to flee their 
country as soon as the war started.^
1. Agona and Fante withdrawal from the alliance with Akwamu 
was bound to affect the latter!s military strength.
2. De la Planque (Accra) to EC, 9* 13 and 21 September 1729* 
NBKG 95* The view that the Akyem entry occurred in mid- 
1730 seems incorrect. Cf. Wilks, M.A. Thesis pp. 109-110; 
Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics, p. 31*
3 . Wilks, M.A. Thesis, p. 92; Kwamena-Poh, Government and 
PoliticSj p. 37*
4. Gawron (Apam) to EC, 17 September 1730, NBKG 97; AAT: Asafo 
& Maase (1925/6); An Award in Asamankese-Akim Abuakwa 
Arbitration in 1929* cited by Kwamena-Poh, Government and 
Politics, p. 37 n. 3 .
5 . De la Planque (Accra) to EC, 10 October 1729* NBKG 95*
6 . Cf. p. 82 n. 3 above.
This early setback did not completely demoralise 
the whole Akwamu army. Those who remained behind fought on 
gallantly, occasionally driving the Akyem forces to near 
exhaustion in war stores. 1 But to discerning observers the 
outcome was not in doubt. In September 1730 information 
reaching the coast said the Akyem invaders had taken 
possession of all Akwamu except the capital; that for the 
assault on Nyanoase, they were only awaiting additional
support from the Fante and Agona who had sent to express
2
desire to take part in the assault. The Akyem stormed the 
Akwamu capital in or about the third week of September without 
the expected Fante and Agona support.^ The outcome was as 
the Dutch, for example, had expected. On 21st September 1730 
the Dutch commandant at Fort Lydzemheid at Apam thus reported 
to Elmina Castle: "This is Just to tell you that my Foetoe
^Sfutu/ servant has just arrived straight ...... from
Aquamboe. He tells me that the whole of Aquamboe has been 
defeated by Akim, and the King j^of Akwamu/ taken prisoner 
and put in irons. The whole country is now in the possession 
of the Akiras. Tradition also remembers this Akyem victory.
Dutch delight at the outcome of the war, as 
indicated in Gawron!s report just quoted above, was not
1. Gawron to EC, noted in E.C. Journal, entry, 11 August 1730, 
NBKG 97*
2. Gawron & EC, quoted in E.C. Journal, entry 17 September 1730, 
NBKG,97*
3. For a discussion of the non-participation of the Agona and 
Fante in the attack on Nyanaose, see p. 110 below.
4. Quoted in EC Journal, entry, 21 September 1730, NBKG 97*
5. Traditional history of Abuakwa, as told Stromberg in 1863 
at Kyebi. Cf. Stromberg (Kyebi) to Basel, 24 January 1863* 
BMA - PJC. See Also Wilks, M.A. Thesis; Kwamena-Poh, 
Government pp. 37-38.
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without cause. Since the beginning of the century they had 
looked forward to seeing the day when Akyem arms would 
prevail over Akwamu. Apparently they must have rejoiced 
that at long last the Akwamu stranglehold on the rich gold 
trade from Akyem to the coast had been broken.
For the Akwamu ruling house flight was the only 
alternative to total submission and vassalage to the Akyem. 
Already some of the Akwamu had sought safety in trans-Volta 
district as early as 1 7 2 9 Those who survived capture or 
death in the 1750 phase of the war fled to trans-Volta too. 
Here they founded a new home. This is the Akwamu state as 
we know it today. The founding of the Akwamu state in trans- 
Volta was thus a direct outcome of the defeat suffered at 
the hands of the Akyem in 1750.
Politically the Akwamu were a very ambitious people. 
Defeat and deprivation of their old home did not totally 
dampen their spirits. In trans-Volta they tried to 
influence inter-state relations with a view to establishing 
a political domination similar to what they had enjoyed in 
pre-1750 south-eastern Gold Coast west of the Volta. But
they only succeed in increasing, both in scope and intensity,
2
the conflicts already existing in the region.
The flight of the remnant royal lineage of Akwamu 
to the trans-Volta paved the way for Akyem ascendancy in the 
south-east. By fleeing, the fugitive Akwamu lineage endorsed 
the abandonment of their imperial possessions west of the 
Volta. The ex-Akwamu imperial provinces included Kwawu,
1. See p. 85 above.
2. R. A. Kea, "Akwamu-Anlo Relations, 1750-1815”* in THSG 
Vol. X (1969) PP. 29-64.
Kamana (i.e. the Guan-Kyerepon communities inhabiting what 
is now the Begoro division of Abuakwa), Akuapem, Ga Adangbe 
and Krobo. By virtue of victory Abuakwa and Kotoku took 
possession of all these provinces in addition to the 
remnant of pre-1750 metropolitan Akwamu (hereafter referred 
to in this study as Old Akwamu1). Now Akyem political 
authority extended from the mouth of the Ayensu river near 
Winneba in the west to the Volta estuary in the east, a 
distance of about one hundred and twenty miles; and from 
the shores of the Atlantic to river Anum, some one hundred 
and forty miles inland.
The emergence of Akuapem as an organized state on 
the Akan pattern was another direct result of the 1729-1750 
war. The Akuapem of course accepted the imperial authority 
of the Akyem. But they went one step further. Until 1750 
these people had consisted of petty Guan, Kyerepon and Akan 
communities living almost independently of one another.
After the Nyanoase war, as tradition calls the 1729-1750 war, 
they reached a consensus and invited Safori of Abuakwa,
p
their immediate liberator, to become their paramount chief.
Continued fear of Akwamu seems to have been the 
fundamental motive behind the Akuapem invitation to Safori 
or Ofori Kuma. This is suggested by a Dutch complaint in 
December 1750, made probably on behalf of the Akuapem and 
the Ga, that the Akyem had spent only one-fifth of the time
1. Vis-a-vis New or Trans-Volta Akwamu.
2. Anonymous, Twi Kasamu Akuapem ne Eho Nsem anase Abasem 
(Akropon 1915); Akuffo, Ahemfie, p. 5; Wilks, in Vansina 
& Co., The Historian, p. 405; AAT: Kyebi (1968/9); 
Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics, pp. 45-49.*
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they had contracted to assist the Akuapem and the Ga . 1
Since by then the surviving leaders of the defeated Akwamu
were in trans-Volta, the Dutch query can only suggest the
continued fear of the Akuapem and the Ga that the Akwamu,
even in their new home beyond the Volta river, might again
try to attack from across the river; it was therefore
unsafe to dispense with the services of the Akyem. At
least the presence of Safori as King of all Akuapem would
act as an insurance against their former tyrants, should
they wish to re-open hostilities. It is equally possible
that the Akuapem made the Akyem prince their king in lieu
of the fee they had to pay to the Akyem for the military
assistance against Akwamu. They may have found it
difficult getting the money. The Ga, for example, could
not raise theirs and had to approach the Danish, Dutch
and English trading companies for loans in order to meet
2
their indebtedness to the Akyem.
Whatever the motive behind the invitation, the 
Akyem Abuakwa war chief formed the various petty Guan- 
Kyerepon and pre-1730 Akyem communities in Akuapem into a 
single unitary polity on the Akan pattern. At the head 
was the dynasty established by Safori or Ofori Kuma. The 
dynasty created by Safori has ruled the Akuapem state to 
this day. Thus Akuapem as an organized state owes much to
1. DtG. Pranger (EC) to Blittersdorp (Accra), 13 December 
1730, NBKG 97.
2. See p. 99 below.
Abuakwa for its origins.^ It is an example of what ethnic
admixture and inter-state exchange of political ideas could
positively lead to. In spite of the establishment of an
Abuakwa dynasty there, Akuapem seems to have come under the direct
2
over-rule of Abuakwa.
Almost the whole of the Ga-Adangbe district also
came under Abuakwa overlordship. This district was made up
of the Ga states, Ladoku, Ada and Krobo. Owusu Akyem, heir-
apparent to the Abuakwa stool, was made governor of Ga-
•3
Adangbe and Akuapem.
1. For a full discussion of the subject see Wilks in Vansina 
etc., The Historian, also Kwamena-Poh, Government and 
Politics, pp. 59-^1• While Kwamena-Poh is inclined to 
accept the view that the Akyem Akuakwa created Akuapem 
into a unitary state* Wilks argues quite well that an 
organized Akuapem state already existed before the 
1730s. Whatever stand one takes, the imposition of the 
Akyem, as the paramount authority, on the Akuapem seems 
to be incontrovertible.
2. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 158.
3. De la Planque & Blittersdorp (Accra) to EC, 30 October 
1730, NBKG 97; Waroe (CCO) to Copenhagen, 24 and 28 
December 1730 and 27 September 1731» Vgk 122; Minutes of 
Council Meeting (EC), 15 May 1732, NBKG 98; Romer, 
Tilferladlig, p. 158; R. Biom, Beretning om de Danske 
Forter og Negerier paa Gulneakystem (Copenhagen, 1788)
p. 20 8. Romer and Biom as well as Abuakwa traditional 
historians claim that Owusu Akyem was one of the Abuakwa 
Kings of the eighteenth century. This is wrong. In fact 
Romer who appears to have been the first to create this 
impression was confused on the subject. Sometimes he 
referred to Owusu as heir to Baa Kwante (Cf. op. cit. p. 
168), at others as king. Reindorf (History, p. 3^8) and 
Danquah (Akan Law, Appx D) appear to have based their view 
on the wrong notion of Romer. J. K. Fynn is correct in 
thinking that Owusu was not one of the Abuakwa Kings Cf.
11 Akim Abuakwa King List; A Chronology.”
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Kotoku obtained the principality of Osu.^ This 
small province appears to have become a source of conflict 
between Kotoku and Abuakwa during the 1732-173^ period, as 
the latter tried to add it to its other provinces.^ There 
is an indication that Kotoku gained Kwawu as another imperial 
province. Oda tradition asserts that Kotoku kings, since the 
reign of Frimpon Manso, were wont to regard Kwawu rulers as 
" w i v e s . A m o n g  the Akan, jocular marital relations implied 
cordial relations in which the "wife" regarded the "husband" 
as superior. The relationship suggested by the Oda 
tradition is of this type. Probably it is a reference to 
vassal - overlord relationship between Kwawu and Kotoku, 
traceable to the 1730s. A strong name of Kotoku Kings is 
"Oko-fro-Boo/1 (Conqueror-of-the-Hills), possibly another 
allusion to Kotoku over-rule with respect to Kwawu, a hilly 
district.
Whether Kotoku did or did not obtain Kwawu as an 
imperial province, it is clear that Abuakwa received the 
larger share. Kotoku!s share was not commensurate to its 
contribution to the conquest of Akwamu. Probably Kotoku 
did not wish to be saddled with the task of administering 
provinces far removed from the metropolis but limited itself 
to obtaining the Osu principality which would enable it to 
easily acquire "Dane-guns,for which the Akyem seem to 
have had a great liking.
The acquisition of an empire brought considerable
1. Romer, Tllforladlig, p. l6l.
2. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 80.
3. AKT: Adoagyir; (1968/9 ).
4. Cf. p. 115 below.
prosperity to the Akyem. Tributes and taxes were imposed on
the subject states. Ground-rents for the forts, castles,
and lodges on the Ga-Adangbe coast went to Banso and Oda.
While Abuakwa rulers collected those from James Fort and
Crevecoeur, the Kotokuhene received the rent for
Christiansborg Castle. The Akyem also gained in many
other ways. The European traders were wont to send them
gifts - dashes as they were usually called. In late 1736,
for example, the Abuakwahene received twenty bendas of gold
from the Danes for allowing them to go ahead with plans to
build fort Fredensborg at Ningo.*1* The English had plans to
put up a lodge at "Prangprang" (Prampram), and apparently
appealed to the Abuakwahene for permission to build the
lodge. They must have made some kind of payment to the
Akyem ruler. In 17^0, however, the Danes and the Dutch
together sent a protest to the Abuakwa Court against the
2
plans of the English. A gift would by all means accompany 
such a protest. Even after 1742 when the Akyem ceased to 
be overlords of the Ga district, the Danes for example, 
still found them so important that Christiansborg Castle 
authorities continued to give Akyem leaders gifts. By 
early nineteenth century these gifts were being described
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 158. Romer recalls how Prince 
Owusu Akyem shaved the hair of his head, added 8 oz. of 
gold to it, and gave it to the Danes to be buried under 
the foundations of the Fort. Norregaard (Danish Settle­
ments, p. 97) mentions the Danish negotiation with the 
Akyem, especially Owusu Akyem (Orsu of Korregaard*s) but 
does not add the details Romer provides.
2. Kuiji (Accra) to E.C., 4 and 19 December 17^ -0. Breven og, 
Papieren van-der Kust van Guinea (BPKG) 1740-4l.
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as regular salaries. 1
The Akyem must have also derived great benefit 
from trade which prospered during their ascendancy. The 
European traders on the coast found the Akyem domination 
in south-eastern Gold Coast quite congenial to trade. For 
besides the necessary overall peace which Abuakwa and Kotoku 
imposed in the region, the Akyem themselves were great 
drivers of trade from the interior to the coast.
Strong evidence has been adduced to establish that 
by the 1730s trade on the Gold Coast had shifted from a gold-
p
based to a slave orientated one, with the bulk of the slaves 
finding their way across the Atlantic to the Americas and 
West Indies. It might therefore be tempting to conclude 
that all states and peoples of the Gold Coast participated 
fully in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This is generally 
true. But the Akyem were particularly not keen participants 
in this trade, as they demonstrated after the 1729-1730 war. 
Europeans on the coast then had expected the victorious 
Akyem to march the Akwamu prisoners-of-war to the coast and 
sell them to the trans-Atlantic slavers. But this the 
Kotoku and the Abuakwa did not do: instead they sent the 
captives to Akyem in order to swell their country!s 
population.-^ Danish opinion confirms the Dutch. Romer was 
an official at Christiansborg castle in the 1730s. Writing 
in the 1760s he commented that most Africans sold their 
prisoners of war but the Akyem kept and grafted them on
1. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 208.
2. Walter Rodney, ,fGold and Slaves on the Gold Coast,M in 
T H SG Vol. X pp. 13-38.
3 . Pranger & Council (EC) to Amsterdam, 1 March 1731 (Furley 
Collection).
native lineages by eventually manumitting and regarding them -
as free-born members of Akyem society. 1 This negative
attitude of the Akyem towards the Atlantic slave trade was
unique in the Gold Coast. In the whole of West Africa a
parallel could be found only in contemporary Dahomey where
the ruling house at Abomey, for reasons other than those of
the Akyem, were at one time not favourably inclined towards
2
the Atlantic slave trade.
The disinclination of Abuakwa and Kotoku towards
the trans-Atlantic trade, however, did not prevent them
from practising slavery in their own country. In this
respect they were no different from European slavers. Just
as the Europeans travelled to Africa south of the Sahara to
procure slaves, so did the Akyem undertake expeditions to
neighbouring districts, especially Krepi, to either raid
■3
for or purchase slaves.
Military and economic considerations dictated the
objectives of slavery in Akyem. Slaves rendered military
4
services in war time, and in peace time provided a cheap 
labour force for the extractive industry and long distance 
trade. Contemporary evidence leaves room for no doubt that 
the gold industry formed the backbone of Akyem economy in
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 158.
2. I. A. Akinjogbin, Dahomey and Its Neighbours, 1708-l8l8, 
(CUP 1967) p. 24.
3 . Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 167*
4. Ibid., p. 158.
both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Akyem
used three methods in searching for gold. These were 
surface collection after heavy rainfall, collection from 
river beds by scooping the sedentary sand, and thirdly 
digging for gold. 1 All three methods, especially mining, 
required ample labour force. Romer gives a detailed 
account of Akyem mining method in the eighteenth century.
He writes:
“According to what our Accras and the Akims tell 
us, /tYie Akyem7 dig holes in the ground wherever 
they please, making sure, however, that it is a 
good distance from the towns and not too close 
to the footpaths, so that their children and 
animals may not fall into them. They make 
landings about three feet high (half a man’s 
length) in order that they may pass the tray 
or vessel (with the soil which they have dug 
from the ground) to each other. While Europeans 
dig ’streets’ underground and prop them up ..... 
and have windlasses to hoist their ore etc. the 
Akims simply dig a slanting hole into the ground 
which look like a staircase, each step being 1§ 
alien high.
If after having dug 6-10 alien they find 
that the soil is not rich, they start digging 
elsewhere. Sometimes, however, they bring a 
trayful of earth to the water to test it. If 
they do not hit a rich soil by the time they
have dug a hole 10 alien deep .... or 8 landings,
their effort has been in v a i n  they go to
another place to start digging afresh.
Yet they seldom fail to find rich soil ....
and in most cases it is so rich that each of the 
workers delivers 8 oz. every day, which is 
considered the minimum of what the master will 
accept."
Romer states further that at least an average of forty workers 
were needed on one pit. For, besides the diggers at the 
bottom of the pit, between thirty and sixty others were 
expected to stand on the stairs and pass trays to and from 
their colleagues at the bottom of the mines. On ’bonanza’
1. J. B. Danquah, Akim Abuakwa Handbook, p. 8 .
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mines still larger numbers were required as the digging 
usually went deeper and deeper down.
The evidence from Homer suggests that the Akyem 
controlled production with a view to keeping supply at a 
reasonable level. At one time, Homer writes, "Prempung’s 
men found a whole rock of gold in a mine. This was reported 
to the King and he was asked whether they should take chisels, 
as the travat /i.e. the tornado/ season was approaching.
Frempung consulted his great men and the resolution was that 
this rock must be the mother or father of the small gold; 
nobody was therefore to touch if, . the men should leave 
that mine and start at another place.**1 Romer attributed the 
resolution of the Kotoku leaders to abandon this rich gold
o
mine to stupidity and superstition. Romerfs conclusion is 
quite perceptive because even now there are people in some 
parts of Asante Akyem who would believe that gold must be aL.
god if it occurred in a large quantity. But this did not 
prevent people from making use of troves. The real motive 
behind the resolution of Kotokuhene Frimpon Manso and his 
councillors was to prevent the King*s miners, who were generally 
slaves, from acquiring any part of the rock gold they had 
just discovered. Had they been allowed to extract the gold 
the miners would have secretly kept part of it and thereby 
would have increased gold supply on the market. Increase in 
supply would of course lower the price of gold. Hence the 
sanction prescribed by the Kotokuhene. Among the peoples of 
the Gold Coast to invoke superstition was the best means of
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 197*
2. Ibid.
making a sanction work.
Romer’s detailed information above was representative
of European interest in the Akyem gold industry. Throughout
the eighteenth century the name ^kim* was almost synonymous
with gold to Europeans in and outside Gold Coast. At the
beginning of the century the Akyem district was said by
Bosman to furnish "as large quantities of gold as any land
that I know and that also the most valuable and pure of any
that is carried from this coast: it is easily distinguished
by its deep colour. Accra at present carries away the
greatest part of this metal from hence. " 1 In the 1750s the
Akyem sent only "few slaves" but "plenty gold" to the coast 
2
for sale. Thirty years later the district was described as 
a great source of gold.^ Sufficient labour was required to 
exploit the sources.
Slave labour was also required for long distance 
trade. The strong purchasing power which the possession of 
gold placed in their hands, made it possible for the Akyem 
to undertake long distance trading, particularly to the coast, 
from which place only they could obtain firearms and other 
European manufactured goods. Escorting and porterage were 
the two major areas of trade where slaves were employed.
The trade routes were not wholly free from highway robbing 
and raiding. The Akyem solution to this problem was the
1. Bosman, Description p. 78*
2. Romer, Tilforladligj p. 164.
3. Atlas de l fAsie et de l fAfrique (1764) No. 104, cited by 
G . Macdonald, The Gold Coast Past and-Present (London 
1898) p. 121 footnote.
4. Dutch Reports in March 1714 (Furley Collection, Legon).
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caravan system of organizing 1foreign1 trade. An Akyem 
caravan could contain as many as two thousand men.^
An interesting aspect of the Akyem caravan system 
was collective bargaining. On arrival at the coast the 
master traders went to the forts to negotiate with the 
merchants on the prices of the various articles the Akyem 
traders intended to buy. The bargaining could last up to
four days. As along as the bargaining continued so long
2
would the Akyem traders refrain from buying. Purchasing 
proceeded briskly as soon as prices were agreed upon between 
the European sellers and the African customers.
The Akyem bought all sorts of things from the coast, 
but they gave top priority to a few of them. Among these 
were salt, textiles, knives, iron, drinks and above all 
firearms and ammunition. Constant inter-state warfare 
explained the great importance they attached to guns and 
other munitions of war. Sometimes Akyem traders to the 
coast bought nothing but these. In 1741 the Dutch at Accra 
had to please them by asking for more stock from Elmina 
Castle because the Akyem were buying nothing else. The 
ruling house of Abuakwa, led by Baa Kwante also purchased 
large quantities of drinks from the coast, especially Danish
5
Plensborger c o m  brandy for which he had a particular liking.
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 164.
2. Ibid., p. 165.
3 . Ibid., pp. 165-7j Cf. also Chapter l,Pp. 39-43above.
4. Kuijl (Accra) to Director-General J. Baron des Bordes (EC), 
13 September-1741, NBKG 105-
5 . Romer, Tilforladlig, pp. 165-6 .
Trade in south-eastern Gold Coast, on the whole,
prospered under the Akyem domination. Some of the European
traders, the Danes for example, were sorry when the hegemony
came to an end in 1742. "We /Danes/", Romer wrote in the
1760s, "could have earned enough in those years to cover all
our costs for some fifty years. We did not /then/ need to
take our goods out ourselves for sale as we have had to do
recently; nor did we need the services of up to forty
African agents in the interior of the country, as is now
the practice".*1-
Success and prosperity of course created their own
problems for Abuakwa and Kotoku. Some of the European
trading companies were wont to be trouble makers; occasional
provincial revolts broke out; and above all the success of
the Akyem aroused the jealousy of neighbours. All these
had to be dealt with. The most immediate problem, however,
was the provincial administration, an altogether new thing
to the Akyem. They did not evolve a uniform system as the
Akwamu had done before them. In their imperial days the
Akwamu adopted the system of residential governorship for
their provinces. For example Prince Amo, as already shown,
was accredited to the Ga district, while Amaga, another
2
prince, governed Ladoku. The Akyem combined non-residential 
governorship and indirect rule. As stated already, Owusu 
Akyem, for example was governor of Ga-Adangbe and Akuapem.
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 171.
2. See pp. 80-81 above. For the most recent discussion 
of Akwamu provincial administration see Kea, R. A. Trade, 
State Formation and Warfare on the Gold Coast, 1600-1826, 
Ph.D. Thesis, London University 1974 (Unpub.), especially 
pp. 223-275.
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He resided in none of these provinces. Nor was any resident 
governor appointed for Old Akwamu. With regards to Old 
Akwamu the Dutch in Accra hoped in 1730 that the Akyem would 
govern it directly. 1 But Jan Pranger, the Dutch Director- 
General at Elmina, a shrewd observer of the situation in the 
Gold Coast, disabused the minds of his colleagues. He told 
them: "As regards the ^Gld7 Quamboe country, you say you
want to see the Akims assume .... the government of it,
but that will never happen because it is an established 
custom of the nations /in the Gold Coast7 that they always 
leave a part of their defeated enemies in their own country, 
one of whom they put in authority over it, whom they regard 
as their tribute paying vassal. The conquerors can live 
there, if they so wish, but they never share in the govern- 
ment ^of the conquered territory7»w Pranger was proved 
absolutely right. The Abuakwa court appointed one of the 
Akwamu chiefs who did not migrate to trans-Volta to 
administer the district. By December 1731 the Abuakwahene 
"Bacontin ^Baa Kwante7 and the native who will govern ^01d7 
Aquamboe country by order of the Akims" were known to be 
sending messages to Accra. This chief was called Kwasi
ii
Bibri. Contemporary evidence thus substantiates the 
traditional view that after the Nyanoase war, the pre-1730
1. De la Planque (Accra) to D-G Pranger (EC), 10 November 
1730, NBKG 97-
2. Pranger to de la Planque & Blittersdorp, 17 November 1730, 
NBKG 97; also quoted by Fynn, Asante, p. 4l.
3. Elet (Accra) to EC, 3 December; EC Journal, entry,
9 December 1731» NBKG 97*
4. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, p. 115*
99.
Akwamu chiefdom came under Abuakwa over-rule, 1
Relations with the European trading companies on
the coast were a set of another problem for the Akyem
hegemony. The Dutch for example were a problematic lot.
Difficulties with them started right from 1730 when they
to
refused to help the Ga/requite the Akyem leaders for their
services against Akwamu in the 1729-30 war. The Ga had
promised to pay the Akyem a subsidy of "360 bendas of gold"
and "six strings of contre de terre."^ After the war the Ga
could not raise the subsidy on their own. They approached
the European trading companies for loans which would enable
them meet the commitment to the Akyem. The Danes and the
English obliged but the Dutch refused to give out the loan;
■3
arguing that the Ga might not pay it back. Of course payment 
of the subsidy was the direct responsibility of the Ga, but 
the Dutch decision not to help the Ga did not augur well for 
Akyem-Dutch relations, considering that the Danes and the 
English readily helped the Ga.
A direct friction seems to have started between 
the Akyem and the Dutch during the first two years after the 
Nyanoase war. The tension was over the subject of ground- 
rent (or Kostgeld as the Dutch called it) for fort Crevecoeur.
1. AAT: Asafo & Maase (1925/6); K. Ameyaw, Asamankese 
Tradition, IAS. Acc. No. KAG/4; Amayaw, Akwatia Tradition, 
IAS, Acc. KAG/2 (Legon 1963).
2. De la Planque & Blittersdorp (Accra) to EC, quoted in EC 
Journal, entry, 30 October 1730, NBKG. 97• Contre de 
terre was a Portuguese term for a type of beads. Cf. 
Bosman, Description, p. 117 and Fage s note on p. 527 of 
Bosman s book (1967 ed.)
3 . Director-General Pranger (EC) to de la Planque (Accra),
1 November 1730, NBKG. 97*
As overlords of the Ga district the Akwamu had held the
’notes’ for the European forts on the Ga coast.'1’ By right
of conquest the Akyera now obtained the notes, and were
therefore entitled to collect the ground-rents of the
forts in the Ga area. The Akyem rulers appear to have
found some difficulty in collecting the rents for the
Dutch fort, Crevecoeur. This is suggested by the fact that
it was not until 1732 that they managed to get the Dutch to
pay, not at the rate of 2 oz. per month, as had been paid
to the Akwamu and insisted upon by the Akyem leaders, but 
2
at 1 oz. Apparently there had been some misunderstanding
between the overlords and the traders.
Competition among the European trading companies
sometimes posed difficulties to the Akyem imperial presence
on the coast. The European traders occasionally engaged in
rivalry to the point of open conflict. This happened
between the Danes and the Dutch as from about 1736.^ In
that year the Danes accused the Dutch of trying to instigate
Chief Darko of ’Dutch” Accra and the Chief of Osu to rise
4
against the Danes. It was the turn of the Dutch to level 
a similar charge against the Danes in 1737 when they said
1. The ’note’ was a kind of document which the officials of 
the various forts gave to African rulers. It entitled 
such a ruler to collect the ground-rent of the fort or 
castle for which it was issued.
2. Minutes of Elmina Castle Council Meeting, 15 May 1732, 
NBKG. 98.
3. Norregaard also discusses the Danish-Dutch Conflicts in 
the 1730s. Cf. Danish Settlements, pp. 97“99*
4. EN. Boris (CCO) to Copenhagen, 6 July 1736, Vgk 123; 
breve og dokumenter fra Guinea, 1732-17^5«
the Danes were intriguing with Prince Owusu Akyem of Abuakwa
against Dutch interest. 1
The fundamental cause of the Danish-Dutch tension
was the desire of each of them to get a greater diare of the
African trade. Their involvement in Ga politics, however,
intensified the hostility. The Dutch had supported the
candidature of Darko against Okaidja (or Okaidze) another
candidate to the ,Dutchf Accra stool. The Dutch also
offended Okaidja the more by panyarring (seizing) some of
•3
his close relatives and slaves. As a reprisal the dis­
satisfied Okaidja fled to the Danes at Osu and joined them 
against the Dutch. As overlords of the Ga district it was 
the duty of the Abuakwa and Kotoku leaders to settle the 
differences between the various parties. But instead of 
mediating, the Akyem became hostile to the Dutch, as a 
result of the intrigues of the Danes and Okaidja. The 
dissatisfied Dutch Accra prince and the Danish authorities
informed the Abuakwa and the Kotoku that the Dutch were
h
instigating Asante to attack Akyem. Relations with Asante 
were a delicate affair with the Akyem.^ In 173^ they had 
accused the Dutch of being "the friends of Poko ^7are7M, the
1. Camper (Accra) to EC, 8 May 1737, NBKG 102.
2. Darko is probably the chief Reindorf refers to as Darko
Panyin of the Otu street of Dutch Accra. Cf. History,
p. 8 0.
3- De Bordes1Journal der Voyage au Accra, entry, 22 July 1737* 
NBKG 190.
4. De Bordesf Journal, entry 21 July 1737* NBKG 190.
5 . Akyem-Asante relations during the 1730s are fully discussed
on pp. 112-117 below.
Asantehene.^ To intrigue with one African power against
2
another seems to have been a speciality with the Dutch,
but the Akyem leaders found it difficult to decide whether
on this occasion there was any truth in the accusation
against the Dutch. All the same the Akyem took a serious
view of the charge against the Dutch, particularly when the
information came from somebody who was in a position to know
the Dutch well. That the Akyem at once prepared to attack
Fort Crevecouer underscored not only the success of the
Okaidja and the Danish intrigue with the Abuakwa and Kotoku
rulers but also the sensitivity of the Akyem in the matter of
relations with Asante.
Prospect of Akyem invasion of their establishment
in the Ga area was something the Dutch viewed with gloom.
They decided to prevent its occurrence by resorting to high-
powered diplomacy. To this end the Dutch Director-General
himself, J. Baron des Bordes, travelled from Elmina Castle
to Accra in order to open talks with the Akyem courts. On
4th June 1737, barely a day after his arrival in Accra, des
Bordes sent ambassadors
”to the Great Men of the Akim Nation such as 
Frempung, Baquentyn, and Oers ^Owusu Akyem/
  to enquire from them why they have decided
to attack the Dutch Company with whom they have 
been accustomed to trade always.
The move paid off. On 20th July 1737 des Bordesfs
ambassadors returned, accompanied by Akyem representatives,
1. Augier (Accra) to EC, 28 October 1734, NBKG 101.
2. K.Y. Daaku, "The European Traders and the Coastal states, 
1630-1720W, in THSG, Vol. VIII (1963) PP. 11-23.
3. Des Bordes1 Journal der voyage.
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to investigate the charge against the Dutch. During the 
investigation it was discovered that Okaidja was the source 
of the accusation, and that there was no truth in the 
allegation against the Dutch. Consequently Akyem-Dutch 
relations were seemingly normalised for the moment. 1
Seemingly because subsequent events show that the 
normalisation of relations did not necessarily lead to a 
complete elimination of Akyem involvement in the Danish- 
Dutch conflict. Prince Owusu Akyem of Abuakwa, non-resident 
Governor of almost all Ga-Adangbe, was opposed to the 
decision and preferred to Join Okaidja and the Danes against 
the Dutch. Dutch determination to punish Okaidja for his 
conduct gave the Akyem Prince the opportunity to pursue 
this independent line of action. The Dutch sentenced the 
Ga Prince to a term of imprisonment but on the pleas and
intercession of the leading men of Dutch Accra, they
2
commuted it to a fine. Eventually Okaidja effected his 
escape and went to the Danes and the Osu people, who were 
only too pleased to welcome and use him as a tool against 
the Dutch. By late 1737 war was raging between the Danes 
and Okaidja on the one hand and the Dutch on the other. 
Okaidja and the Danes apparently managed to get Prince Owusu 
Akyem to side with them against the Dutch.
The Danish-Okaidja appeal to Prince Owusu Akyem is 
explained not only by Owusufs governorship of Ga-Adangbe 
but also by his capabilities and independent turn of mind.
1. Des Bordesfs der Voyage.
2. Ibid., entries, 23-27 July 1737. The fine is not stipulated 
in the records.
Owusu was a man of action. Romer regretted that he was not 
the King of Akyem (Abuakwa), and that such a high office had 
gone to Baa Kwante, a drunkard.'*' On this occasion, however, 
it is difficult to say whether presents or principle made 
Owusu Akyem decide to side with the Osu-Okaidja alliance.
What is certain is that in late 1737 Owusu raised an army
p
of about 8 ,000 and sent it in advance to assist the allies.
In November the army moved into Akuapem, and then on to 
Accra in December 1737*^ By January 17^8 Owusu himself had 
followed his army to the Ga Coast, bringing reinforcement of 
between 6,000 and 8,000. His presence with a force consisting 
of about 16,000 soldiers compelled many of the inhabitants 
of ’Dutch* Accra to flee into Port Crevecouer for protection.^ 
Then suddenly the situation reversed in favour of 
the Dutch. Owusu unexpectedly withdrew his army and returned 
it to its base in Akuapem. Prom here the army eventually 
left for Akyem Abuakwa. The Danes explained the withdrawal 
by saying that there was shortage of water in the Ga 
district. Scarcity of water could be bad enough for an
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. l8l; cf. also Reindorf, History, p.80.
2. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 93.
3 . Kuijl (Breku) to EC, November; Starckenburg (Accra) to EC 
11 December EC Journal, entry 16 December; Resolution of 
Brummer, Janse & Starckenburg (Accra), 23 December,
Starkenburg (Accra) to EC 23 December; des Bordes (EC) to 
Raams (Shama), 26 December; Raams to de Bordes, 27 December;
EC Journal, entry 29 December 1737, NBKG 103 •
A. Starckenburg (Accra) to EC 16 January 1738,NBKG 103*
5. Starckenburg to EC, 29 January & 15 February; EC Journal, 
entry 22 February; Resolution of officials of Port Crevecouer, 
quoted in EC Journal, entry, 6 March; de Bordes (EC) to 
Accra, 8 March 1738 NBKG 103.
6 . Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 9 8.
army on campaign, but this does not appear to provide all 
the explanation for the withdrawal. Ultimate effectiveness 
of instructions from Banso seems to have been the other and 
perhaps better part of the explanation. In December 1757 
the Dutch had noted that ”Oers /Owusu/ is not assisted with 
proper force by his brother ^ a a  Kwante/ to begin a formal 
war here; his advance is entirely contrary to the views of 
his brother”.1 Starckenburg repeated this opinion in
p
February 1758. It is therefore reasonable to infer from
this that representations of the Abuakwahene, and possibly
those of Frimpon-Manso of Kotoku, ultimately prevailed upon
Owusu to abandon the Ga venture, and join in an impending
■3
Akyem invasion of Agona.
Whatever must have obliged Owusu to withdraw his
assistance from the Danes and Okaidja, his action considerably
eased the tension in the Ga District, though it did not
immediately deter Okaidja from engaging in continued hostility 
4
to the Dutch. Nor did the Ga Prince pay any heed to later
warnings, from the Akyem courts, to desist from unfriendly
activities against the Dutch. He defied his Akyem overlords,
and proved very
went ahead to block some of the routes leading to Dutch Accra,/
15
elusive to all Dutch efforts to catch him. Obviously he felt
1. Starckenburg (Accra) to EC, 11 December 1757» NBKG 105*
2. Starckenburg (Accra) to EC, 26 February 1758; EC Journal,
entry, 5 March 1758, NBKG 103.
3. See pp. 109-111 below.
4. Starckenburg (Accra) to EC, 28 March; EC Journal, entry,
7 April 1730, NBKG 103.
5. Starckenburg to EC, 11 June 1758; Starckenburg (Tema) to 
EC, 10 July 1758, NBKG 103.
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that the Akyem rulers would not be able to send any punitive
force against him, as they were pre-occupied with problems in
Old Akwamu and elsewhere.^ This point must be emphasized
because in the second half of 1738 when Akyem leaders managed
to solve some of their difficulties in Old Akwamu, and
became less pre-occupied with other matters not much was
heard about Okaidja's activities. He must have become
frightened when information reached Tema in July 1738 that
an Akyem army would soon arrive in the Ga-Adangbe province
2
to deal with him. Moreover, by then the Danes and the Dutch 
had reached some kind of a peace settlement. Without Danish 
co-operation and support from Owusu Akyem Okaidja had reached 
the end of his tether.
Old Akwamu also presented provincial problems.
Here the Akyem over-rule was hated. In 1730-1731 when the 
inhabitants accepted vassalage to the Akyem, it seems that 
they were only playing for time. Continual recalcitrance 
on their part became the main feature of relations with their 
overlords. In 1732 they blockaded the routes to the Ga coast 
against Akyem trade. Prom then onwards Old Akwamu dislike 
for the Akyem domination usually expressed itself in this
2l
type of economic sanction. Banso and Oda found it a 
nuisance; and the European trading companies regarded it as 
bad for business naturally, and tried to persuade Old Akwamu
1. See below.
2. Starckenburg (Tema) to EC, 10 July 1738, NBKG 103*
3. D-G Pranger (EC) to Amsterdam, 3 April 1732, FCL.
4. Campier (Accra) to EC, 16 & 22 September 1738, NBKG. 101; 
Starckenburg (Accra) to EC, cited in EC Journal, entry
5 March 173o, NBKG 103.
against it. In 1735 the Dutch for example offered to
mediate between the vassals and the overlords, 1 but were
not successful largely because the people of Old Akwamu
would neither send representatives to Accra to deliberate,
nor make known their immediate grievances against the 
2Akyem.
In 1734 the Akyem disclosed intentions to send a
punitive expedition against Old Akwamu and invited assistance
from other subject peoples such as the Ga and the Akuapem.
The Gad were not willing to accept the request but knowing
what the consequences of a direct refusal would mean for
them, sent presents to the Akyem leaders, apparently with a
plea to be excused. The projected punitive expedition,
however, did not materialize. It would appear that
unexpected developments elsewhere in their empire compelled
the Akyem rulers to postpone the day of reckoning with Old
Akwamu. In mid-1738, however, Akyem forces descended on
■3
the province and confirmed their authority there. The
success of the Akyem naturally increased the dislike Old
Akwamu had for them. In 1741-2 this province received with
great enthusiasm the news of an impending Asante attack on
4
Abuakwa and Kotoku.
1. Minutes of the Council at Elmina Council, 10 July 1733; 
EC Journal, entry, 14 July 1733> NBKG 99*
2 . Pranger (Accra) to EC, 3 August; EC journal, entry,
6 August 1733*-NBKG 99-
3. Starckenburg (Accra) to EC, 7 October 1738, NBKG. 103*
4. Akyem-Asante relations during this period are discussed 
on pp.112-117 below.
io8.
And so did the Voltaic Akwamu, naturally. The
basic cause of the grievance of Voltaic Akwamu was continued
Akyem hostility against her, even across the Volta. Since
they fled to and settled in trans-Volta, in 1730, Akyem
war-mongers had scarcely left them in peace in spite of
distance and the barrier presented by the Piraw (Volta)
river. In 1730 a section of the Akyem forces joined the
rebel Akwamu Prince, Amo, 1 to invade parts of the Lower
trans-Volta region. An attack on Voltaic Akwamu was not
the direct objective of Amo, but the presence of the Akyem
in his army must have frightened the trans-Volta Akwamu.
In 1731 and again in 1734 the Akyem themselves invaded the 
2
region. The attacks were actually slave raids which the
Abuakwa prince, Owusu Akyem, organized against Krepi,^ but
they may have scared Voltaic Akwamu. At any rate in 1737
there was a direct Akyem attack on them. The Akyem killed
and captured many of the Inhabitants; those who could escape
death and capture sought safety on an inland in the Volta 
4
river. To prevent future Akyem attacks on them the Voltaic 
Akwamu appealed to the Dutch at Keta to accord them protection 
or at least intercede with the Akyem. King Agaja of Dahomey 
invaded the Keta district at about this time. There was a
1. Cf. p. 8l above.
2. Waroe & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 25 March 1731* Vgk.122.
3 . Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 169.
4. 'From* (?Vroom) Keta, to EC, 10 June 1737, NBKG, 103.
5. Vroom’s Report from Keta, 10 June 1737, NBKG 103*
6 . Akinjogbin, Dahomey, p. 106.
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strong speculation among the Dutch that Voltaic Akwamu
probably had appealed to the Dahomean King for help against
the Akyem. 1 The Dutch began to put their defences in the Ga
area on good footing in anticipation of the allegedly
2
impending Dahomean assault on the Akyem. The expected attack 
however, never took place, but this does not rule out the 
possibility that Voltaic Akwamu had solicited help from 
Abomey. For the Akyem ascendancy was a source of worry to 
the Voltaic Akwamu, just as it was to others like Asante,
Fante and Agona.
Immediately after the defeat of Akwamu, Agona and 
the eastern Fante began to show their dislike for the Akyem 
hegemony. The 1729-50 war had scarcely ended when there were 
indications that relations between the Akyem states and the 
Agona as well as the Fante were not going to be cordial.
The basic cause of the strained relations was of course the 
jealousy of Agona and Fante for the Akyem success against 
Akwamu; and the immediate cause the duplicity and opportunism 
of those two peoples. In the second half of 1750 when the 
war with Akwamu was at its peak, Agona and Fante, until then 
allies of Akwamu, sent to assure the Akyem leaders of their 
willingness to join in the final assault on Akwamu. Indeed 
between them Agona and Fante were believed to have raised an 
army of 20,000 strong for the purpose. But they did not go
1. D-G des Bordes (Accra) to EC, 21 July 1757, NBKG. 105-
2. Ibid.
5. Abomey was the capital of Dahomey.
4. Blittersdorp (Accra) to EC, 5 September 1750; Gawron 
(Apam) to EC, EC Journal, entry 17 September 1750,
NBKG 97-
to the aid of the Abuakwa-Kotoku forces as promised; instead
they remained outside the war zone, and true to their
general habit of trying to reap where they had not sown,
the Fante and Agona captured any Akwamu who fell into their
2
hands while fleeing.
Consequently after the war with Akwamu, Frimpon
3
Manso of Kotoku and Owusu Akyem of Abuakwa^ marched into 
Eastern Fante. Gomoahene Kusi Adu offered to mediate 
between Akyem and their adversaries. Apparently he was not 
altogether successful as by 1752 war was still raging 
between Akyem forces and those of the Agona-Fante alliance.^ 
Akyem had assistance from an Assin chief whom the Dutch 
called **Doddi Thibo**. This ruler seems to be no other than
1. Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* European records are 
full of instances of this. To some of the Europeans cheating 
was Fante ’national* characteristic.
2. Blittersdorp (Accra) to EC, 14 December 1750, NBKG. 97*
5. Baa Kwante, the Abuakwahene himself, left directly for home, 
perhaps satisfied with the notion that his heir apparent, 
Owusu, could act better than he.
4. Blittersdorp (Accra) to EC, 14 December 1750, NBKG 97*
5. Raems (Senya Breku) to EC, cited in the EC Journal, entry 
4 February; Elet (Accra) to EC. noted in the EC Journal, 
entry 16 February 1752,-NBKG 98.
6 . EC Journal, entry 16 February 1752, NBKG 98. It is not 
altogether clear which of the Assins, Apemanim or Atanoso, had 
"Thiboas its ruler. Most probably he was king of Assin 
Atanoso. The second of his names is surely identifiable
as Tsibo or Tibo, a name quite popular with Assin Atanoso 
Princes. Atanoso tradition recalls that the Fifth 
Atanosohene was called Oduro Tsibo (Cf. Daaku, K.Y., Oral 
Traditions of Asin-Twifo, p. 5). **0duro** might well be
the ''Doddi** of the Dutch sources.
the Assin Atanosohene, Oduro Tsibo, who, according to 
tradition, assisted Kotokuhene Primpon Manso in his war 
against Akwamu.'*' Before Akyem forces were ready for the 
war, this Assin ruler had declared his willingness to 
attack Agona and Fante on their behalf. Agona and Fante 
seem to have sued for peace, before war could break out.
But Agona continued to be a nuisance to the extent that 
Abuakwa-Kotoku forces, led by Frimpo Manso and the Abuakwa
o
Prince, Owusu Akyem, invaded and defeated it in 1738.
About two years after the attack on Agona Frimpon
Manso died. Romer dates the event to 17^1 and so does
•3
Remdorf. Evidence from contemporary sources suggests
1. Daaku, Assin-Twifu Tradition, p. 7* This tradition is 
essentially confirmed by the tradition of Asafo, in Akyem 
Abuakwa. The Asafo tradition gives it that during the 
Nyanoase War, as it calls the 1729-30 war, a Nana Oduro 
Tibo, described as Denkyerahene, assisted Kotokuhene 
Frimpon Manso against Akwamu. The Denkyera do not 
recollect a King of theirs called Oduro Tibo. Perhaps 
the Asafo tradition refers to Assin Atanoso and not 
Denkyera. This is not to imply that Denkyera could not 
have also gone to the aid of Frimpon Manso. The ruling 
lineages of Kotoku and Denkyera were, and are still, of 
the Agona clan. The Akan clan system enjoined all lineages 
of the same clan to regard themselves as kinsmen who, if 
possible, should help one another, in times of difficulty. 
But all in all the circumstancial evidence suggests that
it was Assin Atanosohene Oduro Tsibo who assisted the 
Akyem states against Agona and Fante in 1732.
2. Kuijl (Accra) to EC, 15 & 20 September 1738; Starckenburg 
to EC, 20 September and 7 October 1738, NBKG 103•
3 . Romer, Tilforladlig, p. l8l; Reindorf, History, p. 8 0.
that Frimponfs death may have occurred in 1740. During the
first eight months of 1740 Akyem traders did not frequent
the coast as they were wont to do; and a planned invasion
of Agona was dropped.'*’ Probably the Akyem were mourning
Frimpon’s death. Asante declaration of war in 1740 against
2
the Akyem states substantiates the suggestion here. In the 
1720s Asantehene Opoku Ware had promised never to go to war 
against the Akyem states as long as Frimpon Manso lived. In 
1740 he was poised for war against them, and the Akyem made 
feverish preparations to face himt from the Danes alone 
they bought 6,000 lbs. of gun-powder, 2,000 pieces of 
flint, and 6,800 ankers of Flensborger brandy.^ Frimpon 
Manso must have died about that time.
The tension with Asante dated back to the very 
beginning of the Akyem hegemony. In spite of Opoku Ware’s 
promise to Frimpon Manso referred to above, rumours of 
impending Asante attack on the Akyem states were prevalent 
in 1730, 1751, 17^4 and 1737 • Perhaps it was a proof of 
the strong influence which the personality of Frimpon Manso 
exercised on Kuraasi that war did not break out between Akyem 
and Asante earlier than 1740. Asante jealousy for the Akyem 
domination in the south-east was the fundamental cause of 
the tension. The story is told how while he had great 
respect for Frimpon Manso of Kotoku, Asantehene Opoku War I
1. Groen (Accra) to EC, 8 April; A. L. Smith (Mouree) to EC, 
19 October; EC Journal, entries, 26 April and 19 October 
1740, NBKG. 104. Cf. also Norregaard, op. cit., p. 101; 
Fynn, Asante, p. 73*
2. See n. 3 below.
3. E. N. Boris (CCO) to Copenhagen, 25 May 1740 Vgk.
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was inclined to look down upon Abuakwahene Baa Kwante as a 
man of poor qualities, at least when Baa was a prince.^
He thus did not expect Baa, as Abuakwahene to achieve 
imperial status and thus be at par with the Asantehene.
Other grievances against the Akyem included the Asantehene*s 
feeling that the Akyem had treated the Akwamu ruling 
lineage unfairly by driving them out of their pre-1750
kingdom: the Asante court secretly cherished the hope of
2one day restoring the Akwamu to their Nyanoase Kingdom. 
Another was the inclination of the Akyem States to want to 
sympathise with and support Wassahene Ntsiful, a rebel, 
against Asante.^ Probably Dutch intrigues also contributed
ji
to the Asante decision to go to war against the Akyem.
The immediate cause was of course Asante
bellicosity. Apaw succeeded to the Kotoku stool after
Frimpon. Soon the Asantehene sent to tell him and Baa
Kwante of Abuakwa that he would descend on them. Probably
the object of the message was to frighten the Akyem leaders
in order to compel them to voluntarily accept vassalage to
7
Asante. But they rather chose to fight.
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 167.
2. Richard Graves (CCC) to the Royal African Company (RAC), 
5 April 1742, T 70/1515.
5. Director-General Pranger (EC) to Blittersdorp (Accra),
15 December 1730, NBKG 97. -
4. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 101.
5* Ibid.. p. 102; Fynn, Asante, p. 74. Reindorf (History, 
p. Bo), says Ampem (Ampirn) was the successor.
6 . Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 182.
7. Ibid.
Throughout 1741 the Akyem continued with the war
preparations they had started in 1740, buying all war stores
they could get from the European merchants in the Ga
district.”* Pull battle was, however, joined in or about
early 1742 when the Asante army carried the war to the Akyem.
A prominent authority on Ghana history gives the impression
2
that the war was between only Akyem Abuakwa and Asante*
The evidence so far adduced here leaves room for no doubt 
that the war was between the two Akyem states of Abuakwa 
and Kotoku on the one hand and Asante on the other. The 
Asante army was about twenty thousand strong and was under
• Z
the command of MUrsue Afrie11 (Owusu Afriyie). The Akyem
met them with a much larger number: Abuakwa and Kotoku each
provided an army of ten thousand strong; besides, contin-
4
gents from Ada, Akuapem and Dutch Accra assisted them.
The Akyem forces went to the war with the confidence that
R
they would win.
A series of battles took place. Opinions vary as
1. Juijl (Accra) to EC, 13 and 26 September, 4 and 5 December 
1741, NBKG 105*
2. Wilks, in Ajayi and Crowder, History of West Africa,
Vol. One, pVjTY-
3. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 185.
4. Ibid., pp. 182-3. The Dutch Accra, led by their Chief 
Daako, sided with Akyem against Dutch advice, Cf. Kuijl 
(Accra) to EC, 5 December 1741, NBKG 105• Daako lost his 
life. -Cf. Janson (Apam) to Juijl (Accra), n.d.
5. Juijl (Accra) & EC, 4 and 5 December 1741, NBKG. 105*
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to how many there were. One says t h r e e a n d  another gives
2two. One thing common to these views is that they suggest
that the war was keenly contested. By March 1742, however,
the Akyem had suffered a terrible defeat.^ Their losses must
have been heavy: Apaw lost his life; Owusu Akyem, the
Abuakwa warrior prince, also fell in the war; Baa Kwante as
well as many members of the Akyem aristocracy, seeing that
the war was lost, committed suicide; and a little under ten
thousand of their number were captured, among them the Kotoku
4
Prince Broni, and Asare, an Abuakwa Prince.
Those of the Akyem who survived death or capture 
attributed their defeat to the defectiveness of the Danish 
manufactured guns they used in the war. The fault with the 
guns may have indeed partly led to their downfall, for the 
Danes, on receiving the Akyem complaint, examined their guns 
and actually found them to be faulty. Asante military 
strength, of course was the other major factor.
In spite of the defeat the Akyem would not submit. 
They held on for two years, by resorting to guerrilla war­
fare. It was the Asante themselves who initiated moves
1. Romer, Tilforladlig» pp. 183-4.
2. Reindorf, History » p.81.
3. Kuijl to EC, 18 March; Minutes of EC Council Meeting,
22 March; Raams & Verscheuren. Journal of a Voyage to 
Accra, 25 March and 4 April 1742, NBKG.106. Governor and 
Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 19 March 1742, Vfek 123; 
Richard Graves (CCC) to RAC, 3 April 17*12, T70/1515. Cf. 
also Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 102.
4. Romer, Tilforladlig, pp. 183-5.
5. Ibid. p.213.
towards a peace settlement. Opoku Ware is reported to have 
sent to inform the Akyem of his intentions to live peaceably 
with them provided
(i) They would enstool the captive Akyem princes, 
Broni and Asare, as Kotokuhene and Abuakwahene 
respectively;
(ii) they would ensure safety to Asante traders 
and travellers passing through Akyem terri­
tory to and from the Ga coast;
(iii) they would surrender the 'notes1 for the 
forts and castles in the Ga district;
(iv) they would sentl representatives to Kumasi to 
treat formally with him. 1
Abuakwa and Kotoku reacted differently to the offer.
Kotoku accepted it. During the two years after 1742 they were
a vagabond nation. They seem to have enstooled Ampem as their
King. But on accepting the peace terms from Asante they
2
deposed Ampem and put Broni in his place. Abuakwa, on the 
other hand rejected the peace offer and determined to resist 
Asante.
But whether they chose to be stubborn or submit, 
the defeat in 1742 brought the Akyem domination in the south­
east to an end. All their former subject states welcomed 
Asante as the new overlord. Nor were the European trading 
companies slow in deciding to pay the ground-rents of their 
forts to the Asantehene.
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, pp. 188-9 .
2. Reindorf, History, p. 8 0.
3 . The Abuakwa resistance is discussed in Chapter 4 below.
After defeating Akwamu in 1720 and the Agona in 
1723, Abuakwa and Kotoku stood on a proud pinnacle of 
imperial power and prestige. Success also conferred on 
them economic prosperity. But this very achievement created 
its own problems. They had the ability to and did solve 
many of them. But when they were called upon in 1742 to 
solve the perennial problem of tension with Asante they 
were found wanting. By their failure they lost an empire 
that was barely ten years old.
CHAPTER 4
ABUAKWA, KOTOKU AND ASANTE, 1742-1784
The 1742 debacle presented Abuakwa and Kotoku with 
two alternatives: they had to choose between quick submission, 
with consequential acceptance of vassalage, to Asante, and 
continued resistance in spite of defeat. There is the view, 
first expressed in the early l820s and repeated more recently, 
that by 1750 all Akyem had submitted to Asante imperial 
domination. 1 This view is only true in relation to Kotoku 
which submitted to Asante soon after the 1742 war. But 
Abuakwa, under Pobi (1742-1764) and Obirikoran (1764-1784) 
could not so easily reconcile itself to the status of a
p
willing vassal, and resisted Asante domination till 1783 
when it finally submitted.
The contrast between the two decisions derived 
mainly from the different geographical positions and attitudes 
of the two states in relation to Asante. Proximity to Asante 
militated against the desire and ability of Kotoku to resist 
Kumasi with effect. According to Romer, Asante itself 
offered peace terms to the Akyem states about two years 
after the 1742 war. Kotoku accepted the terms. It must 
have been after the acceptance that Asante political thinkers 
and war strategists recommended the unprecedented measure of
1. Dupuis, A Residence, p. 234; Boahen, Topics, p. 74, and 
in Ajayi & Espie, A Thousand Years, p. Ib4.
2. Wilks, I., Asante in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 
University Press (CUP), 197$» P* 24.
3 . Romer, Tilforladlig, pp. 188-9 .
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forcing the Kotoku to remove their capital, Oda, on the 
east bank of the Pra, to Dampon, on the west bank.’1’ The
transplantation deprived the Kotoku of the Pra as a barrier
2
to,and a bastion of defence against; Asante. Besides, the
measure pulled the Kotoku ruling house nearer to
metropolitan Asante, and thereby increased prospects of
closer and constant Kumasi surveillance on political climate
in Kotoku. The slightest indication of recalcitrance and
restiveness could easily and quickly bring a punitive armed
expedition against Kotoku, as happened in 1781 .^  There is
an indication that Kotoku experienced a more subtle form of
the transplantation measure. Asantehene Opoku Ware I is
reported to have given the name f,Asante-Akyem” to northern 
4Akyem. This would suggest an Asante policy aimed at making 
the Kotoku forget themselves as Akyem. These measures so 
weakened the Kotoku that between 1744 and 1783 when Abuakwa 
ultimately yielded to Asante, they had staged only one revolt 
against Asante; this was in or about 1781* hut it was not
R
successful.
Proximity and over all inclination towards loyalty 
to Asante so worked against Kotoku, that it is to be wondered 
at that Asante leaders ultimately failed to bring about full
1. Reindorf History pp. 82 & 8 9.
2. In 1717 they made a good use of the river to defeat an 
invading Asante army. cf. Chapter 2 p. 69 above.
3 . Dupuis, A Residence, p. 244.
4. ”Precis of Akim claims; Confidential Report, No. 34-5/00, 
dd. 7th January 1903* File No. D.46, Kumasi Archives.
5. Bowdich, Mission, p. 237; Dupuis, A Residence, p. 244; 
Reindor£ History, pp. 133-4; "Precis of Akim claims”,
MP. 5505/W-
integration with Kotoku. The Asante failure is all the more 
striking since other factors favoured such a course. In 
language, culture, manners, ethnic affinity, and above all 
social as well as political systems, the Kotoku were every 
bit akin to the Asante. This view is equally applicable to 
Akuakwa and non-Akyem states like Kwawu, Denkyera, Assin 
(Apemanim and Atandoso), Twifo and Wassa. Inability to 
conceive integration between the various Akan groups as an 
ultimate and desirable goal seems to explain the Asante 
failure. Excellent at conquering, eighteenth century Asante 
could not devise tight provincial administration, which alone 
could have ensured the continuous subservience of vassal 
states and thereby pave the way for ultimate integration 
with such subject states which, by every standard, were 
kindred to them. 1 This omission, coupled with Asante 
tendency to be harsh in exacting vassal obligations, often 
created in subject states a disposition to rebellion. This 
was particularly the case with these of them who were fairly 
removed from metropolitan Asante and at the same time were 
fortunate to have leaders with indomitable spirit.
Abuakwa had these two advantages. Situated to the
south of Kotoku, Abuakwa was, by that fact, further removed
from Asante than was Kotoku. In fact Afcuakwa could sometimes
2
use Kotoku as a buffer against Asante. But its greater 
fortune lay in the enstoolment of forceful rulers after 174-2. 
Pobi, sometimes called Pobi Asomani, succeeded to the stool 
after the death of Baa Kwante who was killed in the 174-2 war
1. For useful discussions on the subject of Asante provincial 
administration, see I. Wilks, "Ashanti Government", in D. 
Forde & P.M. Kaberry (ed) West African Kingdoms in the 
Nineteenth Century (0UP)-1967) PP* 206-238; GP Hagan,
11 A'shantl Bureaucracy", in THSG Vol. XII (1971) PP* 43*62.
2. See Chapter 2, p. 65 above.
with Asante. Right from the beginning of his reign Pobi
showed the same fighting spirit as Prince Owusu Akyem had
possessed. He was determined to resist Asante. Guerrilla
warfare and alliances were the two major methods he used
in opposing Asante militarism. He and his subjects were
probably that section of the Akyem who were reported to
have fled "eastwards" immediately after the 1742 war. 1 To
flee his kingdom after the March 1742 defeat would give him
a breathing space to reorganize his forces. He gave battle
to the Asante occupation army in April 1742, and once again
2
Abuakwa suffered a defeat. It was after this second defeat
of Abuakwa that the invaders were able to gain a passage
through to Accra to announce their victory formally on the
coast. Even then the general opinion on the coast was that
■3
there would be further fighting between the two peoples.
Asante inability to gain access through Akyem to the Ga
, 4coast until about mid-1743 suggests continued Abuakwa 
resistance. But problems which Asante faced elsewhere seem 
to have indirectly assisted the Abuakwa resistance. For 
example, Sahwi, to the north-west of Asante, invaded and
1. Kuijl (Accra) to Director-General de Petersen (EC)
18 March 1742, NBKG 106.
2. Richard Graves (Accra) to CCC, 3 April 1742 (T70/1515); 
cf. also S. Tenkorang, "The importance of firearms in- 
the struggle between Ashanti and the coastal states", in 
the THSG Vol. IX (1968) p. 5 notes 22 and 2 3.
3 . Director-General de Petersen (EC) to the Assembly of Ten 
(Amsterdam) 9 July 1742 WIV 488).
4. Jorgesen to Dorph, 25 May; Dorph (CCO) to Copenhagen,
11 July 1743 Vgk 123; breve og documenter fra Guinea; 
1732-1745. '
sacked Kumasi while the Asante army was still campaigning 
in Akyem and Asantehene Opoku Ware I had to double-march 
part of his army back home in order to deal with the Sahwi. 1 
Dagomba to the north-east, was restive, and eventually
p
revolted in 1744. Perhaps it was these other problems
which compelled Asante to offer to the Akyem states the
peace terms already referred to. This move was all the
more necessary for Asante to make because the conflict with
Akyem Abuakwa led to strained Asante-Fante relations.
Greediness had inspired the Fante to help themselves to
booty from defeated Akyem, even though they were not allies
of Asante in the 1742 war.^ Another cause was probably the
4execution, by the Fante, of an Asante chief. After dealing 
with the Sahwi, Opoku Ware in 1743 decided to curtail his 
war with Akyem in order to prepare for an armed expedition 
against Dagomba and for this venture, which took place in 
1744,^ he "had all the powder bought up in both Accra and 
Elmina. ”6
The diversion of Asante*s attention to other 
directions gave the Abuakwa time to re-organize themselves. 
Between 1742 and 1746 they were a homeless people crouching
1. Reindorf, History, pp. 81-2.
2. Billsen’s letters, 30 March & 21 July 1744 (Vgk 123).
3 . Janson (Apam) to Kuijl (Accra) 30 March 1742, enclosed in 
Raems & Verscheuren (Accra) to de Petersen (EC) to April 
1742 (NBKG 106).
4. D-G de Petersen's Report, 9 July 1742 (WIC 488).
3. Cf Wilks, in Ajayi & Crowder, Vol. One, p. 377 for a
discussion of the Asante campaign in Dagomba.
6 . De Petersen (EC) to the Assembly of Ten (Amsterdam)
31 October 1744-(WIC 488).
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on ’’the hill country” . 1 ’’The hill country” was perhaps a
reference to the Begoro section of the Kintampo-Kwawu-
Kofori-dua hill range. Such a terrain would be difficult
for an enemy force to storm. The Abuakwa were a defeated,
2
but not a destroyed, nation.
Failure of Asante to restore Voltaic Akwamu to 
their pre-1730 inheritance is the best measure of the 
success of the Abuakwa resistance against Asante. The 
restoration had been one of the aims of Asantehene Opoku 
Ware I in declaring war on the Akyem in 1742. But Asante 
was never able to achieve this goal, owing to the effec­
tiveness of Abuakwa resistance. In 1747 Pobi ruthlessly 
suppressed a revolt in ’’Old Akwamu”.^  Next he carried the
war to Voltaic or New Akwamu, the inhabitants of which he
c;
forced to seek refuge on an island in the Volta. Thus 
far from Asante resuscitating pre-1730 Akwamu, Akyem 
Abuakwa, in reply to Asante attacks, was wreaking 
vengeance on what was left of Akwamu power on either side 
of the Volta.
Pobi did more than that. Four years crouching on 
the Begoro hills obliged him to espouse an "eastern” policy, 
aimed at conquering that area. This was the home of the
1. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 21 July 1746
Vgk 883; Sekeretprotokoller fort de Christiansborg i 
Guinea, 1746-1754.
2. Fynn Ph. D. Thesis, p. 167. In his published work, 
however, Fynn simply says Asante annexed part of Akyem, 
cf. Asante p. 75*
3 . Cf. Chapter 3 P* 113 above.
' 4. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 18 January 1747* 
Vgk 883.
5 . Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen 6 February 1747* 
Vgk 883.
Gyakiti, a Guan-Kyerepon community. The descendants of
these people now inhabit the west bank of the Volta opposite
Akwamufie. They recall that their original home was
Toprefu, as they called the Begoro-Bososo district. They
attribute their emigration from this district to pressures
from Akyem Abuakwa who had been defeated by Asante and
driven to the Osino neighbourhood. 1 The evidence from the
Gyakiti tradition finds confirmation from Begoro (Abuakwa)
tradition, which names Topremanso, Ketekraa, Besease, Boso,
Bosomfi, Akwaawa, Meri, Twewa and Supruso as being among the
Guan communities the Fanteakwa (Abuakwa-Begoro) Stool drove
2
away from the Begoro-Bososo District. The two traditions 
do not recall exactly when the Abuakwa subjugated the 
Gyakiti (or Toprefu) country, but the event may be dated 
to the late 1740s. Theirs may have been the hill country 
referred to by the Danes in 1746as the place where a 
section of the Akyem took shelter after their defeat by 
Asante in 1742.^ Toprefu, until then, was under Akwamu 
overlordship. Thus instead of the 1742 Akyem-Asante war 
weakening the authority and narrowing the base of the Akyem, 
it increased both.
A tripartite alliance with Akuapem and Krobo was 
yet another aspect of the "eastern" policy. This alliance
1. Gyakiti Tradition, as related by Kwabena Ayisi, "Chief 
Spokesman of Gyakiti, recorded in Gold Coast Gazette 
Extraordinary No. 6 (1956) P« 91* Tke Gazette contains 
the Report of a Commission appointed to enquire into land 
dispute involving Abuakwa, Akwamu and Manya Krobo.
2. AAT: Begoro (1923/6).
3. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 21 July 1746,
Vgk 883.
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instituted an economic sanction against Asante. Its main 
objective was to prevent Asante from getting to the coast 
trade in the Ga-Adangme area in order to procure firearms 
and ammunition from the European forts and castles there.
The blockade was quite successful, to the discomfiture of 
the pro-Asante Dutch. In May 1746 the Dutch on the coast 
complained to their employers in Holland that they had 
dilligently tried, but in vain, to get the closed trade 
routes opened so as to enable them to send presents from 
Holland to the Asantehene.^ The continued application of 
the blockade up to 1749 obliged Asante traders and travellers, 
desirous to get to the Ga-Adangme coast, first to direct 
their course to Kwawu, descend the hills to the Afram plains, 
and cross the Volta into Akwamu, before working their way,
with the help of Akwamu escort, to the Adangme and Ga coast
2
towns. In fact Opoku Ware died in 1750 without being able 
to subdue the Akyem Abuakwa.
In the 1750s the alliance became the eastern 
counter-part of one in the western sector of southern Gold 
Coast, though not as a result of a planned policy of the 
southern states. The alliance in the West embraced the 
Fante confederate states, Denkyira, and Wassa. All three 
had axes to grind against Asante.
The tension between Fante and Asante had already
1. D-G de Petersen (EC) to Amsterdam, 20 May & 15 November 
1746 (Furley collection, Legon); cf. also Governor & 
Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 21 July 1746, Vgk. 88 3.
2. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 23 May 1748 &
26 November 1749# Vgk. 124: breve og. documenter fra 
Guinea, 1746-1750; Brummer (Accra) to EC, 10 November 
1749, NBKG 110.
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been mentioned. With regard to Denkyera, since 1701
there had been no real peace between her and Asante.
And hostility had always been the main feature of Wassa-
Asante relations since 1721 when Asante invaded that
state and forced the Wassa ruling house to abandon their 
2
country. In 1730-1 this dynasty vainly sought refuge in
Akyem (Kotoku).-^ From then on the Wassa became a vagabond
nation till the 1740s when the Fante allowed them to settle
k
in the interior of Fanteland. The rationale behind the 
Fante hospitality to the Wassa was Fante plan to organize 
concerted action with Wassa against Asante, the common 
enemy. Like the eastern alliance, the western pact was 
defensive; its main objective was to prevent Asante from
acquiring war stores from the European traders on the
5
coast.
In this respect the eastern alliance, headed by 
Abuakwa, was singularly successful, as indicated by Dutch 
inability to get through to Asante. Another yardstick 
was the inability of Asante traders to get to the Ga coast,
1. See p. 122 above.
2. T. Melvil (CCC) to the Committee, 9 & 26 August 1751* 
T.70/29.
3 . Pranger to . Blittersdorp (Accra), 13 December 1730 
NBKG 97; Pranger to the Assembly of Ten (Amsterdam),
1 March 1731 (Furley Collection).
4. Thomas Melvil (CCC) to the Committee of Merchants 
Trading to Africa (The Committee), London, 9 August 
1751 (T70/29).
5 . Tenkorang, ’’Firearms", in THSG Vol. IX p. 5.
6. See p. 125 > above.
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because of "the Akim and Krobo /and Akuapem7 who stay in 
large numbers between Aquamboe and the beach" . 1 There was 
constant anxiety among the Ga and the Dutch as to when 
"Akim Caboceer Pobbie" would open the trade routes for 
"The Asiantee and the Quamboe people". The western 
alliance was equally successful. Opoku Ware I tried to 
smash it in 1748 but failed. As late as 1757 the English 
as well as the Danes and the Dutch were lamenting the 
long absence of the Asante (whom they described as great 
traders) from the western sector of the coast for the past
seven years, on account of a quarrel with Wassahene
•5
Ntsiful. Indicative of the success of the alliance in the
eastern sector was Dutch attempt in 1750 to destroy it by
trying to detach Akuapem and Krobo from Akyem Abuakwa.
Pobi got wind of the move and sent 5*000 soldiers to Ladoku
5
to strengthen the blockade against Asante and Akwamu.
Basically Pobi’s eastern policy was political but 
it was also in response to the dynamics of trade on the Ga- 
Adangme coast. The Akyem drive to the coast had affected 
the slave trade on this section of the coast. Until its
1. Brummer (Accra) to van Hoorst (EC) 10 April; same to 
same 11 & 29 May 1750 (NBKG 111').-
2. Brummer to EC. 17 M&rch 1750 (NBKG 111); cf also Letters
from CCO to Copenhagen, 23 May and 10 August 1750 (Vgk
124) and 17 September 1750 (Vgk 883).
3 . Thomas Melvil (CCC) to the Committee, 9 & 26 August 1751*
T70/29.
4. Brummer (Accra) to EC, II, 18 & 29 May; Brummer (Ponny) 
to EC, 3 December 1750* NBKG 111.
5. Ibid.
defeat in 1730 by the Akyem, Akwamu had been the pillar of
the slave trade here. After its defeat and following the
subsequent migration of the ruling dynasty to the trans-
Volta, the trade in Accra decreased in volume, as indicated
by constant European complaints already referred to. Its
centre of gravity would seem to have shifted east-wards, in
response to the Akwamu migration, to the Ladoku coast.
However, the Akwamu emigration does not provide a full
explanation to the shift. Availability of slaves in Krepi
partly explains the change. By mid-eighteenth century this
trans-Volta district was supplying a sizeable proportion of
the slaves in the Gold Coast trade. Hence the practice in
the 1730s of the Abuakwa rulers raiding the district for
slaves. 1 The building of Fort Fredensborg at Ningo by the
Danes during this period, and the general rivalry among the
European trading companies to establish themselves east of 
2
Ga, were other responses to the shift, and no doubt 
indicators to the lucrativity of trade east of Accra.
Pobi’s occupation of Ladoku with a 5*000 strong army in 
1750 was obviously aimed at blocking the loophole the shift 
created in favour of Akwamu and Asante.
The effectiveness of the economic blockade which 
the southern states organized against Asante should have 
encouraged them to take the offensive against that power.
At least during the 1750-1 period such a move stood a good 
chance of being successful. Asante was then in considerable
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 169.
2. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, pp. 108-109*
disarray. A succession dispute following the death of Opoku 
Ware in the first third of 1750 had divided the Kumasi state 
into two factions.^ And the dispute did not end until late
p
1751 when Kusi was selected as the new Asantehene. As
long as the succession dispute remained, psychologically
Asante was ill-prepared for foreign aggression. But there
was no indication that Abuakwa or any of the southern states
ever thought of carrying the war to Asante. In fact throughout
the second half of the eighteenth century and the early years
of the nineteenth none of the Akyem states or the other
southern states ever thought of, much less executed,
aggression against Asante.
This deficiency in the Akyem and other southern
states created in Asante a superiority complex. Kusi Obodum
underlined the Asante confidence in November 1751 when he
announced intentions to invade Akyem Abuakwa within four
•3
months from that time. He was not indulging in empty 
boast. He did attack and defeat Akyem (Abuakwa).^ But once 
again Asante failed to subjugate the country. Pobi continued 
to be in arms throughout the rest of the 1750s and even after. 
The cause of Abuakwa was well served by the rebellion of 
Wassa against Asante. The rebellion attracted much of the 
attention of the Asante Court. In or about 1755 Kumasi put
1. Brummer (Accra) to EC, 3 , 11, 18 & 29 May 1750 (NBKG 111). 
One faction supported Daako and the other Kusi Obodum.
2 . Director-General & Council (EC) to Assembly of Ten 
(Amsterdam) 17 November 1751 (WIC ?490).
3 . Director-General & Council (EC) to Amsterdam, 17 November
1751, WIC 490.
4. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, 109-110.
an array of about 90,000 strong in the field against Wassa. 1
One of the factors encouraging Asante to undertake the
Wassa venture was the steady disintegration of the western
alliance. The Fante, for example, were steadily growing
weary of it. For the existence of the blockade of the
trade routes by the alliance reduced the volume of trade
from the interior to the coast. To the Fante the decrease
meant a great loss in their middlemen1s profits. Thus in a
way the sanctions they themselves had helped to institute
against Asante were backfiring on the Fante. Consequently
in 1750-1 they secretly worked to destroy the ban by
2
clandestinely inciting Asante to attack Wassa. But Asante
could not immediately take advantage of the Fante betrayal
of Wassa, owing to the death of Opoku Ware I about that time.
It was left to Opokufs successor, Kusi Obodum, to attack and
defeat Wassa in 1752.
The Asante victory over Wassa seems to have
frightened Akyem Abuakwa. In or about early 1753* Abuakwa
joined Wassa and other southern states in a move to find a
•3
peace settlement with Asante. In December 1753* Thomas 
Melvil, the governor at Cape Coast Castle, reported of the 
intention of Akyem Abuakwa, Wassa and others including the 
Fante, to send ambassadors to negotiate peace with the
1. Bascot (Axim) to EC, 16 January 1752, NBKG 113.
2. J. Roberts to Halifax, 28 September 1750, cited by Tenkorang, 
"Firearms” in THSG, Vol. IX, p. 6 n. 26; Roberts to 
Hillhouse, 23 November 1750, T70/1476; Fiscal von Dadelbeek 
(EC) to Amsterdam, 16 September 1757 WIC 490.
3 . Governor & Council (CCCJ) to Copenhagen, 3 May 1753 VGK 
124; Thomas Melvil to the Committee, 3 November 1753 
T70/30.
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Asantehene and that he had been asked to appoint a
representative to join the ambassadors to Kumasi.^
The rationale behind the request to the Governor was
probably that the presence of his representative in the
peace mission would lend weight to the move and convince
Asante of the sincerity of the peace seekers.
Besides the Fante effort, Abuakwa initiative
contributed to the launching of the peace move. A member
of the Abuakwa ruling house was given great credit in
this respect. In August 1754 the English recorded that
ffa near relation of Ous, formerly King of Akim 
/i.e. Owusu Akyem who was a Prince and not King7 
went to Ashantee without communicating his design 
to any one. When he came before Quishee /Kusi/, 
he told who he was, on which orders were given 
to chop off his head. But he very cooly told 
the King that if he had a passion for his head, 
he was welcome to it, only he wished he /King/ 
would first give him time to tell what carried 
him there; this was granted. I observe, said 
he, that for many years you on one side, Akim, 
Dinkera, and Warsaw on the other, have kept 
each other at bay, neither party choosing to 
fight, and yet you do not make peace. It is 
for this reason that I am come to know your 
terms, if I can be the means of reconciling 
all your differences, I shall esteem it the 
greatest action of my life; if I fail, you may 
dispose of my head as you please. Quishee and 
all present applauded the resolution and good 
intentions of the man. A treaty was immediately 
set on foot and concluded on their terms. The 
Ashantees are to recover 1600 oz of gold, viz 
from Warsaw 800 oz, from Akim /Kbuakwa/ 400 oz, 
and from Dinkira 400 oz. Of this money the 
Warsaws have paid 400 oz to the King’s messengers
1. Melvil to Committee, 26 December 1753* also same to 
same, 4 April 1754, T70/30; ”A narrative of Transactions 
with the Fantees on the death of Intuffero (Ntsiful), 
King of Warsaw” (Wassa), 1752, T70/50 pp. Ilf.
now in their camp. The other moeity is to be 
paid when Say /Osel/, heir to the Stool or Throne
  of Ashantee takes fetish to observe what
has been concluded"^
The reaction of the European traders to the peace 
agreement seems to have been one of relief. The Dutch for 
instance were happy at the prospect of the peace settlement. 
They noted how the Akyem had agreed in principle to serve 
Asante; and hoped that eventual peace settlement would be
2
reached very soon to make it possible for trade to recover. 
Contrary to the Dutch expectation, however, the peace price 
to be paid by Abuakwa became a subject of misunderstanding 
between them and the Asante government, and nearly led to 
a breakdown of the negotiations. The details are not known 
but the differences must have been great enough, because the 
Akyem delegates to the talks were detained at one stage and 
rumours circulated in May 1755 that Asante might take the 
field against Abuakwa at any moment. Abuakwa attempt to 
change its mind seems to have caused the hitch. The change
1. Thomas Melvil (CCC) to Committee, 7 August 1754 (T70/30).
The money to be paid by the three peoples to Ashantee was 
probably a form of compensation rather than tribute.
Among the Akan (and other Ghanaian peoples) in a quarrel 
or dispute the party found guilty was expected to pay 
money called mpata i.e. compensation, to appease the 
offended party. By virtue of earlier victories, Asante 
was the overlord of these three states. The latter*s 
continued resistance against Asante amounted to rebellion 
and therefore an offence against Asante.
2. Pieter Woortman to EC, noted in EC Journal, entry ? July 
1754, NBKG 115.
5. Woortman (Apam) to EC, 13 May 1755; NBKG 116, de Graft 
(Accra) to EC,-l4 June 1755# NBKG 116; Day-Journal (CCO), 
entries, 5 June 1754 & 5 March 1755# Vgk; Sekretprotokoller, 
1755-1762.
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of attitude was perhaps a contagion from Wassa. The
Wassahene, Enimil I , 1 acting under the influence of his War
2
Chief, Asare, refused to ratify the peace pact, and may
well have tried to persuade the Abuakwahene to follow his
example. Consequently it was not until 1757 that Akyem
Abuakwa finally reached a truce with Asante;^ while Wassa
4was still opposed to it. As a result of the truce, in 
October 1757 Akyem (Abuakwa) and Asante traders turned up 
in strength to trade on the Ga-Adangbe coast.
This encouraging development was, however, short­
lived. Within three years the truce had broken down, and 
parties were back to their pre-1757 positions. Lack of 
interest in true peace settlement on the part of Abuakwa 
and bad influence from Wassa appear to have been the causes 
of the breakdown. Pobi’s aim in reaching the 1757 truce was 
obviously to gain a breathing space. Bad influence from 
Wassa is suggested by the ultimate alignment between 
Abuakwa and that state. Between 1758 and 1759 the Fante
1. Ntsiful died in 1752.
2. Tenkorang, ’’Firearms”, in THSG Vol. IX p. 7*
3. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 15 August 1757 
(Diverse Arkivalier fra-Guine), I am grateful to Mr.
Ole Justesen of University of-Copenhagen (1969) who drew 
my attention to this source.
4. Tenkorang, ’Firearms’, in THSG. Vol. IX p. 7*
5. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 22 October 1757* 
Diverse Arkwalier.
6 . Cf. p. 135 below.
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tried in vain to wean Wassa from its uncomproraising
attitude towards Asante. But Wassa remained adamant.
So irritating did Fante find the attitude that they
threatened to sack the Wassa from the Fante country.^
Worse for Wassa the Fante Confederation resolved at Abura
to, and did, inform Kumasi of their anger against Wassa for
2its intransigence. This action led to a strengthening of
-5
the rapprochement between Asante and Fante.
Asante flirtation with Old Akwamu may have also
contributed to the breakdown of the 1757 truce. For in
July 1760 Pobi ordered an attack on Old Akwamu; the object
of the attack was two fold: it was a punitive measure against
the restive province, and a calculated move to round up all
4
Asante citizens found there. The expedition was successful. 
Thus to Old Akwamu the 1742 Asante invasion of the Akyem 
states eventually brought neither freedom nor peace and
5
prosperity as Asantehene Opoku Ware had hoped it would.
Abuakwa presence there had come to stay. Neither recalcitrance 
and rebellion of the Akwamu nor Asante efforts, could save Old 
Akwamu from ultimate incorporation into the Abuakwa state 
complex that was evolving.
1. Nassau Senior (CCC) to the Committee, 15 June & 5 July 1758, 
T70/30.
2. Senior to the Committee, 3 January, 5 & 22 May and 3 June 
1759, T70/30.
3 . Senior to the Committee, 25 September 1759; Mutter to the
Committee, 15 October 1760, T70/30.
4. Blyenburg (Accra) to EC, 17 July 1760, (NBKG 121).
5. Wilks, M.A. Thesis, p. 135.
6 . The incorporation is fully discussed in Chapter 5* 
pp. 158-9 below.
With Old Akwamu subdued, Pobi felt free enough
to organize an alliance with Denkyera, Twifo and Wassa
against Asante.'*’ This was probably the time, as Dupuis
suggests, when the Yoruba State of Oyo, in Dahomey,
encouraged Akyem, Kwawu and others against Asante, on the
2
promise of Oyo military assistance, though the assistance 
never came. The alliance was more of defensive than 
offensive in nature. Like preceding southern alliances its 
main aim was to institute an economic sanction against 
Asante by tightening up the blockade of the trade routes 
to the coast against that power. The alliance was also in 
reply to what its members considered to be Fante perfidy in 
siding with Asante.
The blockade of the trade routes was a great 
success, to the utter annoyance of the Dutch. As a 
reprisal against tbs members of the alliance the Dutch in 
1760 took the decision not to sell firearms and ammunition 
to the Akyem Abuakwa in particular and Denkyera and Wassa 
generally. Asante was of course furious and looked for 
ways and means to hit back at members of the alliance,
4
especially Akyem Abuakwa.
The times were opportune for the southern states 
to consider organizing an attack on Asante. Leadership
1. Blyenburg (Accra) to EC. 9 September 1760 (NBKG 121); 
David Pieter Erasmi (EC; to Amsterdam, 22 March 1761
wic 115'.
2. Dupuis, A Residence, pp. 237-8. Claridge, Vol. I
pp. 210-211.
3 . Blyenburg to EC. 17 July 176O; EC Journal, entries,
26 & 28 November 1760, NBKG 121.
4. Erasmi (EC) to Senya Breku, 28 November 1760. NBKG 121.
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there was then relatively weak. There is certainly 
substance in the view that Asantehene Kusi Obodum was a 
mediocrity in statecraft.^ Between 1759 and 1760 rumours
kept circulating that he would soon descend on his southern
2
enemies. He even warned the English at Cape Coast Castle
that he would take a serious view of it if the English
continued to give arms and ammunition to the Wassa for
example, as they had allegedly been doing, because he was
about to attack the Wassa.^ But the English treated the
warning with contempt, saying Asante under Kusi could never
take the field against Wassa or any of the other southern 
4
states. Developments in Akyem however, forced Asante to 
take up arms once more in 1764. As already noted an Akyem- 
Oyo friendship seems to have been developing. Asante tried to 
prevent this development before it got out of hand. In 1764 
Akyem was invaded by an Asante army under the command of the 
Juabenhene. The details of the war are not certain. But it 
appears that the Akyem suffered a defeat. One report said ”the 
residue of Akim” tried, or at least planned, to migrate to 
trans-Volta in order to put themselves under the protection
1. Fuller, A Vanished Dynasty, p. 31* Others hold contrary 
views, saying that tne times were very difficult for 
Asante under Kusi. Cf. Fynn, Asante, p. 8 6.
2. Senior (CCC) to the Committee, 29 September 1759 (T70/1964); 
same to same, 3 February & 20 May 1760; Mutter (CCC) to 
Committee, 15 October 1760 (T70/30).
3. Mutter’s 15 October 1760 Report.
4. Senior to the Committee, 27 November 1760 (T70/30).
5 . The palatine state of Juaben was a leading member of the 
Asante confederation. Its Chief regarded himself as 
next to the Asantehene . . Asante success against Akyem 
Abuakwa may have partly encouraged them to undertake the 
trans-Volta venture which eventually led to their defeat 
by Oyo in 1764. Cf. Fynn, Asante, p. 96
of "Ashampoe, King of Popo".1 "The residueof Akim" must of 
necessity refer to Abuakwa since Kotoku had already accepted 
"dominion of Ashantee," as the report says. But Akuakwa 
was not yet subdued. Asante traders could scarcely visit 
the coast between the Tano in the west and the Volta in 
the east largely because of Abuakwa hostility. European 
opinion on the coast was that Asante would never have easy 
access to the forts and castles unless she succeeded first
in smashing the alliance between Akyem (Abuakwa), Denkyera,
2
Twifo and Wassa.
The over-all success of the economic blockade the 
allies organized against Asante should have given them 
inspiration to defend themselves militarily, if they were 
too cautious to take the offensive against Asante. But by 
1764 there were signs that the Southern Alliance would soon 
collapse; strains and stresses had set in. Abuakwa 
contributed to this development. Abuakwa-Wassa relations 
had become strained owing to what the Wassahene regarded 
as Pobi’s interference in Wassa internal affairs. An 
unsuccessful palace coup led by Asare, the Wassa war chief, 
against Wassahene Enimil I in 1763 had brought about a 
civil conflict in Wassa.^ In or about early 1764 Asare 
fled his country and sought protection with Pobi of Abuakwa.
1. Gilbert Petrie (CCC) to the Committee, 20 August 1764, 
cited by Kea, "Akwamu-Anlo Relations", in THSG. Vol. X. 
(1969) P. 37.
2. Hujdecoper & Council (EC) to Amsterdam, 15 October 1764 
(WIC 115).
3 . EC Journal, entry, 9 February 1763 (NBKG 124).
4. Mutter (CCC) to the Committee, 27 May 1764 (T70/31).
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To Pobi Enimll applied for Asare's extradition to Wassa to 
face justice. But Pobi refused to deliver him up. The 
stand of the Abuakwakene was unfortunate for the southern 
alliance. By October 1764 it had led to the straining of 
relations between the two states.1
A much greater harm to the alliance, however, was 
the withdrawal of Denkyerahene Owusu Bore from it in 1765- 
The immediate cause of the withdrawal was Denkyera’s secret 
understanding with Asante. Reports reaching the coast said 
that the
"King of Dinkira, was suspected by his allies above 
mentioned of carrying on a correspondence privately 
with the Ashantees and of having formed a design of 
abandoning his own country in order to assist the 
Ashantees in destroying the other nations in 
alliance with them.
Accordingly when the Warsaws panniared (sic)
Ashantees .....Ousbody2/Owusu Bore/ insisted on
their being set at liberty. The Warsaws and 
their allies refused to do this and being now 
convinced of Ousbody's underhand practice, there 
more determined to put him to death, and fixed 
upon the next Saturday for putting their scheme 
in execution. However, Ousbody on the Thursday 
morning preceeding, fell upon them at 5 o fclock, 
and as they had not the least intention of his 
design, nothing could save them but their heels; 
a considerable number were killed and many taken 
prisoners; who, it seems, afterwards made their 
escape, and it is thought that the booty in gold 
and agree /Agore/ beads will be very considerable 
.... The King of Dinkirah and his people 
immediately set out, and have fixed their camp 
about half-way between Warsaw and Ashantee. The 
Ashantees now give out that they will join the 
Dinkirahs and then attack the Warsaws, Akims, and 
Tufferoes, in which case they /Xsante/ will, in 
all probability, become masters and consequently 
force trade to the waterside /coast/”
1. Mutter (CCC) to the Committee, 21 January 1765 (T70/31)*
2. i.e. the Denkyerahene.
3 . Mutter (CCC) to the Committee, 25 April 1765 (T70/31)*
The change in the fortunes of the Alliance reflected 
current dynamic leadership in Asante. MZey Commah" (i.e. Osei 
Kwadwo), had succeeded to the Golden stool following the 
destoolment of Kusi Obodum. The new Asantehene was "young, 
war-like, enterprising”, and religiously committed to the 
policy of total destruction of his enemies, namely members 
of the southern alliance, or the remnant of it, made up of 
Akyem Abuakwa, Twifo, and Wassa. By mid-1765 he had declared 
war, overtly against the entire alliance but covertly against 
Abuakwa alone. 1
The Alliance's forces rallied at a place called 
"Benda” (Benna) which was about forty miles to the north of
o
Cape Coast. Here the fate of the southern alliance and its 
pivot, Akyem Abuakwa, was sealed. For it was at this juncture 
that Asante subversive diplomacy worked extra hard to effect 
a greater damage to the alliance than the Denkyera perfidy. 
Twifo and Wassa also withdrew from it. Their forces left 
Benna and quartered themselves at a place called "Ahiman” 
(?Heman), allegedly at the instigation of Asante.^ Thus by 
July 1765 the twenty-three year old grand alliance of the 
southern states had completely disintegrated, leaving Akyem 
Abuakwa, its pivot, to face the brunt of Asante fury, led by 
Osei Kwadwo, a young and virile King who was as anxious to 
win his spurs as Pobi was keen to re-establish the pre-1742 
Abuakwa domination in the south-east.
Hostile relations with Fante worsened the 
situation for Abuakwa. Before Asante took up arms against
1. Mutter to Committee, 20 July 1765, T70/51*
2. Ibid.
5. Mutter to the Committee, 25 April, 17^5 T70/51.
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the south, Abuakwa was already at war with Fante. The
immediate cause of the war is uncertain. Most probably
Fante, like Asante, had come to the conclusion that
Abuakwa was the main-stay of the southern alliance and
therefore the chief promoter of the economic blockade against
Asante by which the Fante were losing trade profits. It is
equally possible that Abuakwa initiated the war to please
Wassa and thereby recover its tarnished image with that
state owing to the Asare affair. Whatever the immediate
cause of the war, by June 1765 the fortunes were favouring
Pobi. The imminent Abuakwa success seems to have forced
Fante to reach the final pact with Asante, spoken of by
Margaret Priestley.1 For it was precisely at this juncture
2
that Asante took the field against Abuakwa.
Abuakwa could not cope with the increase in the 
enemy forces. The war with Fante had naturally weakened 
her militarily. And deserted by their allies, the 
Abuakwa, in the war with Asante, fell flan easy prey into 
the hands of their enemies, /but/ a considerable number
/of them/, it is said, ...... escaped and are at present
/July 17657 in or near their own country."^
The Benna War, as Abuakwa calls it, was a 
disaster for her. Among the fallen or captured was
1. M. Priestley, "Richard Brew: an Eighteenth Century Trader
at Anomabu", in THSG Vol. IV Pt. 1 p. 3 8.
2. E. C. Journal, entry, 13 June 1765, NBKG 126 .
3 . Mutter (CCC) to the Committee, 20 July 1765, T70/31 .
4. AAT: Pamen (1925/6). Reindorf (History, p. 8l) is 
therefore wrong in giving this name to the 1742 war.
The Pamen tradition tallies with documentary evidence.
Pobi himself. There are conflicting contemporary pieces
of evidence as to who killed Pobi, the Fante or Asante.
The Dutch in June 1765 claimed that he was captured by the
Asante. 1 But the English in July said "Poby ..... is a
prisoner among the Fantees”. The Dutch assertion
seems to gain strength from the view held in early
nineteenth century that Abuakwahene Atta Owusu (l807-l8ll)
hated Asante because Asantehene Osei Kwadwo had killed a
predecessor of Atta's.^ Possibly Pobi was captured by
neither the Fante nor the Asante, but committed suicide
4
when the day was lost. For one thing neither Asante nor 
Fante claim to have taken possession of Pobi’s skull, 
something Asante in particular -would have prided itself in 
having as^precious war trophy. For another Abuakwa tradition 
simply states that Pobi and several of his chiefs fell in 
the war, possibly an allusion to suicide. Whatever the 
manner by which Pobi met his death, Abuakwa losses in killed 
or captured appear to have been heavy. Osei Kwadwo is 
reported to have executed "more than four hundred Akims”. 
Besides, the slave markets on the coast became so flooded 
immediately after the war that prices suddenly fell.^ Indeed
1. E.C. Journal, entry, 17 June 1765, NBKG 126 .
2. Mutter to the Committee, 20 July 1765, VT70/31 , cf. also
Priestley in J.A.H. Vol. II (1961) p. 43*
5 . See Chapter 5 P« 166 below.
4. Fynn, Asante, p. 100.
5 . Letter from Kormantse, 2 July 1765 NBKG 126'.
6. Mutter’s Report of 20 July 1765 T70/51 • Mutter said 
male slaves sold at 6 or 7 ozs. of gold while price for 
female slaves was 4 or 5 ozs. He however, did not state the 
prices prior to the Benna War.
the view prevailed in 1766 that Abuakwa was a destroyed
nation. 1 But this seems to have been an exaggeration.
The Abuakwa had merely been defeated in a battle. They had
no intentions to submit to Asante. For they quickly
retreated into their own country in order to regroup their 
2
forces, thanks to a breakdown of the Fante-Asante alliance.
The cause of the breakdown has been traced to
unwarranted Asante entry into Fante territory after the 
■3
Benna war. This view appears to be only part of the cause.
Fante betrayal of trust was probably another and perhaps a
greater cause. During the Benna war, the Fante seized many
Asante subjects, besides a large number of the defeated
Abuakwa, and quickly sold them into slavery; moreover, the
Fante denied Osei Kwadwo permission to sell Akyem prisoners
h
of war directly to the forts in Fante. Consequently for 
several days, according to Mutter, there were skirmishes 
between the two until lack of provisions and an outbreak 
of smallpox in the Asante camp forced Osei Kwadwo to 
withdraw his army from Fante.
The Fante feared that Asante might strike again. 
This fear drove the fickle Fante to seek alliance once more 
with Wassa .and Twifo. But as the recent perfidy of the Fante 
was too fresh in their minds, these two nations were not
1. John Hippesley (CCC) to the Committee, 2 March 1766, 
(T70/31).
2. Mutter’s Report, 20 July 1765*
3. Priestley & Wilks, in JAH Vol. I No. 1 (i960) p. 94; 
Priestley in THSG. Vol. IV Pt. 1. (1959) p.'3o; Priestley 
in JAH Vol. II 1961) p. 43.
4. Mutter’s 20 July Report, cf. also Tenkorang, "Firearms”, 
in THSG Vol. IX p. 10.
145.
enthusiastic about such an alliance, not even when the
Fante leaders undertook to give up, as hostages, important
Fante personalities to back their word.1 The reluctance of
Wassa and Twifo may also have been partly due to the
intrigues of the Dutch who were trying to persuadethem
2
against the alliance. All this shows rank particularism 
among the southern states, a deficiency which made them 
incapable of forging a genuine and sustained united front 
against their common enemy, Asante. Little wonder that up 
to the 1770s many of them were in imminent danger of being 
attacked by that power. Fortunately for them Asante was 
unable to strike immediately as was expected. Opinion was 
divided in Kumasi as to the wisdom of a new invasion of the 
south. One view, held by the more youthful party, supported 
by the vigorous Osei Kwadwo and the Queenmother, favoured 
such a measure. But "the oldest councellors endeavoured to 
divert him /Osei Kwadwo/ from his design."^
This considerable internal instability in Asante 
proved very useful to Abuakwa. It prevented Asante from 
following up its success in 1765 with further pressures on 
Abuakwa.
1. Mutter to the Committee, 25 October 1765 (T70/51).
2 . Ibid.
5 . Hippersley (CCC) to Committee, 15 July 1766; Gilbert
Petrie (CCC) to-the Committee, 15 September & 20 October 
1766; same to same, 51 January, 9 October 1767# 10 
February, 51 March, 27 August and 21 October 1768;
David Mill (CCC) to the Committee, 22 June 1772 (T70/51).
4. Hippersley (CCC) to the Committee, 20 March 1766,
(T70/51).
Meanwhile Obirikoran succeeded to the Abuakwa 
s t o o l H i s  was a very difficult inheritance. In twenty- 
three years the Abuakwa had suffered two disastrous defeats 
at the hands of Asante, the second defeat occurring barely a 
few months before his accession to the Abuakwa stool.
Continued resistance seemed to promise nothing but further 
disaster, while submission would of course compromise the 
independence of Akyem Abuakwa. Obirikoran!s subsequent 
activities show that he, like Pobi, his immediate predecessor, 
was determined to resist Asante to the best of his ability.
The only difference between the two was that Obirikoran 
was prepared to temper resistance with submission in order 
to gain temporary respite and muster forces once more 
against the enemy.
The military situation after the 1765 war was
most unwholesome for Abuakwa. Obirikoran decided to submit
to Kumasi. Fortunately for him Asante too desired peace.
Fante, Twifo, and Wassa had renewed the economic sanctions
against Asante by blocking the trade routes to the western
2
sector of the coast. Peace with Abuakwa would therefore 
assure Asante access to the European trade on the eastern 
sector of the coast. It is therefore not unreasonable to 
imagine Asantehene Osei Kwadwo taking the initiative, as 
Opoku Ware had done after the 1742 war, to cox Abuakwa to 
a peace settlement. At any rate in or about February 1766
1. AAT: Pamen (1925/6).
2. Tenkorang, "Firearms”, in THSG- Vol. IX (1968)
pp. 11-1 2.
3 . Gilbert Petrie (CCC) to the Committee, 13 September 1766, 
T70/31.
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Obirikoran accepted allegiance to Asante in principle and 
promised to go to Kumasi at the appropriate time to 
formally swear the oath of allegiance to the Golden Stool. 1 
Hippesley was probably referring to this submission in March 
1766 when he said that war stores the Akyem were purchasing
o
in that month were “professedly for thejrnew masters”. The
submission does not appear to have very seriously affected
the prestige of Abuakwa in south-eastern Gold Coast. For in
late 1766 both black and white were anxiously awaiting an
•3
expected visit of Obirikoran to the Ga coast.
In reality the submission was a move to gain time 
and ease the military pressure on Abuakwa. For in 1767
4
Obirikoran renewed hostilities against Asante. He blockaded 
the eastern trade routes against Asante access to the trade on 
the coast. To ensure full success of the blockade he re­
established Abuakwa’s links with Akuapem and Krobo. While 
the sanction was primarily directed against Asante, it 
enabled him to resusticate the old trans-Volta policy of 
harassing Akwamu. Early in 1767 he raised a motley army of
Abuakwa, Akuapem and Krobo soldiers, later joined by the
c;
Krepi, with which he invaded Voltaic Akwamu. The venture was
1. EC Journal, entry 29 February; Pieter Woortman (Accra) to 
EC, referred to in EC journal, entry 16 March; same to
same, 12 April; EC journal, entry 16 April 1766, NBKG 127.
2 . Hippesley (CCC) to the Committee, 20 March 1766, T70/31.
3. E.C. journal, entry 12 September; Woortman (Accra) to EC,
17 September 1766, NBKG 127.
4. Petrie (CCC) to the Committee, 20 August 1767* T70/31; 
Priestley, in T.H.S.G. Vol. IV Part I p. 45.
5. EC Journal, entry, 28 February;Director-General Huydecoper 
(EC) to Woortman (Accra),4 March; EC Journal, entry, 21 
March 1767 (NBKG 128). -
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successful. He defeated Akwamu, and forced Akwamuhene
Daako to seek safety on an island in the Volta. 1
Naturally Asante became alarmed at the rate of
Abuakwa resilience. The Asantehene tried to exploit the
attack on Akwamu to remind Obirikoran that he was still
vassal to Asante: Osei Kwadwo requested the Abuakwahene,
as well as the Akwamuhene to come to Kumasi for a settlement
2
of their differences. Obirikoran refused to comply. By
1768 he was feeling strong and bold enough to demand, and
did secure, the ground-rents of all the Accra forts.^ Open
compliance with Obirikoran’s request by the European
trading companies could well lead to misunderstandings
between them and Asante. Consequently some of the
authorities of the European forts, Christiansborg for
example, took the precaution to describe the money paid to
Obirikoran as a commission for his overriding ability to
4
drive trade to the coast. The English also seem to have 
taken a similar precaution because in spite of the payment 
they made to the Abuakwahene, they still retained the 
Asantehene on their pay roll, paying him one benda of gold 
per month. But, however successful they were in deceiving
1. Woortman (Accra) to Huydecoper (EC), 16 March 1767 
(NBKG 128).
2. Woortman to Huydecoper, 15 April; EC Journal, entry,
20 April 1767 (NBKG 128).
3 . Lise M. Johannese (CCO) to Copenhagen, 12 March 1768 
(Vgk); EC Journal, entry, 3 April 1768 (NBKG 129).
4. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 4 December 1768 
(Vgk).
5 . James Port (Accra) Daybooks, entries, January, February, 
September, October, November and December 1768, T70/979*
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the Asante court, there can be no doubt that the European 
Companies were clearly responding to the resurgence of 
Akyem Abuakwa in the south-east.
Asante declaration of war. in mid-1768 against it1
also emphasized the Abuakwa resurgence. Battles were fought
during the months of August and November 1768. Abuakwa
again suffered a defeat and Obirikoran, attempting his first
armed confrontation with Asante, had to take to his heels,
fleeing, with the remnant of his subjects, to a place
2
described as between Akuapem and Asante. A place between 
Akuapem and Asante could well be a reference to either the 
mountain fastness of the Begoro district or Kwawu, if the 
latter was not vassal to Asante. But two defeats in three 
years appear to have discouraged Abuakwa, and Obirikoran was 
obliged to submit to Asante power. He visited Kumasi in
■7.
early 1769 to swear the oath of allegiance to that power.
With the Abuakwa submission vanished any desire 
of Akuapem and Krobo to be hostile to Asante. They too 
went on their knees before Asante. In January 1770, 
Obirikoran, accompanied by some of his own subjects, Asante 
envoys, as well as Akuapem and Krobo ambassadors, arrived 
in Accra. There were two conflicting views as to the 
purpose of his visit. The Dutch said he had come to raise 
a loan of f,100 bendas” of gold iBidkjB the European Companies
1. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 21 July 1768, Vgk.
2. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 1 November 1768
Vgk.
3 . Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 9 March 1769 (Vgk);
de Graft (Accra) to EC, 13 January 1770 (NBKG 131)•
l4g.
to defray the heavy expenses he had incurred at the Asante 
Court during his 1769 visit thither. 1 The Dutch Director- 
General advised against the advance of the loan. De Graft 
the Dutch factor at Port Crevecoeur in 1Dutch1 Accra, 
thought the advice was unfortunate as the Danes and English 
had advanced loans to Obirikoran without any pre-conditions. 
De Graft was perhaps considering the possibility of Abuakwa 
driving all its trade to only the Danish and English Forts. 
This interpretation derives its strength from what the 
English gave as the object of Obirikoranfs visit. They 
said that
"Abricoan ,/0birikoran7, King of A k i m  came
with a good number of Ashantees, Hill country 
^Akuapem/ and Crobbo Caboceers to clear the 
paths from pirates and get trade down to the 
waterside /coas£7 in safety.
The readiness with which the Danes and English 
gave out the loan to the Abuakwahene finds explanation 
here. These pieces of evidence show that the visit probably 
had a dual purpose. Obirikoran perhaps hoped to raise a 
loan ojdi the European companies and at the same time help 
lift the economic sanctions which he himself had largely 
engineered against Asante prior to his defeat in 176 8.
The submission, though it compromised Abuakwa*s 
independence, did not seriously affect the high esteem
1. De Graft (Accra) to EC, 24 January, EC Journal, entry 
29 January 1770 (NBKG 131) The names of the Asante 
envoys were given as ttEtja Corrie” (?Atakora)&nDekyeM 
(?Denkyi).
2. P. Woortman (EC) to de Graft, 3 February;de Graft to 
Woortman 23 February 1770 (NBKG 13l);cf. also Noregaard, 
Danish Settlements, p. 126.
3 . James Fort (Accra) Daybooks, entry, 18 January 1770 
(T70/979).
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which the peoples of south-eastern Gold Coast conferred 
on the Abuakwahene. Akuapem Krobo and Ada, for example, 
looked up to him for direction and assistance. There is no 
indication to suggest any Asante attempt to deprive Abuakwa 
of Old Akwamu as a province, as Asantehene Opoku Ware I had 
hoped to do in the 1740s. 1 Besides,the Ada, far away at
2
the mouth of the Volta, were said to be vassal to Abuakwa.
The Asantehene even appears to have pampered Obirikoran.
Barely four months after his submission, the Asante Court
not only allowed, but assisted him with an army of about
seven thousand strong, to raid some of the Lower trans-
Volta states, especially Anlo, for slaves so as to be in a
position to defray expenses incurred at Kumasi and to pay
•5
his debts to the European companies. The Volta venture was
4
intended also to assist the Ada against the Anlo. To 
ensure the success of the expedition, Obirikoran raised a 
motley army of Akyem, Akuapem and Krobo soldiers. Great 
panic seized the Ga-Adangbe area on this occasion, an 
evidence of Abuakwa resurgence in the south-east. The 
Dutch appealed directly to Obirikoran not to molest any of 
their local allies.^ In July 1770 Obirikoran crossed the
1. See Chapter 3 P*113 n.2above.
2. Pieter Woortman (Accra) to EC, 15 June 1770, NBKG. 131.
3 . Woortman to EC, 4 June; EC Journal, entry, 9 June 1770, 
NBKG. 131.
4. Woortman to EC, 15 June 1770, NBKG 131J R.A. Kea, "Akwamu- 
Anlo Relations, c. 1750-1813,” in THSG Vol. X (1969)
PP. 37-38.
5 . P. Woortman (Accra) to EC, 9 &27 June; EC Journal, entry, 
30 June 1770 (NBKG-131).
Volta with his army, stormed two Anlo towns and threatened 
to do same to the Anlo capital as well as Akwamu. But 
Anlo, possibly assisted by Akwamu,1 gallantly met the 
invaders, and eventually repulsed them, taking captive of
p
about five hundred of Obirikoran‘s men.
In spite of this set back the Abuakwahene was 
determined to continue the campaign against Anlo. He was, 
however, prevented from taking further action by an order 
from the Asante court that he should put a stop to his 
hostile activities in the trans-Volta region. The Asantehene 
probably had not anticipated that the Abuakwa expedition 
would affect Voltaic Akwamu, friends of Asante. It is 
even possible that Anlo too enjoyed Asante patronage at 
this early date though our present knowledge of the subject
2i
does not provide a clear evidence to that effect. The 
order, together with the defeat he had sustained, apparently 
obliged Obirikoran to withdraw from the Trans-Volta. He 
however, could not completely reconcile himself to the 
failure and frustrations he had experienced. He held 
Asante partly responsible for his discomfiture. For in 
1771, assisted by Okuapemhene Atiemo, he once more revolted
1. A. Gijl (Ponny) to EC, 22 July; N. W. Krugger (Tema) to 
EC, 26 July 1770 (NBKG 132); also Kea, op. cit. p. 37 
n.53.
2. Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 26 July 1770 (Vgk) 
Krugger (Tema) to EC. 26 July; Froelick & Woortman (Accra) 
to EC. 27 July; Gijl (Ponny) to EC. 27 July 1770 (NBKG - 
132) Kea, op. cit. p. 38 nn* 5^ & 55*
3. Krugger (Tema) to EC; 26 July 1770 (NBKG 132); Wilks MA 
Thesis (Unpublished) p. 13^; Kea, op. cit., p. 38 n. 5 6.
4. There was such a relationship between the two in the 
nineteenth century. Cf. chapter 9 P* 323 below.
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against Asante, organized a blockade of the * easternf trade
routes against that power, and disobeyed an order from the
Asante court to proceed to Accra and swear to the Dutch
that he would keep the trade routes open. 1 Asante was left
with no other choice than to take the field once more against
Akyem Abuakwa. Osei Kwadwo in early 1772 raised an army of
2
about 30,000 for the Akyem invasion. The war, however, 
did not break out till about late that year.
In January 1773 an English report said that Abuakwa 
gained the initial advantage in the war but eventually 
became frightened by the sheer numerical superiority of the 
adversary. Consequently Obirikoran abandoned his country, 
sent his womenfolk and children into hiding in the mountain 
fastness of Krobo and headed southwards with his army.
Lack of allied assistance partly obliged the Abuakwahene to 
take to his heels. He had sounded the Krobo for help, but 
the latter merely agreed to shelter Abuakwa women and
4
children. Akuapem does not seem to have been interested.
And an appeal to the Ga yielded no good result. In November 
1772 he sent messengers to publicise in Accra Asante tyranny 
towards him and the Asantehene’s determination to have his 
head just because he would not yield to his exhorbitant 
demands; the messengers were also to ask for Ga military
1. Woortman (Accra) to EC. 11 December 1771 (NBKG 13^)*
2. Woortman (Accra) to EC, 12 January 1772 (NBKG 136), James 
Fort (Accra) Daybooks, entry, 29 November 1772 (Tto/979)•
3. David Mill (CCC) to the Committee, 30 January 1773*
T70/31.




aid in the war against Asante. To get involved with an
Asante invading army was something the Ga least desired.
For that reason they advised Obirikoran and his people to
2seek protection in eastern Fante. Obirikoran and his army
took the Ga advice and they sought refuge in eastern Fante
after initially heading towards Ga. There in Fante, the
pursuing Asante army dared not attack him for fear that he
might strike an alliance with Fante. In spite of the
departure of the Abuakwa army from the Ga area, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Asante invading force, "Adoocei"
(i.e. Adusei) was still suspicious of Ga loyalty. To put
the matter beyond doubt he subjected the Ga to serious
interrogation. On 10th December 1772* the English recorded
the arrival in Accra of
"Ancrah /Ankra/, one of the Zey*s captains, with 
two other captains and upwards of 700 soldiers, 
to this /James Fort7 and other forts, desiring 
to know what they had to expect from Accra in 
general, and at the same time demanding every 
Akim and Hill country /Akuapem7 that were about, 
and requesting presents for the Commanding 
Officer, Adoocei, who, by Ancrah, gave assurances 
of his good disposition towards the English”.^
What the Ga did or said to prove their loyalty is
been
not known for certain. The invading Asante army seems to have / 
satisfied with Ga sincerity. All the same its presence in 
the Ga vicinity brought untold hardships to the inhabitants.
Aside from paying "apgeatoo" (war-tax) which Captain Ankrah
1. James Fort Daybooks, entry, 17 October 1/ and 27 November 
1772, T70/979.
2. James Fort Daybook, entry, 27 November 1772, T70/979*
3. David Mill (CCC) to the Committee, 3o January 1773* 
(T70/31).
4. James Fort (Accra) Daybooks, entry, 10 December 1772 , 
(T70/979).
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cleverly chose to describe as presents, the Ga experienced
shortage of provisions: the Asante army of occupation
demanded every available food.1 It was not until March 1773
that the army left for Old Akwamu, on the first stage of
2
their homeward journey. Thus Asante failed to achieve the 
main objective of the invasion of Abuakwa, namely the defeat 
and decapitation of Obirikoran. In fact Asante was never 
able to effect a military solution to the Abuakwa Question 
up to about 1783.
Aside from the guerrilla tactics of Abuakwa, 
other factors militated against Asante success. Develop­
ments in the west engaged its serious attention. Wassa 
was still a thorn in its side; the Fante Confederate states
played a double game against Asante. The Fante pretended to
' 3be disposed towards a peace settlement with Asante, but in 
1775 when Asante invaded Wassa, Fante turned coat and went 
to the assistance of Enimil who succeeded in beating back
2i
the Asante. The successful resistance of Abuakwa in the 
east and Wassa in the west meant a blockade of Asante access 
to the coast trade between Takoradi and Ada. The blockade 
forced Asante to renew contact with the Nzima coast in 
order to procure firearms from there. Though she succeeded
1. Vanderpuije (Accra) to EC, 1 May 1774, (NBKG 139).
2. Aarestrup (CCO) to Copenhagen, 7 March 1773. Kea must be 
referring to this incident when he says that at this time 
Asante informed Akwamu about a projected Asante expedition 
against Akyem, cf. THSG, Vol. X (1969) p. 38.
3. J. M. Cleland’s Evidence before the Privy Council, 1792 
(T70/l6l p. 56), cited by Tenkorang, "in THSG. Vol. IX 
(1968) p. 14 n. 64.
4. Fort William (Anomabo) Daybooks, entry, 10 November 1775 
(T70/990); CCC Daybooks, entries 16 & 22 November 1775 (T70/ 
1037); Richard Miles to the Council (CCC), 24 November 1775 
(T70/1534), all cited by Tenkorang, op. cit. p. 14 n. 65.
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in doing this in 1780, by 1785* Wassa was keenly contesting 
that access too.
Asante pre-occupation with affairs in the west, 
gave Obirikoran a freer hand in the east. After the
departure of Adusei and his army, he also moved into Old
1 2 Akwamu. He was still there in 177^* His residence in
Old Akwamu, (what is now the Kyebi area) was in response to
a change in Asante strategy in its relations with Abuakwa.
Asjtante diplomacy, or rather subversion, had caught hold of
”01d Akim”, as the Dutch called the Banso metropolitan area,
where part of the Abuakwa ruling house still resided. By
March 1775 it was known on the coast that Twum Ampofo,
"the youngest brother of Ebicoram /0birikoran7,
who is the Head Chief in Old Akim, has reconciled
with the King of Assiantyn, and that the same 
ZSas7 sent him much help and made him King of 
Akim”.,
But there was no doubt in the minds of discerning 
observers on the coast that Obirikoran was still a 
political force in Akyem. The Danes for example doubted if 
Asante could ever have it easy in Abuakwa as long as 
Obirikoran lived. The truth was that Obirikoran, now 
domiciled in ”new Akyem” .(i.e. Old Akwamu) vis-a-vis Old 
Akyem (i.e. Banso) was still a strong force in the south-east.
1. Woortman (Accra) to EC, 24 April 1775 (NBKG 157); Wilks; 
1958 M.A. Thesis (unpublished), p. 154, where he cites an 
earlier Woortman report in connection with the same 
subject.
2. Vanderpuiye (Accra) to EC, 1 May 177^ (NBKG 140); James 
Fort (Accra) Daybooks, entry 18 March 1774 (T70/978).
5. Letter from Breku, 16 March 1775 (NBKG 141) cf. also 
Governor & Council (CCO) to Copenhagen, 28-May 1775 
(Vgk?)
All the same the political division was unfortunate
for Abuakwa. Apart from impairing its resistance against
Asante, the split helped the European trading companies to
exploit it in their quarrels. For example during the Danish-
Dutch conflicts of the 1776-1778 period, the Danes invited
aid from Ampofo while the Dutch solicited the help of
Obirikoran.^ The house of Abuakwa was thus divided against
itself. Had Asante found it convenient to exploit this
situation fully Abuakwa would have paid dearly for its
disunity. Fortunately Asante was more pre-occupied with
2
affairs in the south-west.
Obirikoran visited Ga in 1780 in order to attend
the funeral of the Mantse of Osu. For his friendship and
services both the Dutch and the English on this occasion
showered presents on him. The presents which the English
Commandant of James Fort gave him included clothing as well
as arms and ammunition. In return Obirikoran promised to
reopen the trade routes in order that trade might once more
■5
flow from the interior to the coast. Asante and their 
Abuakwa collaborators might regard him as deposed but to 
the inhabitants of the Ga area, he was still the Abuakwahene. 
This is a clear proof that his so-called deposition was not 
effective. Asante conceded this point in 1783 and opened 
peace negotiations with him.^ They eventually "reinstated” 
Obirikoran as King of all Abuakwa after he had agreed to pay
1. Reindorf, History, p. 9h; Norregaard, Danish Settlements,
,p. 136.
2. Vanderpuije (Accra) to EC, 29 June 1780, NBKG 151*
3- James Fort Day-books, entry 29 June 1780, T70/978.
4. James Fort Day-books, entry 29 January 1783* (T70/980).
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a fine to the Asante court. The truth is that Asante was 
in dire need of peace with Obirikoran, For one thing peace 
with Obirikoran would give Asante access to the Ga coast 
while Wassa was still putting impediments in their way to 
the west coast. For another, Osei Kwadwo had died, so 
Asante could come to peace settlement with Obirikoran 
without much less of face.
A year after the peace pact, Obirikoran, the bug­
bear of the Asante drive to the eastern sector of the coast, 
died. In January 1784 the English Commandant of James Fort 
recorded presents he gave to messengers
"sent by Biramquoy’s successor, King of Akim, who 
came to inform me of Biramquoy's death, and to 
assure me that he ^the new Abuakwahene/ had 
despatched messengers to Ashantee to acquaint that 
King that their ^Asante/ traders will not be 
molested in their passage to the waterside. ”2
The new Abuakwahene was no other than Twum Ampofo,
the old protege of Asante. His message probably signified
his anxiety to leave Asante in no doubt that a new era had
dawned in Abuakwa-Asante relations. In consonance with his
collaboration with Kumasi in the 1770s Twum ^pofo replaced
the old Abuakwa policy of resistance, pursued with religious
dedication by his immediate predecessors, with one of
recognition of Asante supremacy and submission to it.
The effects of Obirikoran’s death and Ampofofs
departure from traditional Abuakwa hostility to Asante went
beyond the boundaries of Akyem. Abuakwa’s traditional ally,
1. Kystdokumenter paa Guinea, entry, 15 March 1785*
2. James Fort Daybooks, entry, 5 January 1784, T70/980.
Akuapem, was forced to review its unfriendly relations with 
Asante. Apparently deprived of Abuakwa’s superior co­
operation, Okuapemhene Atiemo rushed to Accra to assure 
the European trading companies of his determination to allow 
traders of all indigenous nationalities to pass through his 
kingdom unmolested. 1 The action was obviously meant to 
confirm his submission to Asante.
Abuakwa and Akuapem were sincere in their
submission. In 1785 Asante campaigns in Nzima and Aowin
disrupted trade in the western sector of the coast. But in
the eastern section, the English for example were happy to
note that trade was flourishing, with Asante having a
2
substantial share in it. Clearly Asante had at long last 
stamped its authority on the south-east.
Thus in relation to Asante the careers of Pobi and 
Obirikoran were a failure. Forty-two years of resistance 
to Asante overlordship had come to naught.
1. Kwamena-Fho, M.A. Thesis, p. 177*




UNDER ASANTE DOMINATION, 1785-1851
The Abtiakwa resistance against Asante described in 
the preceding chapter was not altogether an unprofitable 
exercise. It eventually paved the way for integration 
between the Akyem and Old Akwamu districts. The submission 
to Asante did not reverse the integrational process. However, 
vassalage to Asante imposed on the Akyem states considerable 
disabilities and limitations which, given their ambition, 
they could not tolerate for long. Prom about 1810 they 
resolved to recover their freedom. To this end they made 
use of co-operation with other states subject to Asante as 
well as the British and the Danes.
A long term and a most significant effect of the 
Abuakwa resistance against Asante was the eventual 
incorporation of pre-1730 metropolitan Akwamu into the 
Kingdom of Akyem Abuakwa. A major objective of Asantehene 
Opoku Ware I (1717-1750) in going to war against Abuakwa and 
Kotoku in 17^2 had been the restoration of the Akwamu to 
their pre-1730 inheritance, of which the Akyem had dis­
possessed them.'1’ By 1785 when Abuakwa finally yielded to 
Kumasi domination, the Asante leaders seem to have lost 
interest in the restoration idea. Evidence is yet to be 
found that they attempted to implement it; and if they did, 
they must have found it a hopeless exercise. For it would 
seem that by the 1780s Old Akwamu either had become, or was
1. Cf. Chapter 5, p. 86 above.
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on the way to becoming, an integral part of Akyem Abuakwa.
The integration was accelerated by the movement of 
the most important section of Abuakwa leaders, namely the 
paramount and Adonten lineages, from Akyem proper to settle 
in the pre-1730 Akwamu territory. The paramount stool settled 
at Kyebi from Banso, and the Adonten stool, leaving Takyiman, 
settled at Kukurantumi.1 That the areas where Kyebi and
Kukurantumi were sited once formed part of Akwamu territory
2
is vouchsafed by Akyem as well as Akwamu traditions. There 
are two views as to when the paramount lineage settled at 
Kyebi: one says 1812 and the other about 1815 .^  There is 
reason to believe that neither of these two views is correct, 
and that the event seems to have occurred before, and not in 
or after, 1812. The Kyebi-Kukurantumi neighbourhood was 
linked to the Ga coast by a major trade route passing 
through Akuapem. For several years after the Akyem - 
Akwamu wars of 1729-1750, the route fell out of use; but by
ii
the 1780s it had been re-opened. It is possible, as Johnson 
concludes, that the establishment of the paramount and Adonten 
stools at Kyebi and Kukurantumi ”may have been connected with 
the re-opending of the route.” Perhaps Obirikoran was the 
first Abuakwahene to have settled at Kyebi. He may have done 
so in the 1770s when Asante used his younger brother, Twum
1. AAT: Kukurantumi (1925/6 ).
2. Crowther, F., Papers laid before the West African Lands 
Commission, 1913# cited by M. Johnson, Migrants, p. 10, 
n. 51; AAT: Kukurantumi, Maase and Asafo X1925/6 ); Akwamu 
Tradition, as recorded by Field, Akim Kotoku, pp. 2-3.
3 . M. Johnson, Migrants, p. 8 ; Ward, History, p. 208, n. 2.
4. Jdhii&oir, Jtig3?ants *. p. II
l6o.
Ampofo, to oust him from Banso. Obirikoran may, in all 
probability, be the Abuakwahene who is said to have appealed 
to the Akwamu for land to settle on and was told to go to
p
Akwamu hunters at *Kyibi* for land. Probably Obirikoran 
decided to iuake Kyebi the Abuakwa capital after his peace 
settlement with Asante in 1783. The creation of Kyebi as the 
Abuakwa capital however, did not mean total abandonment of 
Banso: the latter was, and is still, used as the burial place 
for deceased Abuakwa royals.
The incorporation of Old Akwamu into the Abuakwa 
kingdom increased the size of the Akyem country. Its southern 
boundary shifted from the western confines of the Atewa- 
Atwiredu range to as far south as the Nyanao hill on the 
present day Nsawam - Adeiso - Asamankese road. Akuapem, Ga, 
Awutu (or eastern-most Fante) and Agona now became Akyem*s 
southern neighbours.
The incorporation in turn led to the creation of 
a new category of chiefs, namely chiefs of nominal divisional 
status in Abuakwa. This is reflected in the Abuakwa constitu­
tion. Among the Old-Akwamu or pro-Akwamu communities were
powerful ruling lineages such as those of Tafo, Otwereso,
-5
Asamankese and Akwatia. Asamankese and Tafo for example
4 i »were great land-owners. Such powerful new members of the
1. Cf. Chapter 4,pp. 154-156 above.
2. Field, Akim-Kotoku, pp. 2-3.
3 . K. Ameyaw, Akwatia Tradition, I.A.S. Acc. No. KAG/2 & 
Asamankese Tradition, I.A.S. Acc. No. KAG/4, Legon.
4. Field, Akim-Kotoku, pp. 2-3; to this day the royal horn- 
blower of the Tafohene intones: **Kuro-wo-asase*f (Tafo is 
a great Landowner). Personal communication from Tafohene 
Nana Okru Banin. -
Abuakwa state were accorded the status of 'divisional' chiefs
without controlling divisions separate from the five already
in existence i.e. Adonten, Nifa, Benkum, Gyase and Oseawq. 1
Consequently today the Otweresohene is regarded as of equal
status with the Benkumhene (Begorohene) though the latter is
the substantive head of the Benkum (Left) Division; the
Asamankesehene stands in a similar relation to the Wankyihene,
2
head of the Oseawus Division.
If vassalage to Asante did not disturb Abuakwa*s 
integration with Old Akwamu, it did entail some serious 
disadvantages to Abuakwa as well as Kotoku. For example a 
newly installed Abuakwa or Kotoku ruler was obliged, by 
Asante imperial law, to visit Kumasi three years after his 
enstoolment in order to swear the formal oath of allegiance 
to the Asantehene. Akyem rulers were also required, by Asante 
law, to participate, either personally or by representation, 
in the annual Odwira festival at Kumasi; they had to take 
part in royal funeral rites there. With respect to royal 
funerals, they were obliged to provide human sacrificial 
victims whose blood was to water the *grave* of the deceased 
Kumasi royal. Submission also imposed on the Akyem payment 
of annual tributes and prescribed taxes such as apeatoo (war 
tax). As gold-producing countries, Abuakwa and Kotoku would 
normally have paid the tribute in gold. But in the l860s the 
Abuakwa recalled that part of it was paid in * slaves* 
obtained from amongst the Abuakwa themselves and that so 
heavy was the obligation that Abuakwa population was
1. Danquah, Akan Laws. pp# 30-33.
2. Ibid., p. 32.
depleted.1
To ensure that the Akyem fully discharged such
obligations, the Kumasi court stationed resident commissioners
in Abuakwa and Kotoku. The resident commissioners probably
had other duties such as preventing the Akyem from insulting
2
Asante subjects. The Commissioners were also expected to
report the least indication of insurrection on the part of
a subject state to the Asantehene. Abuakwa suffered
considerably in this respect during the I8l0-l8ll period
when it revolted. So vigilant and enthusiastic was Tano,
the then Asante resident Commissioner in Abuakwa, that
without even a prior reference to Kumasi, he raised a force
■3
to try and suppress the revolt.
The Akyem states experienced a degree of inter­
ference in their foreign policy also. They could not wage 
wars on their own initiative without receiving prior 
permission from the Asantehene. The permission was not 
always given as Abuakwa discovered in the last years of the 
eighteenth century. Abuakwa in the 1780s and 1790s was
1. Kyebi Tradition, as told Stromberg by Opanyin Apietu, "a 
grey-haired elder” of Kyebi. Cf. Stromberg (Kyebi) to 
Basel, 24 January 1863* No. Akim 17; Lodholtz (Kyebi) to 
Basel, 13 October 1869, No. Akim 16, BMA-PJC.
2 . In relation to Akuapem, A.R. Biorn said in 1788 that ”the 
King of Ashantee retained a high lieutenant ^there7 for the 
protection of his subjects from insults.” Cf. A.R. Biorri, 
Beretning, p. 204. Biorn was made Governor of Christiansborg 
Castle in the 1790s.
3. Cf. p. 170 below.
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regarded as one of the powerful states in the Gold Coast.
The Danes, for instance, paid tribute to the Abuakwahene,
just as they did to the Asantehene and the King of Popo.'1'
In 1791 Danish Governor Biorn of Christiansborg Castle appealed
to Twum Ampofo, the Abuakwahene, for military assistance
against Krepi, promising the Abuakwahene a subsidy valued
at twelve slaves and two thousand rigsdaler. Ampofo agreed
to help the Danes, but when he tried to seek permission
from the Asantehene to enable him undertake the Krepi venture
2
he met with a refusal. The Danes attributed the refusal to
Asante fear that the Abuakwa were probably contemplating
migration to the trans-Volta.^ This would suggest that
Ampofo, once so enthusiastic about Abuakwa subservience to 
1l
Asante, was now finding the subordination intolerable.
Anlo intrigues have also been suggested as having probably 
influenced the Asante decision, for the Anlo disliked Akyem 
Abuakwa on account of its cordial relations with Ada, an 
enemy of Anlo. All these may be true but a third and 
perhaps the most plausible explanation is Asante desire to 
deprive Abuakwa of the subsidy to be paid to her by the 
Danes. This is suggested by the Asantehene*s offer to
1. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 153*
2. Guinea Journal, entry, 6 February 1791> Vgk: Sager til 
V.J. No. 25* 1792; Norregaard, op. cit., p. 155l Kea, in 
THSG. Vol. X (1969) p. ^2; Fynn, Asante, p. 130 n. 2.
Kea ( Ph.D Thesis, pp. 39-42) thinks that by Krepi
is meant little Popo.
3. Ibid.
4. Cf. Chapter 4,pp. 154-6 above.
5 . Fynn, Asante, p. 130. Anlo subservience to Asante is thus 
implied.
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assist the Danes himself at a much higher subsidy. 1 After
all in the event of an Asante war with Krepi, the Akyem
states were obliged, by Asante imperial law, to join the
Asantehene’s army. Abuakwa thus suffered a triple loss: she
was denied an opportunity to make a financial gain; she was
deprived of a chance to increase her military and political
prestige in the Gold Coast; and yet at the same time she was
expected to sacrifice her subjects on the alter of Asante
imperial wars. Only rulers like Twum Ampofo could tolerate
such a situation as long as he did.
Fighting the wars of their imperial master was
perhaps the greatest of the disabilities which the submission
to Asante imposed on the Akyem states. In 1743-4 Akyem
2
Kotoku joined Asante in its wars against Dagomba. And so
did Kotoku again, as well as Abuakwa during the Asante war
against Assin Atannoso and Fante between 1800 and 1807*^
By the early nineteenth century changes had
occurred in the ruling houses of both Abuakwa and Kotoku.
According to Reindorf, not long before the Asante war with
4Assin in 1807> Ampoma, the Kotokuhene, died. His death 
must have occurred in or just before 1800 because the 
Asante-Assin/Fante conflict had already started by then.^ 
Kwadwo Kuma, Ampomafs nephew, was the most legitimate
1. Fynn, Asante, pp. 131-6.
2. See Chapter 4 p. 122 above.
3. The Akyem participation is fully discussed on ppr 165 
below.
4. Reindorf, History, p. 139*
5. James Fort (Accra) Day books, entries, 10 & 26 February & 
17 August 1800, T 70/982; Archibald Dalzel (CCC) to the 
Committee of African Merchants (CAM)j London, 13 October 
1800, T 70/34.
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candidate to the Kotoku stool. He is said to have gone to 
Abuakwa to represent his uncle at a royal funeral and was 
still there when Ampoma died. 1 In his absence another
2
candidate, Opoku, was enstooled as the new Kotokuhene.
Possibly the royal funeral at Abuakwa was in 
connection with the death of Twum Ampofo who is said to have 
died in or about 1794.^ The successor to the Abuakwa stool 
was Apraku. He and Opoku personally led the Abuakwa and 
Kotoku to join Asante against Assin Atanoso and Fante in the 
1807 war.^
The immediate cause of this war was tension between 
the two principalities of Assin, namely Atanoso and Apemanim, 
and the former’s rejection, in a most insolent and rude 
manner, of the efforts of the Asantehene to mediate between 
them. The war had a very far reaching effect on relations 
between the Akyem states and Asante. It immediately led to 
further changes in the ruling personnel of both Abuakwa and 
Kotoku. While in the field Apraku is said to have unjustifi­
ably executed four of his subjects. The rest of his subjects 
therefore declared their intentions to depose him, and carried
1. AKT: Awisa (1968/9).
2. Reindorf, History, p. 159*
5 . Fynn, ’’Abuakwa King List.”
4. Reindorf, History, pp. 159 and 141.
5. Torrane (CCC) to CAM,
in Metcalfe, Documents p. 8; Meredith, H. Gold Coast of 
Africa, London 1812, pp. 152-5; Hutton, W ., A Voyage to 
Africa, London 1821, p. 557. Cruickshank, Vol. I Chapter 
IV; Reindorf, History, pp. 158-9; Claridge Vol. I, pp. 
258-9 . Ward History, p. 148.
this into effect on returning home, even though the deposition
was against the advice of the Asantehene. 1 Opoku of Kotoku
2
was also distooled on similar grounds. Atta Owusu, strong- 
named Yiakosan (The Valiant), was enstooled Abuakwahene 
after Apraku; and Kwakye replaced Opoku as Kotokuhene.
Kwakye’s enstoolment meant that Kwado Kuma who was still in 
Abuakwa had missed the Kotoku stool for a second time in 
succession.
The accession of Atta Owusu to the Abuakwa stool 
did not augur well for Akyem relations with Asante. Within 
three years after his enstoolment Abuakwa had raised the 
standard of rebellion against Asante. Atta was the main 
driving force behind the rebellion. For the fundamental 
cause of the rebellion was his dissatisfaction with the 
continued subservience of Abuakwa to Asante. He already bore 
Asante a grudge before he became Abuakwahene in 1807;
Asantehene Osei Kwadwo had killed a predecessor of his.
This hatred increased in 1807 when Asantehene Osei Bonsu 
imposed a heavy burial tax on him. A relative of his is said 
to have fallen in the 1807 Asante-Assin-Fante war in which 
Atta himself had fought with distinction. He applied to the
Asantehene for permission to give his deceased relative a
k „
formal burial. The Asantehene then demanded a large sum
1. Reindorf, History, p. l4l.
2. Ibid.
5 . Cruickshank Vol. I, p. 92. It is not clear who this pre­
decessor was; perhaps this may be a reference to Pobi who 
lost his life in war against Osei Kwadwo. Cf. Chapter 4 
p.l4l above. Claridge (Vol. 1 p. 263) gives the name of the 
Akyem Chief as nOfusu , i.e. Ofosu. None of the eighteenth 
century Abuakwa Kings was called Ofosu.
4. Normally the Akan did not give formal burial to anybody who 
did not die a natural death.
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of gold” from Atta before granting the permission. "This, 
together with other acts of oppression so irritated Attah 
that he determined on taking the first opportunity of 
resenting them. ”1
The opportunity came within three years after his 
enstoolment as Abuakwahene. In 1810 he was expected to pay 
an official visit to Kumasi in order to swear the oath of 
allegiance to the Asantehene. He refused to perform this 
vassal obligation. The Asante court sent to find out why 
he had not visited Kumasi. The query was compounded with a 
customary gift of 4 oz. of gold and a request that he should 
equip his army and join an Asante army which was about to 
take the field once more against Assin Atanoso and Fante.
The cause of the new Assin-Asante warwas the intransigence of 
Assin Atanoso and Fante. In spite of defeat in the 1807 war 
and the acceptance, on their behalf, of Asante overlordship, 
by Governor Torrane of Cape Coast Castle in June 1807* the 
Assin Atanoso and the Fante had refused to submit to Asante 
domination. Between 1808 and 1810 Atanoso and Fante 
demonstrated their dislike for Asante by attacking Elmina 
and Ga, the only two coastal peoples still friendly to 
Asante. The Asante army which the Akyem states were required 
to join was going to the rescue of Elmina and Accra. The 
anxiety of Asante to rescue Elmina and Ga was dictated by the 
fact that they were the only two places on the coast from 
which Asante could still obtain European goods, especially 
war stores. 2
1. Governor White (CCC) to C.A.M., 25 March l8ll, T70/35; 
Metcalfe, Documents,- pp. 17-18.
2. White to CAM, 5 May & 26 December l809> T70/35; Governor de 
Veer (EC) to White (CCC), 7 May 1810 T70/35; Hutton, A
Voyage, p. p42.
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The request gave Atta Owusu yet another chance to 
demonstrate his hatred for the Asante yoke. He calmly 
accepted the customary gift of gold and replied that he 
would certainly arm, not against Assin Atanoso or Fante, but 
against Asante itself.’1' To show that he was in earnest, he 
followed this declaration of his revolt with the arrest, 
detention, robbing and execution of all but one Asante
traders and travellers, including Royal messengers, returning
2home from Ga, who happened to be passing through Akyem. It 
is clear from the above that the rebellion was not fortuitous,
having come about on account of the request to fight Asante’s
■3
wars:^ it was premedidated, awaiting execution at the appro­
priate time.
The period between 1808 and l8ll was very suitable
for launching a revolt, because Asante was then experiencing
almost universal provincial rebellion. Assin Atanoso was
4still in arms, and so was Fante. Wassa revolted in 1809 by 
joining the Western Fante against Elmina. Agona also 
revolted by siding with the eastern Fante against Ga.
Akuapem had revolted by 1809 .^  Information reaching Elmina
1. White to CAM, 25 March l8ll, T70/35* Cf. also Reindorf, 
History, pp. 152-3*
2. Cruickshank, Vol. I, pp. 92-3; A.B. Ellis, A History of the 
Gold Coast (London 18&3 ) p. 123; Reindorf, History, p. 153; 
Claridge Vol. I p. 263.-
3 . Ward, History, p. 157*
4. See p. 167 above.
5. White to CAM, 26 December 1809* T70/35*
6 . A. de Veer (EC) to White (CCC),.7 May 1810, T70/35*
7 . Meredith, The Gold Coast, p. 167*
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in February l8ll said Denkyera was also in rebellion. 1 At 
least Abuakwa, Akuapem, Denkyera and Wassa had all fought 
for Asante in the 1807 war. It was surely no coincidence 
that in a space of four years after 1807 they should all be 
in revolt against the overlord. Asante tyranny alone cannot 
be said to have produced all these almost concurrent 
rebellions. In the case of Akyem Abuakwa Atta Owusu was 
aggrieved because the Asantehene regarded him as a slave; 
in 1817 the Asantehene was" bo tell the members of the
British mission to Asante that Kotokuhene Kwadwo Kuma was
2
his slave. Fante diplomacy also may have incited Abuakwa
and the others to rebel. For Atta Owusu tried to co-operate
■3
with Fante against Asante. In launching his rebellion Atta
Owusu of Abuakwa surely must have taken into careful
consideration the possibility of striking an alliance with
some of the other rebel states, as he actually did with
4Akuapem, Agona, and the eastern Fante. Besides, the other 
insurrections were bound to stretch Asante military resources 
to the full and thereby increase the chances of success for 
the Abuakwa rebellion.
Internal disunity nearly deprived the revolt of 
success. There was in Abuakwa a strong pro-Asante party 
which did not support the rebellion. Meredith was no doubt
1. De Veer’s diary (EC), entry, 1 February l8ll, WIC. 124A.
2. Beecham, J., Ashantee and the Gold Coast (London, l84l, 
1968 ed.) p. U K
3- See pp. 173 below.
4. See p. 173 below.
alluding to this disunity in 1812 when he said Atta, the
Abuakwahene, "governed” the kingdom "in conjunction with
Tando ...... and /Atta7 was tributary to the King of
Ashantee. He refused obedience to the King’s orders by not
going against tbeFantees: which produced a dispute between
himself and Tando, who drove him out of Akim ...nl
Bowdich’s account of 1817 makes ’Tando' an Asante Resident
Commissioner for Akyem Abuakwa, adding that he was retired
for his conduct because
"though Attah was adjudged to be in fault, after 
the palaver was talked at Coomassie, the Ashantee 
government thought it politic to displace Tandoh, 
though he had become disagreeable to the other, 
only for his vigilance and fidelity. " 2
Asante resident commissioners did not possess standing armies 
to back their word in the provinces to which they were 
accredited. Tano could only have raised an army either from 
among the Abuakwa themselves, or from the Kotoku who seem to 
have been quite loyal to Asante. The first suggestion seems 
more probable. Oral traditional evidence suggests that there 
was a strong pro-Asante party in Abuakwa. Its leader was 
Bruku, the woman chief of Asiakw^ headquarters of the Nifa 
(Right) Division of the Abuakwa state.? The Asiakwa tradi­
tion finds support from Hutton who, in 1821, says that Bruku 
was the Asiakwa Chief in the 1810s. She must have provided 
Tano with the army which he needed to challenge Atta. Of the 
five divisional chiefs of Abuakwa, only the Asiakwahene traced
1. Meredith, The Gold Coast, p. 169.
2. Bowdich, A Mission, p. 123.
3. AAT: Asiakwa (1925/6).
4.Hutton, A Voyage, p. 342.
ancestry to Asante. The founders of the Asiakwa ruling 
lineage are said to have come from Barekese, near Kumasi, 
during the reign of Asantehene Osei Tutu, and that they were 
of the Oyoko abusua. 1 Ancestry and clan ties would seem to 
have vitiated Asiakwa loyalty to Akyem Abwakwa, for the 
Asiakwa tradition goes on to say that during Brukufs time 
the Asiakwa tried to emigrate, back to Barekes^ but were 
prevented from doing so by the rest of Abuakwa.
Asiakwa's treachery naturally would affect the 
fighting strength of Atta's army. At the height of his
insurrection Atta's army was variously reckoned between three
2
thousand and five thousand. But he went ahead with the 
rebellion all the same. And the Asantehene determined to 
suppress him.
An Asante army of about ten thousand, under the 
command of Adusei Kra was sent against him.^ Atta first 
encountered Adusei's force in or about September 1810.^ The 
Abuakwa won the two battles which took place, and Adusei had 
to send home for reinforcement. In response Asantehene Osei 
Bonsu instructed Opoku Prefre, initially detailed to go to 
the rescue of the Ga with a 25,000 strong army, to direct his 
course to Abuakwa, take over:fi?om Adusei, and suppress the 
Abuakwa revolt.
Opoku Prefre's entry into the war increased the
1. AAT: Asiakwa (1925/6 ).
2. Vanderpuije (Senya Breku) to de Veer (EC), 15 March l8ll, 
WIC. 124A; Meredith, Gold Coast, p. 168,
3. Reindorf, History, p. 153*
4. Vanderpuije (Senya Breku) to de Veer (EC), cited in EC 
Journal, entry, 17 September l8lO,WWIC 124.
5. Reindorf, History, p. 153-
formidability of the Asante army. Abuakwa countered this
development with an alliance with Akuapem. The alliance
was not difficult to contract. Akuapem was already in
revolt against Asante. 1 Kumasi was thus a common enemy to
both. Besides, clan and historical ties between the Abuakwa
2and Akuapem ruling houses, made a concerted action against
the common enemy all the more attractive. The alliance
enabled the Abuakwa army to retreat southwards in order to
join forces with the Akuapem, led by their King, Kwao
Safrotwie. The allies made a stand against the Asante
army at Mampon. There are two conflicting views on the
outcome of the Battle of Mampon. While one gives victory
to Asante, the other says the allies had the edge over the
adversary, who was obliged to appeal to the Ga for reinforce- 
4
ment. The conflicting views suggest that the battles were 
keenly contested, and that probably they were indecisive.
The entry of the Ga into the war as allies of 
Asante widened the scope of the war for Abuakwa and 
Akuapem. It meant that they had to fight on two opposite 
fronts, against Opoku Frefre's Asante army in the north, 
and against the Ga in the south. Guerrilla warfare was the 
reply of the allies to this development. They separated: 
the Akuapem army headed first to the fastness of the Krobo 
hills and later on to Ada on the coast, with the Asante 
army in hot pursuit. Atta Owusu and his Abuakwa forces
1. See p. 168 above.
2. Cf. Chapter 3 P» 81-83, and 86 above.
3 . Reindorf, History, p. 154.
4. Cruickshank Vol. I PP. 93-4; Ellis (1883) P* 124; Claridge 
Vol. I p. 264; Ward, History, p. 158.
5 . The most recent account on this aspect of the war is 
Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics, pp. 86-87*
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on the other hand went westwards to eastern Fante and Agona 
where another and a much smaller Asante army of about 4,000, 
under the command of Appia Dankwa, was harassing the inhabi­
tants. Atta’s aim was to fight this smaller array.
He arrived there in the early months of l8ll. By 
then he had established a reputation as a very redoubtable 
warrior; the Agona and Fante flocked to join him against 
Asante. 1 Perhaps it was also indicative of this reputation 
that Opoku Frefre chose to pursue Kwao Safrotwie to Krobo 
and Ada and not Atta Owusu. For Appia Dankwa too became 
frightened at Atta’s approach and tried to flee. But the
Abuakwa army caught up with and defeated him in the Tantum
2
hinterland before he could do so.
The war with Asante made the Akyem Abuakwa hostile
toward all those who were friendly, or in any way showed
sympathy, with and support for that power. A section of
the European trading presence on the coast had become quite
partisan in its African relations. The Dutch for example
were pro-Asante. On account of that Atta Owusu extended
his hostility to the Dutch in the Fante district. After
putting Appia Dankwa’s army to flight, he ordered the siege
of the Dutch fort, Lydzamheid, at Apam, destroyed a greater
part of it, put the officials there to flight, and freed all
■5
African prisoners in the fort. Besides, he threatened more
1. Meredith, Gold Coast, pp. 168-9 .
2. White (CCC) to CAM, 25 March l8ll, T 70/35; also in 
Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 17-18.
3. Nicron (Kormantse) to de Veer j(EC), cited in EC Journal, 
entry, 11 March lSll, WIC. 124A . -
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destruction for the Dutch after he had fully settled scores 
with Asante. 1
Parallel to the Akyem maltreatment of the Dutch at 
Apam and threat against the Dutch in general was Asante 
assault on the Danes. At Ada Opoku Prefre detained Mr. 
Flindt, the Danish factor at the fort there, for allegedly
helping Kwao Safrotwie and his forces to escape at a time
2when the Asante army had almost cornered them. At the foot 
of the Akuapem hills Opoku Prefre ordered the destruction of 
Danish coffee plantations jointly owned by Governor 
Schionning and a Mr. Meyer. Opoku threatened the Danes 
with further destruction and death, if they did not end
4
their support for Abuakwa and Akuapem. It is clear from 
Opoku*s declaration above that Danish friendship with the 
Akyem (Abuakwa) and Akuapem was the basic cause of the 
Asante hostility towards the Danes. Governor Schionning, 
however, sought to ascribe the cause to Anglo-Dutch
zr
intrigues with Asante. The English denied the charge, 
pointing out Danish sale of arms and ammunition to the
1. Vanderpuije (Senya Breku) to de Veer, EC Journal, entry, 
15 March 1811, WIC. 124.
2. Kwamena-Poh, Government and Politics, pp. 86-7.
3. W. Hoitman (Accra) to EC, 17 March 1811, WIC. 124A .
4. Dawson (James Port, Accra) to Danish Governor Schionning 
(CCO), 17 June l8ll, Diverse Arkivaler fra Guinea (DAFG; 
No. 50.
5 . Akyem-Danish relations are fully discussed in Chapter 6* 
P&t below.
6 . Schionning (CCO) to Dawson (James Port, Accra), 17& 20 
June l8ll, DAFG. 50.
175.
Abuakwa and Akuapem as a source of the Asante anger against
the Danes; and advised the Danes to be more discreet in
their African relations. 1
The British advice to the Danes was the result of
personal experience. In 1807 they had supported the Fante
and Assin Atanoso against Asante and had suffered terribly 
2
for that. Consequently in the current upheavals they tried 
to observe strict neutrality, refusing to take sides with 
any of the combatants, even though Abuakwahene Atta Owusu 
tried to force them to declare against Asante. When Atta 
tried to levy apeatoo (war tax) on the English at Simpa 
(Winneba) the latter, led by Mr. Meredith, refused to pay 
the tax as such, contending that payment would imply English 
partisanship with Akyem, which was against their policy. 
Instead Meredith sent to the Abuakwahene presents “as a 
token of friendship, with an assurance of British desire 
to support strict neutrality.This was a judicious stand. 
Neither the Akyem Abuakwa nor the Asante inflicted the 
slightest injury to British property and persons.
Success in Agona and Fante encouraged the Abuakwa 
to turn eastwards in order to attempt yet another confronta­
tion with the much larger Asante army under the command of
«4Opoku Frefre, then believed "to be at the back of Addah. 
Misfortune, however, struck the Akyem cause at this
1. Dawson to Schionning, 21 June l8ll, DAFG. 50.
2. For two days running an Asante army besieged Fort Williams 
at Anomabo.
5. Meredith, Gold Coast, p. 176; cf. also Metcalfe, Documents, 
p. 18; Cruickshank Vol. I p. 96.
4. White (CCC) to CAM, 25 May l8ll, T 70/35.
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juncture. Atta Owusu and his men had not gone further than 
the Agona town of Kwanyarko when he fell victim to an out­
break of smallpox and died a few days later. 1 The exact 
date of his death is not known. It must have occurred
between 20th August when Governor White reported of the
2
adverse effects of the war on trade and 7th October when 
the news of Atta’s demise reached Cape Coast, carried there 
by an official Abuakwa delegation.
The war of liberation sustained a great loss in 
the death of Atta. Under him the Abuakwa had fought with 
"great courage" and inspiration.^ Thirty-five years later 
it was said of him that he was a genius of a military leader 
whose patriotism, courage and implacable dislike for Asante 
domination would have enabled him to rescue his people from 
the clutches of Asante imperialism but for his untimely death. 
He deserved the strong name 'Yiakosan' (The Valiant). The 
Asante themselves recognized his importance by recalling the 
armies of Appia and Opoku iriimediately upon receiving the news 
of his death, which was judged to mean the end of serious 
Akyem resistance. It was therefore a fitting tribute that 
his people commemorated, as they still do, his death with the 
’national’ oath "Kwanyarko": they deemed his death a great
1 . White to CAM, 13 October l8ll, T70/35; AAT; Pamen 
(1925/6 ).
2. White to CAM, 20 August l8ll, T70/35.
3. CCC Daybooks, entry, 7 October l8ll, T70/1099, White to CAM, 
13 October 1811, T70/35.
4. White to CAM, 25 March l8ll, T 70/35.
5 . Cruickshank, Vol. I pp. 97-8.
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'national* disaster. 1
Atta's death had a great demoralising effect on the
liberation movement. The two immediate successors to the
Abuakwa stool lacked his dynamism. The first was Asare
Bediako. In 1812 Asare decided to emulate Atta's military
activities by Jointly organizing an attack on the Ga with
Kwao Safrotwie of Akuapem and Aduku of Mankesim (Fante).
The Ga venture failed miserably for this time Ga arms
prevailed against the aggressors. But for the bravery of a
lesser chief, Doku Sra of Pamen, the Abuakwa stool would
■5
have been captured by the Ga. The misadventure had a
disastrous effect on the Abuakwa ruling house, particularly
Asare’s line. The people of Abuakwa declared him an unlucky
leader, deposed him and asked him and the closest of his
4
relatives to commit suicide, which they did.
Kofi Asante was enstooled as the new Abuakwahene.
He was only a little better than Asare in terms of luck and
5
exciting leadership.
In the poor qualities of the two immediate 
successors of Atta seems to lie the source of the wrong 
notion that Kwadwo Kuma succeeded Atta. Kuma came into the
1. Compare the Asante ’national' oath ’Kormante’, in memory of 
the death of Asantehene Osei Tutu.
2. Reindorf, History, pp. 155-6 ; AAT: Pamen (1925/6 ). The view 
that Kwadwo Kuma succeeded to the Abuakwa stool after Atta
Owusu is misleading. Cf. Cruickshank, Vol. Ip. 99 & Ward, 
History p. 159* Kuma, as pointed out on pp. lo4-5 above, 
was a Kotoku Prince. The source of the confusion is discussed 
on pp. 178 f. below.
5- AAT: Pamen (1925/6 ). Reindorf, History, p. 157# is of the 
opinion that the stool was actually captured. Perhaps the 
Pamen tradition implies that it was retrieved by Doku Sra.
4. Reindorf, History, p. 157; AAT: Pamen.
5. Cf. p. l8l f. below.
6 . Cruickshank, Vol. I p. 99; Ward, History, p. 159•
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forefront of the Akyem war of Independence at this time by 
launching the Kotoku branch. He had preferred to reside at 
the Abuakwa court after failing to get the Kotoku stool on 
two consecutive occasions. 1 What he found attractive in 
Abuakwa may never be known directly. He seems to have been 
the adventurous type. Probably Atta Owusu’s personality and 
policy in relation to Asante fascinated him. This is 
suggested by the fact that even though Kotoku, led by 
Kwakye, sided with Asante in the l8l0-l8ll war, Kuma chose 
to fight for Atta and Abuakwa. He paid dearly for this. 
Reindorf states that Kuma's closest relatives, including 
his mother and sister, as well as his aunt (on mother’s 
side) and her daughter, were sent as prisoners to Kumasi 
where they were killed. Kumasi no doubt meant the punish­
ment to be a reprisal against Kuma. It is equally possible 
that the ’prisoners' were sent to Kumasi on the ini- 
.tiative of Kwakye, with a view to destroying Kuma’s line 
of successors to the Kotoku stool, and thereby eliminate 
opposition to the Kwakye line.
Ultimately Kwakye’s collaboration with Kumasi, 
coupled with Asante cruelty, as shown by the execution of 
his mother and others, made Kwadwo Kuma even more determined
to free Kotoku from the Asante yoke. After the failure of
2
the Ga venture he resolved to go back home and claim the 
stool from Kwakye. He gained the full support of Abuakwa 
leaders. Dokuwa, the Queen of Abuakwa, and Abuakwahene Kofi 
Asante reciprocated his services by providing him with men
1. Cf.pp.165-166 above.
2. See p. 177 above.
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and material. The gamble was successful. He defeated
Kwakye in the Battle of Dampon. 1 Kwakye lost heart,
gathered his close relatives, one of whom was his nephew 
2
Kofi Agyeman, took the Kotoku stool, and fled with them to
Asante. There he and his relatives were made guests of the
ruling house of the small state of Bosome near Lake
Bosomtwe. But Kwakye died barely a month after his
4
arrival in Asante.
Kuma was enstooled as the new Kotokuhene. But he 
was a King without the stool of his ancestors. He therefore 
made efforts to get it back from Asante. According to 
Reindorf, he approached the important palatine state of 
Juaben to intercede with Kumasi for the Kotoku stool to be 
returned. But all he could get as a reward for his efforts 
was a message from Asante that he should go to Kumasi and 
get it. Of course it was dangerous for a rebel like him to
set foot on Asante soil, and so he did not make any further
efforts to recover the Kotoku stool. Instead he resolved to 
make Kumasi suffer for its intransigence and tyranny. For 
two good years between 1813 and l8l4 he effectively blockaded 
the Akyem trade routes leading to the Ga-Winneba coast 
against Asante. So tight was the measure that it gave a 
relief to many of the southern states which had suffered 
recently from Asante political and military pressures.
1. Reindorf, History, p. 157*
2. Agyeman featured in Akyem as well as Gold Coast politics as 
from the l820s, as we shall see in due course.
3 . It would seem that by the l8l0s the Boaman people who
remained behind in 1706 when their ruler, Ntow Krobo, 
emigrated to Akyem (Cf. Chapter 2,pp43-5 above), had also 
adopted the name Bosome, by which the State founded by 
Ntow in Akyem was known.
4. Reindorf, History, pp. 157-8.
5 . Cruickshank, Vol. I p. 101.
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Increased Asante bitterness against him was of 
course the eventual heavy price Kuma had to pay for his 
success. In him Asante apparently saw another Atta Owusu.
And so indeed was Kuma. Like the late Abuakwa warrior 
King, he did not limit his activities to the confines of 
Akyem district. He may have been the moving spirit behind 
the Akyem delegation which in 1813 went to Fante to whip up 
against Asante the Fante hatred which was said to be on the 
wane. 1 Akyem Kotoku rebellion was bad enough for Asante.
But for rebel Kotoku to incite and sustain insurrection in 
other states was something Asante just could not tolerate
for long. The Kwadwo Kuma phase of the rebellion in Akyem,
2
rather than the failure to suppress Atta Owusu, seems to
have compelled Asantehene Osei Bonsu in 1815 to put a ten
■5
thousand strong army in the field against the A k y e m . I t
has often been said that Asante put a smaller army into the
field, under Appia Dankwa, whose instructions were to block
4
any possible retreat of the Akyem into Fante. Appia was 
actually expected to go and suppress Denkyera and Wassa who
R
were still in revolt.
1 . CCC Daybooks, entry, 23 April l8l3> T70/1103*
2. Ward, History, p. 159*
3 . Governor de Veer’s Diary (EC), entry 8 August 1815, WIC. 
124^. Cruickshank (Vol. I p* 101), Claridge (Vol. 1
p. 274) and Reindorf, (History, p.*158) all estimate the 
Asante army at 20,000.
4. Cruickshank, Vol. I p. 101, Reindorf, History, p. 158; 
Claridge Vol. I p. 274, Ward, History p. 159*
5 . CCC Daybooks, entries 1 & 11 September; 24 & 29 December 
1815, T 70/1107.
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Kofi Asante of Abuakwa and Kwao Safrotwie of 
Akuapem joined Kwadwo Kuma in resorting to the tactics of 
guerrilla warefare used by Atta OwusU. The Akyem rulers 
abandoned their Kingdoms and retreated first into Akuapem 
with whose army they made a stand against the Asante army, 
under the command of Amankwa Abunyiwa, 1 at Adweso (?Adawso)*
’ o
The battle may have taken place in or about September 1815. 
Opinion is divided on its outcome. One is that the allies 
lost the battle, the other makes the contest indecisive.
The second view seems to be nearer the truth, considering 
that after the battle the Agona and the Fante invited the 
rebels to come and join them for a concerted action against
R
Asante. The invitation implies Agona and Fante recognition 
of the Akyem army under Kuma as a powerful fighting force. 
Moreover the severity of the Adweso battle and the retreat 
of the rebels into Fante forced Amankwa Abunyiwa to rest 
his army in the Ga district for about three months before 
feeling confident enough to resume pursuit of the Akyem and 
Akuapem armies. Kuma, Kofi Asante and Safrotwie proved so 
elusive that the Leg-breaker went as far as Cape Coast in
1. Abunyiwa is a strong name meaning The Leg-Breaker.
2. J. Hoern (Accra) to de Veer*(EC), cited in EC Journal entry, 
50 September 1815, WIC, 124 . -
3 . Reindorf, History, p. 158; Claridge, Vol. I p. 274.
4. Ward, History, p. 159.
5. Hope Smith (CCC) to CAM, 26 May 1817, T70/40. Reindorf 
(History p. 158) says the rebels went to Fante to seek 
asylum.
6 . Flindt (CCo) to Copenhagen, 30 October 1816, Guineiske 
Journaler (GJ).
March l8l6 without meeting with them.**'
At this juncture treachery and ill-luck afflicted
the Akyem-Akuapem cause. Some of the Kotoku chiefs, such as 
2
one Amoako, began to feel weary of war and deserted Kwadwo
Kuma. These appear to have colluded with the Fante to betray
Kuma's movements.^ The Fante betrayal would seem to have
been the result of the rigorous intimidation the Leg-breaker
subjected them to. He seized three prominent Fante chiefs
and was determined to send them to Asante as prisoners-of-
war if the Fante did not disclose the whereabouts of the
two Akyem rebel rulers and Kwao Safrotwie. But for British
and Dutch intercession the Asante war leader would have
4
executed the threat. The Fante had to pay one hundred
5
ounces of gold to get the release of their chiefs. It is 
therefore likely that they gave the Asante army a clue to 
the movements of Kwadwo Kuma and his colleagues. He tried 
to beat the treachery by taking to flight. But he was 
"pursued so closely ^by the Asante army7 that he put an 
end to his own existence rather than fall into the hands of 
his enemies." The Asante, however, succeeded in getting
1. Van Neck’s Report on Asante-Fante-Anglo-Dutch Meeting 
held at Cape Coast Castle, 25 March 1816, NBKG 3^9* Acting 
Governor Dawson (CCC) to CAM, 26 March & 21 April 18l6, 
T7O/3 6.
2. He was later made Regent of Kotoku by the Asantehene. Cf.
p. 184 below.
3 . Reindorf, History, p. 160.
4. Van Neck's Report.
5. Ibid.
6 . Dawson (CCC) to CAM, ?June 1816, T70/3 6.
183.
his dead body and took off the head as a war trophy. Kuma’s
fall was received with jubilation in Kumasi.'1’
Kuma’s defeat and death in l8l6, like the demise of
Atta Owusu in l8ll, deflated the Akyem and Akuapem struggle
for independence. Some members of the Akuapem ruling house
2
betrayed Kwao to the Asante who killed him. Akuapem
submitted in or about November 1816.  ^ Abuakwa also lost
heart; and tendered its submission in the same month of
November 1816. A fine of one hundred ounces of gold was
4
imposed on Abuakwa. It would seem that Abuakwahene Kofi 
Asante and possibly some of his close male relatives, were 
executed in spite of the fine. In terms of punishment 
Kotoku received the harshest treatment. Almost all chiefs 
who had supported Kwadwo Kuma up to the time of his fall, 
according to Reindorf, were executed. Only chiefs like 
Amoako, who had deserted Kuma in the last days of the 
rebellion, were pardoned and spared their lives. Reindorf 
goes on to say that the Kotoku prince, Afrifa Akwada, son 
of chief Amoako, his mother and his sister would have been
1. Huydecoper(Kumasi) to Governor-General Daendels (EC),
7 June 1816, NBKGO6 9.
2. Anonymous, Akuapem Ne Eho Amansem anase Abasem (?Akropon 
1913) pp. 39-^0; Kwamena-Eoh, (/overnment and Politics, 
p. 89 Abunyiwa imposed a fine of 400 slaves on Akuapem.
Cf. several reports by Roelessen (Accra) to EC, in NBKG
501; cf. also Reindorf, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
3 . Roelessen (Accra) to Daendels (EC), 6 November 1816,
NBKG 501.
4. Roelessen (Accra) to Daendels (EC), 6 November l8l6,
NBKG 501. *
5. For by 1817 Queen Dokua had been enstooled as Abuakwahene,
an indication that there were no male heirs to the Stool. 
Cf. p. 184 below.
executed had not his father paid a fine of three preguans 
of gold. Finally a fine of three hundred preguans was 
imposed on the entire state. The gravity of the punishment 
for Kotoku clearly proves the importance of Kuma's role in 
the Akyem liberation movement.
Political life in post-l8l6 Akyem received serious 
interference from Asante. The Kotoku for example were not 
allowed to choose a successor to Kwadwo Kuma. Instead the 
despicable Amoako was imposed on them as governor. 1 Abuakwa 
was not touched, apparently because of the accession of a 
woman to the paramount stool. The execution of Kofi Asante, 
and possibly other male members of the royal house, had 
deprived the Abuakwa of matured male heirs to the stool. 
Consequently Queen Dokuwa was enstooled as the new 
Abuakwahene, perhaps in 1817. With a woman on the Kyebi 
stool, Kumasi may have felt there was less danger, if any, 
from Abuakwa.
The Abuakwa-Kotoku submission was complete. In 
1818 they loyally discharged their vassal obligation by
*5
fighting for Asante against Gyaman. But they also suffered
much. For example the Abuakwa, like the small lacustrine
state of Bosome in southern Asante, sustained heavy losses
4
in men during the Gyaman war. The Akyem states must have
1. Reindorf, History, p. 160.
2. In reference to Dokuwa the term ’Abuakwahene* will be used 
because among the Akan the woman who ascended a ’male' 
stool was addressed as if she were a man.
3* AAT: Kukurantumi (1925/6 ).
4. Ibid. The losses of Asante Bosome who also fought for 
Asante in the Gyaman war were such that they felt Asante 
was indirectly exterminating them as a state. Cf. Ward, 
History p. 142 n. 15-
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suffered in other ways, such as in the matter of tributes 
and taxes prescribed by Asante. In this respect Asante 
had, by 1822, decreed that only gold and European 
manufactured goods, and not slaves, would be acceptable. 1 
Until then gold and slaves were the normal forms by which 
vassal states met their tax and tribute commitments to 
Asante. The Akyem must have been unhappy about the change 
because the gold mining industry does not appear to have
o
been a profitable concern during the l820s.
Nor were they enthusiastic about the Asante yoke
in general. Prom about 1820 there was a new but initially
suppressed wave of Abuakwa hostility against Asante. By 
had been on the Abuakwa 
then Dokuwa/stool for three years. Asante provincial law
required that she should now pay an official visit to
Kumasi in order to swear the formal oath of allegiance to
the Asantehene. But up to 1825 she had not done so. It
would appear that her subjects had started questioning the
wisdom and necessity of continued Abuakwa subservience to
Asante, because by August 1823 Dokuwa had allied with the
British who, assisted by the Danes, were already vigorously
■5
engaged in a campaign for local allies against Asante . 
Earlier in the year, however, she had decided to stand by 
Asante, and, to leave the latter in no doubt as to where 
her loyalty lay, resolved to go to Kumasi in order to 
perform the oath of allegiance ceremony. She was at the
1. Major Chisholm (CCC) to Sir Charles MacCarthy, Sierra 
Leone (SL) 30 September 1822, CO.267/56, reproduced by 
Metcalfe,- Documents, pp. 77-80.
2. Dupuis, A Residence, Part II p. viii.
3 . See pp. 186-7 below.
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point of leaving for Asante when messengers from the British 
and the Danes arrived in Abuakwa to solicit her support 
against Asante.'1'
The European request to the woman Abuakwahene 
was dictated by deteriorating Anglo-Asante relations.
Asante suzerainty over Fante was the fundamental cause of 
its strained relations with the British. A British
mission to Asante in 1817 had recognized both Asante and
2
the British as exercising over-rule on the Fante. The 
unsuitability of such an arrangement was underlined in the 
late 1818 and early 1819 period when Asante, in connection 
with its war with Gyaman in 1818, tried to levy apeatoo 
(war tax) in Komenda and met with Fante opposition to the 
tax and a subsequent misunderstanding with the British over 
the same issue, as Asante was inclined to hold the British 
immediately responsible for the Komenda conduct. Consequently 
in 1820 when Dupuis went to Asante as the official representa­
tive of the British Home Government, he tried to simplify 
matters by conceding that the Asantehene was the sole 
overlord of the Fante. But Hope Smith, head of the British 
mercantile administration at Cape Coast Castle, refused to 
endorse Dupuis’s decision.^ As a result up to 1821 when 
the British crown took over the administration of British 
possessions in West Africa from the Committee of African 
Merchants, Anglo-Asante relations were very much strained.
1. Cf. pp. 187 below.
2. Bowdich, A Mission, Chapters II-VI,
3 . Dupuis, A Residence, Chapter III. Dupuis arrived in the 
Gold Coast in lbl^ and visited Asante in early 1820.
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The situation worsened as from 1822 when Governor
Charles MacCarthy arrived in the Gold Coast, from Sierra
Leone, to take over the administration from the merchants.
He at once adopted a hostile attitude towards Asante.
Asante retaliated with the execution, in March 1823, of an
African sergeant in British employ at Fort Williams at
Anomabo, 1 and a successful but a limited armed confrontation
with the British at Dunkwa. Governor MacCarthy then began
preparations for a full scale war with Asante. Hence the
campaign for local allies against Asante.
The British spent the rest of 1823 canvassing for
allies from amongst the southern states, using diplomacy,
2
bribes, and sometimes intimidation to get them. Dokuwa of
Akyem Abuakwa was one of the local potentates whom the
*5
British approached, perhaps some time between March and 
July 1823. This may have been about the time when 
Dokuwa was at the point of leaving for Kumasi for the oath 
of allegiance ceremony. If so it is reasonable to imagine
4
her returning an unfavourable answer to the British appeal.
But at this point the muted divided opinion of her 
subjects over the question of the continued Abuakwa 
subordination to Asante tilted the balance in favour of an 
alliance with the British. While some favoured the 
relationship, others were opposed to it, and would not 
allow Dokuwa to go to Kumasi. The pro-Asante party consisted
1. Reindorf, History, p. 173; Metcalfe, Documents, p. 83 col.2.
2. Metcalfe, Maclean, p. 41.
3 . Reindorf, History, p. 173*
4. Ibid., p. 176.
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mainly of Divisional chiefs like the Nifahene, alias the 
Asiakwahene, and the Gyasehene, otherwise known as the 
Kwabenhene. 1 The preponderance of the anti-Asantists was 
made up of lesser chiefs, the most vociferous of whom were
Okru of Apapara, Oben Ayekwa of Apedwa, and Kwasi Asimen of
2
Tete. A civil war ensued over the issue and the anti-
Asante party won.
The effects of the outcome of the Abuakwa civil
war were tremendous for both the Abuakwa themselves and
the Gold Coast in general. It may well be that it was from
about this time that the three chiefs of Apapam, Apedwa, and
Tete were constituted into the Amantoo-Mmiensa Council, or
the Council of the Three Counties, as Danquah called it,
and recognized as the Fourth Estate in the Akyem Abuakwa 
4
constitution. For these three chiefs came to be regarded 
as the custodians of the Okusukrunku stool^ and the 
protectors not only of its occupant but also the interest 
of the Abuakwa kingdom as a whole.^ The civil war had thus 
promoted a constitutional development in Abuakwa. This 
outcome needs to be emphasized because the Amantoo-Mmiensa 
Council is the only aspect which makes the Abuakwa
1. Reindorf, History, p. 175; AAT: Kwaben (1925/6 ).
2. Ibid.,, p. 175.
3. Ibid., p. 175, AAT: Pamen (1925/6 ).
4. Danquah, Akan Law, p. 11. In this work Danquah fully 
discusses the Abuakwa constitution. The present author 
accepts his description, analysis and conclusions. See 
Appendix A.pp363-374 below.
5. i.e. The Abuakwa paramount stool.
6 . Danquah, Akan Law, pp. Ilf.
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constitution different from those of the other two Akyem 
states.^
The success of the anti-Asantists in the civil
war of course meant Abuakwa renunciation of its subjection
to Asante. The internal conflict thus ushered in a third,
and what was to turn out to be the last, phase of the
Akyem struggle to free itself from the Asante yoke. This
stage in the struggle may conveniently be christened the 
2
Dokuwa phase. Were the Kumasi Court not obsessed by the 
strained relations with the British, they would have 
immediately despatched a punitive armed expedition to 
Abuakwa.
In terms of the Gold Coast as a whole, perhaps 
the most significant effect of the Abuakwa civil war was its 
generation, in the Abuakwa, of a more favourable disposition 
towards the alliance suggested by the British. In or about 
August 1823, Dokuwa arrived in Accra to announce Abuakwa 
membership of the Southern Alliance which had already 
emerged. Anglo-Danish diplomatic pressure had, no doubt, 
influenced the Abuakwa decision, but Abuakwa anticipation 
of a possible attack by Asante seems to have been another 
and perhaps a greater contributory factor. Abuakwa member­
ship in such an alliance would ensure them of brighter
1. The other three Estates were the State (Okyeman) Council, 
the Sovereign-Executive (the Abuakwahene), and the Kyebi 
Council. This Council was made up of lesser office-holders 
and elders who were normally resident in Kyebi and could 
therefore easily make themselves available to advise the 
Abuakwahene. Cf. Appendix A pp. 363-374 below.
2. The first two phases occurred in 1810-11 and 1812-16.
Cf. pp. l67-l84 above.
3. Reindorf, History, p. 176.
prospects of success if Asante attacked.
Asante war strategists took the developments in 
Abuakwa into serious consideration. By January 1824 Asante 
had taken the field against the British, the Wassa and the 
Denkyera in the western sector of the Gold Coast, defeating 
them all and decapitating Governor MacCarthy in the battle 
of Nsamankow. Meanwhile the Asante sent another and a much 
smaller army, under the command of one Kwaku Bri or Bribi, 1 
to punish the Akyem Abuakwa. It is most probable that, on 
grounds of vassal obligation, the Akyem Kotoku, who were 
still loyal to Asante, were expected to join Kwaku Bri*s 
force.
They, however, appear to have played a double 
game to tilt the balance in favour of Akyem Abuakwa.
Probably it was they, at any rate a section of them, who 
sent secret information to the Akyem Abuakwa about the 
impending Asante attack on them, because while Kwaku Bri 
was in Kotoku, Dokuwa sent to solicit military support 
from her kinsmen Addo Dankwa, the Okuapemhene. 2 The 
Akuapem responded favourably and immediately too. Again 
the Kotoku seem to have rendered the Abuakwa another good 
secret service by revealing to them the movements of the 
Asante army under Bri. This is suggested by the fact that 
the Abuakwa-Akuapem alliance carried the war to Bri while 
he was in Kotoku instead of waiting to be attacked. A 
stiff battle was fought near Asene in the neighbourhood of 
present day Asante-Akyem town of Obogu, and victory went to
1. Wilks (1975 P« 180) gives the name of the Asante commander 
as Kwaku Bene, who-was the Chief of the Asante town of 
Atwoma-Agogo.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 190.
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the allies.^ The Akuapem are given greater credit for the
victory. Tradition has it that the Asante force had almost
defeated the allies when the Okuapemhene and his men
cleverly outflanked the enemy and attacked from behind.
Panic seized the Asante army who were totally routed as a 
2
result. The battle of Asene was probably fought before 
August owing to the panic which it produced on the Asante 
army in the western sector of the Gold Coast, in that month, 
when news about Bri’s defeat reached them.
As soon as word about Kwaku Bri’s defeat reached 
the Asante army in the west in the month of August 1824,-^
4
some of its important leaders resolved to return home. The 
resolution was judicious because the Akyem Abuakwa and the 
Akuapem could easily follow up their victory over the 
Kwaku Bri force with an attack on an unprotected Asante, 
from the east, if these allies were more adventurous.
Indeed rumours were circulating that the Danes, led by 
their Governor, Richelieu, had started advancing on Asante 
through Akyem and that the news of the alleged Danish move
*5 iforced them to return home. This was a mere Danish threat. 
However, the Abuakwa defeat of Kwaku Bri's army, together 
with the Danish threat, whether real or a ruse, forced the
1 . Reindorf, History, p. 190; AAT: Kukurantumi, Begoro, 
Asiakwa & Pamen; Ward, History, p. 221.
2. AAT: Kukurantumi (1925/5 ).
3 . Wilks, Asante in the Nineteenth Century, p. 180.
4. Reindorf, History, p. 190.
5. Ellis (1893) P* 176.
6. Claridge, Vol. 1, pp. 375-6.
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main Asante army in the west to abandon its campaign in the 
western sector of the Gold Coast. 1 The success of the 
Abuakwa-Akuapem alliance in the east thus saved the British 
and their allies in the west from a possible greater 
disaster. Part of the credit must, however, be given to the 
Kotoku. Their secret messages to the Akyem Abuakwa went a 
long way to contribute to the success of the Abuakwa and 
the Akuapem over the Bri force.
For their role they undoubtedly anticipated an 
attack from Asante. They seem to have calculated that the 
best way to avoid such an eventuality was to desert northern 
Akyem and put distance between them and Asante. There could 
not have been a much better place to go than Akyem south of 
the Birem, into the heart of Akyem Abuakwa. Here they 
would be sure not only of Abuakwa allied support but also 
that of the rest of the Southern Alliance. Amoako who was 
still the Regent of Kotoku, refused to be party to the 
emigration. Together with a small following he left Dampon, 
the Kotoku capital, and went to the Agogo, who, though in 
northern Akyem, seem to have supported Asante. His son, 
Prince Afrifa of the Kotoku royal house, then assumed the 
leadership of the Kotoku emigration to Akyem Abuakwa. The
1. Wilks (Asante, p. 180), however, thinks that the out­
break of disease among-the Asante army and the rains also 
forced them to abandon the western campaign.
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migration is said to have taken place in I8 2 5 .1 Abuakwa*s 
success had still wider consequences. This was about the 
time when the ruling lineage of lacustrine Bosome also 
migrated southwards to join their kinsmen in Western Akyem.
The remote cause of their migration was tension with Kumasi.
They had distinguished themselves in the 1818-1819 war in
2
which they had fought for Asante against Gyaman. They lost 
many men in the war but the large booty which they gained 
compensated for these losses. The booty, however, became a 
bone of contention between Koragye Ampaw, their King, and 
the Asante Court, as the latter demanded its surrender. To 
end it all Koragye and his people migrated to western Akyem.
It is reasonable to imagine the nineteenth century Bosome 
migration taking place in the 1824-5 period, when many of 
their neighbours, including Kotoku, Denkyera, Wassa and the 
two Assin states of Apemanim and Atanoso, all migrated south­
wards, in response to either the 1824 Abuakwa success against 
Asante or the campaign which the British launched during that 
period for local allies in a projected campaign against Asante. 
For Reindorf suggests that there was a degree of co-ordination
1. G-J. (l84o-l844): entries No. 329 dated 18 December 1842 
and No. 367 dated 10 February 1843; Simon Sus (Gyadam) to 
Basel, 1 March 1859* BMA-PJC; "Petition of Quabina Fuah,
King of Inswaromoon ,/tfsuaem or Oda today/”* to the Governor 
(CCC), 17 July 1871, CO. 96/88; Dr. Gouldsbury's Report,
29 June 1874, CO.96/112; "Precis of Akim claims to Ashanti- 
Akim: Kotoku MP. 212/93, MP.5718/94* Confidential MP. 105/96, 
MP. 559/96, MP. 69V96, MP. 8661/97, MP. 4964/98, MP. 1588/OO, 
MP. 1209/01; Colonial Secretary (Accra) to Chief Commissioner 
(Ashanti), 2 June 1908, all in File No. D.46 (Kumasi Archives) 
Governor^Hodgson (Accra) to Chamberlain (CO), 17 July 1900,
CO.96/361; Colonel Willeocks (Fumso, Ashanti) to Chamberlain,
4 July 1900, CO.96/374.
2 . Ward, History, p. 169.
3 . ABT: Soaduro (1968/9 ); Ward, History, p. 220; D. Afua 
Sutherland, State Emblems of the Gold Coast (1954) p. 15; 
Wilks, in JAH’VoIT'IX (1968) p. 163.
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between some of the migrating ruling lineages, for example 
between Kotoku and Denkyera. 1
Socially as well as politically the movement to 
the south proved quite useful to the Akyem in particular 
and the other southern states, the British and the Danes, 
in general. Immediately, the movement led to family re­
unions among the Bosome and the Kotoku. A split had 
occurred among the Bosome in 1706 when a section of the 
ruling lineage and the people, led by Ntow Kroko, migrated
p
to western Akyem. The 1824-5 migration seems to have 
brought about a re-unification of the two sides in Western 
Akyem. The re-union made it possible for Bosome to exercise 
a considerable influence on Akyem affairs as from about this 
time.
The 1824-5 Bosome migration to western Akyem
prepared the ground for another family re-unification, this
time among the Kotoku. Joining in the Bosome migration were
the relatives of Kwakye, the fugitive ex-Kotokuhene who had
fled his kingdom for Asante in 1812.^ One of these
relatives was his nephew, Kofi Agyeman. Both the Kotoku
and Bosome migrants had scarcely settled when Afrifa, the
Kotokuhene, died in eastern Akyem (Abuakwa) through accident,
killed by a falling tree. His subjects quickly sent to
recall Agyeman from the Bosome Court at Soaduro, and
4
enstooled him at Gyadam as the new Kotokuhene. Thus while
1. Reindorf, History, p. 192.
2. Cf. Chapter 2pp. 45-44 above.
3. See p. 179 above.
4. Reindorf, History, pp. 192-3*
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the migrations to the south had led to family re-unions
among the Bosome and the Kotoku, it was also forging
closer contact between the three states in Akyem. 1
The Kotoku and the Bosome were not now expected
to move without Asante putting up a fight to prevent them
from having their way. Nor were the Abuakwa expected to
escape punishment for defeating the Asante army under Kwaku
2Bri and killing the commander himself. The three Akyem
states must have realised that sooner than later they would
have to face a punitive armed expedition from Asante. Only
the death of the great Osei Bonsu, which seems to have occurred
in November 1823^ but perhaps kept secret till after the
Battle of Nsamankow in 1824, apparently prevented Asante
from taking the field at once against the Akyem. There was
thus every reason for the Akyem to prepare for further war
with Asante. This realisation must have made them more
4
anxious than reluctant to seek alliance with the British 
who had an axe to grind against Asante in the defeat and 
death of Sir Charles MacCarthy. Obviously it was due to the 
importance they attached to such an alliance that the woman 
Abuakwahene, Dokuwa, and the new Kotokuhene Agyeman, re­
affirmed their membership of the alliance and gave up 
hostages to back their loyalty to it. Almost all states
1. The effect of this new development is disucssed in Chapters 
6 and 7 below.
2. Cf.pp. 190-1 above.
3. Wilks, I., Asante in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge 
University Press, 1975> P* 174.
4. Reindorf, History, p. 176.
5. Ibid.
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south of Asante, as well as the Danes, Joined1 the British
promoted alliance.
The Asante army took the field in early 1826. It
has been suggested that one aim was to punish the Ga for
2deserting their friendship with Asante. This may well be
true: not only did the Ga renounce the Asante alliance but
between 1823 and 1824 in response to the British propaganda,
they seized, robbed and killed many Asante subjects they
could catch in the Ga district and elsewhere. However, an
additional and perhaps a weightier objective of Asante was
to punish the Akyem and return them to allegiance with
Kumasi. Besides, the Asante army could notget to Ga without
first fighting the Akyem, unless of course they directed
their course via trans-Volta Akwamu.
The Akyem forces had several skirmishes with the
■5
invader and seem to have suffered as many reverses. They 
were therefore compelled to retreat southwards into Akuapem, 
en route to join forces with other members of the Southern 
Alliance.
The Allies met Asante forces at Akantamasu in
August 1826, and won the battle which ensued. The Akyem
are said to have later inflicted further but minor defeats
4on the already battered Asante army.
1. Of the Southern states only Kwawu remained loyal to Asante. 
The Dutch remained loyal to their friendship with Asante.
2. Cruickshank, Vol. I p. l6l; Reindorf, History p. 193; 
Claridge, Vol. I p. 385; Ward, History, p. lo3*
3 . Reindorf, History, pp. 198-9*
4. Ibid., pp. 208-9*
After the Battle of Akantamasu the British, on
their own behalf and that of the other members of the
Alliance, made protracted efforts to effect a peace
settlement with Asante. But it was not until November
1831 that this was finally achieved. The delay in
reaching the peace settlement was due mainly to the
opposition of the African members of the Alliance to the
British efforts. Foremost among the opponents were the
Akyem. In terms of ethnic affinity, geography, and culture,
of all the various Akan groups, the Akyem peoples were
perhaps the closest to the Asante, and yet the most hostile
to them.1 On that account they did not favour peace with 
2
Asante, without an opportunity to obtain a revenge for the 
past ills they had suffered from Asante. They refused to 
assent to the peace treaty unless certain Asante prisoners- 
of-war, including Akyaa,^ daughter of the Asantehene, were 
given up to them. On the other hand the Asante negotiators 
at the peace conference showed considerable contempt for the 
Akyem as erstwhile vassals to Asante. The attitudes of the 
two peoples generated such serious disturbances during the 
signing of the treaty that, according to Reindorf, it 
required all the tact and temper of "Governor Maclean to 
maintain peace.
1. C. S. Salmon (CCC) to Kennedy (SL), 3 October l871>
co.96/89.
2. Metcalfe, Maclean, pp. 93-4.
3. The name occurs as Akyianwa in the records etc.
4. Metcalfe, Maclean, pp. 93-4.
5 . Reindorf, History, p. 25 1.
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By virtue of the Peace Treaty of 1831 the Akyem 
states, and all others who had joined the British-promoted 
Southern Alliance, recovered their independence from Asante.1
For the Akyem this was a consummation of a cherished 
and old desire dating back to at least 1783. In that year 
Abuakwa reluctantly accepted vassalage to Asante, following 
the example of Kotoku in 17^ -2. They were obliged to continue 
to be subservient to Asante for lack of dynamic leadership.
But in 1807 when Atta Owusu ascended the Abuakwa stool and 
in 1812 when Kwadwo Kuma mounted that of Kotoku, it was 
evident that the Akyem would one day sever the servitude to 
Asante. This they achieved finally in 1831.
1. Cf. Clause 3 of the Treaty, reproduced by Metcalfe, 
Documents Nos. 83 and 9 8.
CHAPTER 6
AKYEM, ASANTE, THE BRITISH, AND THE DANES
1832-1850
The pre-1831 upheavals had far reaching effects 
on the subsequent history of Akyem. The ruling lineages of 
Kotoku, a section of lacustrine Bosome, and their subjects 
had fled their homes, in northern Akyem and Asante respec­
tively, to Akyem south of the Birem in order to escape from 
Asante domination. 1 But the 1831 Treaty of Peace which 
endorsed the recovery of independence by these states 
omitted to stipulate as to whether the Bosome and Kotoku 
could or could not return to their ancestral homes without 
let or hindrance from Asante. They themselves resolved the 
issue by opting to stay on in Akyem south of the Birem. The 
decision, coupled with the arrival in 1832 of the Juaben, as 
refugees from Asante, turned Akyem south of Birem into a 
haven for fugitive Chiefs. Preponderant European partici­
pation in the pre-1831 events and European economic 
interests also subsequently made Akyem a source of Anglo- 
Danish rivalry for the district as a sphere of influence.
All these influenced intra-Akyem relations as well as 
relations with neighbours and the European traders on the 
coast.
At present there is no direct evidence on the 
motives which prompted the refugees in their decision to 
settle permanently south of the Birem.
1. Cf. Chapter 5PP- 192-4 above.
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It is, however, fairly easy to speculate: continued 
fear of Asante was undoubtedly the main, if not the only 
explanation. This is suggested by the experience of the 
Denkyera. Prior to 1824 the Denkyera had lived in the 
middle reaches of the Ofin basin, but the ruling house and 
some of their subjects had migrated to the south in order 
to foster alliance with the British against Asante. In 1829* 
two years before the signing of the peace treaty of 1831* 
they refused to return to their native country and asked 
the British to negotiate, on their behalf, with the Fante 
for land on which they could settle. The result was the 
founding of a new Denkyera state with its capital at Jukwa, 
just about twelve miles to the north of Cape Coast. 1 
Apparently the Denkyera rulers thought it was impolitic to 
return to their native country where they would be close 
neighbours once again to Asante. That would have been a 
prelude to a rejection of the recovery of independence, 
because proximity was likely to make Asante attempt to 
regain its pre-1831 hegemony. Bosome (at least part of it) 
and Kotoku seem to have arrived at a similar decision.
With respect to Kotoku the decision adversely 
affected the size of the Akyem country.^ Politically the 
refusal to return to their ancestral home rendered northern 
Akyem a no-man's-land in the 1830s and l840s. And by the 
1850s the district was regarded by the British protecting
1. Metcalfe, Maclean, p. 127.
2. As late as 1853 Asante tried this in relation to Assin.
3 . See Map 6 .
power as forming part of Asante1 even though the Kotoku
2
continued to regard it as belonging to them.
Though reduced in size, the Akyem district became 
varied in its population pattern and township distribution. 
The arrival of the immigrants from lacustrine Bosome 
naturally increased the population of Akyem Bosome and also 
Akyem as a whole, though by how much it is difficult to say. 
Bosome tradition suggests that Soaduro was founded by the 
nineteenth century migrants. With the eighteenth century 
migrants already settled in western Akyem, it is more 
reasonable to imagine the later migrants joining the earlier 
ones. The two sections may have then decided.to found a 
new capital.
Changes also occurred in the population pattern 
of eastern Akyem. Before the arrival of the Kotoku ruling 
lineage, the Abuakwa had been the sole inhabitants of the 
district. The Kotoku refugees of course increased the 
population of the district, though the numerical strength 
of the Kotoku migrants is not known. Besides, the two 
Akyem elements became considerably mixed up, in terras of 
location. Reindorf recalls how in the 1820s Dokuwa, the
1. See Chapter 7* p . 230 below.
2. As late as 1908 the Kotokuhene claimed to be the 
legitimate ruler of Asante Akyem. Cf. W.C.F..Robertson, 
Secretary for Native Affairs, to the Omanhene, Akyem 
Kotoku, ? June 1908, Case No. 1073/07* File No. D46, 
Kumasi Archives. See also "Precis of Akim claims to 
Ashanti-Akim: Akim Kotoku”: MP.212/93* MP.5718/9^*
Conf. MP. 105/96, MP.5579/96, MP.697V96, MP.6533/97*
MP.8661/97* MP.4964/98, MP.7826/98, MP.6505/99*
MP.1588/00, MP.4964/00, MP.1209/01, File No. D 46.
3 . Cf. Chapter 2pp.43-4 above.
woman Abuakwahene, cordially welcomed the Kotoku ruling
lineage, and asked them to choose from among the Abuakwa
towns of Gyadam, Adasewase, Muoso, Mampon, Odubi and Asafo
as settlement places; the migrants chose Gyadam as their
chief town. 1 Other Abuakwa towns like Muoso received some
2
of the Kotoku element. Such was the concentration of 
Kotoku element in Muoso that by the 1850s the Kotokuhene 
regarded it as a ’native’ town.^ The migrants, however, 
seem to have founded one or two towns on their own 
initiative. Among these were Asuboa, described in the 
1850s as a suburb of Gyadam, and possibly Moseaso, 
destroyed in 1860 .^  On the whole the arrival and residence 
of the Kotoku ruling lineage in eastern Akyem in the 1830s 
brought a change in the political map of the district. In 
after years portions of it were regarded as ’native1 Kotoku 
territory.
During the immediately following years, however, 
the Kotoku presence in eastern Akyem destroyed the pre-1825 
good relations between them and Abuakwa. The Abuakwa were 
inclined to blame Kotokuhene Agyeman for the deterioration, 
but the fundamental cause would seem to have been familiarity 
which bred mutual contempt for each other. In or about 1825*
C
the Kotoku ’refugees’ chose Kofi Agyeman as Kotokuhene. ”A
1. Reindorf, History, p. 192.
2. AAT: Muoso (1968/9).
3 . See Chapter 7 PP» 235—7 below.
4. Ibid.
5. Cf. Chapter 5 P* !94 above.
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better selection," Reindorf comments, "could not have been 
made, but /the choice/ offended ^?Vbuakwahene7 Dokuwa not 
personally, but on account of his late uncle’s conduct
h 1towards the royal family of Kotoku." The dislike of the 
Kyebi Court for Agyeman persisted in the 1830s and 1840s, 
and led to the straining of relations between the Kotoku 
and their Abuakwa hosts. The details of the tension are 
not known for certain. But the certainty of the conflict 
is not in doubt. It was strong enough to make Andreas Riis
0
notice it in 1839 when he visited eastern Akyem. At some
stage in Dokua’s reign, which ended in 1842, such was
Abuakwa hostility towards Agyeman that he sought safety
with the Danes at the Christiansborg castle, Osu.^
Reindorf therefore may well be right in asserting that in
the 1830s Abuakwa and Kotoku would have gone to war but
4
for Juaben mediation.
The intervention was made possible by the 
presence of the Juaben in eastern Akyem as refugees, and 
guests of the Abuakwa. A civil war in Asante was the 
immediate cause of the Juaben flight to eastern Akyem 
(Abuakwa). Since the creation of the Asante union or 
confederation in the last quarter of the seventeenth 
century, there had always been a muted rivalry between the
1. Reindorf, History, pp. 192-3 . For the conduct in question
see Chapter 5* P* 178 above.
2. EMM. 1840, Part I p. 96f, cited by M. Johnson, Migrants,
Part I p. 16. Cf. p. 213 below for the identity
of Riis.
3. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 206.
4. Reindorf, History, pp. 293-4. For a detailed account of




states of Kumasi and Juaben. The rivalry intensified
after the defeat of Asante in 1826 and steadily developed
into an open war in June-July 1832 when Kumasi forces
invaded and defeated the Juaben. The latter, led by their
Chief, Kwasi Boaten, in July 1832, fled to eastern Akyem
to seek asylum with the Akyem Abuakwa Court.
The choice of Eastern Akyem (Abuakwa) as a place
of asylum was well calculated. Kyebi was already playing
host to the Kotoku ruling lineage and some of their 
2
followers. The Abuakwa were likely to, as they actually
did, welcome the Juaben fugitives also. In the 1830s
Abuakwa as a place of safety seems to have become proverbial:
for besides the Kotoku and the Juaben, a Pante chief and his
■5
subjects also fled to Kyebi for protection. In relation to 
the fugitives Dokuwa, the woman Abuakwahene, was like a hen 
to her brood. Her feelings as a mother may have partly 
inspired the Abuakwa reception of politically and militarily 
hard-pressed neighbours. With respect to the Juaben presence 
in Abuakwa, however, another aim was the possibility of the Juaben 
striking an alliance with the Akyem states against Kumasi.
The Akyem in general had been most opposed to a peace 
settlement with Asante in 1831 without wreaking vengeance 
of a sort on Kumasi. Moreover, the Akyem seem to have had
1. Juaben Tradition, as recorded by Rattray, Ashanti Law, 
pp. 127 & 169; Bowdich, A Mission, p. 279; Dupuis, A 
Residence, p. 138, Cruickshank, Vol. I p. 50; Ward, 
History, p. 207; Metcalfe, Maclean, pp. 124-5•
2. Cf.pp. 192-3 above.
3. EMM, 1840 Part III, cited by M. Johnson, Migrants1 p. 15* 
The identity of the Fante chief is not disclosed by the 
records.
4. See Chapter 5 P* 197 above.
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a soft place in their hearts for the Juaben even though
Asante, as a whole, was hated by them. In or about 1812
the Kotoku, for example, singled out Juaben, from amongst
the confederate Asante states, as a friend. 1
Abuakwa justified itself as a place of asylum.
Dokuwa cordially welcomed Boaten and his subjects to Kyebi
where they lived for some time. Later she allowed them to
establish Saman, near Osino, about ten miles to the north
of Kyebi, as their chief town. Owing to easy communication
between Eastern Akyem and the coastal Ga district, some
merchants in Accra were able to send the Juaben fugitives
2
messages of sympathy and material relief. Neighbours of
the Akyem were equally sympathetic with the refugees from
Juaben. Even before the final outcome of the Juaben-Kumasi
war was known in the south, the Assin for instance had begun
seizing Kumasi traders they could lay hands on in support of
Juaben. The Denkyera sent a message to Abuakwa assuring
the Juaben of Denkyera support should Kumasi dare to attack
4
them in Akyem. It would seem that only the fear of the
whites on the coast prevented all the Akyem and many of the
other states from offering immediate military assistance to
5
the Juaben refugees. Even then the Akyem participated in
1. See Chapter 5 P« 179 above.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 284.
3 . Maclean (CCC) to Dutch Governor-General van Legen (EC), 
13 July 1832, NBKG 360.
4. Reindorf, History, p. 284.
5 . Metcalfe, Maclean p. 125.
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the predatory activities of the Juaben, such as disrupting
Kumasi lines of communication with the coast. 1 They also
took part in an armed expedition which the Juaben refugees
organized against parts of provincial Asante such as Krakye
2
and Namonsi in 1833*
Increased European authority over them was the 
price which the Akyem ultimately paid for supporting Juaben 
hostility against Kumasi. In deciding to encourage the 
Juaben, the Akyem, it would seem, did not take into serious 
consideration the possibility of Anglo-Danish intervention.
To promote the flow of trade between the forts and the 
forest had been the major, if not the sole, aim of the 
British mercantile administration at Cape Coast Castle in 
meticulously guiding the process which led to the signing 
of the peace treaty of 1831 between the Southern Alliance 
and Asante. This administration, headed by Maclean, the 
chief architect of the treaty, just could not countenance 
any activity likely to disturb trade. Apart from disturbing 
trade, the Akyem-Juaben blockade of the trade routes and 
seizure of Asante traders could lead to an Asante invasion 
of Akyem. Such an invasion would involve not only the 
Akyem but also other southern states, the British and the
Danes, in short, ‘‘the entire British alliance .... by
virtue of the Queen /pokua of Abuakwa7, being a member of 
the alliance, whose independence was safely guarded by the 
1831 Treaty.”^ Should another ‘Asante’ war break out, trade,
1. Minutes of Council Meeting (CCC), 27 August 1832, CO.98/IA; 
Maclean to Van Legen (EC), 28 September 1832, NBKG 360.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 28 5.
3 . Maclean to CAM, 27 August 1832, CO.267/ H 7 .
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to the thinking of the British, would be the greatest loser. 
It has been argued that the violation of the 18^1 Treaty and 
the consequential political implications of such a violation 
more than anything else obliged Maclean to intervene in 
Akyem affairs during the Juaben sojourn. 1 The loss of trade 
opportunities and profits was another and no doubt a greater 
concern of Maclean.
By virtue of the Treaty of 18^1 the British could
intervene in Akyem affairs. Clause 5 of the treaty
empowered British mediation between any of the southern
2states and Asante in the event of strained relations.
By actively encouraging Juaben hostility against Kumasi 
the Akyem states committed aggression against Asante. The 
British could therefore intervene.
Maclean threatened the Juaben refugees, and of 
course the Akyem, with a joint Anglo-Danish-Dutch punitive 
expedition if they did not put a stop to their predatory 
activities, release all Asante subjects they were holding 
in detention, and submit the dispute with Kumasi to 
European arbitration. Maclean’s next step was that he and 
the Danish authority each stationed a platoon of six troops 
at Kyebi to watch the movements of the Akyem and the Juaben 
refugees. He also sent a force to clear Akyem and Juaben
1. Metcalfe, Maclean, p. 125-
2. The Clause stipulated: ”To prevent as much as possible 
future war, it is agreed that in case of the parties 
subscribing to these articles </of the Treaty/ committing 
an act of aggression and complaint being made thereof to 
the Governor-in-Chief of his Britannic Majesty’s posses­
sions on the coast .... any satisfaction which the 
circumstances of the case may require, will be adjudged 
to the aggrieved party by the said Governor-in-Chief
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marauders from the trade routes, especially the Assin 
section of the Kumasi-Cape Coast route. 1 Basically these 
measures were merely intimidatory but they had the desired 
effect: by September 1832 the Juaben had agreed in principle 
to the idea of European arbitration as a means of settling 
the conflict with Kumasi.
The quick Juaben submission to the British
authority must be seen as also reflecting Akyem acceptance
of that fiat. The rate at which the submission was made
seems surprising, considering that at their distance, the
Akyem and the Juaben refugees could have easily defied the
authority of the Europeans and the latter would have found
it relatively difficult in taking military reprisal against
them. With respect to the Akyem three things may have
dictated the pace of submission. The presence of uniformed
troops in Kyebi was a novelty which Akyem leaders probably
felt was a pointer to sterner measures the Castle authorities
in general and the British in particular were capable of
taking against whoever tried to displease them. After four
hundred years of commercial association, the Akyem, like
many other Gold Coast peoples, had acquired an insatiable
taste for European imports which they had come to regard
as necessary. For any state or people to refuse to submit
to the wishes of the European mercantile presence on the
coast was a certain way to invite European economic blockade.
The share of the Akyem in the coast trade in the 1830s must
2
have been considerable. They and the Juaben who briskly
1. Reindorf, History, p. 287; Metcalfe, Maclean, pp. 125-6.
2. Akyem economy during the 1830s and 1840s is discussed on 
pp.218-220 below.
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participated in this trade, could not afford to risk a loss 
of their share. But perhaps the greatest fear of the Akyem 
was the possibility of being expelled from the southern 
alliance to face Asante alone. For Clause 6 of the 1831 
Treaty of Peace stipulated: ”lf any of the allied Kings and 
chiefs shall be the aggressor or aggressors /against Asante7 
.—  and if such aggressor or aggressors shall refuse to 
abide by the decision of the Governor /of Cape Coast Castle7
or his representative .....  in that case he or they will no
longer be considered as a confederacy, and must arrange his 
or their dispute as ^Te and/ they best can.” The Akyem 
states might want to annoy Asante in small ways but not to 
the extent of inviting war with Kumasi. It was still too 
soon after the sufferings they had experienced at the hands 
of Asante in the recent past. In the face of the perennial 
Asante bogey, the Akyem states, like other more interior 
southern states, were obliged to seek alliance with the 
militarily superior Europeans and accept their wishes, even 
though the acceptance compromised Akyem political indepen­
dence.
The submission averted the immediate danger of 
invasion from Asante. But the emergence of an Anglo-Danish 
rivalry for spheres of influence in the Gold Coast, particu­
larly for Akyem, Akuapem and Krobo, 1 prevented the process of 
reconciliation from immediately developing into a regular 
peace settlement between the two Asante groups. Consequently 
in 1833 Abuakwa and Kotoku assisted the Juaben to invade some
1. The rivalry is discussed on pp. 214-218 below.
of the trans-Volta districts of provincial Asante.*^ The
Juaben and the Akyem supporters must have done more than
that. For in the early days of 1834 Kumasi threatened to
2
invade Akyem in retaliation. But the death of Asantehene
Osei Yaw Akoto in March 1834 saved the Akyem states from
war with Asante.
Relations between the Akyem and the Juaben on one
side and Kumasi on the other improved as from now on, because
the new Asantehene, Kwaku Dua I, was favourably disposed
towards the Juaben. He worked untiringly in an effort to
get the Juaben back to Asante. This enabled the Cape Coast
and Christiansborg castles authorities to effect a peace
settlement between Juaben and Kumasi in November 1835*^ The
peace treaty is worth quoting in full in view of the direct
bearing it had on subsequent Akyem-Asante relations:
"Article 1st: All differences of whatever kind
soever which may have existed or do now exist 
between the aforesaid parties are hereby declared 
to be at an end, and shall not be revived by 
either party.
Article 2nd: Boatyn and his people, or any por­
tion of men, shall be, from this time forth, at 
perfect liberty to return to their former country 
of Djuabin without let, hindrance or molestation 
from the King of Ashantee or his people.
1. Reindorf, History, p. 285.
2. EC Journal, entry, 9 February 1834, Furley Collection.
3. Treaty of Peace between Asante and Juaben, dated 
Accra, l6th November 1835, CO.267/136. Reindorf is thus 
wrong in dating the peace settlement to May 1835» unless 
of course actual agreement took place in May while the 
formal signing of the treaty waited till November.
Article 3rd; The subjects of Boatyn or Boatyn 
himself, if so inclined, shall be at perfect 
liberty to visit any part of Ashantee without 
being subject to molestation on account of past 
differences and quarrels, and in like manner, 
Ashantees shall be at perfect liberty to visit 
any part of Djuabin or Akim without being subject 
to any molestation or insult.
Article 4th; In order to guarantee this Treaty 
of Peace, and to ensure to both parties the most 
perfect security for their persons and property, 
the Governments of Cape Coast, Elmina, and 
Christiansborg do hereby declare that they will 
look upon as enemies and treat as such either 
party infringing the Treaty."
Akyem leaders probably expected that the Juaben would
return to Asante immediately after the November peace
settlement. But the Juaben stayed on till about l84l when
they finally left for home.
For the Akyem, the delay in the departure was
uncalled for, because with the passage of time the initial
enthusiasm with which they had welcomed the Juaben refugees
was fast waning, giving way to gradually but steadily
increasing tension between the host and the guest. Scuffles
occasionally broke out between the people of Kyebi and the
refugees; Abuakwa princes, especially Atta Obiwom, the
younger of the twin sons of Dokuwa, reportedly had love
affairs with the wives of the Juabenhene; while the Kyebi
Court occasionally accused Boaten of aiding, abetting, and
shielding native Akyem criminals; and Abuakwa royals were
inclined to be jealous of the Juabenhene owing to his skill
in the art of ruling "in the Twi manner. " 1
Existence of further differences with Kumasi was 
given in 1838 as the cause of the delay in the Juaben
p
departure from Akyem. Topp’s assertion in May 1838 is,
however, vitiated by a Dutch observation, made in April
1838, that the Juaben would leave Akyem for Asante in the
dry season, that is during December 1838 and February 1839J
that to hurry the departure, the Asante Court had sent the
Juabenhene one hundred preguans to help him defray any debts
■5
he might have incurred in Akyem. Neither of these two 
assertions can be set aside lightly. The very friendly 
relations still existing between the Dutch and Asante 
gives credibility to their assertion; while the English 
would certainly not make such an utterance if they were 
not sure of the evidence, especially in view of their 
anxiety to bring peace between Kumasi and Juaben.
Unwillingness to leave Akyem, on account of its 
excellent economic opportunities, would seem to best explain 
the delay in departure. The Juabenhenefs trading activities
1. Reindorf, History, p. 286. The phrase "in the Twi manner" 
is unfortunate, as it might create the impression that 
the Abuakwa ruling house was not Twi or Akan in origin.
It could give rise to such misleading assertions as that 
of Dr. Ayandele that the Akyem were not Akan. Cf. his 
Introduction to the 1970 edition of Horton’s Letters, 
p. 20. This is not to say that Dr. Ayandele based his 
assertion on Reindorf, though the possibility should 
not be ruled out. Perhaps Reindorf meant to say Asante 
and not Twi cf. pp. 213-214 below for further comment on 
this assertion of Reindorf.
2. Topp & Council (CCC) to CAM, 8 May 1838, reprinted in 
British House of Commons Papers, cited by Metcalfe 
Maclean, p. 130 n.l.
3. EC Journal, entry, 11 April 1838, quoting report from 
Huydecoper (Kumasi), F.C.; Reindorf, (History, p. 289) 
says 800 preguans was sent to Boaten.
in Akyem suggest this* Andreas Riis, a Danish missionary
working for the Basel Mission in the Gold Coast, was
impressed by these activities in 1839 when he visited
Eastern Akyem.1 The Juabenhene dealt in arms and ammunition,
the sale of which was controlled in Asante. In Akyem, the
Juabenhene, according to Riis, traded in these commodities
2
without restraint. But for the deaths of Kwasi Boaten 
and his brother and successor, Kofi Boaten, the Juaben 
would have stayed longer than l84l, when they left, led 
by Ama Seiwa, the mother of the deceased Chiefs.
By l84l when they finally left, the Juaben 
refugees had lived in Eastern Akyem for almost ten years.
The contact left lasting marks on both the hosts and the 
guests. Ethnic admixture was one of the effects. For there 
had been inter-marriages between the Akyem and the Juaben.
On familial grounds some of the Akyem appear to have joined 
the returning Juaben to Asante; on the other hand some of 
the Juaben opted to stay back. It was believed in the early 
1840s that about one thousand remained in the Protectorate.^
It is reasonable to imagine many of these choosing to live 
in eastern Akyem, i.e. Akyem Abuakwa.
Exchange of political ideas would seem to have also 
resulted from the contact. The Akyem are said to have learned
2i
state-craft from the Juaben. This view is open to doubt.
1. EMM 1840, Part III.
2. The Economy of Akyem is discussed on pp. 218-220 below.
3. Freeman, T.B., Journal of Two Visits to the Kingdom of 
Ashanti, London, 1843, pp. 156-b.
4. Reindorf, History, p. 286.
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The Asante were, and still are, the best exponents of 
government in the Akan fashion. But even if the Akyem were 
not so good, they would have acquired the essentials of the 
’’art of ruling” from Asante long before the residence of 
the Juaben in Eastern Akyem in the 1830s. The acquisition 
could have taken place during the period of vassalage.
In terms of inter-state relations perhaps the 
greatest effect of the contact was the cordial relations 
which were re-established between the Abuakwa Court and 
the Juaben before the latter finally left for Asante.
Abuakwa leaders are said to have put the Juaben on oath 
never to reveal to the rest of Asante any Akyem (Abuakwa) 
secrets they might have come to know. 1 The Juaben are also
p
said to have promised never to take up arms against Akyem.
Ultimately the Akyem paid a heavy price for
allowing the Juaben presence in their country for nearly ten
years. The residence of the Juaben partly encouraged Anglo-
Danish rivalry for the district as a sphere of influence.
It was indicative of this rivalry that in 1832 when the
British stationed a few soldiers in Kyebi to watch the
movements of the Akyem as well as the Juaben refugees, the
■5
Danes also did the same. Besides, both were signatories
n 4to the 1835 Treaty of Peace between Kumasi and Juaben. The
1. Juaben Tradition, as recorded by Rattray, Ashanti Law, 
p. 173.
2. A. A. Boahen, ’’Ashanti Research Conference,” in P. J. 
McEwen (ed.) Nineteenth Century Africa (OUP 1968) pp. 56-7* 
For effects-of this agreement, cf. Chapter 7 F&gpo 250, 
and Chapter Ip' p. 354 below.
3* Cf. p. 207 above.
4. Maclean signed for the British and Morch for the Danes, in 
addition to the Kumasi and Juaben signatories who were two 
on each side.
fundamental cause of the scramble for Akyem, however, was 
Danish claim to jurisdiction over Akyem, as well as neigh­
bouring Akuapem and Krobo. The first open claim of the 
Danes to jurisdiction over Akyem in the nineteenth century 
was perhaps that made by Governor Schionning of Christiansborg 
Castle in 1811. 1 The British indirectly challenged the claim
by saying that no European power possessed jurisdictional
2
rights over any part of the Gold Coast. This muted rivalry
exploded in the 1830s when Governor Morch arrived on the
coast to assume duty at Christiansborg castle. Between
1834 and 1838 he revived ’Danish claims' of jurisdiction to
Akyem, Akuapem and Krobo. It was to insist on this claim
that in 1834 he sent troops to escort a group of Asante
subjects through Eastern Akyem.^ The British could not
tolerate the Danish "attempt to assert, even enforce an
exclusive right to the extensive districts of Akim and
Aquapim ............. Crobbo.’’^  Maclean, leading
the British challenge, invoked the 1831 Treaty to emphasize
the independence of the Akyem states as well as Akuapem and 
5
Krobo. Maclean and Morch took such uncompromising stands 
on the issue that the matter had to be taken up at high 
diplomatic level by their home governments. A protracted
1. Schionning (CCO) to Dawson (James Fort, Accra), 17 & 20 
June l8ll, Diverse Arkivaler fra Guinea (DA fra G) No. 50.
2. Dawson to Schionning, 17 June l8ll, DA fra. G. No. 50.
3. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 206.
4. Council Minutes (CCC), 1 March 1836, CO.98/lA ; Maclean to 
CAM, 8 August; CAM to CO, 5 December 1836, CO.267/136;
GJ. (1837): entries, Nos. 442 & 480.
5. Council Minutes (CCC), 15 March 1836, C0.98/lA .
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correspondence took place between Copenhagen and London.
The Danish Home Government eventually backed down and
warned its officials in the Gold Coast not to advance any
pretensions to exclusive rights over Akyem and the other
two districts. 1
More recently a prominent Danish historian has
questioned the decision of Krabbe-Carius who was the Danish
Foreign Minister during the 1830s. He insists on the
existence of Danish jurisdictional right over the Akyem and
2
the other two districts. With regards to Akuapem and Krobo
the Danish claim has been recently proved to have no basis
3
whatever. Nor has it any substance with respect to Akyem. 
The preponderance of the evidence on Akyem-Danish relations 
since 1730 points to friendship, and not subservience, of 
the Akyem states to the Danish government at Christiansborg 
castle, Osu. Between 1730 and 1742 Akyem rulers in general 
and Kotoku Kings in particular collected ground-rents for
2i
Christiansborg castle as overlords of the Ga district. The 
Akyem lost this right to Asante which defeated them in 1742. 
They, however, continued to receive payments in the form of 
presents - ’dashes' as they were called - from the Danes so
1. British Ambassador in Denmark, Mr. Wynn, to the Danish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Krabbe-Carisius, 6 September; 
Gkt Minutes, 5 December 1837; DFUA draft Letter to Mr.
Wynn, 3 March; DFUA to Danish Ambassador in Great Britain, 
29 March 1838; DFUA to Gkt, 29 March; Gkt to Morch (CCO),
29 June; Resolution of DFUA, 8 August 1838, all in DFUA' 
aim. korres. Intra G. korres, ediide establishmenter paa 
Guinea; CAM to CO, ? March I038, Wynn (Copenhagen) to F0,
12 April 1838, CO.267/150; F0 to Wynn, 24 July 1838, copy, 
F0. 211/33*
2. Norregaard, Danish Settlements, pp. 207-8.
3 . Kwamena-Poh, Government, Chapter Four.
4. See Chapter 3 P* 90 above.
that the Akyem might be induced to drive their gold trade to
the Danes. Such ’dashes’ did not in any way subject them to
the Danes politically, as the Danish Customs Board stated in
1817.1 But it was left for Maclean to emphasize the point
in the 1830s. After dismissing the Danish claim in relation
to Krobo, he pointed out how the Akyem states and Akuapem
had been vassals to Asante until 1824 when they
"upon promises of support from the British, threw 
of the Ashantee yoke, hoisted the British flag, 
and were received into British pay. Their 
independence having been achieved by the powerful 
aid of the British Government, upon what grounds 
can the Danish authorities come forward and claim 
/over themJ territorial rights which never had 
any existence .... If the people themselves, if 
the chiefs and the inhabitants of Aquapim, Akim 
and Crobbo, wish to place themselves under Danish 
protection, the case would be different, but they 
do not wish, and they have repeatedly appealed to 
the British authorities for protection against the 
unjust claims of Governor Morck. ”2
To claim British jurisdiction over Akyem and the other two
districts would have been the logic of Maclean’s argument,
but he only declared that ’’the British authorities wished
for no exclusive rights” over Akyem and the others.^
If Akyem was politically subservient to
neither the British nor the Danes, then something else
about Akyem, and the other two districts, must have
attracted the British as well as the Danes to make them
wish to have the district as a sphere of influence. This
was the prosperous economy of Akyem and the others. ’’The
1. General Toldkammer to DFUA, 19 July 1817* DFUA aim. 
korres.: 1804/1848.
2. Maclean to CAM, 4 June 1838, CO.267/150.
3. Ibid.
British,” declared Maclean in his letter of 4th June 1858, 
"merely wish the trade /In Akyem and the other states/ to be 
free and open to all, but they do badly complain that the 
Danish authorities should, under no pretext of exacting
allegiance ..... stop trade, seize their goods and throw
the whole country into confusion."
The prosperous economy of the three districts at 
this time was a reality. Akuapem and Krobo were the two 
pillars of the palm oil industry of the Gold Coast as from 
the 1830s onwards. 1 As for the economy of Akyem, neither of 
the two European trading nations, like the refugee Juaben, 
could afford to lose the opportunity to benefit from it.
2
This economy is best seen through the eyes of Andreas Riis.
He distinguished four aspects of the economy; these were 
agriculture, hunting, gold-digging, and long distance trade
to the coast. In the agricultural sector, the Akyem produced
■3
plantains, bananas, maize and various types of yam. These
agricultural products were relatively of no use to the
European trading nations on the coast. In the 1830s palm
oil was the agricultural product in the greatest demand by
the European traders. Unfortunately for Akyem "the useful
«4palm-tree is less at home here than in Akwapim.
1. George Barnes, M. Foster & Rev. Brown to R.W. Hay, 29 
February 1832, CO.267/117; EMM (1839) p. 456, cited by 
M. Johnson, Migrants; p. 17 n. 63; British Parliamentary 
Select Committee Report, (1842) Appx. 36; CAM to CO, 8 
December 1840, CO.267/162; Fitzpatrick (CCC) to Earl Grey 
(CO), 10 June 1849, CO.96/15; Metcalfe, Maclean, p. 200.
2. Cf. p. 213 above for the identity of Riis.




Hunting in Akyem, like agriculture, was of no 
great benefit to Akyem - European relations, though quite 
useful to the Akyem themselves. This was because game in 
Akyem did not provide valuable furs or elephant tusks to 
encourage international trade. Hunting in Akyem was there­
fore done on a subsistence basis.
In terms of international trade, however, the
Akyem found adequate compensation in the gold-digging
industry. The industry seems to have been in the doldrums
in the early 1820s when it was described as an unprofitable
venture. 1 Dupuis’s assertion may well be true because the
first quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of
2
great instability in the district. The industry, however, 
experienced a boom in the relatively calm years of the 1830s 
when the people could devote much of their attention to 
economic matters. Demand for Akyem gold was great on 
account of its ”extraordinarily fine" quality.^ The 
producers made every effort to increase output. For 
example, they supplemented free- with slave-labour, a
4
situation which pushed up the price of slaves.
Gold furnished the people with a strong purchasing 
power, which in turn enabled them to pursue long distance 
trade to the coast. Andreas Riis, underlined the link
1. Dupuis, A Residence, Part II p. viii.
2. Cf. Chapter
3 . EMM 1840, Part III, cited by M. Johnson, Migrants.
4. Ibid. The l807 British abolition of the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade did not affect domestic slavery in the Gold 
Coast.
between the extractive industry and the coast trade in 1839, 
when, as explanation to the addiction of the Akyem to gin, 
he said:
"There in the gold-digging we find the explanation.
It provides the means and makes it possible for
anyone, who tries, to buy gin from the coast. On
the road from Accra to Akyem /via Akuapem7 one 
meets many ^Ckyem7  people loaded with gin."^
Of course the Akyem imported many other things from the
coast. Among these may be mentioned textiles, knives,
matchets, iron, and especially firearms and ammunition.
Thus on the basis of export and import the Akyem economy
was attractive enough to make both other Africans, such as
the Juaben, and European traders on the coast want to share 
2
in it. That was why contrary to the decision of the Danish 
Home Government in 1838, Danish officials in the Gold Coast
tried to renew the Danish claim to jurisdiction over Akyem
in the 1840s.
By then Dokuwa had been on the Abuakwa stool for 
about a quarter of a century. Her twin sons, Atta Panin and 
Atta Obiwom, who had been minors in 1817 when she ascended 
the male stool, had achieved their majority. She decided to 
abdicate in favour of the elder of the twins. But she remained 
Queen till 1856 when she died.-^ Atta Panin was proclaimed 
the new Abuakwahene in 1842. In August 1842, Edward Carstensen, 
the Danish Governor, sent his representatives to "supervise"
1. EMM 1840, Part III.
2. Ibid.
3 . Baum (Gyadam) to Basel, 14 July 1857» No. Gyadam 7, 
BMA-PJC.
the enstoolment of Atta Panin. 1 Carstensen’s move implied 
a renewal of Danish jurisdiction over Akyem Abuakwa. This 
the British found very intolerable. They strongly protested 
against the Danish Governor’s activities as an attempt to
p
assert Danish jurisdiction over Akyem. Once more the 
Danish Government in Copenhagen advised its officials in 
the Gold Coast to refrain from that pretension. But the 
local Anglo-Danish ’scramble’ for Akyem continued up to 
1849 when the Danes had almost pulled out of the Gold 
Coast
The Akyem themselves partly encouraged the 
European rivalry. For example they were not judicious in 
their relations with both the British and the Danes. They 
unwarily invited the influence of each European power. In 
the 1826 war against Asante, the Akyem received arms and
ammunition indiscriminately from both the British and the
4
Danes. In 1831 when she was in Accra to assent to the 
Treaty of Peace with Asante, Abuakwahene Dokuwa willingly 
received honours and hospitality from each of these powers 
with equal enthusiasm. In 1832 they submissively allowed 
both the Danes and the British to station troops on Akyem
1. Carstensen (CCO) to Copenhagen, 6 September 1842, GJ; 
Norregaard, Danish Settlements, p. 210.
2. President & Council (CCC) to CO, 17 December 1842; W. 
Hutton to James Stephens, 23 March 1843; Joseph Reid,
W. Hutton & J. G. Nichols (Accra) to CCC, 8 June; Hutton 
to CO 27 July 1843# CO 9^/2; F0 to His Excellency 
Mr. Wynn, British Ambassador in Copenhagen, 31 July;
Wynn to F0, 21 August 1843, F0 84/474; CO to F0, 16 
November 1843, CO 402/1.
3 . Fitzpatrick (CCC) to Carstensen (CCO), 5 June 1849, 
Guineske Sager: -l86o-l893»
4. Reindorf, History, p. 196.
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soil. In 1834 and 1842 Abuakwa and Kotoku rulers welcomed
gifts from the Danes without questioning the significance
of the presents. In view of the great respect they had for
the woman Abuakwahene the British, especially Maclean, must
have occasionally sent her gifts. He may well be right in
claiming that the Akyem and others in eastern Gold Coast,
often appealed to the British for Justice in their judicial
processes, particularly against the Danes. 1 And there
at
might be some truth in the assertion that/least Abuakwa and 
some divisions of the Kotoku eventually adhered to the 'Bonds
o
of 1844 by which several Gold Coast states established closer 
political ties with the British Crown and thereby increased 
British proto-colonialism in the country. In view of all 
this it was quite natural that the British and the Danes 
should each think that they had a claim to Akyem.
The behaviour of Abuakwahene Atta Panin in 1849 
justifies the above analysis. Information having reached 
Cape Coast Castle that he indulged in human sacrifice, he 
was invited to Cape Coast by Acting Governor Fitzpatrick to
defend himself against the charge. Atta immediately claimed
3 4to be under Danish protection; and the Danes backed him up.
But Fitzpatrick insisted on British right over Abuakwa,
adding that Atta’s "case .... is so clear that when a
fitting opportunity offers itself, I shall have him
arrested and see that he gives a good security for his
1. See p. 217, n. 2, above.
2. Ward, History, p. 199*
3. Fitzpatrick (CCC) to Earl Grey (CO), 10 June 1849*
co 96/1 3.
4. GJ (1849)> entry Nos. 824 & 8 2 5.
2 2 3 .
conduct in future.” The Akyem states fully acknowledged 
British over-rule after 1850 when the Danes finally pulled 
out of the Gold Coast.
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CHAPTER 7
ABUAKWA-KOTOKU RELATIONS AND THE BRITISH 
1850-1860
Hostility characterized intra-Akyem relations 
between 1850 and i860. Efforts of the British administra­
tion at Cape Coast Castle to calm the tension promoted 
acceptance of British authority in Akyem. It is, however, 
true to say that the British took the initiative, through 
the promulgation of the Poll Tax Ordinance in 1852, to 
encourage the Akyem to accept British authority.
The departure of the Danes in 1850 vaguely implied 
the transfer of the Akyem states to British jurisdiction.
But the first concrete proof of Akyem acceptance of British 
authority occurred in about mid-1852 when Abuakwa and Kotoku 
rulers travelled all the way to Accra'*’ to join chiefs of 
other states, for the purpose of endorsing the Poll Tax 
Ordinance promulgated by the British, and accepted by the 
Chiefs of the western states earlier in April 1852. The 
Ordinance permitted the British, as the protecting power, 
to levy a poll tax of five pence on every individual, adult 
or child in the Protectorate. Income from the tax was partly
1. Zimmermann (Accra) to Basel, ?July 1852 BMA-PJC:
Governor Hill (CCC) to Earl Grey (CO,) 2 August 1852 
No. 41 CO.96/2 5. There was no mention of Bosome 
representation at the Accra meeting. Nor was it 
mentioned at the Cape Coast meeting. Either Bosome did 
not send representatives or the recorders of the proceed­
ings failed to note their presence. Living in extreme 
western Akyem, they may not have sent representatives to 
the Accra or the Cape Coast assembly.
2. Governor Hill (CCC) to Earl Grey, 25 April 1852 CO.96/2 5.
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to help defray administrative costs; and partly to be used
in providing social amenities for the people. 1 The event
was of great moment for the Akyem district. It was the
first time, since 1851, when the Akyem states made a direct
contact with and accepted British authority.
To facilitate collection of the tax the whole
Protectorate was divided into districts. Akyem was one of
the four districts into which the eastern sector of the
Gold Coast was divided. The others were Ga, Adangme, and
Akuapem. These were collectively termed the Eastern
Districts, and were placed under a Chief Civil Commandant
whose headquarters was Accra. A collector was stationed in
each of the districts. Headquarters of the collector for
2
Akyem was Kyebi. Thus British authority was growing
steadily in Akyem as in other places.
The first returns of the tax, besides indicating
the peoples of Akyem as consciencious taxpayers, emphasized
their acceptance of the British authority. Abuakwa and
Kotoku together paid £1,204.00 sterling during the 1852-5 
■3
financial year. This amount was double that paid by any 
of the other Eastern Districts. Considered in relation to
1. For a full and useful discussion of this subject see 
Kimble, Political History, Chapter IV.
2. The records so far consulted do not show who the first 
collector for Akyem was. According to Sus, the Collector 
for Akyem^pLS called "Vether". "Vether", he said, had 
joined the ... Niger Expedition, and had also been a 
printer in Sierra Leone. Prior to his appointment as Poll 
Tax Collector for Akyem he had been resident in Cape Coast. 
Cf. Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, 16 October 1855* No. IV. 47 > 
BMA-PJC.
5. Statement of Poll Tax: Income and Expenditure CO.96/53*
The statement is edited and reproduced in Kimble, Political 
History, p. 117*
4. Evidence of Mr. T.B. Freeman, 8 June i860 CO.96/54.
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the whole of the Protectorate the total of the tax collected 
in Akyem was second only to that of the Anomabo District. 1
Nor did Abuakwa and Kotoku soon default in paying 
the tax in subsequent years as several other districts did.
In the 1853-A financial year some of the districts, 
especially those on the coast, refused to pay the tax, on 
grounds that they were deriving no benefits in return.
The Ga and Adangn^ for example, rioted to stress their 
refusal. But the Akyem and the Akuapem obediently paid. 
Perhaps this was due partly to the persuasive tongue of
Cruickshank who, following the disorders in the Ga-Adangme
2
area, went to talk to them. But there can be no doubt that 
the non-participation of the Akyem in the protest movement on 
the coast was mainly due to their willingness to pay the tax. 
Acting Governor Henry Connor emphasized this point in l855»^ 
Akyem enthusiasm, however, began to wane after the 
1855-6 financial year. This was not because taxation did not
4
go with representation, but because they received no benefits 
in return. Kotokuhene Agyeman underlined this point in 1857 
when he told Mr. T. B. Freeman, then the Chief Civil 
Commandant of the Eastern Districts, that he and his people 
had paid ”the tax three times but /we/ have not received a
pr
single piece of cloth or anything in return”. In spite of
1. Kimble, Political History, p. 117•
2. Brodie Cruickshank acted as Governor from 27 August 1853 to 
16 January 185 .^
3 . H. Connor (CCC) to Sidney Herbert (CO), 7 April 1855
CO.96/33.
4. Kimble, Political History, pp. 175-187•
5 . Freeman’s Report on a mission to Akyem, 28 December 1857*
co.96/33.
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this indirect protest, both Kotoku and Abuakwa agreed to make 
a bulk payment of £216.00 and £288.00 respectively as the 
poll tax from Kotoku and Abuakwa for that year. 1
Up to 1859 when some of the states had long stopped 
paying the tax, both states continued to pay the tax, even 
though they still derived no benefits from paying. In i860, 
however, they seem to have refused to pay, judging from 
remarks made by Mr. Freeman. He noted in June i860 that the 
Akyem, like others in the Protectorate were given to under­
stand that a portion of the amount /from the tax/ was be, 
as it were, returned to them in the shape of direct social 
services, ’’^ Sut/ the only really direct and social benefits 
which the Akims have since 1852-3 received were my successful 
visit thither in 1857 to put peace between the two /Akyem/ 
Kings and prevent destructive civil war, and Mr. Hesse’s 
appointment there as clerk of the District to assist the 
Kings in their intercourse with the Government. This was 
positively all the direct benefit they received from their 
large payments into the public chest.” All the same there 
could be no doubt about the acceptance by the Akyem, of 
British authority.
Another way of measuring the Akyem acceptance is by 
British mediatory role in Akyem internal politics. Mr. 
Freeman’s visit to Akyem in 1857 was touched off by political 
tension in the district. The tension,which had existed right 
from 1825 when Agyeman was enstooled as the Kotokuhene*
1. Freeman’s Report on a mission to Akyem, 28 December 1857»
CO.96/3 3.
2. Freeman's Remarks, 8 June i860, CO.96/5^-
228.
received no relaxation in subsequent years. 1 In the 1850s 
the situation deteriorated.
Atta Panin, the elder of the twin sons of Dokuwa, 
the woman Abuakwahene, as already pointed out, was enstooled as
p
Abuakwahene in 1842 when his mother abdicated in his favour. 
Dokuwa had disliked Agyeman. In 1855 the report from Gyadam,
the Kotoku capital, was that Abuakwahene Atta Panin was
■3
trying to bring the Kotoku under his rule. It is clear 
that by the 1850s Atta had turned his mother's personal 
dislike for Agyeman into an official Abuakwa policy to 
obsorb Kotoku into the Abuakwa Kingdom.
Admittedly the temptation to adopt such a policy 
was too great for Kyebi to resist it. Europeans on the 
coast were wont to regard the Abuakwahene as the King of 
all Akyem. In 1831 Maclean talked of seeing the Abuakwahene, 
and not the Kotokuhene, in Accra before concluding peace 
with Asante.^ In the 1840s the Danes usually referred to 
the Abuakwa ruler as "Kongen" i.e. the King, and the 
Kotokuhene as "Caboceer" i.e. Chief. The implication was 
that the former was superior to the latter. There is a 
suggestion that in those years, the British encouraged, 
perhaps unwittingly, Abuakwa absorption of Kotoku. In the
1. See Chapter 6pjp. 202-3 above.
2. Cf. Chapter 6 p . 220 above.
3 . Simon Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, 1 June 1855# BMA-PJC.
4. See Chapter 5 P* 197 above.
5 . VGR of GTk: Sager til Guineiske Journaler, 1842-3, No. 458.
6 . Ward, History, p. 199 n. 17-
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1850s the impression that Kotoku was under Abuakwa received
greater emphasis. In 1852 when the rulers of the states of
the Eastern Districts met in Accra to assent to the Poll Tax
Ordinance, the Kotokuhene was described as if he was vassal
to the "King of Akim”, a title accorded to the Abuakwahene. 1
The British colonial office toed the line with its officials
on these shores. In 1855 Sir George Barrow called the
Kotokuhene f,Captain of the King of Akims” i.e. the
Abuakwahene. Governor C. C. Pine shared Barrow’s sentiments
in 1857 when he too described the Kotokuhene as ”a very
powerful vassal, a kind of African Duke of Burgundy” in
relation to the Abuakwahene. It would be absolutely
unrealistic to imagine that Abuakwa leaders were unaware
of the greater recognition Europeans accorded their King
4
vis-a-vis the Kotoku ruler. Such a recognition was likely
1. Zimmerman to Basel, ? July 1852, BMA-PJC.
2. Memorandum of Sir George Barrow to CO, 21 December 1855 
CO.96/35 cf. also Metcalfe, Documents, No. 202, pp.25^-5.
3. CC. Pine (Akuapem-Akropon) to the Rt. Hon. H. Labouchere 
(CO), 7 December 1857 CO.96/43. Pine was on visit to 
Akropon when he sent this despatch. Even as late as 1867 
when there was much evidence for the British to know that 
the Kotokuhene was a ruler of an independent state, some 
of them still thought the Kotokuhene was subordinate to 
the Abuakwahene. For in March 1867 Governor Ussher could 
write thus: ”1 am writing to his /Agyeman 'a? fellow chief 
Attah /0biwom7, on the subject of the barbarities prac­
tised on unoffending Ashantees by Adjaman, and if 
necessary, will concert measures with Attah for his 
removal to Cape Coast”, (Ussher to Blackall, 9 March 
1867, Confidential, CO 9o/7^* This despatch is 
reproduced by Metcalfe, Documents, No. 260, pp. 321-322.
4. It is even possible that the Abuakwa rulers themselves 
gave the Europeans the impression that they were superior 
to the Kings of Kotoku.
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to infaite the ego of Abuakwa and make its ruler want to 
regard the Kotokuhene as his inferior. An attitude of 
this nature could easily encourage, as it actually did,
Abuakwa to adopt a policy aimed at absorbing Kotoku into 
its state complex.
But it was one thing adopting such a policy and 
quite another implementing it. Agyeman was not the person 
to tolerate such pretensions by Abuakwa. His intolerance^ no 
doubt explains the decision of the Kotoku in 1855 to migrate 
from eastern Akyem. 1 But two things prevented the projected 
migration. The first was the discovery by the Kotoku of new
o
gold deposits in the same year of 1855• The other was
Agyeman’s strained relations with Asante.
The immediate cause of the conflict with Asante
was a land dispute. According to Barrow
’’the King of Ashantee complained that a captain of 
the King of Akims /i.e. Kotokuhene/ had called land 
in Ashantee his own, and /ha.d/ taken gold from it, 
and had sworn the great Ashantee Oath^ that the
Ashantee living on that land should leave it .....
It would appear that on each bank of the Prah river, 
which is the boundary between Akim and Asantee there 
is a crom /town/ the inhabitants of which are in the 
habit of digging gold dust, the Ashantees paying 
the tax to King Aggaman /Agyeman/ for the privilege 
... King Aggaman sent his messengers to the Ashantee 
side of the river to collect the tax, but his 
/messenger’s official/ cap was torn from his head, 
one half sent to the King of Ashantee, the other 
to King Aggaman with the message that if he sent 
100 people with such caps they would do the same 
.... and King Aggaman swore by his sword that if 
he had not bound himself to the English Government, 
he would march that day to fight (sic) the 
Ashantees”.^
1. Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, 27 May 185^ No. IV. 43 BMA-PJC.
2. Sus to Basel, 29 August 1855 No. IV. 47 BMA-PJC.
3. It would be more likely for King Agyeman to swear a Kotoku 
oath, if indeed he did on this occasion, than the Asante 
oath. Wilks may well be correct in saying that the Asante 
oath was sworn by a lesser Kotoku Chief. Cf. Asante, p. 212.
4. Barrow's Memo, 21 December 1855 CO.86/35.
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The anger was not one-sided. The Asantehene on the 
other hand fumed against Agyeman for swearing ’’the Great 
Oath” of Asante. He protested strongly to the British at 
Cape Coast Castle in their capacity as overlords of the 
Kotokuhene. The British then invited the Asantehene to 
send representatives to Cape Coast Castle to assist the 
Governor in an enquiry into his grievances against Kotoku. 
Barrow states further that the Asantehene did not oblige.
There is no direct evidence showing why the Asantehene did 
not respond to the invitation. One can only speculate.
Perhaps the King’s intentions in lodging the complaint was 
merely to request the British protecting power to warn the 
Kotokuhene to refrain from claiming ownership to lands on 
the west bank of the Pra. The firm stand which the British 
took in 1853 when Asante tried to regain Assin1 was too fresh 
to remind the Asantehene of what the British were capable of 
doing should he pick up a quarrel with Kotoku. Thus both 
Kotoku and Asante recognized the reality of British authority 
in Akyem. But this did not prevent Asante and Abuakwa from 
being hostile to Kotoku in the late 1850s. This was precisely 
the point which Simon Sus at Gyadam emphasized in 1855 when 
he remarked that ”on this side /to the north of Kotoku/ the 
great Ashantee tiger growls and threatens; on the other side 
/south/ Atta /of Abuakwa/ shows cat’s claws here and there.” 
Aside from the general Abuakwa policy to absorb 
Kotoku, there were other areas of friction between the two
1. Ellis (1893) p.219-220; Claridge Vol.l pp. 485-493; Ward, 
History, pp. 209-212.
2. Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, EMM Part III p. 30, quoted by Marion 
Johnson, Migrants * p.17*
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states. These included economic rivalry, missionary
enterprise in Akyem, and a clash of jurisdiction. Let us
examine these one after the other. First the economic
rivalry. The consensus of Basel missionary eye-witness
accounts is that Gyadam, the Kotoku capital, in the 1850s,
was by far and away the largest town in all Akyem. It also
pulsated with brisk agricultural and commercial activities
quite in contrast with dull Kyebi, the inhabitants of which
were described as being generally lazy. 1 At least one piece
of contemporary evidence also shows that Kotoku had more than
2
its fair share in the gold-digging and washing industry. In 
fact the economic buoyancy of Gyadam largely influenced Sus 
in 1854 to select it as the base for Basel Missionary 
enterprise in Akyem. This economic prosperity could easily 
excite jealousy from Abuakwa. The Akan proverb says the 
stranger gets rich only at the expense of the native.
Strictly speaking the Kotoku, though Akyem, were strangers 
in Abuakwa. Kyebi could not afford to see them prosper 
without feeling uneasy in mind.
To worsen the situation was the selection of 
Gyadam as the missionary station in Akyem. Akyem’s 
earliest contact with Christianity was perhaps in 1770.
1. Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, 3 February 1852; Widman and Mader 
(Akropon-Akuapem) to Basel, 3 March 1852; Mader’s 
Reisbericht (Report) on a visit to Sus at Gyadam in 1854, 
dated 21 April 1854; Zimmermann’s Report on a journey to 
Eastern Akyem, ? May 1858, BMA-PJC.
2. Freeman’s Report on a mission to Akyem in 1857 to enquire 
into Abuakwa-Kotoku relations, dated 28 December 1857
CO.96/5 7 .
3 . Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, 9 January 1854, BMA-PJC.
233.
In that year Danish Governor Gerhard Wrigsberg of
Christiansborg Castle introduced to Abuakwahene Obirikoran
four Moravian missionaries at the Castle.'1' Nothing came
out of the contact. Obirikoran was then too pre-occupied
with political instability in his Kingdom to have any
thought for a strange religion. The next contact was made
in 1839 when, as already pointed out elsewhere, Andreas
2
Riis visited Eastern Akyem. At the end of his visit he
concluded that the district was not ready yet for 
■3
Christianity. It was thirteen years later that Akyem had
two missionary visits, one by Simon Sus in January 1852 and
the other by J. A. Mader and J. G. Widmann in February of 
4
the same year. All three missionaries reported the 
eagerness of the Abuakwahene to have a mission station 
opened in Kyebi. He even asked Sus to take two of his 
sons, Gyekye and Asirifi, to Akropon and enroll them in the 
mission school which had been established there. But the 
Basel missionaries, led by Sus, rather chose Gyadam, partly 
for its economic advantages and partly because they felt 
that together with many nearby towns like Asuboa, Mmuoso,
1. P. Steiner, Eir Blatt aus den Beschite den Bruder mission
(Basel, 1888) p.36f, cited by Debrunner, A History oT
Christianity in Ghana (Accra 1967) p.126 n.3; Reindorf, 
History, p. 217. For an account of Obirikoran’s reign 
see Chapter 4 pp.H4-I57 above.
2. See Chapter 6 p.213 above.
3. EMM 1840 Part III.
4. Sus (Akropon, Akuapem) to Basel, 3 February; Widmann and 
Mader (Akropon) to Basel, 23 March 1852, BMA-PJC.
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Adasawase, Ankaase, Abompe, Osino etc., Gyadam would be an 
excellent starting point.'*'
The selection of Gyadam as the first Christian
Mission Station in Akyem hurt the feelings of the Abuakwa
2
Court, to the extent that Atta Panin ordered all the Abuakwa
towns surrounding Gyadam not to entertain the enterprise.
Consequently between 1854 and March i860 only thirteen
converts were made; and out of this number only five of them
■3
were native Akyem.
Naturally the Abuakwahene would regard the Kotoku 
of Gyadam as the people who had upset his apple-cart. To 
add insult to injury the Kotokuhene sold to the missionaries
4
the land on which the missionaries built the mission station. 
The Kotoku as refugees had not made an outright acquisition 
of the land around Gyadam. Agyeman therefore had no right 
to sell any part thereof. Though Sus and other missionaries 
who worked at the station in the 1850s did not directly say 
that the sale offended the Kyebi Court, yet the fact that in 
1859 the Abuakwahene referred to the land as his,^ points to 
the anger of Abuakwa at the sale.
1. Sus to Basel, 2 February 1852, Sus (Gyadam) to Basel,
6 September 1853* 9 January 1854 No. III.2> Widmann 
(Akropon) to Basel 2 January 1854, BMA-PJC.
2. Baum (Gyadam) to Basel,J1 April l857> No. Gyadam 6, BMA-PJC.
2- Sus (Gyadam) to Basel, 28 December 1857 No. Gyadam 21;
Haas to Basel, 29 August 1859 No. Gyadam 14; Mader's 
Report on a journey from Akropon (Akuapem) to Gyadam in 
August l859> 7 September 1859* No. Gyadam-21* BMA-PJC.
4. Baum (Gyadam) to Basel, 1 April 1857 > No. Gyadam 6,
BMA-PJC.
5. Haas (Gyadam) to Basel, 1 April 1857> No. Gyadam 6,
BMA-PJC.
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But perhaps the greatest source of conflict was
the clash of jurisdiction. By December 1857 relations
between Abuakwa and Kotoku had so deteriorated as to draw
them to the brink of war. Reporting from Akropon, the
Akuapem capital, on the explosive situation in Akyem,
Governor C. C. Pine in December said that
"the powerful kingdom of Akim which borders this
/Akuapem7 is .....  in a very disturbed state.
The sovereignty of it is divided between the 
King and a powerful vassal /i*e. Agyeman/, a 
kind of African Duke of Burgundy, and on account 
of supposed insults, these two potentates are on 
the point of coming to blows. As each party can 
bring a large force into the field, the result 
of such a war might be very serious, more 
especially as the country borders on that of 
the Ashantees who might perhaps interfere in 
the quarrel.
To prevent the situation from getting out of hand, Pine 
quickly sent Mr. Freeman, the Civil Commandant of the 
Eastern Districts, to try and resolve the situation in a 
peaceful manner.
The remote cause of the impending war was two­
fold. Since 1855 Abuakwa had tried to institute a blockade 
of the trade routes to the coast against Kotoku, as well as 
Bosome, because of the latter’s close relationship with
Kotoku; besides the Abuakwa were in the habit of way-laying,
2
seizing, detaining and robbing Kotoku traders. The 
immediate cause was what Freeman vaguely described as 
"unnecessary demands" which Abuakwahene Atta Panin was in 
the habit of making on Agyeman of Kotoku. Freeman did not
1. C. C. Pine (Akropon) to the Rt. Hon. Labouchere, 
7 December 1857 CO.96/43.
2 . Freeman’s Report, 28 December 1857 CO.96/43*
236 .
explain directly what he meant by "unnecessary demands", 
but his report was detailed enough to explain it.
According to him, the stool of Muosu became vacant when the 
Chief, Abrokwa, died. Muosu, to his thinking was a "Kotoku" 
town. Abrokwa1s successor was a minor called "Obriar"
(Obiri Yaw). The people of Muosu therefore appointed Pepra, 
a relative, to act as Regent. Obiri Yaw had somehow 
incurred a debt of 8 oz. of gold or 4 preguans and Pepra 
was asked to pay the debt. Pepra refused, and in this he 
had the support of his two brothers, Kofi Nyame, a very 
rich man who had earlier declined the regency, and Badu, 
who was a son-in-law to Kotokuhene Agyeman. The three 
brothers would still not co-operate even when the people of 
Muosu undertook to pay two-thirds of the debt. The 
Kotokuhene himself pleaded with the brothers but to no 
avail. Whether or not the Kotokuhene went beyond mere 
pleas, the report does not say, but the three brothers 
suddenly left Muosu for Kyebi and lodged a complaint with 
the Abuakwahene against the Kotokuhene. 1
By their conduct the three Muosu men had brought 
about a clash of jurisdiction between the two independent 
states; besides they had indirectly suggested the 
subordination of Gyadam to Kyebi unless of course they 
claimed Abuakwa citizenship. For, it seems that the 
Abuakwahene invited his Kotoku counterpart to appear before 
the Kyebi Court for an enquiry into the matter. In terms of 
Akan diplomatic etiquette such a request would amount to an 
"unnecessary demand", even an insult, to the Kotoku ruler who 
was an independent sovereign. On the other hand the
1. Freeman’s Report.
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Abuakwahene was in a real dilemma. The Kotoku were living 
on his land, and were therefore his guests. As a host he 
had to seek the welfare of all his guests. Nothing should 
prevent him from composing misunderstandings among his 
guests. But since the Kotokuhene himself was involved, he 
ought to have been more diplomatic in order not to offend 
the dignity of his colleague. As it was, the Abuakwahene 
apparently felt that Agyeman was not his equal. It is 
reasonable to imagine Agyeman not only refusing to go to 
Kyebi for the arbitration, but also becoming very angry 
with Atta for regarding him as his inferior, especially if 
Agyeman was indeed what he has been made to appear, namely 
"a man of overbearing character likely to inflame any bad 
feeling rather than sooth it. " 1 There was already much bad 
feeling created by the Abuakwa economic blockade since 1855 
and in the Abuakwa habit of raiding, robbing and sending 
peaceful Kotoku traders into detention.
Agyeman could no longer contain himself; he 
resolved on war with Atta to preserve Kotoku dignity and 
independence. He was at the point of marching on Kyebi 
when one Abuakwa Chief is said to have invoked an oath to 
restrain him from firing until the British Protectorate 
government had been given an opportunity to look into the 
matter. 2
Whoever that chief was, his indirect intervention 
was timely and wise. It prevented the immediate outbreak of
1. Ward, History, p. 222. But see a contrary view in Horton, 
West African Countries, page 120.
2 . Sus's Jahreisbericht on Gyadam Mission Station, 1 March 
1859 BMA-PJC. The identity of the chief is not disclosed.
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war and thus enabled Freeman, Pine’s representative, to
travel from Akropon on 8th December to Eastern Akyem where
he arrived on 10th December 1857* Freeman spent eight days
investigating the tension. His carefully considered
conclusion was that the Abuakwahene had been interfering
in Kotoku internal affairs; and had also erred in detaining
Kotoku citizens, more than fifty-seven of whom were still in
Kyebi cells at the time of Freeman’s visit. 1 He returned
the verdict of guilty against Atta.
The Abuakwahene did not challenge the verdict.
In fact he could not have done so. He agreed to release
all the Kotoku subjects he was holding in detention, and to
restore whatever goods he had robbed them of. On the subject
of restitution, however, he argued that since Pepra, Nyame,
and Badu, the three Muosu rebels ’’had largely partaken of
the property so plundered, they should also share in the
restitution now to be made.” The Kotokuhene also agreed
to the peaceful settlement of his quarrels with Kyebi. He
was prepared to forgive and forget. On 20th December 1857
when Freeman was all set for his return journey to Accra,
Agyeman asked him, to
’’tell Coffee Yammie and Pipira^ that I freely for­
give t h e m   and that I hope they will
immediately return home and dwell peacefully with 
me; but if they do not wish at present to return, 
they must proceed at once to the coast and remain 
there .for a time under the care of the Government 




3. Badu was in Gyadam, having returned thither with Freeman.
4. ’’Police Memorandum made in Akim, December 20, 1857"» as 
Enclosure No. 19A in Supplement to Freeman’s Written 
Defence, 8 June i860 CO.§6/48.
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Agyeman also requested Freeman to
"tell Atta that all being /now/ settled .... 
between Coffee Yammie, Pipira, and Baddoo and
myself .....  I hope all the past evil things
between us will be forgotten; that he will no 
more stop the paths ^trade routes7 against me
and my people ......  that he will /also/ open
the path which has been shut for the past two 
years against my subjects of Essuadru.^
Thus in 1857 British authority was invoked to compose
disputes in Akyem. The British authority in Akyem was now
a reality.
To the extent that it prevented immediate outbreak 
of war between Abuakwa and Kotoku, Freeman’s mission was 
successful. But the subsequent recalcitrance of Pepra and 
his brothers considerably detracted from this achievement.
Contrary to expectation, they refused to restore their share
2
of the loot, as demanded by the Abuakwahene. They fell out 
with their protector over the issue and subsequently left 
Abuakwa for Akuapem. There they established a base at 
Mampon, and with Akuapem support, especially that of 
Okuapemhene Kwao Dade, they embarked on terrorist activities 
against Kotoku traders and travellers passing through Akuapem 
to and from the Ga coast.
The Akuapem support for the Muosu rebels led to 
strained relations between Gyadam and Akropon. It is not 
known for certain exactly when the three Muosu marauders
1. "Essuadru" i.e. Akyem Soaduro, capital of the Bosome 
state in Western Akyem; for relations between Kotoku and 
Bosome, see pp. 267-8 below.
2. See p. 238 n.2 above.
3 . Freeman’s Written Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48.
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left Kyebi. Probably they did so after the 1858 British 
expedition against Krobo. 1 For Abuakwa, Kotoku and 
Akuapem showed their loyalty to the British by providing 
contingents to join the governmental expeditionary force.
In any case by 1859 they were in Akuapem, raiding Kotoku
2communications with the Ga coast. Supported by Akuapem
accomplices they
"were determined to waylay Agimanfs people on 
the paths in Aquapim and panyar and plunder; 
thus evincing £ln 18527 same perverse 
spirit which they had shown in Akim in 1857  ^
and which had well nigh brought on actual 
hostilities"
between Abuakwa and Kotoku.
The effect of the activities of the Muosu rebels
in Akuapem was greater than the straining of Gyadam-Akropon
relations. They disrupted trade. To the Cape Coast Castle
administration this was a very serious matter. Closely
linked with this adverse economic effect was the political
side. The Akuapem support and sympathy for the three
Kotoku marauders were both private and official. For
while the people of Mampon assisted them in the actual
raids and the robbing of Kotoku traders, Kwao Dade, the
1. For a useful account of events leading to the expedition, 
its course and outcome, see Freda Wolfson, "A Price 
Agreement on the Gold Coast - The Krobo Oil Boycott, 
1858-1866", in Economic History Review (London) 1953 
Vol. VI No. 1.
2. Freeman (Kpong) to Okuapemhene Kwao Dade, 12 February 
1859j as Encl.-No. 23; Hesse (Kyebi) to Freeman (Accra), 
10 May l859> as Encl. No. 26, same to same, 21 May 1859> 
as Encl. No. 27* Ross (?Akropon) to Freeman (Accra),
1 September 1859 (Extract) all in Freeman’s Written 
Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48.
3 . Freeman’s Written Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48.
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Okuapemhene accorded them considerable patronage. For
example he granted Badu a court action against Sus.
Badu's complaint was Sus's offer to be a caretaker of the
former’s personal property at Gyadam. When the three men
left Akyem, Kotokuhene Agyeman anticipated future trouble
from them. To prevent this he appointed Sus to take care
of the property of Badu in Gyadam. 1 Sus visited Akropon
in 1859 and immediately Badu went to lodge a complaint
with the Okuapemhene that Sus had seized his (Badu's)
property. But for a strong warning from the Civil
Commandant of the Eastern Districts, Kwao Dade would have
2
indulged Badu with a court hearing.
Agyeman of Kotoku took a serious view of the 
conduct of Akuapem, and warned the Protectorate Government 
that continued Akuapem support for his rebel subjects might
~z
bring "a row between him and Aquapim.”-^ His expulsion of
David Asante, the Akuapem born Basel Mission catechist,
_ 4
from Gyadam in or about August 1859* must be seen as a 
kind of Kotoku retaliation to the Akuapem support for the 
Muoso renegades. Agyeman refused to rescind the expulsion
R
order when the other missionary personnel pleaded with him.
1. Hesse (Kyebi) to Freeman, 3 May 1858 CO.96/48.
2. Freeman (Accra) to Okuapemhene, 12 February 1859 copy as 
Encl. No. 23 in Freeman s Written Defence, 8 June i860 
CO.96/48.
3 . Hesse (Kyebi) to Freeman, 21 May 1859* as Encl. No. 27 in 
Freeman’s Written Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48.




There was thus a great need for the Protectorate
government to take a quick and firm action, if only to
prevent a possible war between Kotoku and Akuapem. Freeman
was still the Commandant of the Eastern Districts. He
carefully analysed the situation and came to the conclusion
that the solution of the matter lay, not in Gyadam, but
Akropon. Consequently he strongly warned Kwao Dade that
Gyadam matters were beyond Akropon jurisdiction and that
Kwao must not dabble in them. 1 Freeman also asked the
Okuapemhene to withdraw immediately his support from the
Kotoku rebels, and
"to warn Baddoo and those connected with him, 
that if they attempt any interference with 
Agyeman and his people or Mr. Sus, or any 
matter connected with the palaver about which
I visited Akim in 1857 ...... I will call upon
the Military Authorities to send a force and 
bring them down to the coast for punishment.
And let them not fancy that I am indulging in 
empty and unnecessary threats. Their conduct 
has been so bad in creating troubles and 
disturbances that we can no longer bear with 
them if they continue such proceedings".
Freeman followed words with action. In late 1859 he sent a
platoon of soldiers to Akuapem to arrest the Kotoku rebels
and any others who supported them. But the Okuapemhene is
said to have forewarned Badu and his brothers. Consequently
they fled Akuapem before the soldiers arrived there, and
shifted their operational base to the Akyem-Akuapem border
from where they continued to commit "greater outrages"
2
against their own countrymen.
1. Freeman (Kpong) to Okuapemhene, 12 February 1859* copy;
cf. also Freeman (Kpong; to Sus (Akropon) 12 February 1859* 
copy, both as Encl. Nos. 23 & 24 in Freeman's Written 
Defence, CO.96/48.
2. Freeman’s Written Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48.
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The flight of the three ’rebels’ did not in any­
way exonerate Akuapem from an attempt to disturb inter­
state relations which could bring about general public 
chaos in the Eastern Districts. The government of Acting 
Governor Bird felt that the Okuapemhene must be punished to 
serve as a deterrent to other chiefs. At a court held at 
Asabi, at the foot of the Larteh Hills, on the Larteh- 
Ayikuma road, Acting Governor Bird investigated the matter 
and fined the Okuapemhene ”1000 heads of cowries” . 1 Thus 
Akyem affairs were helping, however negatively, to entrench 
British authority not only in Akyem itself but in neighbouring 
Akuapem.
By 1859 Gyadam-Kyebi relations had once more taken
a turn for the worse. Atta Panin had died in May 1858. His
younger brother, Atta Obiwom, had succeeded to the stool as
the new Abuakwahene. Obiwom was a more fiery character,
given to excessive drinking. While he was inclined to 
h
foment trouble, his councillors were wont to instigate 
him to take a more aggressive line with Gyadam. Among his 
bad advisers were Appiatu, described as ’’Chief Adviser,” the 
Ahene mma (i.e. sons of Abuakwa Kings, past and present), and 
above all his sister, whom Captain de R.uvignes in i860 
described as ”a perfect firebrand” who assisted Obiwom with
1. Freeman's Written Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48. One 
thousand heads of cowries were valued at 600 dollars.
2. Testimony of Kotokuhene Agyeman before the Executive 
Council, cf. Minutes, 16 July i860 CO.96/48.
5 . See p. 245 below.
4. See Chapter 6 p. 211 above.
money. 1 Clearly in character and in council Obiwom was not 
cut to promote cordial relations between Abuakwa and Kotoku.
Barely a year after his enstoolment he seems to 
have renewed the old policy of hostility towards Gyadam.
For in May 1859 Agyeman complained of Obiwom*s habit of 
ordering the seizure, robbing, flogging, and detention of 
Kotoku subjects. By the beginning of i860 Abuakwa and 
Kotoku had moved to the brink of war. The explosive 
situation caused Mr. Hesse, the Government agent at Kyebi, 
very anxious moments. Nor were the two Akyem rulers them­
selves happy with the situation. In January i860, Obiwom 
of Abuakwa complained to Mr. Hesse, for the information of
the Civil Commandant of the Eastern Districts, about his
■3
quarrels with Agyeman. Freeman, still the Civil Commandant,
4
promised to proceed to Akyem to investigate the tension.
In February he was twice informed that ’’Obewoom and Ageman
are expecting you everyday.-^ But Freeman did not turn up
as he had promised, and in March i860 war broke out between
7
Abuakwa and Kotoku.
1. Capt. de Ruvignes (Soaduro) to Cape Coast Castle, 5 May i860
co.96/47.
2. Kotokuhene Agyeman to Freeman (Accra), 9 May 1859 CO.96/48.
3 . Freeman’s Written Defence, 8 June i860 CO.96/48.
4. Freeman (Accra) to Hesse (Kyebi) 26 January i860 CO.48.
5 . Hesse to Freeman, 15 February; cf. also same to same,
23 February i860 CO.96/48 copies.
6 . He, in June, attributed his failure to go to Akyem to the 
preference of Acting Governor Bird to rely on military men. 
Eventually the Governor failed to send such men in time.
7. Acting Governor Bird (CCC) to the Duke of Newcastle,
2 April i860 CO.96/47.
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The war had both remote and immediate causes. The
remote cause was that habit of Abuakwa in manhandling,
abusing and maltreating Kotoku citizens, as complained by
the Kotokuhene in 1859• ’*' It is not unlikely that Kotoku
retaliated by similar methods. As to the immediate cause
oral traditional evidence ascribes it to a dispute between
2
Obiwom and Agyeman over some gold nuggets. This traditional 
view does not wholly tie in with contemporary evidence.
Ward is much nearer the truth in thinking that the 
fundamental cause of the war was the attempt of the 
Abuakwahene to claim "some sort of suzerainty over 
Kotoku."*^ The Abuakwahene, however, did not necessarily 
try to do this by "demanding a share of /Kotoku/ mining 
profits", as Ward would have us believe. Contemporary 
evidence gives three slightly different versions of the 
immediate cause of the war. The first is that of Major 
Cochrane, officer commanding the troops at Cape Coast 
Castle. In March i860 Acting Governor Bird sent him to 
Akyem with instructions to prevent the impending war in that 
District. Cochrane arrived there on or about 4th March and 
set his court at "Ashiaquah" (Asiakwa), almost mid-way 
between Kyebi and Gyadam; here he hoped to arbitrate between 
Atta Obiwom and Kofi Agyeman. He failed to get the two
1. See n. 2 p.244 above.
2. AAT: Begoro & Pamen (1925/6); Bosome Tradition, cited by 
Ward, History, p. 222 n. 26; Ameyaw, Oda Tradition (1965) 
pp. 12-14; AKT: Adoagyiri & Awisa (1968/9). AAT: 
Kukurantumi (1925/6 ) confuses events in 1857 and i860, 
and therefore must not be relied upon. AAT: Asiakwa & 
Kwaben (1925/6) mention the war and its effects but do 
not touch on cause.
3* Ward, History, p. 222.
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leaders to come to Asiakwa and by 8th March the war had
begun, forcing him to quit Asiakwa for Anyinasin, about
two miles to the east. Writing from Anyinasin, Cochrane
said that the immediate cause of the war was the
Abuakwahene’ s
"desire to possess himself of Affram’s nephews 
and their property amounting to more than a 
hundred persons and a considerable amount of 
gold and goods taken away from Agjeman’s 
territory.
A month later Captain de Ruvignes was sent to replace
Cochrane as mediator, because Cochrane reported his
inability to prevent or stop the war single-handed. De
Ruvignes sent in a report in April that
"the whole war has been brought about by him 
/Atta 0biwom7 to gratify a favourite of his 
named Affram who being a drunkard, and I 
consider the lowest kind, was perpetually 
calling on his relatives who were under the 
protection /T jurisdiction/ of Adjeman to 
help him pay debts incurred by him in his 
excesses.g
Captain de Ruvignes may have obtained his information from 
StrBmberg, the Basel missionary stationed at Gyadam, who is 
our third source. De Ruvignes report ties in well with 
Stromberg’s. According to Stromberg the cause of the war 
was Abuakwa interference in Kotoku internal affairs. 
Expounding on this Stromberg averred that Affram was a 
Kotoku citizen of Gyadam. Affram one day suddenly left 
for Kyebi and from there requested that all his relatives 
be sent to him at Kyebi. Obiwom backed Affram, and sent 
soldiers to escort Affram’s relatives from Gyadam to
1. Major Cochrane ("Aniah Sing" i.e. Anyinasin) to Ag. 
Governor Bird (CCC), 8 March i860, CO.96/47» Affram was 
a citizen of Kotoku.
2. Capt. de Ruvignes (Akyem) to Cape Coast Castle, 15 April
i860 CO.96/47.
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Kyebi. 1 It is clear that Affram had decided to transfer 
his allegiance to Kyebi, which act could easily be a 
source of inter-state friction, as exemplified on this 
occasion. The people of Gyadam, the missionary states 
further, abused the Kyebi escorts and chased them out of 
the town. Moreover Kotokuhene Agyeman swore to go to war 
against Kyebi, ’’rather than give them /Affram's relatives/
It is clear from all these pieces of contemporary
evidence that the immediate cause of the i860 war was Kyebi
attempt to claim jurisdiction over some Kotoku subjects who
had not willingly renounced their Kotoku citizenship. It
is thus not difficult to see that still at play, was the
old Abuakwa plan to absorb the Kotoku state by subjecting
its ruling house to the Kyebi stool. The policy was hostile
to Kotoku sovereignty, and seemsto explain why in early
1859 Kotokuhene Agyeman once again revived the idea of
emigrating from Eastern to Western Akyem in order to be much
further away from the Abuakwa capital.
The migration idea took a definite form in late
1859 when Agyeman finally decided to implement it, but not
4
until he had fought Abuakwa. Thus an additional and
1. Stromberg (Gyadam) to Basel, 20 March i860 No. Gyadam 4 
BMA-PJC.
2. Minutes of the Executive Council Meeting (CCC), 16 July 
i860 CO.96/48.
5 . Sus’s Jahresbericht on Gyadam, 1 March 1859 BMA-PJC.
4. Kromer’s Report on Gyadam Mission Station for the 4th 
Quarter of l859> I2 January i860, No. Gyadam 26,
BMA-PJC.
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perhaps a weightier immediate cause of the war was Kotoku 
resolve to wage it. British efforts to prevent the war 
did not deflect Kotoku from the step they had decided to 
take. This must not necessarily be attributed to a deficiency 
in British authority in Akyem but to Kotoku determination to 
teach Abuakwa a lesson. For, as shall be seen in due course, 
immediately after the war Agyeman as well as Atta Obiwom 
co-operated with the British officials to end the dispute.
In anticipation of the emigration to western 
Akyem, in late 1859 and early i860 the people of Gyadam and 
the few other nearby Kotoku towns performed intensive custom 
for their dead and fetishes. 1 Next Agyeman sent a large 
section of his people, consisting mainly of women, children, 
and the aged, ahead on the journey to western Akyem.
It appears that Agyeman had done all this even 
before Major Cochrane arrived in eastern Akyem, a situation 
which made more difficult his task of mediation in order to 
prevent war.
Kyebi put an army of two thousand strong into the
2
field as against the eight hundred of Gyadam. The figure 
for Kyebi, though much larger than that of Gyadam, was 
relatively small, considering that three years later Abuakwa 
could put more than 5>000 into the field at a short notice. 
This suggests that not all Abuakwa favoured the war with 
Kotoku, as de Ruvignes discovered. The Asiakwahene, other­
wise styled Nifahene of Abuakwa, is said to have disapproved
1. Joint Jahresbericht of Haas & Kromer on Gyadam, 12 January 
i860 No. Gyadam I, BMA-PJC.
2. Stromberg to Locher, 26 March i860, No. Gyadam 8 
(BMA-PJC).
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of the attitude of Kyebi. 1 It looks as if the war was
between Kyebi and Gyadam, and not Abuakwa and Kotoku.
Obiwom carried the war to Agyeman, thereby taking the
initiative from the latter whose oath to fight tends to
suggest him as the aggressor.
The evidence of the missionaries at Gyadam shows
that two major battles took place, one very near the mission
station on the outskirts of Gyadam. They estimated that
about three hundred souls perished on both sides. There
are conflicting views in traditional history on the outcome
of the war. Almost all available Abuakwa stools traditions
claim victory for Kyebi, adding the detail that the Abuakwa
2
army burnt down Gyadam. On the other hand Kotoku claim to
have won the war, saying that had Dompre, one of their
leading war chiefs, wished, he could have killed the
Abuakwahene whom he cornered. The Kotoku claim ties in
fairly well with contemporary eye-witness account recorded
by the Basel missionaries at Gyadam. They say that in the
two major battles the Kotoku army so routed Atta Obiwomfs
4
forces that he sent to Akuapem for military assistance. 
Either Kwao Dade did not respond favourably or Obiwom felt 
there was need for still more assistance from outside 
because it was also known then that he
1. Report of Capt. de Ruvignes, 15 April i860.
2. AAT: Asiakwa, Begoro, Kwaben, Kukurantumi, Wanlyi, Pamen etc. 
(1925/6).
5 . A.KT: Adoagyiri (1968/9 ). For more accounts on Dompre 
See Chapter 8 jftr and Chapter 9 below.
4. Stromberg to Basel, 20 March, i860, No. Gyadam 1;
Stromberg to Locher (? Akropon), 26 March i860, No. Gyadam 
8 (BMA-PJC).
250.
"sent to invite the Ashantees to come and assist 
him to take /off7 Adjiman’s head.
Asante obliged. This was as to be expected.
Already the Asantehene had an axe to grind against
Agyeman who in 1855 had claimed lands beyond the Pra as
2
his. The invitation gave Asante a chance to settle old
scores with Kotoku. Kumasi therefore detailed the palatine
chiefs of Juaben and Kokofu and the province of Kwawu to go
•5
to the aid of Kyebi. Proximity and old understanding 
seem to have been the criteria for selecting the three 
chiefs to goto the aid of Atta Obiwom. While Kwawu was 
the immediate north-eastern neighbour of Eastern Akyem and 
could therefore speedily move in on Gyadam, Kokofu was a 
nearby north-western neighbour and could easily cut 
Agyeman’s line of march to western Akyem. As for Juaben, 
it may have remembered the concordat it had made with 
Kyebi in 1840.^
The Juaben and Kwawu forces arrived in April i860. 
By then the Kotoku had abandoned Gyadam and other towns of 
theirs and left for Western Akyem. It was this desertion 
which, according to the missionaries, enabled the Abuakwa 
to burn down Gyadam and other Kotoku towns like Mmoseaso.
1. Capt. de Ruvignes (Soaduro) to CCC, 5 May i860 CO.96/47.
2. See p. 250 above.
5. Stromberg to Basel, 31 March i860 No. Gyadam 9 BMA-PJC;
Mr. Freeman (Accra) to Governor Andrews (CCC), 21 April; 
Andrews to Freeman, 25 April; Capt. de Ruvignes (Soaduro) 
to Andrews (CCC), 5 May; Andrews to Asantehene, 9 May i860 
CO.96/70.
4. See Chapter 6 p. 214 above.
The Kokofu force was much luckier in encountering the
migrant Kotoku army and joining battle with it. But the
Kokofu army suffered a defeat and many of their men appear
to have fallen in the battle, one of them described as
’’Adarquah of Kookoofoo’’ . 1 The Asantehene, however, tried
to cover this incident by presenting it as an unprovoked
2
Kotoku attack on his Kokofu subjects. Governor Andrews
dismissed the Asantehene’s complaint by telling the Kumasi
Court bluntly that if Kokofu had suffered any damage, it had
itself to blame, as it had chosen to go to war against
■5
Agyeman and his subjects. Apparently Kumasi had under­
rated the fighting power of Kotoku and sent only a limited 
army to assist Abuakwa; besides not all the Asante help 
arrived in time to turn the scales against Kotoku.
His defeats in March and the subsequent failure 
of the limited Abuakwa-Asante Alliance appear to explain 
Obiwom’s determination to carry the war to Agyeman even in 
Western Akyem. Apparently the outcome of the early 
encounters shocked him. Initially he probably had hoped 
to inflict a quick and heavy defeat on his adversary. He 
seems to have been very sure of this. Hence his refusal 
in early March to yield to the pleas of Cochrane, telling 
the Major in the face that he (Obiwom) had renounced
1. ’’Adarquah of Kookoofoo" i.e. Adaakwa, Chief of Kokofu.
2. Asantehene to Governor Andrews (CCC), 25 April i860
CO.96/47.
3 . Andrews to Asantehene, 9 May i860; same to same, 20 
September i860 copies in CO.96/70.
"his allegiance to the British Government, 
conceiving that it is merely a thing to speak 
of, and that the Government has no power 
capable of compelling him at this distance to 
accept Its verdict, at least not one given on 
what he terms ’his own soil”’^
It is clear from Obiwom’s declaration above that in a way
the war was a challenge to the British jurisdiction;
though the outburst may be dismissed as emotionally made
in moments of anxiety.
After his defeats in March it was bitterness and 
2
bad advice which goaded Obiwom on to further hostility 
against Kotoku. These were fundamental elements likely to 
prolong the war in Akyem, if they were not dealt with in a 
realistic and energetic manner. To Captain de Ruvignes, 
the solution of the problem lay in Kyebi. He therefore 
recommended the seizure and detention of Obiwom and his 
bad advisers such as Appiatu, and Obiwom’s sister.
Governor Andrews had just assumed duty at Cape Coast 
Castle. His knowledge about local politics was no doubt 
limited. And yet he rejected de Ruvignes’s suggestion 
because such a step, he argued, taken by the government,
li
would smack of high-handedness and cowardice.
1. Major Cochrane (Anyinasin) to Ag. Governor Bird (CCC),
8 March i860 CO.96/47.
2. See n.3 below.
3 . Capt. de Ruvigness (Soaduro) to Governor Andrews (CCC),
5 May i860 CO.96/47.
4. Alphonso Cary, Ag. Colonial Secretary (CCC) to Capt. de 
Ruvignes Soaduro, 8 May i860 CO.96/47. At-the time when 
des Ruvignes made the suggestion, Appiatu and Obiwom's 
sister were in Kyebi, while the Abuakwa army was still in 
the field. The two advisers were thus unprotected.
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Fortunately for Andrews, things began to sort 
themselves out in Akyem as from the last week of May i860. 
The truculence of Kyebi started to subside. Several factors 
contributed to the change in the attitude of the Kyebi 
leaders. One of them was the divided opinion in Abuakwa.
The war excitement in Kyebi was in fact by no means 
universal in Abuakwa. Certain important sections of the 
Abuakwa people doubted whether war was the right approach 
to solve the Abuakwa-Kotoku differences. The Gyaase 
Division, headed by Kwaben, is said to have allowed Agyeman 
and his subjects to pass through their lines unmolested 
during the journey to western Akyem. 1 Another division
which did not favour the war was the Nifa (Right), headed
2
by Asiakwa. The Nifahene at the time was Duodu. He was
said to have been
"much opposed to the manner in which Atta 
/Obiwom/ has acted in not in the first instance 
obeying the Governor’s orders, and that he Doodo 
has expressed his determination to meet me 
/Governor Andrews/ at Christiansborg, and that 
Attah should accompany him there,"
to enable the government to settle his disputes with
Agyeman. Obviously the Nifahene had been making moves on
his own initiative towards a peace settlement between Kyebi
and Gyadam.. The move paid off. By the third week of May
bellicose Kyebi had so cooled down that Obiwom informed
Captain de Ruvignes that he would
1. AAT: Pomase (Abomosu) 1925/6.
2. Capt. de Ruvignes (Asiakwa) to CCC, ? April i860
CO.96/4 7.
3 . Andrews (CCC) to the Duke of Newcastle, 9 June i860
co.96/47.
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nno more make war with Adjeman Z*>u£7 w il1
return back (sic) to Chebi by your orders to
await there for the appointed time for us /to
go to Accra/.
The change in the attitude of Abuakwa leadership
immediately eased the tension in Akyem. But it did not
altogether eliminate it. Nor did the Kotoku migration to
the west. As late as 1863 Obiwom claimed that the land on
which Agyeman and his subjects had settled on in western
2
Akyem fell within his jurisdiction. The Protectorate
government had to send an embassy of Fante Chiefs to Kyebi
in order to get Obiwom to revise his hostile stand against
Kotoku. The Abuakwahene agreed in principle, but it was
not until 1870 that Abuakwa and Kotoku concluded a formal
4
peace treaty at the town of Akanten.
Perhaps the deaths of both Agyeman and Atta 
Obiwom in 1867 also contributed to this happy result.^
But a considerable part of the credit must go to Ferguson^ 
who arranged the Akanten peace. Even at this time, 1870, 
when at least ten years had lapsed since the war broke out,
1. Abuakwahene Atta Obiwom (Akantin-Akyem) to de Ruvignes 
(Soaduro), 23 May i860, CO.96/47.
2. See Chapter 8 p. 269 below.
3 . Kromer (Kyebi) to Basel, 1 November 1863* No. Akim 18 
BMA-PJC.
4. Lodholtz (Kyebi) to Basel, 5 January 1871* No. Akim 19* 
BMA-PJC.
5 . See Chapter 8, p. 304 on the demise of the Akyem rulers.
6. George Ekem Ferguson is better known as the African 
Surveyor through whose activities the British Colonial 
Government in the Gold Coast was able to colonize the 
northern territories of the Gold Coast. For a useful 
biography of Ferguson see Sampson, M. J. Gold Coast Men 
of Affairs, London 1969 PP- 129-146.
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feelings were very high. The Kotoku, for example wanted to 
lay down conditions which the Abuakwa peace negotiators 
could not accept. One of the conditions was that a certain 
head of an ex-Gyadam family who had sworn fetish to serve 
the Abuakwa stool and had therefore been allowed to settle 
in eastern Akyem by the Abuakwahene should be handed over. 1 
According to the missionary Lodholtz, this condition was 
clearly a vindictive strain in some of the Kotoku negotiators 
because it was not supported by Kwabena Fua, the new 
Kotokuhene. Eventually the Kotoku negotiators dropped the 
request and the peace settlement was effected.
The ceremony of the peace settlement is worth 
describing, if only to serve as an illustration of how 
Gold Coast Africans of the nineteenth century concluded 
formal peace treaties among themselves. Lodholtz states 
that Ferguson’s interpreter, first took the Kotoku Fetish, 
Ekyere, to the five Kyebi ambassadors (negotiators) to 
’drink” it. This fetish was contained in a small brandy 
bottle, placed in a small brass pan and was carried in 
absolute silence among all those gathered there, as a sign 
of reverence to the Ekyere god. On reaching the Abuakwa 
negotiators the interpreter poured out some of the drink, 
set the toes of his left foot over those of the left foot 
on the person about to ’’drink” the fetish; he then orated, 
the gist of which was that if the drinker was not sincere 
but intended treachery, the fetish Ekyere should kill him. 
After this he poured again from the bottle into the mouth 
of the oath-taker and also over his head. In a similar
1. Lodholtz (Kyebi) to Basel, 5 January 1871 No. Akim 19 
BMA-PJC.
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manner, the five Kotoku peace negotiators drank the god 
Wankobabi, an Abuakwa fetish which was in a beer bottle. 
While the ceremony was going on the horns of the particular 
fetish would be intoning the praises of the god. 1 Even 
though the final peace settlement took place in 1870, it 
is reasonable to regard i860 as marking the end of serious 
hostility between Abuakwa and Kotoku.
The i860 war had far reaching effects on the 
British protecting power as well.
The events compelled the administration of Governor Bullock
Andrews to subject the provincial administration of the
Eastern Districts to a rigid examination. For there was a
belief in some sections of officialdom at Cape Coast Castle
that the inefficiency of Mr. Freeman, as Civil Commandant,
was largely responsible for the outbreak of the war in
Akyem. In June i860 Freeman was formally accused thus:
”to the manner in which you adjudicated the case 
between Atta /Panin/ and Acyiman /in 18527 must 
be attributed the present /1 8 6 0 7 disturbances”^
He was also charged with ’’grossest irregularity in the mode
of keeping ..... accounts”.
Meticulous accounting does not appear to have
been a virtue in Thomas Birch Freeman. Of mixed English
and African parentage he had arrived in the Gold Coast in
1838, as a missionary of the Wesleyan Methodist Mission of
England.-^ In June 1844 he had to return to England to
1. Lodholtz’s Report of 5 January 1871.
2. Mr. Lindsey, Ag. Colonial Secretary (CCC)to Freeman,
2 June i860 CO.96/48.
3 . Harrison M. Wright’s New Introduction to T. B. Freeman, 
Journal of Various Visits to the Kingdoms of Ashanti, Aku 
and Dahomi (196b ed.) p. XI.
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appear before the Committee of the Wesleyan Mission to 
answer a charge of financial mismanagement.^ He returned 
to the Gold Coast but in 1857* gave up missionary work, and 
took up the post of Civil Commandant of the Eastern Districts 
during C. C. Pine’s governorship.
The Executive Council at Cape Coast Castle on 
5th and 16th July i860 sat as a Court to examine the two 
charges against Freeman. Prior to the sittings, Freeman 
had submitted a voluminious written defence refuting the 
two charges. In connection with the first charge,
Kotokuhene Agyeman was invited from Western Akyem to the 
Castle to be a prosecution witness. Freeman ably refuted 
the charge of administrative incompetence. The Kotokuhene's 
testimony substantiated his arguments. He was therefore 
acquitted on that count. But he was found guilty on the 
second charge of financial irregularity and dismissed from 
the service.
The trial of Mr. Freeman emphasized the importance 
attached to the Akyem district by the British administration 
at Cape Coast Castle.
1. Freeman, Journal, p. XXXVIII.
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CHAPTER 8
IMPACT OF KOTOKU PRESENCE IN WESTERN AKYEM 
1860-1867
The emigration of the Kotoku from Eastern Akyem 
had far reaching effects on the Akyem themselves in particular 
and the Gold Coast in general. For example while it 
released the Abuakwa from the aversion they had hitherto 
had for the Christian Missionary enterprise, on account of 
Gyadam as a mission station, the migration led to the 
founding, by the Kotoku, of Nsuaem (later renamed Oda) and 
Nsawam, the one in Western Akyem and the other in extreme 
south-western Akuapem. Their presence in these two places 
enabled the Kotoku to influence, as from mid-i860, events 
in the Gold Coast on such scale and in such scope as they 
had never done before.
Rapid expansion of Christianity occurred in 
Eastern Akyem soon after the Kotoku emigration from the 
area. Since 185A Gyadam, the Kotoku capital, had been 
serving as the Mission Station for the Christian enterprise 
in Akyem. However, the conversion rate had not been 
encouraging, because the Abuakwa who formed the bulk of 
the population in Eastern Akyem had shunned the enterprise 
on account of the selection of Gyadam, and not Kyebi their 
capital, as the mission station.^ The Kotoku emigration 
and the subsequent destruction of Gyadam during the March 
i860 war gave the missionaries a new opportunity to make a 
fresh start. They chose Kyebi as the new mission station,
1. Cf. Chapter 7 P» 234 above.
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and went to settle there in early 1861. 1 Thus it is true
to say that on the ashes of Gyadam grew the Basel Mission
2
station at Kyebi.
The removal to Kyebi was not without problems. Up 
to early 1858 when Atta Panin was the Abuakwahene prospects 
had been very bright, for he had given every indication to 
accord the enterprise royal patronage, if only the 
missionaries would choose Kyebi as the Mission Station. By 
i860 this clear advantage which the enterprise could have 
enjoyed was no longer available, because Atta Panin had 
died in 1858. In l86l some of the Missionaries regretted
•3
that the enterprise had missed such a golden opportunity.
The regret was due not so much to the difficulties
they started encountering in Kyebi as to the realisation
that they had wasted much precious time by starting with
Gyadam as the mission station. For even without the
patronage of Atta Panin they still made rapid progress in
the matter of conversion. By November l86l they had made
several converts and a Christian quarter was rapidly
springing up in Kyebi; besides, evangelization in the
surrounding towns and villages was well under way; towns
like Tete, Pano, Apedwa, Nkronso, Wirenkyiren and
Adadientam, all within less than ten miles radius from
» t 4Kyebi, had received the Word .
1. Stromberg’s Report for the First Quarter of l86l, 28 May 
l86l No. Akim 8 ; Kromer’s Report, 26 May l86l No. Akim 9; 
Station Conference Protocol, 26 June l86l No. Akim 10; 
Stromberg to Basel, 30-31 July l86l No. Akim 13; Kromer to 
Basel, 29 August l86l, No. Akim 14, BMA-PJC.
2. Reindorf, History, p. 221; Smith, The Presbyterian Church, 
p. 53.
3. Stromberg to Basel, 28 May l86l, No. Akim 8 , BMA-PJC.
4. Stromberg’s Report for the Third Quarter of l86l, dd.
1 November l86l No. Akim 11, BMA-PJC.
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The fundamental cause of this happy beginning
seems to have been the indirect patronage of the Kyebi Court.
Abuakwahene Atta Obiwom did not think of ever becoming a
Christian himself even though the missionaries did him
useful services, such as curing him of his illness, at
least on one occasion.^ All the same he showed personal
interest in the welfare of the missionaries. He paid them
2
occasional visits, apparently to learn of their problems 
in relation to their residence in Kyebi. Consequently by 
May, 1867 when Obiwom died,^ Christianity had made 
considerable progress in Kyebi and Kukurantumi at least, as 
evidenced by the following statistics:-
NO. OF CHURCH MEMBERS SCHOOL POPULATION
YEAR KYEBI KUKURANTUMI KYEBI KUKURANTUMI
1862 13 13 12-15 10-33
1863 13 - 15 6-17
1864 20-39 - - -
1865 25 12 14 13
1866 28 15 22 36-39
(3 were girls)
1867 35 12-26. 23 7
Compared with the achievement at Gyadam for the period between
1. Eisenschmid’s Report for the 3rd Quarter of Year 1866.
2. Eisenchmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 3rd November 1863 No. Akim 19 
(BMA-PJC).
3* Eisenchmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 17th May 1867, No. Akim 3> His 
Report for the year 1867 dd. 7th January 1868, Akim 8 (BMA- 
PJC) Mrs. Eisenchmid died in Kyebi in the same month and 
same year.
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185*1- and i860'1' this record at Kyebi, and of course at 
Kukurantumi, is very impressive. The Kyebi achievement 
makes the false start at Gyadam even more glaring.
In about July 1867 the Abuakwa state selected the 
late Obiwom*s successor. She was the elder of Obiwom’s two 
sisters. Her name was Sekyiraa. Sekyiraa, however,
declined the honour in favour of Kwasi Panin, the 14-year
2
old son of her younger sister, Ampofoaa. Kwasi Panin took 
the stool name of Amoako Atta (Amoako Atta I on the Abuakwa 
King List)
Amoako Atta I reigned till 1888, with only a five-
year break between 1880 and 1885. In 1878 he was accused of
being an enemy of the missionaries and a barrier to
4
propagation of Christianity in his kingdom. The general 
feeling in the nineteenth century, and also in the early 
twentieth, was that this Abuakwahene was a persecutor of 
Christians. In fact the British Colonial Government in 
1880 exiled him to Lagos, Nigeria, for five years, overtly 
for being found guilty of committing ritual murders, but
1. See Chapter 7 p.234n. 1 above.
2. Eisenchmid*s Report for 2nd Quarter of 1867, dd. 7 July,
1867 No. Akim 4 (BMA-PJC).
3. Reindorf*s dating of 1866 as marking the beginning of
this reign is wrong, and so is of course that of Noel Smith. 
(Cf. Reindorf, History, Appx. Cp.348 and Noel Smith op. cit.
p.116).
4. Buck’s Report for the year 1878, dd. 29-31st December,
1878 No. 222, BMA-PJC; 0. Schott, Retrospect on Fifty 
Years of Mission Work (Basel 1879) P*35 cited by Noel 
Smith, op. cit. p. 53 n. 5*
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covertly for allegedly persecuting Christians in Kyebi.1 
This chief has been unfairly dealt with.
The charge that he was an enemy of missionary work 
pre-supposes that he hindered the progress of the Christian 
enterprise in his Kingdom. Contemporary evidence shows other­
wise. Statistics relating to the growth of the church in 
Kyebi and Kukurantumi up to 1878 when his so-called conflict 
with Kyebi Christians reached its climax are the best measure;
NO. OF CHURCH MEMBERS SCHOOL POPULATION
YEAR KYEBI KUKURANTUMI KYEBI KUKURANTUMI
1868 42 20 31 6
1869 37 11 38 (28 boys) 
(10 girls)
-
1870 34 13 20 (boys) -
1871 - - 24 -
! 1872 10 - - -
1873 32-35 14-15 23 -
1874 31 12 22 5
1873 14 24 - -
1876 56 36 44 18
1877 108 57 49 23
1878 - - - -
1. Eisenchmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 28th May, 1880 No. 4;
Buck to Basel, 
2nd March, 188C& No. 129; Deiterle to Basel, 12th February 
1880 No. 1 Eisenchmid to Basel, 5th April 1880 No. 2, Buck's 
Report on the "Kibi Anstalt", 28th July 1880 No. 146 ;
Preiswerk (Accra) to Basel ? November, 1880 No. 125 (BMA- 
PJC). There is,-however, the view, implied by Agbadeka, 
that Amoaka Atta was exiled for refusing to heed Government 
orders not to expand his influence over Akyem Kotoku and Juaben 
and also to prevent the latter, who, as from 1875* were 
refugees in Abuakwa "from collecting arms in Abuakwa".
Cf. African Politics, p. 108.
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At least the figures for Kyebi show a very remarkable progress 
far outshining the achievement of the Church during the 
Obiwom period. Besides, by 1878, fThe Word* had reached 
much of Eastern Akyem (Abuakwa) and had even made an 
incursion into Western Akyem where there were many Abuakwa 
towns also. So pleased was the missionary personnel at 
Kyebi that in 1877 it declared hopefully that the great 
moment of the enterprise had arrived. 1 The declaration 
was sincere. For the Word had reached many an Akyem Abuakwa 
town more than twenty miles removed from Kyebi. Among such 
towns were Begoro, Abomosu and Asunafo.
Nor did Amoako Atta show any lack of personal 
interest in the welfare of the missionaries. Like his 
immediate predecessor, Atta Obiwom, he would not become a 
Christian himself, as Buganda Chiefs were wont to do, but 
he showed personal interest in the welfare and work of the 
missionaries. In 1868 while his elders showed apathy, the 
Abuakwahene personally took it upon himself to investigate 
the theft of money belonging to the missionaries, stolen 
while it was in transit from Akropon, (Akuapem) to Kyebi.
He walked to Apedwa, about eight miles away, to do this 
investigation; the money was recovered largely through his
p
efforts. David Asante in 1873 and Mader in 1875* both 
active missionaries at the Kyebi Mission Station, had reason 
to comment on the friendliness of Amoako Atta, adding that
1. David Asante*s Report for the 2nd Quarter of 1877* dd. 
9th July 1877 No. 236 BMA-PJC.
2. Eisenchmid*s Report for 3rd Quarter of 1868, dd. 3rd 
October 1868 No. Akim 10, BMA-PJC.
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the real culprits of any hostility against Christians in 
Kyebi were the aristocracy (the elders who were the King’s 
Councillors).1
However, there can be no doubt about the fact that 
there were occasions when Amoako Atta seems to have joined 
the aristocracy in their hostility towards the missionaries 
and their work, not on grounds of religion but politics. He 
and the aristocracy felt the Church was trying to usurp the 
political powers of the State. The case of Sakyi illustrates 
this point. At the end if 1869 a Kyebi citizen called Sakyi 
became a convert and received baptism. On grounds of 
conversion to Christianity Sakyi, an Okyerema (drummer) in 
the Asafo Company of Kyebi, refused to play the drums again. 
He was arraigned before Amoako Atta by the Asafohene and 
other members, and fined two sheep, valued at (£16 .00  
sterling), for becoming a Christian without the prior 
approval of the Kyebi Asafo Company and refusing to perform 
his duty to the State. The Christian community then took up 
Sakyi's fight by insisting on freedom of worship. Ultimately 
both the Christians and Elders agreed that missionaries 
should always seek the permission of the Abusua-panin (head 
of extended family) of any freeman, or the owner of any
p
slave, who wanted to embrace Christianity. According to 
Lodholtz, the next day when the Christians went to the 
palace with a draft agreement to be assented to by the Elders,
1. Asante’s Report for 3rd Quarter of 1873* dd. 8th October, 
1873 No. Akim 22; Mader to Basel, 21st April, 1875 No. 102 
BMA-PJC.
2. Lodholtz's Report for 1st Quarter of 1870, dd. 28th April 
1870. No. Akim 5*
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none of them turned up; besides they later met one of the Elders
called Kwasi Amoako who openly boasted that he would never allow
any of his relatives and slaves to become Christians, adding that
he hated the "Word of God" . 1 The truth was that Christianity was
taking away the converts from continued performance of their social
and political obligations. This is fundamentally the point which
King Amoako Atta, in connection with the Sakyi affair, no doubt
wanted to emphasize when he somewhat emotionally declared:
"Must I let my horn-blowers, my drummers, my hamraock- 
carriers etc. become Christians? If I do, then I can no 
longer carry out my .... ceremonies, nor can I receive 
foreign embassies worthily. Whoever has an obligation 
to serve me will never be allowed to become a 
Christian. " 2
The conduct of David Asante provides another illustra­
tion of the clash between Church and State. In 1873 the Abuak­
wahene and his people allegedly opposed the stationing of David 
Asante as a Catechist at Kyebi. Asante had been the Catechist 
for the Begoro station and was now transferred to Kyebi. David 
Asante, son of one of the Akuapem Kings, did not limit himself to 
Church matters. He was known to be of a firm character and bold 
in taking people to task on any misdemeanor, be they Christians or 
not, Kings or Councillors or ordinary members of the Akbuakwa 
citizenry. For almost five years he lived in Kyebi. His pre­
sence in the Abuakwa capital was the fundamental cause of the so-
■5
called Amoakoan persecution. In fact it was against him that 
Amoako Atta directed his hostility, not against the enterprise 
as such. If he had hated Christianity as such, he would not have 
allowed the religion to become so entrenched in his Kingdom 
as to enable the missionaries in Kyebi to reach, by the
1. Lodholtz's Report for 1st Quarter of 1870, dd. 28 April 1870. 
No. Akim 5«
2. Ibid.
3 . This theme falls outside the scope of this study. Mr. R. Addo 
Fening of the History Department, University of Ghana, Legon, 
is currently engaged in the study of Abuakwa History from 
1875. It is hoped that he will include the Amoakoan persecu­
tion as a theme in his work.
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1870s, Western Akyem where the Kotoku went to settle after 
the i860 war.
The Kotoku migration to and settlement in western
Akyem were not without problems. The war of i860 had
generated differences between Agyeman, the Kotokuhene, and
Dompre, his Ankobeahene. The cause was what Agyeman
considered to be a most unpardonable offence committed by
Dompre during the war with Abuakwa. Dompre, as already
noted in the previous chapter, was one of the Kotoku
captains in the i860 war with Abuakwa. He is said to
have had a good opportunity to kill the Abuakwahene and
some of his followers but refrained from doing so on grounds
of clan ties. 1 The Abuakwahene belonged to the Asona clan,
just like Dompre. The Kotoku war Chief felt he would have
2
committed fratricide had he killed the Abuakwahene. The 
Kotokuhene who was of the Agona clan, on the other hand, 
thought that in the circumstances of war, Dompre should 
have allowed Kotoku political and military interests to 
take precedence over abusua obligations, by killing the 
number one enemy of Kotoku. With this frame of mind Agyeman 
refused to include Dompre when honouring his war chiefs
■z
after their arrival in western Akyem. Dompre’s reaction 
was sharp and unequivocal. He immediately left western 
Akyem altogether with his subjects to found Nsawam on
1. AKT: Adoagyiri: (1968/69).
2. It is significant to note that even today the Abuakwahene 
is looked upon as head of those who belong to Asona 
irrespective of where they hail from. (Personal communi­
cation from the Adontenhene of Kukurantumi).
3. AKT: Adoagyiri (1968/9 ).
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Akuapem soil."*"
In the prevailing conditions the rift between the 
ruling lineage and its Ankobea was unfortunate for the whole 
tribe. Dompre*s subsequent exploits marked him out as a 
genius of a military leader. He must have contributed very 
significantly to the success of Kotoku arms against Abuakwa 
in i860. Agyeman could have dealt with him more diplomati­
cally and retained his military services. For even in
western Akyem there was no absolute safety for the Kotoku.
2
Kyebi continued to be truculent, and Kumasi, was nursing
hatred against them. Kyebi or Kumasi could attack at any
moment. But there it was: Dompre left with his subjects
and the rest of the Kotoku had to fend for themselves as
best they could in western Akyem.
A major problem Agyeman had to solve was how and
where to establish a home in Western Akyem. Clan ties with
Bosome had indeed partly motivated his migration to that
place, where Captain de Ruvignes found them in April i860,
•5
as guests of the Bosome ruling house at Soaduro. Thus
tradition is absolutely right in asserting that
"after the war between Akim-Kotoku and Akim 
Abuakwa in the middle of the Zl9th7 century the 
Omanhene of Akim-Kotoku left Jyadem /Gyadam7 in 
Eastern Akim and sought another site. The Stool 
of Akim-Bosome was already established at Akim
Swedru in Western A k i m  This stool, like the
Kotoku stool, is of the Agona clan, and for clan­
ship’s sake the Omanhene of Bosome gave sanctuary 
to these homeless kinsmen in her t o w n .....
1. The founding of Nsawam and its impact on the Gold Coast
are fully discussed in Chapter 9 below.
2. Cf. Chapter 7 P« above.
3. Captain de Ruvignes (Soaduro) to Governor Andrews (CCO), 5th
May; Alphonso Cary (CCC) to de Ruvigne (Soaduro), 8th May i860,
co 96/4 7.
4. Kotoku tradition, as recorded by M. J. Field, Akim-Kotoku 
p. 37.
2 6 8 .
The Bosomehene at that time was a woman, called 
Amoakoaa. By giving sanctuary to the Kotoku migrants, the 
Bosome ruling house were fulfilling one of the obligations 
of the clan system, namely that all those belonging to the 
same clan should assist one another in times of difficulty, 
irrespective of tribal, political and economic affilia­
tions.^ To Amoakoaa Kofi Agyeman was more than a clansman. 
Between 1812 and 1825 Agyeman and some of his close 
relatives had lived with the Bosome royal house, first in 
Asante, and then in or about 1824 at Soaduro, in Western 
Akyem. In fact it was from there that he was recalled to
Gyadam in Eastern Akyem in or about 1825 to be enstooled
2
as Kotokuhene. Finally there was one other reason why the 
Bosomehene should care for Agyeman and his subjects. 
Apparently due to the close connection between the Kotoku 
and Bosome ruling lineages, Abuakwa in 1855-1857 had extended 
to Bosome its economic sanctions against Kotoku.^ In i860 
Obiwom almost renewed Abuakwa aggression against Bosome 
when he ordered his Western-most subjects of "Ackiasi” 
(Akyease), living only five miles west of Soaduro, to attack 
Agyeman at Soaduro. Akyease however disobeyed the order 
because tfAdjiman has secret friends amongst Attahfs people”.^
1. Compare with Boah:enfs assertion that ”clan membership .... 
completely cut across tribal and political boundaries”. Cf. 
Ajayi and Espie (ed.), A Thousand Years in West African 
History, p. l6l.
2. See Chapter 5 P* 194 above.
3 . See Chapter 7 P« 235 above.
4. Captain de Ruvignes (Soaduro) to Governor Andrews (CCC)
5 May i860 CO.96/47.
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Permanent residence in Western Akyem was the
object of the migrants. Agyeman’s problem, however, was
how to get land to settle on. The Bosome could not play
host to him indefinitely in spite of the clan ties. Nor
could they give him land to settle on. The Bosome themselves
did not possess ’surplus’ territory part of which they could
give to their newly arrived kinsmen. Consequently Amoakoaa
assisted Agyeman to solve the problem by approaching the
Wankyihene, head of the Oseawu Division of Abuakwa, as
well as other Abuakwa towns in Western Akyem such as Apori,
who readily obliged. 1 It appears that the Kotoku obtained
the land between June i860 and 1863 for in 1863 the
Abuakwahene claimed as falling within his jurisdiction the
2land on which Agyeman had settled in Western Akyem.
Apparently Wankyi and all other Abuakwa towns who made the 
land grants to the Kotoku migrants did not consult, much 
less seek approval, of the Kyebi Court. This is not to 
suggest that Obiwom could have topped the grant had he been 
consulted. The grant merely emphasized the weakness of the 
Kyebi Court in the matter of land ownership in Akyem.
In Western Akyem, Agyeman founded a new home and 
called it Nsuaem (The Slice), apparently in gratitude to 
the Wankyi of Abuakwa who granted him the site. Today the 
town is called Oda. The change of name is said to have
1. AAT: Wankyi (1925/6); Amevaw. Oda Tradition (Legon 1963). 
AKT: Awisa & Nkwanta (1960/9 ); ABT: Soaduro (1968/9 ).
2. Kromer (Kyebi) to Basel, 1 November 1863 No. Akim 18 
(BMA-PJC).
5 . This subject is discussed fully in Appendix a, pp. 363-374  
below.
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occurred at the beginning of the present century. 1 This
may well be true. But the Kotoku occasionally called
Nsuaem Oda as early as the 1870s. Other towns founded by
the Kotoku migrants included Nkwanta, Asene and Asuboa, all
few miles away from Nsuaem (Oda). Thus the founding and
crystalization of the Akyem Kotoku state, as it is today,
was a direct outcome of the i860 war with Abuakwa.
The arrival of the migrants from eastern Akyem
(Abuakwa) created ethnographic, social and political
problems in western Akyem. Naturally the population of
the district increased in variety and size, though by how
much it is difficult to say. The area became relatively
overcrowded as the Kotoku immigrants founded towns and
villages cheek by jowl with existing Abuakwa, Bosome and
■5
stateless Atwea towns. The result was, and still is,
that towns belonging to the three Akyem states are so
mixed up that it will be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to draw clear territorial boundaries between 
A
them. While it is absolutely correct to call eastern
Akyemo Abuakwa, western Akyem does not yield to such an
easy definition; it consists of Abuakwa, Bosome and Kotoku 
5
territory.
1. Ameyaw, Oda (Kotoku) Tradition. The change was to put an 
end to confusion between Nsuaem and Nsawam.
2. See Chapter 10 p. 345 n. 3 below.
3. Ameyaw, Oda Tradition; AKT: Awisa (1968/69).
4. Field, Akim-Kotoku, pp. 2-3; also the map at the back of 
her book; Cf.
5 . See Map. 1.
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This situation appears to have given rise to the
practice of transferring loyalties and allegiances from one
stool to another. For example Kotoku gained Ayirebi, Apaso,
Anyinam, Abenase, and possibly other towns, which had
earlier belonged to either Bosome or Abuakwa. Kotoku also
received new members from the Atwea group of towns which
had belonged to neither Abuakwa nor Bosome. 1 The Kotoku
2
stool was, however, not always at the receiving end. But
it would seem that transfer to, rather than from, Kotoku
was the general rule. For in less than ten years after
arriving in the area the Kotokuhene was referred to as
"the King of Western Akim".^
The Kotoku paid a price for this tremendous
achievement in western Akyem. By the 1870s the predominance
of the ruling lineage in the area had created tension between
them and the Bosome, who in i860 were so kind as to provide
them with shelter. Captain Butler noted the tension during
the British invasion of Asante in 1874, when Nsuaem and
4
Soaduro disputed over Awisa. This town was situated between 
Nsuaem and Soaduro. Kwabena Ahenkora was then the Chief of 
Awisa. "This chief", observed Butler, "owed a kind of 
divided allegiance, on the one hand to Quabina Fuah /King
1. Ameyaw, Oda Tradition.
2. Field Akim-Kotoku pp. 53-63; Danquah (1929) p. 32.
3 . Horton, West African Countries, pp. 132-133.
4. Butler, Akimfoo: A History of a Failure (London 1874) 
p. 179.
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of Kotoku/, on the other hand to Coffee Ahenkora ^Cing of 
Bosome/. Fuah had sent to summon him to Insuaim with all 
his men to march under the banner of West Akim to the war 
/British invasion of Asante/. But Cobra, doubtless 
thinking that he might altogether escape service in the 
field, pleaded that to Coffee Ahencora, and not to Quabinah 
Fuah, was his fealty, if any due, and declined to obey the 
summons from Insuaim. Upon this Fuah had declared that he 
would go to war with Awisa if the refusal was persisted in. 
With the rifles and ammunition he had received for service 
against the Ashantis, he /Fuah/ would, it was averred, soon 
carry destruction into the hamlet of Cobra Ahencora. Hence 
the alarm at Swaidroo, for Awisa lay only a mile distant 
/from Soaduro/ . " 1 Butler, however, managed to get Kwabena
Fua and Kofi Ahenkora to sink their differences for the
2
success of the impending attack on Asante.
By far the greatest price Kotoku paid for their 
presence and achievement in Western-Akyem was increased 
tension with Asante. In fact Asante invaded Western Akyem 
in 1863 with a view to punishing Kotoku and their Bosome 
allies for thwarting Kumasi political ambition and economic 
aspirations.
Hitherto this invasion has been looked upon as
1. Butler, Akimfoo p. 183. Awisa is barely five miles from 
Oda (Nsuem).
2. The Akyem involvement in the 1874 British invasion of 
Asante is fully discussed in Chapter 10 below.
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directed against the British.1 This view needs careful but 
concise examination because it has prevailed to this day.
The main source of this wrong notion was the 
existence, at the time of the war, of an Anglo-Asante 
quarrel and the use Asante made of the quarrel to deceive 
the British on the cause and object of the attack. 
Immediately before the invasion there had been differences 
between the British at Cape Coast Castle and the Asantehene 
over the extradition of two Asante fugitives from the 
Protectorate. The request was made by the Asante monarch.
One of the fugitives was a slave boy and the other an
2
Asante Chief called Gyani. Gyani had violated a financial
law of Asante, and to skip justice, had fled into the
Protectorate. At the time of the invasion, he was
residing in Denkyera. But while on his way to the south he
and the runaway slave-boy are said to have been sheltered
4
by the Kotokuhene. This is doubtful. Agyeman could well 
have done this if the fugitives arrived in the Protectorate
1. J.A.B. Horton, Letters, pp. 52-57; Ellis (1893)# Chapter 
XVIII; Claridge, Vol.l pp. 502-03; Fuller, op.-cit. p. 91 
Rev. W. T. Balmer, A History of the Akan Peoples (London,
1924) pp. 141-142; Ward, History, p. 199; Kimble, op. cit.
p. 199; Agbodeka, African Politics _ _ _    __
and British Policy on the Gold Coast, 1869-1900 (Nup. 1971) 
p. 16; A.A. Boahen, in Ajayi & Crowder, Vol. Two., pp.224-- 
227, Wilks (Asante, pp. 219-222) is not certain who the war 
was against, the British or the-Akyem Kotoku, though he says 
the main force of the Asante army attacked Kotoku and not the 
British at Cape Coast. He seems to lean towards the conven­
tional view.
2. The name is variously given as fTJaninft (in the contemporary 
records), Jenin, Gainie, Ganin etc. in the secondary source.
3 . The law stipulated that anybody who discovered a gold nugget 
or nuggets should surrender same to the King’s treasury.
Its violation carried death penalty.
4. Claridge, Vol. 1 p. 517. Ward, History, p.215. Wilks, Asante, 
p.221, citing Despatches from the Governor of the Gold Coast, 
explaining the cause of war with the King of Ashante (PP: 
Accounts & Papers, LXV).
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via Western Akyem after May i860 when the Kotoku ruling house 
themselves settled in the area from Eastern Akypn. But one 
report in 1863 said Chief Gyani with eight hundred followers 
had "left Ashantee several years ago. " 1
Barely two months after Richard Pine’s assumption 
of the governorship of Cape Coast Castle in October, 1862, 
the Asantehene applied to him to extradite Gyani, as well 
as the runaway slave boy, back to Asante in order to face 
justice. There was the possibility of their being executed 
as soon as they set foot on Asante, even though the 
Asantehene promised to spare their lives. On humanitarian 
grounds, therefore, Governor Pine refused to send them back 
to Asante. In February 1865, the Asantehene renewed his 
application by sending down a high-powered delegation to 
Cape Coast Castle to re-state his case, but Pine remained 
adamant. A month later the Asante army invaded the 
Protectorate. It is thus easy to see why since the l860s 
many observers have been inclined to regard the extradition 
dispute as the cause of the attack.
But this view has two major weaknesses. The 
first is that the manoeuvres of the Asante invading army 
show unmistakeably that the British at Cape Coast Castle 
were not the object of attack. Secondly the view contra­
dicts what the Asante themselves gave out in and after 1865
1. Report by Commodore Wilmot, ? April 1865, Br. PP. 1864 
(5364), Vol. XLI, p. 21.
2. Richard Pine (CCC) to the Duke of Newcastle, 10 December 
1862, CO.96/58; Metcalfe, Documents, No. 230, pp.
291-2 .
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as the causes of the invasion, namely strained relations
with Kotoku. Let us examine the first point. The general
opinion is that the invading Asante army adopted a three-
point attack. Horton seems to have been the first writer
to popularise this view. Commenting on the manoeuvres of
the 30,000 strong invading army, Horton in 1869 said that
"the smallest division of about 2 ,000 was sent to 
the boundary of Warsaw ^Tassa/ on the west ^of Cape 
Coast/ with orders to avoid, as much as possible, 
any general engagement with the enemy, but keep 
the Warsaws and Denkeras in check and prevent them 
from joining the Fante force. The second 
division, consisting of about 8 ,0 0 0 descended, 
after crossing the Praah ,/River Pra/ on the main 
road to Cape Coast, pushed rapidly into the middle 
of the country as far as it was safe, avoiding 
engagement with a superior force. The third and 
main body /20,000/ under the personal command of 
Prince Osoo Cokkor /Owusu Kokoo/ marched on the 
eastern Fante /and western/ Akim, the most 
powerful and warlike people in the Protectorate, 
forcing everything before t h e m .....
If indeed Cape Coast Castle was the target of the invaders,
and their aim was apparently to punish Governor Pine for
his intransigence, then it should be absurd for the Asante-
hene to send only 8,000 soldiers against the Cape Coast
district and 2,000 against Wassa and Denkyera, where
Gyani had taken shelter, and 20,000 against the eastern
Fante (by which term Horton clearly meant the Agona) and
the western Akyem, living some fifty miles away, to the
north-west of Cape Coast. Ward detected this absurdity
but explained it thus:
1. Horton, Letters (1970 ed.)pp. 52-53* Other sources put 
the strength of the Asante army much higher, 60,0 0 0.
Cf. The African Times, cited by Wilks, Asante, p. 221 n. 66.
276.
”0n this occasion the eastern most column /of the 
Asante army7 was the strongest. This was apparently 
because Ashanti had a subsidiary object in the 
capture of Akim Kotokuhene Agyeman. Agyeman had 
sheltered the two fugitives on their way to the 
coast, and had returned an insulting answer when 
called on to surrender them."^
It is difficult to imagine that an intelligent
people like the Asante would send the strongest section of
their army to chase after a subsidiary object and allow the
principal one, the British at Cape Coast Castle and Gyani in
Denkyera, to get away with it by sending against them only
12,000 who, if we are to believe Horton, were to avoid a
superior force. Even if the British at Cape Coast were
weak, surely the Assin and the Central Fante were there to
offer a stiff resistance. Besides, their awareness of
British military superiority, the geographical position of
the Assin states, and the central Fante would no doubt make
Asante send a much stronger force against Assin and Central
Fante.
The truth was that "the whole war", as Captain
Brownwell put it in April, 1863, TTis against King Argiman
2/Agyeman/ and the Queen." The Queen in question was Amma 
Amoakoaa, the woman Akyem Bosomehene who was then an ally of 
Kotoku. Two months after Brownwell's report, the Asante 
themselves left Cape Coast Castle authorities in no doubt as 
to whom they were fighting against. In May, 1863 Prince
1. Ward, History, p. 215• But see his note 15 on the same 
page.
2. Captain Brownwell (Agona Swedru) to Major Cochrane 
(Anomabo), 1st April 1863 CO/96/6 1.
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Owusu Ansa1 was sent by Governor Pine to the Asante war camp
to inquire from commander Owusu Kokoo whom the Asante were
fighting against and why. On June 1, 1863 Owusu Ansa
2
reported back that the war was against Akyem Kotoku.
Writing a day after Ansafs report, the Asantehene himself
confirmed Ansa's view. He queried Governor Pine as to why
the British and the Pante were fighting against his army
because Asante was at war with neither the British nor
■5
Pante, but with Akyem Kotoku. In Kotoku-Asante relations, 
therefore, must be sought the cause, or causes, of the 1863 
war.
Ever since i860 relations between Kotoku and Asante
had never been cordial. The Asantehene in 1863 was still
which
smarting under the defeat/Kotoku inflicted on the Abuakwa- 
Asante Alliance in i860. He made no secret about this as a 
remote cause of the 1863 war. He opened his letter of 2nd 
June 1863, already referred to, thus:
1. J. 0. Ansa was one of the two hostages the Asante gave 
to the British to back their word during the signing of 
the 1831 Treaty of Peace. With the other hostage,
Owusu Nkwantabisa, Owusu Ansa was sent to London and 
educated at Clapham. The two returned to the Gold Coast 
in or about l84l. Nkwantabisa died soon after. Owusu 
Ansa was not allowed to return to Kumasi but was 
employed at Cape Coast Castle. His mission to the 
Asante war camp, Gyadam, on the Birem, near Akyem Soaduro, 
was the result of his own request to Governor Pine to be 
allowed to go and interview his countrymen, as no one then 
knew for certain whom the Asante were fighting. For a 
detailed biography of Owusu Ansa see Wilks, Asante, 
especially Chapter 14.
2. Prince Owusu Ansa ("Gyadam - upon - Birim") to Governor 
Pine, 1 June 1863, CO.96/61.
3 . Asantehene Kwaku Dua to H. E. Governor Pine, 2nd June
1863 co.96/6 1.
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”I should like to inform my friend /Governor Pine/ 
about the case of Akim Argieman Inkantoe and Attah 
who fought some time ago, and at that time one man 
of mine named Ardarquar of Kokofoo was killed.”
Then in a long winded way the Asantehene went on to say how 
he appealed to Mr. Andrews, Governor of Cape Coast Castle at 
that time, for justice to be done him, but the governor
cause of the war. Another was perhaps the Kotoku migration
to western Akyem. It is possible that Kumasi saw the
migration as the first phase of a secret Kotoku plan to
return to Asante-Akyem. Nsuaem, the new Kotoku capital in
western Akyem was much nearer to Asante-Akyem than Gyadam,
their former capital, in Eastern Akyem (Abuakwa). Yet
another remote grievance against Kotoku, (although the
Asantehene made no mention of it in 1863) is also traceable
to i860. It had something to do with a Kotoku citizen who
in July, i860 beat an Asante priest called Busumuru at
Anomabo. Some Asante traders had gone to trade at Anomabo.
2They put up in the house of the gold-taker of a Mr. Butler,
an English merchant there. It was about this time that
Kotokuhene Agyeman was invited to Cape Coast as a prosecution
3
witness in the Freeman trial. On his way back home some of 
his subjects, including his interpreter, went to the gold- 
taker 's house. Six Asante traders, including Busumuru,
1. See Chapter 7 pages 248- bove for an account of the 
Abuakwa-Kotoku war of i860 and the Asante involvement.
2. A gold-taker was a kind of middle-man in the gold trade 
between the forest and the coast. He introduced to the 
merchants the producers who came to the coast to sell 
gold.
refused to redress his grievance. 1 This then was one remote
3 . See Chapter 7 page 256-7 above.
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were already in the house. As soon as the Kotoku entered 
the house, Busumuru shouted: ftWho comes there, is that crook­
legged Argiman’s interpreter?”1 One of the Kotoku who could 
not bear to see his King insulted in this manner, grabbed 
the priest and beat him. Busumuru’s companions saw how 
impetuous their colleague had been and what the consequence 
might be should the Kotoku citizens report the incident to 
their King. To induce the Kotoku not to report the incident
to their King, Busumuru’s colleagues gave the Kotoku 4i
2
ackies of gold. When Busumuru and his colleagues returned
home to tell their own story the Asantehene took up the
matter and complained to Governor Andrews about the beating
of his priest by Kotoku subjects. The Committee of Enquiry
at Anomabo was the action Andrews took on the Asantehene’s
complaint. The committee found the Kotoku not guilty
because they had been extremely provoked. After studying
the report of the Committee, Governor Andrews informed the
Asantehene that the conduct of Busumuru had been extremely
3
provocative and therefore he deserved the beating.
Apparently the Asantehene saw that Andrews was 
a fair and firm man who could not be easily pushed about.
He decided to wait for a more suitable occasion to retaliate 
against the Kotoku. By November, i860 he was exuberantly
1. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Asante grievance 
against Kotoku: ’’Evidence from the gold-taker of Mr. 
Butler on Oath at Anomabo” 13th August, i860 CO.96/47*
2. Ibid.
3* Andrews to the Duke of Newcastle, 13 December i860
CO.96/47.
2 8 0 .
professing friendship with the British. In that month he
sent a live hog to Andrews with the following message
f,My friend, I send this /Tetter7 to you to tell 
you plainly to send this nice hog called sanker 
/osanka in Tvj±/ to the Queen of England as a 
present /from me/. I am well, hoping that you 
are the same.’^
But it is clear that in i860 while Kumasi was professing
friendship with the British, it was nursing bitterness
against Kotoku, a British protected state.
Tension between Kotoku and Asante continued during
1861-62 and thereby made it possible for Kumasi to secure an
immediate cause for attacking Nsuaem. Some time between l86l
and 1862 the Kotokuhene ordered his subjects to tattoo an
Asante citizen on the face. The Basel missionaries at
Kyebi thought this was the immediate cause of the 1863 Asante
2
attack on Kotoku. The missionaries may well be right,
judging from what the Asante themselves gave out as their
immediate grievance against Kotoku, namely the seizure and
murder of a number of Asante subjects by the Kotoku. On 1st
June, 1863 the Officer commanding the Asante army was quoted
as saying that the Kotokuhene ordered the detention and
execution of sixty Asante subjects in his territory; and
this angered the Asantehene who instructed his army to
3
attack and kill Agyeman. The Asantehene himself esentially 
confirmed the statement of his Commanding Officer. In his 
letter of 2nd June, l863> already referred to above, the
1. Asantehene Kwaku Dua I to Governor Andrews (CCC) 20th 
November, i860, CO.96/4 7.
2. Stromberg (Kyebi^/^th April, 1863 No. Akim 18, BMA-PJC.
3 . Owusu Ansa (Gyadam-upon-Birem) to Governor Pine, 1 & 2 
June 1863, CO.96/6 1.
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Asantehene, commenting on the immediate cause of the 
invasion also said: ’’Argieman Inkantoe caught sixty of them 
/Asante citizens/, killed 40 /of them/ and delivered twenty 
to me; therefore I sent my chief captain Osoo Korkor to /go 
and/ kill him and bring his jaw- /bone/’’. Clearly the 
presence of the Kotoku paramountcy in western Akyem had 
added fuel to the tension already existing between it and 
Asante. It seems that in Western Akeym the Kotoku were in 
the habit of not only panyarring but also killing Asante 
subjects.
The 1831 Treaty of Peace had anticipated dispute 
between some of the Protectorate states and Asante, and had 
laid down the procedure to normalise relations in the event 
of tension. The Treaty was still in force in the early 
l860s. Clause 5 of the 1827 section of the Treaty stipulated 
that whenever any of the Protectorate states offended Asante, 
the Kumasi Court should first complain to the Governor or 
any official empowered to act for the governor, who would 
settle the issue as justice required. Asked why the 
Asantehene did not lodge a complaint with the Governor 
against Kotoku before attacking that state, the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Asante Army said the Asantehene feared that if 
he had complained to Cape Coast Castle, ”he would be served 
as before” . 1 Owusu Kokoo was here no doubt referring to 
Governor Andrews’ refusal to entertain Asante grievance (in 
the Adarkwa and Busumuru affairs) against Kotoku in i860.
Much has been made of the claim, attributed to Asantehene 
Osei Bonsu (c. 1801-1824) that Asante never went to war to
1. Ansa’s Report of 1st June, 1863.
2 8 2 .
obtain justice "while a path lay open for negotiation." If 
indeed this was a general maxim of Asante, then its conduct 
in 1863 was an exception to the rule, because it did not 
complain against Kotoku before attacking that state.
By March 1863 the Asante army had arrived in 
Western Akyem. It apparently took Kotoku and its Bosome 
ally unawares. This can be inferred from Agyeman*s 
message to the government. For the information of Mr. Nicol 
Irwine, the acting Civil Commandant of the Eastern Districts, 
a Mr. Parker of Simpa (Winneba) observed on l6th March that 
according to the Kotokuhene f*the Ashantees have come to his 
town and are ready to fight,which gives him no chance to 
have it fair with them from the way they have surrounded 
his town; but as soon as he finds chance he will fire on 
them”. The ’surprise* tactics which the invading Asante 
army adopted seems to suggest their respect for Kotoku as a 
fighting nation. Asante no doubt well remembered Kotoku 
ability to hold its own against the combined efforts of 
Abuakwa and Asante in i860. The 1863 Asante war planners 
probably worked on the principle that a surprise attack on 
Kotoku was more likely to bring about its quicker defeat.
The course and outcome of the war are other aspects 
where earlier writers have distorted truth. The impression 
is given that the invading Asante army swept everything before 
it, winning victory in two major battles of the war fought at 
Asikuma and Bobikuma, and withdrawing with impunity only at
A Residence,
1 . DupufsT 7 PP# 225-6; Wilks, in Forde and Kaberry,
op. cit. p. 218. Cf. also Boahen, Topics, p. 79*
2. Mr. Parker (Winneba) to Irwine (Accra), 16 March 1863*
co.96/61.
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the approach of the rains. 1 This is not borne out by
contemporary evidence. In the first place there were three,
and not two, major battles. Nor is it correct to say that
only the rainy season forced the invader to withdraw.
Defeat in the three battles, and the possibility of further
debacles were weightier reasons for the withdrawal.
The immediate problem which Agyeman and Amoakoaa
had to solve was how to extricate themselves from the
spider’s web the invaders had almost woven around them. A
way of escape lay to the south. And so they and their
subjects retreated southwards, into nieghbouring Gomoa and
Agona. The retreat gave them a breathing space to work out
their war plans. It, however, had one great disadvantage.
It left their Kingdoms unprotected. This enabled the
invaders to loot and burn down about thirty Kotoku and 
2
Bosome towns. This initial success was about all that the
Asante army achieved.
Gomoa and Agona readily rallied to the aid of the
retreating Akyem, allowing them to establish their main camp
at Agona Swedru. In set battles the Protectorate states
which actually fought against the Asante in 1863 were Kotoku,
■5
Bosome, Agona and Gomoa. In the last days of March Kotoku 
and their allies met the invaders at Asikuma, where the first 
major battle was fought. Earlier accounts claim that victory
1. Ellis (1893) p. 228; Claridge Vol. I p. 515; Ward, 
History pp. 215-6; Wilks, Asante, p. 221.
2. Pine to Newcastle, 10th June, 1863 CO.96/61.
3 . The term ’allies’ as used in this study therefore refers 
primarily to these Protectorate states.
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went to the invaders. 1 Contemporary evidence tells a 
different story. According to Captain Brownwell who arrived 
at Swedru a day after the battle, the allies won the day. 
They captured many Asante soldiers during and after the 
battle. These prisoners-of-war gave the allies information 
on the situation in the Asante war camp after the Battle of 
Asikuma. They said at the beginning of the war the Asante 
army numbered many thousands though they could not tell the 
exact number. Besides Owusu Kokoo, there were many other 
captains, including "Adarquar" (Adaakwa), "Samaquanta" 
(Asamoa Nkwanta), "Eddoo Guaffooah" (? Adu Bofoo), "Yah 
Mannee" (Yaw Omane), and "Koyah” (Keya); that Adaakwa and 
Keya and several lesser captains were killed at Asikuma; the 
Asante losses at Asikuma were so great that the Asantehene 
had sent word to Owusu Kokoo to curtail the war and bring 
the remnant of the army back home; that all were agreed to 
obey the royal order except Owusu Kokoo who said he would 
not return home until he had either killed or captured 
Agyeman. 2
The second battle was fought at Bobikuma in or 
about the second week of April. Again earlier writers 
credit Asante with victory. This view is not borne out by 
contemporary evidence. Before Bobikuma was fought, Major
1. Ellis (1863) P* 228 Claridge Vol. I p. 515; Ward History 
p. 215.
2. Captain Brownwell (Agona Swedru) to Major Cochrane 
(Anomabo), 1 April 1863* Nos. 1-& 2, CO.96/61. Brownwell 
had been-sent to study the situation in the Winneba 
neighbourhood. He arrived at Swedru in the morning of 
1st April, a day after the Battle of Asikuma. He 
immediately sent a report to Major Cochrane, Commanding 
the small force at the castle. He sent his second report 
in the evening of the same day.
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Cochrane had sent an order asking Brownwell to leave the
allies1 camp and retire to Winneba. 1 Captain Brownwell
obeyed. While at Winneba he received word about the Battle
of Bobikuma. The information said the Allies had won
2
another victory.
There was a third battle, which has never been
mentioned in any of the earlier accounts of the war. It
was fought near Nsaba on 1st May 1863. By then Captain
Brownwell had realised the incompetence of Cochrane as a
commander. He defied the Major's order to stay at Winneba;
and went to join the Allies just before the Battle of Nsaba.
He was thus not only an eye-witness but an active participant
•5
in the war. Again victory went to the Allies. Thus in all 
three set battles, the invaders suffered defeats.
The false impression that the war had gone against 
the Protectorate is explained by the poor handling of the 
situation by both Governor Pine, at least during the initial
1. Seepp. 287-8 below for account on Major Cochranefs 
conduct and movements during the war.
2. Captain Brownwell (Winneba) to Cochrane, 15th April, 1863 
CO.96/61 Horton (Letters p. 62) says this war occurred
on 12th May. The present author is inclined to accept 
Brownwell's date. His was almost an eye-witness account. 
Horton was an astute observer. But he wrote years after 
the event. Another contemporary source is a letter from 
Commander H. W. Wratislaw of HMS Sloop Ranger, to Commander 
A.P.E. Wilmot of HMS Rattlesnake, dated Cape Coast, 17 May 
1863 (BrPP). This is a confused account of the war.
Though it reports on Bobikuma it does not state clearly 
who won and who lost.
3 . Captain Brownwell (Agona Swedru) to Governor Pine, 1st May; 
Captain Williams (Agona Swedru)- to Governor Pine 2nd May 
1863 (CO.96/61) Captain Williams reached Agona Swedru in 
the afternoon of 2nd May and there found the allies elated 
at their victory.
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stages of the war, and Major Cochrane. This aspect has not
received serious scrutiny by historians. 1 Until mid-May
when the British at Cape Coast had become absolutely sure
that the Asante invasion was not against them, they showed
very little, if any, concern for the safety of the protected
states, particularly those in the interior. By the middle of
April the British had become fully aware that "large parties
of Ashantees have crossed the boundary ^iver Pra7 and
invaded the Protectorate, pillaging and over-running the
country and compelling the allies to fall back". But all
that the Executive Council at Cape Coast Castle could do was
to resolve that "as no positive (sic) declaration of war has
been made by the King of Ashantee, it was desirable to know
whether the alleged incursions of his subjects were with his
sanction and approval."-^
To this end Prince John Owusu Ansa was to leave for
Kumasi. He never got beyond the Pra, because the invader
made it dangerous for him and his companions to go further.
The government at Cape Coast Castle needed no more proof to
make them mobilize and advance against the invader. But
Pine and the executive ordered war stores to be issued out
only to "allies", i.e. the nearby Fante. Not a single gun
was sent to Kotoku and its Bosome, Agona and Gomoa allies,
who had already fought two major battles against the enemy.
And the nearby Fante who received the war stores were instructed
4not to use their weapons "unless in case of extreme necessity1,
1. But see Claridge, Vol. I, p. 545*




a clear proof that the war was nowhere near Cape Coast.
U
Earlier, on 10th April, the Executive Council had 
resolved that Major Cochrane, Officer commanding the Gold 
Coast Artillery Corps, should take the field with his A20 
soldiers,
"not for the purpose of attacking the Ashantees 
but with a view of observing their movements, 
concentrating the Allies /iTe. the central and 
Western Fante7, and his little army in an advan­
tageous position so as to command access to that 
point of the Protectorate the most surely pressed”.
These were decisions of the Protecting power when already a
section of the Protected were under heavy fire; when those of
the Protected not yet attacked had assembled a force of
"between 15,000 and 20,000" at Mankesim and were waiting for
Cochrane and his professional soldiers to lead them to the
aid of Kotoku and Bosome as well as their Agona and Gomoa
allies. 1 Worst still Cochrane made a mess of the somewhat
2belated British war efforts to assist Kotoku and its allies. 
Governor Pine gives us an insight about Cochrane’s movements.
On 10th April the Major and his men moved from Cape Coast to 
Anomabo. There he remained till 15th April, thinking that 
the enemy might attack that town. But as the enemy did not 
show up he moved to "Mankesim, about 19 miles in the interior, 
in the direction of the alleged position of the enemy - where 
he remained until 5th May, but without meeting with any 
opposition although reporting to me /fine/ continually that
-Z
the enemy was sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another."-^
1. Pine to Newcastle, 15 April, 1863 CO.96/6 0.
2. Claridge Vol. I pp. 515-9* Ward, History p. 215.
3. Pine to Newcastle, 12th May, 1863 (CO.96/60). In a lengthy 
correspondence with Pine (also found in CO.96 /60 Cochrane 
tried to defend his conduct. The correspondence emphasizes 
rather than refutes his incompetence.
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In fact Cochrane did not actively get involved in the war1 
until 5th June when he joined the forces of the rest of the 
Protectorate that had met at Ajumako prior to going to the 
aid of Kotoku, Bosome and Agona forces still encamped at 
Swedru. Cochrane’s conduct - or is it misconduct - largely 
explains the charge of desertion from duty which, according
p
to Pine himself, the people levelled against his government.
The success of Kotoku and its allies in the three 
set battles had different effects on the Asante invading 
army and the British administration at Cape Coast Castle. 
Owusu Kokoo ultimately realised the futility of trying to 
defeat the Kotoku in war and resolved to try diplomacy as a 
means to secure the person of Kotokuhene Agyeman. A change 
in the position of his camp gave the first indication of 
this new development among the invading army. Until 1st May 
his war camp had been at Odobin, deep in the heart of Agona. 
After the Kotoku victory at Nsaba he removed his camp to 
Gyadam-upon-Birem, an Abuakwa town in Western Akyem on the
R
north bank of the river Birem. This was a much safer place 
because Abuakwa then seems to have been considerably hostile 
to Kotoku. In 1863 Abuakwa was still smarting under the 
defeat it had suffered at the hands of Kotoku in i860.
1. Wratislaw (HMS Ranger, Cape Coast) to Wilmot (HMS Rattle­
snake), 17 May 1863, BPP Vol. 57 (1863) pp. 307-8.
2. Pine to Newcastle 10th June, 1863 CO.96/60.
3 . Captain Brownwell to Cochrane, 1st April 1863 CO.96/6 1.
4. This is to be distinguished from the old Kotoku capital in 
Eastern Akyem destroyed by Abuakwa in the i860 war.
5. Cf. Map No. 7*
6 . See Chapter 7 P- 249 above.
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For Atta Ob.iwom, the Abuakwahene* claimed that the land on 
which the Kotokuhene was settled in Western Akyem fell 
within Kyebi jurisdiction.^ The Cape Coast Castle admini­
stration seems to have suspected Abuakwa intrigues with 
Asante. This is suggested by the delegation of Fante Chiefs
which Pine sent to Kyebi in late 1863 to induce Atta Obiwom
2
to change his hostile attitude towards Kotoku. The continued
tension between Kotoku and Abuakwa probably provided the
pretext for Asante efforts to persuade Abuakwa to return to
3
its old allegiance to the Asantehene. Abuakwa response was 
not favourable: by the late 1860s Abuakwa had become most 
hostile to Asante. In 1863* however* Asante* no doubt
Orv
regarded Abuakwa as a friendAwhose soil the Asante army in
the field could encamp and feel safe.
At this safe distance, the Commander-in-Chief of
the invading army sent to Captains Williams and Brownwell
at Agona Swedru, a prisoner-of-war, carrying two sticks,
one short the other long. The messenger was to tell the
white soldiers in the allies’ camp that he
’Prince Owoosoococco, Commander-in-Chief of his 
/Asantehene’s/ invading army .... was encamped at 
a place called Gadem-upon-Berim, about forty miles 
from this /Swedru/; he has come to fetch King 
Adjiman who had previously insulted and wronged the 
Prince’s father: he will have Adjiman dead or alive; 
he does not wish to fight the whitemen or the 
Fantees; if I /Captain Williams/ will give up 
Adjiman dead or alive the war will be short, in 
which case I must send the short stick; but if I 
refuse, I must send the longer, and he will
1. Kromer (Kyebi) to Basel, 1 November 1863* No. Akim 18, 
BMA-PJC.
2. Ibid.
3- Claridge, Vol. 1 p. 524.
4. Cf. Chapter 9 P« 321 below.
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remain in the territory for years. ”1 
In relation to the authorities at Cape Coast Castle the 
message-of-sticks had a singularly salutary effect. In the 
first place it was yet another proof that the invader had 
not come directly against the British. Secondly it showed 
that so far the war had not gone well for the invader him­
self. This evidence confirmed Pine in his conviction, 
arrived at since 12th May, no doubt as a result of the 
successes of Kotoku and its immediate allies, that Asante 
was not all that formidable. The Kotoku victories so 
encouraged Pine, who had been panicky at the initial stages 
of the war, that after 1st May he began to advocate that 
the British should invade Asante itself. From then on he 
took up the fight for Kotoku and Bosome. For he was now 
determined ”that a final blow shall be struck at Ashantee 
power, and the question set at rest forever as to whether 
an arbitrary, cruel, and sanguinary Monarch ^Tshantehene7 
shall be for ever permitted to insult the British flag and 
outrage the laws of civilization.
”The desirable object” he pleaded with the British 
Colonial Secretary ”can be obtained only by the possession of 
such a force as I fear the Governor of these settlements can 
never hope to command unless your Grace should be pleased to 
urge upon Her Majesty’s Government the policy, the economy, 
and even the mercy of transporting to these shores an army 
of such strength as would, combined with the allied native
1. Captain Williams (Agona Swedru) to Governor Pine (CCC)
21st May, 1863 CO.96/6O.
forces, enable us to reach Coomassie and there plant the
British flag” . 1
Pine anticipated that the British Home Government
might think that what he was advocating for was just not
practicable. He hurried to assure would be sceptics thus:
"To a stranger the cause I point out may appear a
visionary one; but I am convinced that even with
the disadvantage of climate, the expedition would 
not be so dangerous, so fatal, or accompanied with 
such a loss of life as have attended expeditions 
in other and apparently more congenial climates; 
and with 2,000 disciplined soldiers followed by 
upwards of 50,000 native forces who require only 
to be led and inspired with confidence by the 
presence of organized troops I would undertake 
(driving the hordes of Ashantee before me) to 
march to Coomassie.”
To compensate Kotoku in particular and the rest of 
the Protectorate in general was Pine’s objective. For in 
advocating for the invasion of Asante itself, he declared, that 
he was
’’guided by the same principles with respect to the 
liberty of an innocent subject, which your Grace 
was pleased to approve in the case of the Chief 
Gainin /Gyani7, as Adjiman is not known to have 
committed any offence
For Kotoku and Bosome the Battle of Nsaba virtually 
marked the end of direct hostility with Asante. From now the 
British took up their cause. Pine was determined to atone 
for the betrayal of the trust reposed in the British by 
Kotoku and the rest of the Protectorate. He was resolved 
never to leave the Gold Coast ’’until I have gained them
1. Pine (CC) to Duke of Newcastle, 12th May 1863 CO.96/6 0. 
This source is reproduced by Metcalfe, Documents No. 225 
pp. 295-6. For colonial Office reaction to Pine’s 
proposition see p. 296 .‘ below.
2. Pine to Newcastle, 12 May 1863, CO.96/60.
292.
redress for the wrongs they have suffered . ..’’.^  This mood 
of aggression had started to develop after 1st May and it 
increased on receipt of the message-of-sticks.
His immediate reaction however, was to find
confirmation for it, and this meant corresponding directly
with the Asante war leaders in the field. On 22nd May he
selected Prince J. Owusu Ansa as his messenger to Gyadam- 
2
upon-Birem. Ansa was to tell the Asante Commander-in-Chief, 
that the British accepted in principle the idea of a 
negotiated settlement which Owusu Kokoo had suggested, 
through his message-of-sticks, but the British would negotiate 
only on their own terms and not on those of Asante. Ansa 
was also to ask Owusu Kokoo to send ’accredited and 
responsible” representatives to Cape Coast, to assist the 
Governor in enquiring into whatever grievances the 
Asantehene had against the Kotokuhene; that Owusu Kokoo 
should realise that Asante had placed themselves in the 
wrong by invading a part of the Protectorate, with a view 
to obtaining the person of a Chief under British protection, 
without first complaining to the British authorities; that 
the Asante Commander-in-Chief should immediately withdraw 
his army from the Protectorate and give immediate compensa­
tion for whatever damage the invading army had already done 
in the Protectorate; if Commander Owusu Kokoo refused to 
accept these pre-conditions, John Owusu Ansa was to end his
1. Pine to Newcastle, 12 October 1863 No. 92, CO.96/62.
2. Governor Pine (CCC) to J.O. Ansa (CCC) 22nd May 1863.
A copy of this letter can be found in-CO.96/108. Ansa 
was to be accompanied by a Mr. Bernasco, an Assistant 
Catechist of the 17es3QBn Church at Cape Coast and four 
carriers.
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interview with a warning that the British and the Protec­
torate would wage a fullscale war against Asante. 1
Ansa’s mission proved very advantageous to the 
frustrated Asante army. It gave the invaders a most 
welcome opportunity to withdraw secretly without further 
loss of face. Ansa and his companions set out for Gyadam- 
upon-Birem on 29th May and arrived there on 51st May. He 
had his first interview with Commander-in-Chief Owusu Kokoo 
in the morning of 1st June, 1863. On the same day Ansa 
sent back a report part of which reads:-
”l have already made known your Excellency's 
message. The Prince /i.e. Owusu Kokoo/, 
according to their custom, will /formally 
assemble/ his great Chiefs /tomorrow/ to hear 
your Excellency’s message again and give an 
answer. /From/ the little I have seen of the 
Prince this morning, I think he will send a 
proper messenger with me to Your Excellency
  Depend upon it I will not let them take
advantage of my time. ”2
But this wasjexactly what happened. On June 2 he 
reported that the Asante War leaders at Camp Gyadam had 
resolved (a) that it was not within their competence to 
start peace talks with the governor without a mandate from 
the Asantehene, therefore he Owusu Ansa should go to Kumasi 
and see the King himself; (b) that while Ansa was effecting
contact with the Kumasi Court, they would withdraw from the
3
Protectorate and remain on the western bank of the Pra. In
1. Pine to Duke of Newcastle, 10th June, 1863 CO.96/60.
2. J.O. Ansa (Gyadem-upon-Birem) to Governor Pine, 1st June,
1863 CO.96/60. This report did not reach Pine till after
10th June together with a second from Owusu Ansa. Ansa’s 
explanation was that the Asante had detained without his 
(Ansa's) knowledge the messenger bringing the letter.
3. J.O. Ansa (Gyadam) to Pine, 2nd June 1863 CO.96/6 1.
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view of the above, Ansa asked Governor Pine whether or not
he should proceed to Kumasi to see the Asantehene.'1' But
in a postscript he wrote: "The Ashantee people are ready to
start with us now, which I am very glad /of/”* That is to
say Ansa who desired the Governor to instruct him as to
whether or not he should go to Kumasi felt it was no longer
necessary to wait for the Governor’s instructions. Clearly
to
he was determined to help his countrymen/withdraw before the 
Cape Coast administration could subject them to further 
harassment.
The best way to achieve this goal was to gain 
sufficient time for the invaders to withdraw unnoticed. And 
so he made sure that his subsequent communications after his 
first report did not reach Governor Pine quickly. His 
second letter, just referred^ to did not reach Governor Pine 
until after 10th June when he sent it together with a third 
letter, written from a village he called "Akiassiwa" (i.e. 
Akyeasewa) in Asante. In the third letter he explained the 
delay thus: ”l sent Your Excellency a letter from Gadam 
dated 2nd instant by three messengers, /put/ I am very sorry 
indeed that they /the three messengers and the letter/ were 
returned to me at this place /Akyeasewa/ today by the 
Ashantees.” The reason of the Asante Commander-in-Chief, 
he said, was that the messengers might get killed. But that 
Ansa had been playing for time can be deduced from his 
statement, in the same third letter, that he was, however, 
pleased because "Prince Owoosoo Cocor had faithfully fulfilled
1. J.O. Ansa (Gyadam) to Pine, 2nd June l86j CO.96/61.
2. J.O. Ansa (Akyeasewa, Asante) to Pine, 10th June, l863
co.96/61.
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his promise /to withdraw from the Protectorate/ to my 
satisfaction. He is /here/ now with me with all his army. " 1 
Thus the Asante war leader who had vowed to stay on in the 
Protectorate for years in order to secure the person of 
Kotokuhene Agyeman could not even spend a few days on the 
borders. The final proof of Ansa’s collusion with his 
country-men was his sudden return to Ajumako on 19th June 
without reaching Kumasi. His reason was that he ’’went 
with Prince Owoosoo Cocor as far as a day and half journey 
from Coomassie /and he/ told me to return.” Governor Pine 
was furious with Ansa, for he saw that Ansa had deliberately 
helped the invaders to withdraw.
Nor was Pine luckier with his other plans. 
Immediately after receiving the message-of-sticks, he 
rushed to Ajumako with the aim of organizing that part of the 
Protectorate forces assembled there in anticipation of the 
fullscale war which he intended against the Asante invading 
army.^ He arrived there on 28th May and spent about two 
weeks there, organizing the African forces while waiting to 
hear from Ansa in Western Akyem. He suddenly fell sick and 
had to be carried back to Cape Coast on 12th June.
But he was still bent on satisfying the Akyem and 
the Protectorate as a whole, by punishing Asante in spite of
1. J.O. Ansa (Akyeasewa, Asante) to Pine, 10th June, 186^ 
CO.96/6 1.
2. Ansa (Ajumako) to Pine, 19th June, 1863 CO.96/61.
5 . Pine to Newcastle, 11th July, 1863 CO.96/61.
4. Pine (Ajumako) to Newcastle, 10th June 1863* CO.96/60.
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its reverses in the war.^ Besides, there was a general but
erroneous belief, that Akyem and other parts of the
2
Protectorate might be re-invaded. It was better, he thought,
to carry the war to Asante on their own soil than to wait to
be attacked by them again. He took up with greater zeal the
idea of invading Asante itself. But the Colonial Office
would not permit such a measure, saying it was too serious
to be entertained. The Colonial Office, however, allowed
the establishment of two military posts on the border with
Asante, one at Akyem Soaduro and the other, which is the
better known in Gold Coast history, at Praso in Assin.
Claridge gives the impression that the military posts at
Praso and Akyem Soaduro were a prelude to an impending
British invasion of Asante. This is wrong. They were
meant to be "a demonstration” of British military power
which, it was hoped, "would induce the King of Ashantee to
proffer such /peace/ terms as /Vine/ could consistently
accept”.^  By June 1864 both posts had been abandoned on
7
account of bad weather.
The notion that western Akyem and other parts of
1 . Pine to Newcastle, 12 October, 9 & 13 November, and 12 
December, 1863, CO.96/62.
2 . Pine to Newcastle, 12 October, and 13 November 1863 CO.96/62.
3 . Secretary of State for the Colonies to the War Office, 22 
August 1863, CO.96/6I; Metcalfe, Documents, No. 236, p.296.
4 . Pine to Newcastle, 12 February & 11 March 1864, CO.96/64. 
Claridge, Vol. I p. 527•
5. Claridge, Vol. I p. 524.
6. Pine to Newcastle, 12 December 1863, Despatch No. 106,
co.96/62.
7 . Claridge Vol. I pp. 524-530;Crooks, Records, p. 362; Ward 
History p. 218.
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the Protectorate might be invaded again by Asante was strongly
prevalent up to June 1864. This was because the general
public was not aware of the virtual defeat the Kotoku-
Bosome-Agona alliance had inflicted on the invading Asante
army in the 1863 war. The fear, however, began to vanish
after June 1864, to the extent that some of the interior
states, those of Akyem included, began to commit acts of
aggression against Kumasi: they raided Asante territory
near the border and carried off or killed some of its 
2
inhabitants. Asante did not retaliate, an attitude 
which Cape Coast Castle authorities felt was most uncharac­
teristic of her. The truth, as Lieutenant-Colonel Conran
said in 1865, was that Asante's reverses in the last war
•3
had been quite disastrous.
Viewed against this situation in the Gold Coast, 
the public and parliamentary furor and fuss to which the
ii
Kotoku-Asante war produced in Britain seems ironical, 
though understandable. In June 1864 the Opposition in 
the British House of Commons tabled a motion with a view 
to censuring the Government on the subject of the war.
For in Britain, as in the Gold Coast, the general notion 
was that Asante had invaded a British protectorate with 
impunity. That cast a slur on Britain as the protecting 
power. The motion was defeated narrowly by 233 to 226 
votes.^ But the Kotoku-Asante war compelled Britain to
1. Pine to the Right Honourable Edward Cardwell, 10 November 
1864, CO.96/6 5.
2. Report of Major R.S. Jones, 9 May 1865, CO.96/8 8.
3. Lt.-Colonel Conran (CCC) to Cardwell, 8 September l865>
CO.96/68.
4. The Times, 16 &17 June 1864 issues.
5 . Metcalfe, Documents, No. 24l No. I.
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revise her policy in West Africa. It seemed to many that 
British presence in the Gold Coast was a liability rather 
than an asset to the British tax payer. Aside from expenses
incurred to combat Asante in the 1863 war, the cost to the
Imperial Treasury of maintaining the British Gold Coast 
possessions had risen from £5 ,000 .00 sterling in 1850 to 
£12,000.00 in 1 8 6 3 .1 And yet, it was argued, returns from 
the Gold Coast were not commensurate to investment. All 
this raised the issue as to wehther there was any justifica­
tion in the continued presence of Britain in the Gold Coast
especially and West Africa in general. Some felt there was
2
none, others thought there was. Consequently the British 
Government, in 1864, appointed Colonel Ord as sole 
commissioner to investigate the subject of British presence 
in West Africa, particularly the efficiency of the administra­
tion, and recommend ways and means of cutting down expenditure 
on them. A Parliamentary Select Committee was also set up in
1865 to study 0rd*s report. Its Chairman was Mr. Charles
Bowyer Adderley, a free trader and surprisingly a 
vociferous campaigner against extension of British 
Protection beyond the immediate precints of the forts and 
castles to neighbouring states and peoples.
After considering Colonel 0rd!s report the 1865 
Select Committee came to the conclusion "that it is not 
possible to withdraw the British Government, wholly or 
immediately, from any settlements or engagements on the
1. Figures quoted by 0. Dike, Trade and Politics in the 
Niger Delta 1850-1885 (0UP 1956) p. 167.
2. House of Commons Debate, 21st February 1865 (Hansard 
3/177/535 T) reproduced by Metcalfe, Documents No. 244 
p. 307 Column 1.
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West African Coast. ”1 It, however, recommended
"that all further extension of territory or 
assumption of Government or new treaties 
offering any protection to native tribes, would 
be inexpedient; and that the object of our policy 
should be to encourage in the natives the 
exercise of those qualities which may render it 
possible for us more and more to transfer to them 
the administration of all the Governments, with a 
view to our ultimate withdrawal from all, except, 
probably Sierra Leone."
The Committee also recommended for adoption the suggestion
that for efficient supervision on administration, all the
British West African establishments be headquartered in
Freetown, Sierra Leone. This then was the extent of the
impact which Kotoku’s strained relations with Asante in the
early 1860s made on British policy in West Africa.
Meanwhile by the last months of 1865 it had become
clear in the Protectorate that Asante would not invade again
as many in the Protectorate had expected. In fact by then
Asantehene Kwaku Dua himself had started throwing feelers
p
about in search of peace. In September 1865 he sent 
messengers to Mr. George Blankson, a well known Fante 
merchant at Anomabo, overtly to buy silk cloth from him 
but covertly to sound him on the subject of a possible peace 
settlement. For their safety, the royal messengers first 
travelled to Kwawu and crossed the Volta, via the Afram 
plains, into trans-Volta Akwamu. The Akwamuhene then 
provided them with an escort to Accra from where they were
1. Resolutions of the Select Committee, 26 June 1865 (HC 412 
of 1865) reproduced by Metcalfe, Documents, No. 248 p. 311.
2. Wilks (Asante, p. 22^) suggests that it was the Cape Coast 
Castle administration-who made the first peace move, by 
inviting the Asantehene to peace negotiation.
conveyed in a boat to Anomabo by sea. This unexpected but 
genuine gesture on the part of Asante enabled Lieutenant- 
Colonel Conran to reverse his predecessorfs policy of 
hostility towards Asante.
The role of George Blankson in the peace moves 
has scarcely been emphasized by any of the earlier writers 
who have touched on this subject. It was the confidence 
the Kumasi Court placed in him which partly helped to 
generate moves towards a peace settlement.1 For his part 
Blankson worked to justify the trust. To make sure that 
no Asante messenger was molested on their way to Cape 
Coast, Blankson himself travelled to Assin Praso in
December 1865 to receive and lead three Asante negotiators
2
to Cape Coast. In a letter to the Governor, the Asante-
hene declared:
"Your Excellency, yours by George Blankson to
send  my ambassadors down to your honour
at Cape Coast Castle for putting in order the 
case between me and you /has been received^
I have sent by him one of my sword-bearers 
named Cofee Doro /Kofi Duro/* Chief Cofee 
Aifilfah /Cofi Affrifah/, and Cudjoe Aiboo 
/Kwadwo Abu/ my herald, and I hope to hear from 
you by them."^
The talks lasted throughout the second week of 
January 1866. A peace settlement was reached in principle
1. George Blankson (Ansonabo) to H.M. Kwaku Dua, 19 September 
1865, copy, as Enclosure in Conran to Cardwell 9 October 
1865, CO.96/68.
2. G. Blankson (Praso) to Lt.-Colonel Conran (CCC) 20 and 25 
December 1865 (CO.96/7 0); G. Blankson (Atwereboanna) to 
Conran, 4 and 5 January, 1866 CO.96/70.
3 . Asantehene to Conran, 19 December; cf. also Asantehene to 
Blankson, 20 December, 1865 CO.96/70.
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on 12th January 1866 .^  A formal but unwritten treaty of
peace was effected not at the end of 1865, as some writers
2 3have thought, but in April 1866.
Conranfs peace settlement, however, was not
thorough, though not on account of the reasons often
4
advanced to condemn it, but because of a serious omission
in the settlement. He failed to make Akyem Kotoku a direct
party to the peace of April 1866, Such an involvement was 
which
a necessary step/he easily could have taken by simply
inviting the personal assent of Kotokuhene Agyeman. The
omission of Akyem Kotoku from the treaty as a direct party
is all the more surprising since Conran was fully aware that
strained Kotoku-Asante relations were the cause of the 1863 
6war.
The sin of omission nearly marred the settlement 
on account of the existence of continued tension between 
Kotoku and Asante. In May 1866, that is barely a month after
1. "Minutes of Proceedings of Public Meeting with the 
Ashantee Ambassadors of Peace at Cape Coast", 8 and 15 
January, 1866; Conran to Asantehene 18 January, 1866;
Conran to Assin Atanosohene (Copy), 25 January; Conran to 
Cardwell, 5 February, 1866 CO.96/70.
2. Claridge, Vol. I p. 5^5; Ward, History, p. 220.
3 . Conran (CCC) to Major Blackall, Governor-in-Chief (SL),
10 May and 6 July; Blackall (SL) to CO 19 May and 3 August
1866, co.96/71.
4. Claridge Vol. 1 pp. 5^5-6; Ward, History, p. 220; Wilks, 
Asante, p. 223. This view claims that the Governor issued
a proclamation that Asante had sued for peace, whereupon the 
Asantehene became annoyed and ended the peace talks.
5. Maclean achieved excellent results by inviting Abuakwa to 
assent to the 1831 Treaty of Peace. Cf. Chapter 5 P* 
above.
6 . Cf. n.l p. 303 below.
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the Conran peace settlement, Kotoku and Bosome farms were
raided by a group of Asante subjects. According to King
Kofi Agyeman of Kotoku, the raids had occurred without the
least provocation on the part of Kotoku and Bosome. He
therefore concluded that the raids could well be a prelude
which
to yet another attack/Asante might be planning against his
Kingdom and Bosome. With this frame of mind he appealed
to the Cape Coast Castle Administration for na small
quantity of /igunT-powder and leadbars to enable him resist
any attack which might be made on his part of the British
Protectorate” . 1 Irwine, as the Acting Civil Commandant of
the Eastern Districts, felt the Kotoku request was
reasonable because such a supply would encourage the
Western Akyem to ward off any possible Asante encroachment
2on the Protectorate.
But Conran's reaction to the request was utter 
disbelief. In his mind's eye he could see the impending 
collapse of all his efforts to establish a lasting peace 
between the Protectorate and Asante. To him if he failed, 
Kotokuhene Agyeman would have been the sole cause. That 
Chief, he felt, should be checked before he could cause 
further damage. In this mixed mood of fear and anger, 
Conran saw no justification for anybody, much less an 
Acting Civil Commandant, to encourage Agyeman. To Irwine,
1. Nichol Irwine (Accra) to Colonel Conran (CCC), 6 May 1866 
CO.96/72. A merchant in the employ of the Firm F. & L. 
Swanzy, Irwine was then acting as the Civil Commandant of 
the Eastern Provinces. It was through him that the 
Kotokuhene appealed to Government for the war stores.
2. Ibid.
the Administrator expressed
"his very great surprise to see or hear of your 
recommending that this scoundrel, Adjaman (sic) 
who provoked the last /T86^7 war, and now wants 
to do the same, should receive encouragement 
whilst the Government are at peace with the King 
of Ashantee."^
Conran then reminded Irwine that the peace arrangement he 
had just effected with Asante enjoined the Kotokuhene, and 
any other traditional ruler for that matter, to refrain 
from ill-treating Asante subjects, "who if wrong, will be 
punished by their King through the governor's report there­
after.” Irwine was therefore to warn the Kotokuhene further 
that
"if he .... by any means whatever, disturbs the 
peaceful relations now existing between Asante 
and the Government, Colonel Conran, with an armed
force, will proceed to Akim for the purpose of
bringing him down to this coast prior to trans­
posing him beyond the seas altogether, as a most 
seditious and insubordinate Chief is never at 
rest."2
Irwine was surprised to learn that the governor 
entertained so low an opinion about the Kotokuhene as to
call him a scoundrel. "I have been resident in Accra for
twelve years", he said, "and I can assure Your Excellency 
that this chief has always been looked upon with such great 
universal respect that he is considered by the whole of the 
Eastern Districts as the trustworthy guardian of his
-Z
frontiers against Ashantee".
1 . Alphonso Cary, Colonial Secretary at CCC to Mr. Irwine 
(Accra), 11th May, 1866 CO.96/7 2.
2. Alphonso Cary (CCC) to Irwine (Accra); Irwine 11 May 1866,
co.96/72.
3 . Irwine to Conran, 14 May 1866, CO.96/72.
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The raids on the Kotoku farms, however, did not 
lead to fresh war between Nsuaem and Kumasi. The raids 
were perhaps in reply to similar activities undertaken by 
Kotoku against Southern Asante palatine states like Adanse, 
Bekwae, Kokofu and Kontanase. But the tension continued to 
exist till 1867 when both Agyeman and Kwaku Dua died, the 
one in or about July and the other earlier in May. Thus 
with respect to Kotoku-Asante relations, Kofi Agyeman 
bequeathed a difficult inheritance to his successor, Kwabena 
Fua. For the Lower Volta District was fast emerging as the 
next battleground for Kotoku and Asante.
CHAPTER 9
DOMFRE OP NSAWAM. c.1867-1871
While the presence of the bulk of the Kotoku in 
Western Akyem was creating problems for the district in 
particular and the western sector of the Gold Coast in 
general, the Ankobea division, headed by Dompre, had, by 
1867, started influencing the course of events in the 
eastern sector and the lower Trans-Volta district from their 
base at Nsawam. Trade interests got the Kotoku of Nsawam 
involved in the inter-state conflicts which bedevilled the 
Lower Volta District as from about 1865. The involvement 
culminated in Kotoku (Nsawam) collaboration with British 
efforts to re-establish their authority in the district 
from which they had withdrawn in i860.
The founding of Nsawam by the Ankobea section of 
the Kotoku was a direct result of the differences between 
Dompre, the Ankobeahene, and Agyeman the Kotokuhene, 
following the Kotoku-Abuakwa war of i860. 1 Unable to 
tolerate his King, Dompre withdrew from Western Akyem 
altogether with his subjects, and headed eastwards till 
they reached extreme southwestern Akuapem where they 
decided to settle. They appealed to the Aburihene of 
Akuapem, to whom the land immediately belonged, for the
grant of the site on which they founded a town and called
0
it Nsaawa-mu (i.e. Nsawam today). It is even possible that
1. The rift is discussed in Chapter 8 pp. 266 above.
2. Nsawam Native Affairs, Case No. 76/191# Ghana National 
Archives (GNA); AKT: ADOAGYIRI (1968/9). Nsawam means 
"Under-the-Nsaa-trees. ’Asaa* or fasoaaf (pi. nsaa) is a 
wild fruit tree of the grapes family.
306.
Dompre and his subjects did not go to Western Akyem but 
moved directly southwards after the i860 war with Abuakwa. 
The founding of the town may have taken place between April 
i860 and 1866 when Dompre started influencing the course of 
events in the Eastern Districts of the Gold Coast.
Abundance of fish in the nearby river Densu is
held up as Domprefs reason for choosing the Nsawam site. 1
Other and better factors seem to have influenced the choice.
Political independence was possibly one. The withdrawal
from Western Akyem meant a physical separation as well as
political isolation of the Ankobea headquarters from the
rest of the Kotoku polity. But Dompre seems to have had no
desire to substitute any other power for the authority of
the Kotokuhene. Since his town of Nsawam was on Akuapem
soil, he would of course regard the Okuapemhene, through
2
the Aburihene, as his landlord. But situated about ten 
miles west of the Akuapem hills, Nsawam was quite removed 
from the main stream of Akuapem political life which was 
located on top of the hills. Besides Akuapem, other nearby 
states were Ga, about twenty-five miles to the south, 
Abuakwa, some forty miles to the north and Agona, about 
thirty miles to the west. To none of these did Dompre 
transfer his allegiance.
Economic interest however appears to have been
1. AKT: Adsagyiri (1968/9).
2. At the beginning of the present century a quarrel with their 
landlords compelled the Kotoku to abandon Nsawam to found 
Adoagyiri just on the western bank of Densu opposite Nsawam. 
The land here belonged, and still belongs, to the Abuakwa- 
hene. The people of Adoagyiri to this day pay homage to 
the Abuakwahene on account of the land on which they live. 
During the 1968 Okyeman Council meeting the present author met 
an Adoagyiri delegation attending the meeting.
another and perhaps the greatest factor which influenced
Dompre!s choice of Nsawam as a place to settle. Nsawam was
on economic cross roads, as it were.1 A trade route linked
it to Accra, by far and away the most commercial centre in
the Gold Coast. This enabled the Kotoku of Nsawam to drive
2
a salt trade from the Ga coast to the interior. The trade 
route from Accra extended northwards to reach Abuakwa and 
beyond it.^ This route would help Dompre and his subjects 
to share in the Eastern Akyem gold-digging industry in the 
Birem and Densu basins. A third route from Nsawam went 
westwards to Adeisu where it bifurcated, with one branch 
going northwards to Western Akyem via Asamankese and Akwatia 
and the other to Agona Swedru. The people of Nsawam 
could exploit the European trade on the Senya Breku-Winneba 
coast via Avona Swedru. A fourth trade route went eastwards 
to climb and descend the Akuapem hills and reach the 
Lower Volta region, in whose economy the Kotoku of Nsawam 
shared fully. The importance of this last route to 
Nsawam seems to have been second only to the one leading 
to the Ga coast.
For the economy of the Lower Volta district^ was
1. See Map No.8.
2. AKT: Adoagyiri.
3. T.B. Freeman's Report on a mission to Eastern Akyem in 
1857, dd. 28 December 1867, CO.96/43.
4. Cf. pp. 308 f. below.
5. The Lower Volta Region may be said to have roughly con­
sisted of the district falling within about forty miles 
on either side of the stretch of the Volta between its 
estuary at Ada and the point where the river Daji joins 
the Volta. See Map. 8.
508.
very prosperous during the second half of the nineteenth 
century.1 The prosperity of the region derived from 
agriculture and trade. Among the leading agricultural and
forest products exported from or via the district were
2 3 4cotton, palm oil, and to a less extent peanuts. Between
1858 and 1866 Krobo, perhaps the greatest producer of palm
oil in all Gold Coast during the second half of the nine­
teenth century, exported much of its produce via the Lower 
Volta and the Ada-Anlo coast, in an attempt to beat British 
monopoly and low prices for the commodity on the coast
between Accra and Prampram. So abundant was palm oil from
Krobo and Akuapem that the l86l season was described as 
"glorio us .Gu m copal from Akyem also reached the Ada-
Keta coast through Lower Volta for sale mainly to American 
7
merchant-men.1 Part of Akyem gold export would also go via 
the same channel.
1. For a detailed study of the Lower Volta economy see 
Reynolds. E., Trade and Economic Change on the Gold Coast 
1807-1874, N.U.P. 1974, especially ppTl4l-144 & 172".
2. Evidence of Rev. E. Shrenk before the 1865 British 
Parliamentary Select Committee, Br. P.P. (1865) Vol. 412 
pp. 136, 142 & 147; Ga Mantse Cudjoe Ababeo (Ada) to Lt.- 
Colonel Conran (CCC), 1 November 1866; Crozier, Chief Civil 
Commandant of the Eastern Districts (Accra) to Conran,
29 November 1866, CO.96/7 2; Horton, Letters, pp.75-6.
3 . The West African Herald, quoted by The London Times,
26 October l86l.
4. Ibid.
5 . F. Wolfson, "A Price Agreement on the Gold Coast. The Krobo 
Oil Boycott, 1858-1866," in Economic History Review, 2nd 
Series, Vol. 6 No. 1 (1953) PP« 68-77; Kimble, op. cit.
pp. 6 & 187-188; D.E.K. Amenumey, "Geraldo de Lima; A 
Reappraisal," in T.H.S.G. Vol. IX (1968) pp.68-9 .
6 . West African Herald, quoted by the London Times, 26 October 
1861.
7 . J. Mullerfs Report to Basel on a journey to Eastern Akyem 
in 1868, 11 March 1868, BMA-PJC.
These agricultural, forest and mineral products 
exported from or through the region turned the Lower Volta 
district into one big market of brisk international trade 
attracting both American and European ships. 1 The truth is 
that besides the commodities already mentioned, the region 
exported slaves in spite of the general abolition of the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade; Asante and the Lower Trans-
Volta states were the slave producers while South American
2merchantmen were the buyers. The other feature which made 
the "Volta” trade attractive was the non-existence of 
customs duties on the Ada-Keta coast.
African and European merchants resident in Accra 
and the Adangbe-Anlo coast found the Volta trade most 
attractive. The preponderant participation of the Accra 
merchants in the Volta trade emphasized its attractiveness 
to non-Voltaic peoples. States and peoples like Kwawu, 
Akuapem, Fante, Asante, and above all the Akyem, vied to get 
a share in the Volta trade, owing to the wide variety of 
European manufactured goods available in the trade. Akyem
1. The London Times, 26 October l86l.
2. Alfred Churchill to Colonial Office, 20 April 1863,
CO.96/63; R. Pine (CCC) to the Colonial Office, London,
9 November 1863, CO.96/62; African Times, 23 January lo64 
Amenumey, "Geraldo," THSG. Vol. IX pp. 63-6 8.
3* Memorials of Accra Merchants to Lt.-Colonel Conran, 31
January and 24 February 1866; Crozier to Conran, 5 December 
1866 CO.96/70. Prominent among the Accra merchants were 
Nicol Irwine of the firm Foster & Smith; F. & L. Swanzy, 
G.S.B. Hyall, William Morris, James and Charles Bannerman,
S. Brownwell, William P. Gunnel, N.H. Luterodt, William 
Addo, G.F. Cleland, Leberecht Hesse, and N.L. Rottmann of 
the trading wing of the Basel Mission in the Gold Coast. 
Geraldo de Lima, an Ewe, was the foremost of the merchants 
not residing in Accra. His bases were at Ada and Keta.
traders carried trade to and from the Trans-Volta states. 
Most avid among them were the Kotoku of Nsawam.1
But economic pursuits involved Nsawam in the 
inter-state conflicts which bedevilled the district as from 
1865, on account of trade rivalries and traditional tribal
animosities. The conflicts were very boisterous, and
2 3adversely affected trade in the region. In 1865 Geraldo*
seizure of twelve casks of palm oil being canoed down from
Kpong to Ada sparked off a dispute between him and the
people of Ada who eventually burnt down his shop and house;
he solicited support from Anlo, the traditional enemies of
Ada, and war broke out between the two.2* To eliminate
Geraldo!s stiff competition in the Volta trade, the Accra
merchants got the crew of H.M.S. Dart to bombard some of
the Anlo coastal towns; the Anlo countered with piracy on
the navigable stretch of the Volta between Ada and Kpong,
about sixty miles upstream. Kpong was then the greatest
collecting centre of the Volta trade. The object of the
piracy was to block the Volta as the major trade route for
the Accra merchants most of whom had business establishments
at Kpong, "the great emporium of the cotton t r a d e . I n  this
1. T.B. Freeman (Odumase-Krobo) to Ussher, 19 August 1867,
CO.96/79; Dodi Tradition, cited by Marion Johnson,
"Ashanti East of the Volta", in THSG. Vol. VIII (1965).
2. Reynolds, Trade & Economic Change, pp.143-^*
3 . The most recent and objective account on Geraldo de Lima is
that of Amenumey, in the THSG. Vol. IX (1968), already 
referred to. *
4. Memorials of the Accra Merchants to Conran, 31 January &
24 February 1866, CO.96/70; Amenumey, "Geraldo".
5. Horton, Letters, pp. 75-6.
exercise the Anlo were supported by Akwamu and Akwamu 
dependencies like Dafor and Volo.
Efforts of the British administration at Cape 
Coast Castle to solve the Volta conflict through military 
approach widened the area of conflict. In response to 
repeated appeals of the Accra merchants who represented 
Geraldo de Lima and the Anlo as saboteurs of the Volta 
trade and therefore enemies of British interests, 1 the 
administration of Lieutenant-Colonel Conran organised an 
armed expedition to the Lower Volta District in March-April 
1866. The sole object was to subdue the Anlo and Geraldo. 
Among the participants in the expedition were many of the 
Accra merchants themselves, Ga and Adangbe rulers, Akuapem, 
and the Kotoku of Nsawam led by Dompre.
Dompre!s love of military adventure is given as
the fundamental cause of the involvement of Nsawam in the 
2
expedition. The tradition of Adoagyiri says Dompre and 
some of his subjects had gone to trade in Accra where he 
learned about the projected expedition. Immediately he 
offered to fight for "Nkranhene Takyi” (i.e. Ga Mantse, 
Tackie), one of the three Ga rulers who had undertaken to 
lead the expedition. Dompre, no doubt, had better motives. 
Probably acquisition of firearms was one. To the Ga chiefs, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Conran issued about five thousand muskets 
and a large quantity of ammunition for use during the
1. Merchant Memorials, 21 January and 24 February 1866.
2. AKT: Adoagyiri.
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expedition. 1 To fight for the Ga rulers was a sure means
of obtaining some of the arms and ammunition. A much nobler
motive of Dompre*s, however, seems to have been his desire to
protect and preserve the share of Nsawam in the Volta trade.
In fact in 1867 he and his subjects emerged as a principal
party in the Volta conflict on account of their trade
2
interests in the area.
The details of the expedition need not detain us.^ 
that
Suffice it to say/it failed ultimately to achieve its aim of
clearing the Volta water-way in order to allow the smooth
4
flow of trade once more. There was no radical change in 
the situation up to 1868 even though by then diplomacy had 
enabled the British West African administration to reach 
peace agreement with the Anlo on two occasions, one in early 
1867 and the other in late 1868 .^
1. Conran to Quarter Master General, HM Forces, London,
8 March 1806; Conran to Cardwell, 10 March 1866, CO.96/70. 
Claridge (Vol. I p. 549) puts the figure at 1,200. He 
seems to have based his-figure on that of Mr. James 
Bannerman who gave the same number in a letter to Horton 
in 1869. Cf. Horton Letters p. 34 footnote.
2. Cf. pp. 313 f. below.
3. Claridge, Vol. I pp. 548-552; Ward, History, pp. 227-228.
4. Conran to Cardwell, 5 May 1866; Conran to the Accra 
merchants, 28 May; Conran to Blackall (Freetown) 9 June; 
Blackall to Colonial Office, 20 June 1866, Petition of 
Accra Merchants to Conran, 12 November 1866, CO.96/72.
5 . Blackall (Freetown) to Carnavon (CO), 6 May 1867, CO.96/74 ; 
Treaty Opening the-River Volta, 30 November i860, 
reproduced by Metcalfe, Documents, Appx. C, p. 7^6.
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The failure to resolve the Volta violence is 
attributed to Anlo inability to keep faith. 1 Another cause 
of the failure was the emergence, by 1867* of the Kotoku of
o
Nsawam as principal party in the conflict. Ussher*s
administration emphasized this point in September 1867 when
it described the presence in the Lower Volta District of
the Kotoku (Nsawam) army, led by Dompre, as a threat to
peace and responsible for the continued existence of the
Volta conflict.^
Efforts of Dompre to rescue about forty Nsawam
traders from the Dafor and Volo was the immediate cause of
the continued presence of the Kotoku (Nsawam) in the Volta 
4
area. The Dafor and Volo, inhabiting the banks of the
5
Volta south of Akuse, were a piratical set of people owing 
allegiance to Akwamu. In or about April 1867, they seized, 
on the orders of the Akwamuhene, about forty traders from 
Nsawam, robbed and detained them and even killed some of 
them. Probably this is the incident which Ward alludes to
1. Amenumey, "Geraldo", THSG. Vol. IX (1968) p. 71.
2. The determination of the Ga chiefs to achieve a military 
victory over the Anlo and thereby make amends to the failure 
of the 1866 expedition was yet another. For this, the 
administration at Cape Coast Castle, headed by Ussher, Conran’s 
successor, outlawed the Ga chiefs in mid-1867.
3* Ussher to Yonge (Freetown), 6 September 1867 CO.96/74.
4. By the end of 1867* the Ga rulers had withdrawn from the 
Volta district.
5 . Few miles south of present day Adomi bridge.
6 . T.B. Freeman (Odumase-Krobo) to Ussher (CCC), 19 August 1867, 
CO.96/79* Dodi tradition claims that the Kotoku traders got 
involved in a dispute over market tolls and the Kotokuhene 
sent Dompre to go and investigate. Cf. Marion Johnson in 
THSG. Vol. VIII p.44. This traditional evidence is not accep­
table because up to July 1867 when he died, Kotokuhene Agyeman 
was still not reconciled with Dompre following differences 
between them since i860.
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when he says that the Akwamu were "in the habit of way­
laying Akim Kotoku traders and robbing them. ”1 The 
maltreatment of the Nsawam traders was obviously Akwamu’s 
reprisal against Dompre for assisting the Ga-Adangme chiefs 
in the 1866 expedition against Anlo, Akwamu1s ally.
Eventually the measure backfired against the Dafor,
Volo and the Akwamu themselves. Dompre was a warrior chief
2
who would not let slip any opportunity to fight. Besides,
it was his duty to rescue his subjects. Ussher under-rated
this obligation of the Kotoku chief in his despatch of 6th
September when he said that a
"more important reason for the hostile attitude of 
the Doffoes /andJ/olo7 is the unnecessary and 
inconvenient armed presence of the Akim Captain 
Odum-Pira at Asuacharry.
Apparently Ussher was playing down the seriousness of the
situation for the benefit of his superior in Freetown.
That he was really concerned showed in his appointment, in
June 18679 of Mr. T.B. Freeman as chief Civil Commandant of
the Eastern Districts so that Freeman might use "his acknow-
4ledged tact to solve the Volta problem.
Though the Colonial Office did not ultimately 
approve of the appointment, before the disapproval arrived 
in the Gold Coast in or about November l86j,^ Freeman had
1. Ward, History, p. 2^0.
2. AKT: Adoagyiri.
3 . Odum-Pira » Dompre or Odompre; Asuacharry = Asutware.
4. Ussher to Yonge, 6 September 1867, CO.96/74.
5 . Buckingham (CO) to the Administrator-in-Chief (Freetown), 
18 November 1867, CO.96/74. The reason given was that - 
Freeman had been dismissed from the Gold Coast administra­
tion in i860 for gross misconduct. Cf. Chapter 7 P* 
above for details.
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made efforts to resolve the Volta conflict. He singled out
the Akyem Kotoku (Nsawam) factor as one of the two major
barriers impeding solution to the Volta problem. In this
frame of mind he immediately sent to ask Dompre and his
army to stop all hostility against the Dafor, Volo and
Akwamu, confine themselves to only a defensive measure, and
wait till they heard from the government again.'1' He followed
up words with work. He left Accra for Odumase, the Manya
Krobo capital, from where he, on 10th August, sent
messengers to invite Dompre, then at Asutware, to come and
confer with him at Odumase on the subject of the Volta 
2
conflict. Dompre declined the invitation for two reasons.
He said Odumase was a place he would scarcely visit because 
Odonkor Azu, Konor (King) of Manya Krobo, was intriguing 
with Akwamu against Kotoku (Msawam) interest; secondly he 
just could not leave Asutware, his base, because the Dafor 
and Volo were threatening him with an attack. Eventually 
Freeman had to go to Asutware in order to meet Dompre. He 
was accompanied by Rev. Zimmermann of the Basel Mission 
station at Odumase.
On 15th August he met Dompre formally. Dompre1s 
personality very much impressed Freeman. The Nsawam chief 
was "courteous and respectful." The diplomatic move paid 
off, at least in theory, for Dompre agreed in principle to 
leave the redress of his grievances against the Dafor, Volo
1. Freeman1s Report on a Mission to Akuapem and Krobo, 5 July 
1867, CO.96/74.
2. Freeman to Ussher, 19 August 1867, CO.96/74.
3. Ibid.
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and Akwamu in the hands of the government, and suspend all 
his military operations. 1
Part of the solution of the Volta conflict of 
course lay in Akwamu. Dompre!s conciliatory attitude
encouraged Freeman to turn to Kwafo Akoto, the Akwamuhene.
?
Again accompanied by Rev. Zimmermann and Mr. Rotmann,
Freeman went to Akwamufie on 28th August, and succeeded in 
talking the Akwamuhene into signing ”a Treaty of Amityn and
a
commerce with the government.
Ussher was elated at Freeman*s success with Dompre 
of Nsawam and the Akwamu. The end to the Volta problem, he 
said in his letter of 6th September already cited, was now 
in sight:
**The only matter now remaining which gives me 
some uneasiness is the probable correctness of 
the rumours of the death of Quaquoe Dooah, King 
of Ashantee. Should this really prove to be the 
case, I fear that his successor will be easily 
led by the war party of Ashantee to commit acts 
of aggression on the Protectorate, unless this 
Government, by a mixture of firmness and 
conciliation, can avert the blow.”
In reality Freeman*s success had come too late to be lasting.
On account of the armed Kotoku presence in the Lower Volta
district, Akwamu and Anlo had long sent to ask for Asante
2l
military assistance. Only the death of the Asantehene in 
May 1867 had prevented Asante from immediately responding
1 . Freeman to Ussher, 19 August 1867, CO.96/7^*
2. See p. 309 n.3 above for his identity.
3 . "Treaty of Amity”, 28 August 1867, CO.96/74; also reproduced 
by Metcalfe, Documents, p. 7^6.
A. Freeman to Ussher, 19 August 1867, CO.96/74; cf. also 
Wilks, Asante, pp. 224-5*
favourably to the Akwamu-Anlo appeal. In anticipation of 
the impending help from Asante, Akwamu did not urge the 
Dafor and Volo to release the Kotoku traders held in 
detention by them. Consequently Dompre was obliged to renew 
hostilities as from September 1867. Up to June 1868 when 
Ussher went on leave, the Volta conflict still remained 
unresolved. 1 The problem remained for his stand-in, Mr. 
Simpson, acting as Administrator, to attempt a solution to 
it, as best he could.
Simpson emphasized the seriousness of the situation
in September 1868 when he declared that the Eastern Districts
(by which he included the Lower Volta District) required
greater attention than they had hitherto received because
they were in a very unsettled state: the trade routes were
closed and the whole navigable stretch of the Volta had
been blocked by the ceaseless and "petty hostilities" among
2the inhabitants occupying both banks of the river.
To describe the hostilities as petty was an under­
statement. By 1868 the conflict had increased in scope and 
intensity. The Kotoku of Nsawam had struck an alliance 
with Krepi in reply to the Akwamu-Anlo-Dafor-Volo one. No 
wonder that the Kennedy Peace Treaty of November 1868 with 
Anlo^ failed to end hostilities. The armed presence of the 
Kotoku (Nsawam) as a key factor in the Volta conflict was 
emphasized in December 1868 when the Anlo bitterly complained
1. Ussher to Freetown, 5 December 1867* CO.96/7k; same to 
same; 6 February 1868, CO.96/76 .
2. Simpson (CCC) to Sir Arthur Kennedy, 5 September 1868,
co.96/79.
3 . See p. 316 n.3above.
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against what they described as the excesses of the Akyem 
Kotoku army "under Odumpeley.nl By excesses the Anlo no
doubt were referring to Dompre1s seizure and execution of
2
two Anlo ambassadors returning from a mission to Kuraasi.
They and Akwamu must have renewed the appeal to Kumasi for 
military aid against Dompre, for by the early months of 1869 
an Asante army of about five thousand, under the command of 
Asamoa Nkwanta, had arrived in the Lower Volta district to 
assist the Akwamu-Anlo alliance against the Kotoku (Nsawam) - 
Krepi alliance headed by Dompre. Thus the view that in
1869 Asante invaded Krepi to acquire booty needs to be
k
revised. The Akwamu remember very well that they 
solicited Asante support against Dompre. It is clear that 
old enmity with Kotoku partly inspired the favourable Asante 
response to the Akwamu-Anlo invitation. The request offered 
Asante an opportunity to meet and if possible defeat an 
Akyem Kotoku army, no matter how less representative it 
was, and thus square matters with Kotoku at whose hands 
Asante had suffered two defeats, one in i860 and the other
1. Lawson (Accra) to Kennedy (Freetown), 17 December 1868, 
CO.96/79* Lawson was left by Kennedy in the Volta 
district in November to complete the peace agreement with 
Anlo.
2. D.E.K. Amenumey, 1964 M.A. Thesis (unpublished) pp. 182-3.
3* Simpson to Kennedy, 22nd March 1869* 00.96/79* Other 
sources say that the command was given to Nantwi. Cf. 
Ramseyer,F.A. and Kuhne, J., Four Years in Ashantee,
London 1897, pp. 57 & 136; Ward, history, p. 241; Wilks, 
Asante, p. 225*
4. Ellis (1893)* P* 260; Claridge, Vol. I, p. 576; Kimble, 
op. cit. p.-269.
5. Akwamu Tradition, cited by Ward, History, p. 230.
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in 1863.1 To protect its commercial interest in the Lower 
Volta district was possibly another Asante aim. By 1869 
then the scope of the Volta conflict, still sustained by 
economic interests and traditional antagonisms, had widened 
to include not only Ada and Anlo, but also Akwamu and Krepi 
as well as Asante and Akyem Kotoku (Nsawam). What Ussher 
had anticipated in 1867 thus happened in 1869.
The Kotoku-Krepi alliance, headed by Dompre, met 
the formidable force of the enemy alliance in early 1869.
2
The Asante force, as already noted, was about five thousand.
The strength of Akwamu is not known, but the Anlo force
numbered about six hundred, all armed with guns. The
strength of Krepi is also not known; but the Kotoku force
4
under Dompre consisted of about four hundred soldiers.
By March 1869 two major battles had taken place. The
importance of the Kotoku factor was again emphasized in
March 1869 when Simpson, commenting on the war, said that
in the two battles, the Krepi obtained
f,the powerful assistance of Domprey, an Akim 
Captain who had come to Crepee for the purpose of 
obtaining satisfaction from the Aquamoos for some 
property of his countrymen which /the Akwamu/ had
plundered them of whilst peaceably trading .....
This man is undoubtedly the leading spirit of these 
districts; his name is a terror even to the Ashantees 
themselves; and he has shown qualities which serve 
to indicate him as a man of remarkable energy, talent, 
and daring courage  He alone, unaided, at the
1. See Chapter 7pp*2^9-251 and Chapter 8pp.283-283 above.
2. Cf. p. 318 above.
3. Zimmermann (Odumase-Krobo) to Shrenk (Akropon, Akuapem),
17 May 1869, cited in Shrenk to Russell, Chief Civil 
Commandant of the Eastern Districts, 21 May 1869* CO.96/8 0.
4. Simpson to Kennedy, 2nd March 1869# CO.96/79*
head of 400 followers, has defeated the Aquamoos 
in two engagements against great odds, and at present 
is the barrier to a general subjection of Crepee by 
the Ashantees. W1
Simpson initially thought of using diplomacy to 
try and resolve the Volta conflict, as Blackall and Freeman 
in 1867 and Kennedy in 1868 had attempted to do. He felt 
that Akwamu was the key factor. Consequently in the last 
days of February 1869 he journeyed to Akwamufie in order to 
effect a peace settlement with those people. After a 
protracted discussion lasting five days during which he 
said he was virtually a prisoner of the Akwamu, he
2
succeeded in signing a peace treaty with the Akwamuhene.
But he knew right from his arrival at Akwamufie on 1st March 
that diplomacy as a means of resolving the Volta problem was 
doomed to failure owing to "the omnious presence of the 
Ashantees” in the area.^
This realisation, together with his awareness of 
Domprefs qualities as a first class soldier, made Simpson 
decide on using military approach to resolve the conflict.
1. Simpson to Kennedy, 22 March 1869, CO.96/79*
2. Simpson (Akwamufie) to Kennedy, 2 March 1869* CO.96/79*
It is claimed that-the Akwamu would have killed him 
but for the intervention of Adu Bofuo, commander of 
the Asante forces in the Lower Volta district. (Cf. 
Claridge Vol. I p. 579; Ward, History, p. 242). It 
must be pointed out that by March 1869, Adu Bofuo had 
not as yet arrived in the area. He arrived there in May 
(cf. p. 323 below). It must have been Asamoa Nkwanta 
then who interceded to save him if indeed Simpson’s life
was in danger. One is inclined to think that this was a
piece of exaggeration by Simpson.
3* Simpson to Kennedy, 2 March 1869* CO.96/79*
To him Dompre was the right means. This plan matured on 
8th March 1869 when he, in a strongly worded letter, 
requested Kofi Karikari, the new Asantehene, to withdraw 
Asamoa Nkwanta’s army immediately from the Lower Volta 
District, or he Simpson would not hesitate to give material 
support to the Krepi in defence of their country. 1 In 
anticipation 6f the refusal of the Asante Court to comply 
with this request, Simpson signed on Dompre and his small 
Kotoku force against the enemy. Thus by early 1869 Dompre, 
whom, barely two years ago, the administration had described 
as a disturber of peace, had emerged as a soldier, in the 
employ of the government, charged with the pacification of 
the Lower Volta region.
To help Dompre achieve success Simpson tried to 
rally support from other parts of the Eastern Districts. He 
began to mobilize the Ga to go to the aid of Dompre. He 
also tried togst Eastern Akyem to help. To Abuakwahene 
Amoako Atta I, described as the bravest, staunchest and the 
most determined foe of Asante, he sent a gift of £100.00 
sterling and a consignment of arms and ammunition and the 
message that the government relied on his loyalty to the 
British Crown and welfare of the Protectorate to render every
1. Simpson (Odumase-Krobo) to Asantehene, 8 March 1869* oopy* 
enclosed in Simpson to-Kennedy 22 March 1869 CO.96/79*
2. Simpson (Odumase-Krobo) to "Domprey, commanding the Ackim 
Forces," 8 March 1869*-CO.96/79*
3* Simpson (Accra) to Kennedy, 22 March 1869, CO.96/79; 
Horton, Letters, pp. 36-7 footnote.
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assistance "in your power" to oppose the enemy. 1
Dompre’s employment as a government soldier,
however, did not last long because the Administrator-in-
Chief of the British West African possessions as well as the
Colonial Office did not approve of the military approach
2
adopted by Simpson to resolve the Volta question. By June 
Simpson had reversed his policy and discontinued sending 
war stores to "Domprey and his Akim army."^
Dompre was left in the lurch, as it were.
Simpson’s bellicosity, as spelt out in his 8th March letter 
to the Asantehene, and preparations for armed confrontation, 
together with Dompre’s successes against Asamoa Nkwanta, had
1. Simpson (Odumase-Krobo) to "King Attah, Ackim," 8 March 
1869, CO.96/79* Cf. also Kromer (Kyebi) to Basel, 28 
July 1869* No. Akim 9 and 7 October 1869# No. Akim 15; 
Lodholtz (Kyebi) to Mader (Akropon, Akuapem), 9 August 
1869, No. Akim 11, BMA-PJC.
2 . Kennedy (Freetown) to Simpson, 7 April 1869# CO.96/79; 
Granville (CO) to Kennedy (Freetown) 17 May 1869, CO.96/79; 
Metcalfe, Documents, pp. 326-32 8. Kennedy in his 7 April 
letter wrote: "Whatever may have been the result of your 
negotiations with the King of Ashantee, I am averse to 
your committing the Government to affording any material 
aid /to the Krepi etc^ as long as the belligerents 
confine themselves to the distant district of Crepee."
And Granville in his letter of 17th May said Simpson "had 
adopted a very hazardous cause without a clear apprehension 
of the facts or a just calculation of his powers, a 
serious error in an officer occupying so responsible a 
position." His measures, Granville added, "would make 
the British Government not a neutral, nor even an ally, 
but a principal in the quarrel /conflict/" and that the 
defeat of the Akyem Kotoku-Krepi alliance would be "the 
defeat or ill success of the British government. If he 
/Simpson/ were a less efficient and zealous public servant, 
I should have therefore thought it necessary to recall
commission  I refrain, however, from doing so,
in the confident hope that he will loyally dispel the 
illusions his vows must have created, and that his know­
ledge of native character will enable him to retain that 
influence which this untoward affair must no doubt impair."
3 . Simpson to Kennedy, 19 June 1869, CO.96/79*
so angered the Asantehene that in or about May 1869 he sent 
a much larger force of fifteen thousand, under Adu Bofuo, to 
go and assist the Akwamu and Anlo. 1
The arrival of the Adu Bofuo reinforcement increased
the enemy opposition to Dompre. By May 1869 he was fighting
against great odds. Numerically his own Kotoku force of four
hundred must have thinned down, and Krepi could not have
provided any great force, though there is no means of telling
their strength with confidence. Besides, he seems to have
run out of war stores. Before the disapproval of his policy
reached him in May, Simpson had detailed Oben Daako, the
younger brother of Dompre, to convey a consignment of war
2
stores to Dompre. But when Oben Daako arrived at Barto on 
the Volta, Domprefs position had been surrounded by the 
enemy.^ On 23rd May Dompre reported that he had had to
1. Rev. Zimmerman (Odumase-Krobo) to Ellias Shrenk (Akropon), 
17 May; Simpson to Kennedy, 20 May; Shrenk to Russell, 
Civil Commandant of the Eastern Districts (Accra), 21 May 
1869# CO.96/80; King and chiefs of Ada to Russell, 7 
October 1869, CO.96/8 1. Other writers give 20,000-30,000, 
as the strength of Adu Bofuofs force. The present author 
has found no contemporary evidence to support the view 
that the army under Adu Bofuo formed the eastern-most 
column of a three-point impending Asante invasion of the 
Protectorate. Cf. Ellis (1893) P* 260; Claridge, Vol. I 
p. 276; Ward, History, p. 241.- The only pieces of 
contemporary evidence nearest to this view are (a) the 
false and alarmist interpretation which Ada Chiefs put on 
Adu Bofuofs movements (Cf. King Dosu, Ada, to Russell,
30 August 1869; Dosu to Simpson, 7 October 1869, CO.96/8 1); 
and also a false alarm from Elmina Castle (cf. Colonel 
Boers to Simpson, 8 April 1869, enclosed in Simpson to 
Kennedy, 9 April 1869, CO.96/79*)
2. Simpson to Kennedy, 20 May 1869, CO.96/79*
3* Oben Daako (Barto) to Russell (Accra), 6 June 1869
co.96/8 0. - . *
beat a retreat before the enemy on account of the numerical
inferiority of his army, and requested that the Administration
should send him express reinforcement.'1' On 21st June he
sent out another appeal for help in which he reported the
fall of the town of Anum and the capture, by the Asante, of
the Basel missionary Ramseyer, his wife and baby, and his
2
colleague Kuhne.
In spite of very great disadvantages, Dompre
fought on bravely, disputing every inch of ground with the
enemy. But this could not go on indefinitely. The enemy
pressed in on him. In August he sensed that the end was
not far, and informed Mr. Addo, an Accra merchant for the
benefit of the Protectorate Government that
"the Ashantees and Aquamoos /ha.ve/ fought me and 
the whole of the Crapees three times, and have 
driven us to Avarteam /Avatime7 on top some hill 
- I beg therefore on the receipt of this /letter/ 
you may be kind enough to tell the Governor and 
the Kings of Accra to send me immediate assistance 
to protect me and the whole /of/ Crapee otherwise 
the land fpt/ Crapees is going to be taken by the 
Ashantees^";
he added that the Krepi were contemplating to sue for peace
■3
by handing him over to the enemy.
It is clear from all these messages that Dompre 
at this time regarded himself as nothing but a soldier in
1. Dompre ( 11 Afframay Camp") to Russell (Accra), 23 May 1869
co.96/80.
2. Dompre ("Jorkpee, Crepee") to Russell (Accra), 21 June.
Cf. also same to same. 26*June; Windmann (Akropon-Akuapem) 
to Russell, 29 June I869 CO.96/8 0.
3 . Dompre ("Agoteam" i.e. Agotime) to Mr. Addo, 27 August 
18693 CO * 96/8 1. Mr. Addo was one of the well known 
African merchants of Accra with business connections in 
the lower Volta area.
the employ of the British administration, defending Krepi 
which he felt was under British jurisdiction. At least the 
actions of Simpson had led him to regard Krepi as British 
territory. It was therefore unfair for Simpson to say on 
l6th July 1869 that Dompre had been foolish because he had 
not been asked to defend Krepi but to station himself at 
Barto on the Volta and that Dompre should blame himself if
the enemy was closing in on him . 1 Worse, Simpson accused
Dompre of selfishness:
’’The Ashantees say that they fight only 
against Domprey, and not against the British 
Government. Is this, as I suspect, on account of 
the old palaver between them and Adjeman? If so, 
how can he expect me to follow him wherever he
chooses to go - I am no friends with Ashantee,
but neither can I justify to support one who
leaves the Protectorate for selfish purposes of 
his own and seeks to fight over my shoulders his 
own independent quarrels. ”2
Simpson was absolutely correct in thinking that old enmity 
between Kotoku and Asante partly accounted for the involve­
ment of both in the Volta conflict. But he just could not 
deny his own responsibility in getting Dompre thus far in the 
current predicament for which he was now blaming the Nsawam 
chief. Simpson was too honest a man to shirk responsibility, 
and had to admit that the implied refusal to continue to 
support Dompre was due to the disapproval of his measures 
by Freetown and the Colonial Office:
’Domprey is a good soldier if not a good 
citizen, and I would gladly have made use of him 
to increase the defensive strength of the 
Protectorate. The state of the country is 
deplorable enough, but unless I can satisfy my
1. Simpson to Oben Daako (Barto), 16 July l869> CO.96/80, 
copy.
2. Simpson to Oben Daako, 16 July 1869* CO.96/8 0.
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Government in Great Britain that we are in the 
right, I risk my own position by offering aid to 
your brother.’^
This then was how confused British policy on lower Volta
pushed the Akyem Kotoku Chief Dompre into war with an
Akwamu-Anlo-Asante Alliance only to leave him in the lurch.
Many historical accounts on the Gold Coast are replete with
accusations, against the states and peoples, of barbarism,
and a love for wars. There were occasions when European
over-rule was responsible for some of the wars.
Deserted by the Administration in the thick of the
war, Dompre and his small Akyem army had to battle with the
formidable enemy as best they could. He became the main
target of the enemy alliance. Asantehene Kofi Karikari
resolved that either the British should give up Dompre or
o
"else he will catch him at any price." It was proof of 
Domprefs prowess that in spite of the great odds against 
him he continued to give stiff opposition to the powerful 
Asante army under Adu Bofuo.
Domprefs plight created a sense of unity in the 
entire Protectorate. Many recognized him as a patriot of 
the Protectorate. His predicament, the capture of the Basel 
Missionaries of Anum by Adu Bofuo, and the false but widespread 
alarm that Adu Bofuo intended to invade the Ga-Adangbe district 
after subjugating Krepi, aroused the entire Protectorate to 
assist Dompre in one way or another. The new Kotokuhene, 
Kwabena Fua, sent reinforcement to him, in spite of the
1. Simpson to Oben Daako, 16 July 1869* CO.96/80.
2. Zimmermann (Odumase-Krobo) to Shrenk (Akropon), 17 May 
1869 CO.96/80 copy, Cf. also Lodholtz (Kyebi)-to Basel, 
4 September I869 No. Akim 13, BMA-PJC.
Administration's refusal to supply this reinforcement with 
war stores. 1 Thus by his action the new Kotokuhene healed 
the nine-year old breach which had existed between the
o
Ankobea Division and the Kotoku Court since i860.
Abuakwahene Amoako Atta I also raised a force of 5*000 strong
•3
to go to the aid of Dompre. Though this array eventually 
did not reach the trans-Volta, Amoako Atta’s gesture went a 
long way to improving Kotoku-Abuakwa relations which had 
become strained since 1860 .^  For just a year later (1870) 
representatives of the two Akyem states met at the Abuakwa 
town of Akaanten to perform a ceremony formally marking the
R
end of the strained relations.-^ Under the aegis of the
Mankesim Council^ Assin and Fante showed moral support by
tightening up the hitherto loose blockade of the Cape
7
Coast - Kumasi trade route against Asante. A group of 
scholars describing themselves as "Accra Gentlemen" took 
umbrage at Simpson’s description of Dompre as a marauder.
1. King Ghartey (Winneba) to Simpson (CCC) 5 July; Simpson 
to Ghartey, 6 August;- Simpson to Kennedy (SL), 7 August 
1869 (CO.96/81). King Ghartey was then President of the 
Mankesim Council which had emerged in Fante to oppose 
the 1867/8 Anglo-Dutch exchange of spheres of influence.
2. See Chapter 8 pp. 266-7 above.
5 . Simpson (CCC) to Kennedy (SL), 7 August and 30 October 
1869 CO.96/8 1.
4. See Chapter 7 above.
5. Lodholtz (Kyebi) to Basel, 5 January 1871 No. Akim 19 
(BMA-PJC). Cf.-also pp. 255-6 above.
6 . Alias the Fante Confederation.
7. Simpson to Kennedy, 7 August 1869 (CO.96/81).
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They not only rejected the epithet as unfair but also
declared Dompre as a devoted patriot who
"is really playing a very important part in the
preservation of the Protectorate ...... It is
essentially owing to the recent movements of 
Domprey that the Ashantees have hitherto been 
prevented from making further progress.
In appreciation of Dompre*s achievements the Ga set up a
committee charged with raising funds and a force to assist
p
the patriotic Akyem Kotoku army under him. He even seems
to have received at least moral support from the well known
■3
Dante Oracle at Krachi. In short, as Simpson himself put
it in October 1869# **the whole of the Eastern Districts were
in arms against Ashantee. What may have partly engendered
this universal and enthusiastic outburst of support, material
or moral, for Dompre was his signal victory over the Asante-
Akwamu forces in a battle fought at the rocky hill of Gemi
in the Amedzofe neighbourhood, in October 1869 .^  Before
this spontaneous moral and material support could reach
Dompre he had fought gallantly and managed to reach the
Western bank of the Volta with the remnant of his small Akyem 
6army.
1. **Accra Gentlemen" (possibly the African educated elite) to 
Simpson, 31 August 1869 CO.96/8 1.
2. "Accra Educated Natives" to Simpson, 14 August; Simpson to 
Captain Lees (Accra), 21 August 1869 CO.96 /81 Captain Lees 
was then the Commandant of the Eastern Districts.
3. Marion Johnson, in Bulletin defInstitute, p. 49.
4. Simpson to Kennedy (SL), 3 October 1869 No. 117; cf* also 
same to same, 18 October 1869 No. 124; Zimmermann (Odumase 
Krobo) to Simpson, 22 October 1869 CO.96/8 1.
5 . Claridge Vol. I p. 595; Ward, History, p. 26 5.
6 . Captain Lees (Accra) to Ussher (CCC), 16 December 1869 
CO.96/84. Ussher had returned from-Leave.
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Ussher had then resumed duty as Administrator at
Cape Coast Castle. He regretted DompreTs withdrawal from
the Lower trans-Volta. The basis of Ussherfs regret was a
change of heart in Freetown and the Colonial Office. It had
at last dawned on them that the military solution which
Simpson had advocated was after all the best method to
resolve the Volta Question. Ussher had therefore hoped to
renew the governmental aid to Dompre, as soon as practicable.
Domprefs departure from the Lower trans-Volta, he feared,
might inspire Asante not only to subdue but to occupy the
whole of Krepi.^ The military approach was now all the
more desirable because Geraldo de Lima had renewed or was
2just about to renew his hostilities from Anlo. Ussher 
determined to salvage the deplorable situation by quickly 
signing on Dompre, once again, as a government soldier. 
Besides a small contingent from the West India Regiment, 
Ussher got the Ga Chiefs and the merchants in Accra to 
raise a force for an armed expedition into the Lower Volta 
basin; he next invited support from the British establish­
ment in Lagos INigeriaJ from where came the gun-boat HMS Eyo 
with troops under the command of Captain Glover. Together 
with Glover and the entire regular and indigenous forces, 
Ussher, in May 1870, sailed up the Volta to Barto with a
view to consulting Dompre, without whose advice he would not
3
proceed further with the armed expedition. Both he and
1. Ussher (CCC) to Kennedy (SL). 17 January No. 33 and H  
February 1870 No. 37, CO.96/84.
2. Geraldo de Lima (wVosveH) to Mr. Addo (Accra), 4 April 1870,
enclosed in Ussher to Kennedy, 6 April 1870 CO.96/84.
3 . Ussherfs full Report, on the Expedition, to Kennedy, 8 July
1870 No. 90 CO.96/8 5. Published in part in Metcalfe,
Documents pp.329-30. Captain Glover was the Administrator 
of the British Lagos establishment.
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Glover found Dompre
”a competent man, and moreover most loyal to H.M. 
Government. The remarkable absence of ostentation 
and marked deference paid him to the position of
the Kings did not fail to impress me with a high
idea of him ....”^
In spite of the recent British betrayal, Dompre had no hard
feelings against the British administration. He was still
prepared to co-operate with it in an effort to find peace
for trouble-tom Lower Volta basin. On 30 May 1870 he and
Ussher signed a convention. The Convention stipulated that
Domprey should
,fl. Charge himself with the defence of the left 
or eastern bank of the Volta; keeping open the 
communications for trade, with the duty of 
repelling, to the best of his ability, attacks 
from hostile tribes in the trans-Volta Districts.
2. That he receive instructions either from the 
Administrator direct, or through the Civil Commandant 
of Accra, and from none other. Should any inter­
ference be tempted by other Chiefs to report at
once to the Commandant.
3. To use every means in his power to protect
and keep open trade and communication in the Volta, 
and neither on his own behalf, nor on that of any 
other person, to permit toll or imposts to be 
levied on persons, merchandize or produce ascending 
or descending the river.
4. To confine his operations, us well as may be, 
strictly to the defence of his country and that of 
his allies, and to neglect no means to effect a 
permanent peace, and not to refuse to accept the 
submission of hostile tribes or bodies. He will, 
above all, refrain, by any ill advised measures, 
from prolonging the war, in the interest of 
selfish and disaffected persons.
5. In consideration of the faithful discharge of 
these conditions, and of his general desire to 
promote the welfare and foster the trade of the 
River Volta and the Eastern Districts, Domprey 
shall receive from Her Majesty’s Colonial 
Government of the Gold Coast settlements, the sum 
of two hundred pounds sterling /£200 .007 per annum, 
paid quarterly in advance, in addition to such 
assistance from time to time in munitions of war 
and general necessities, as to the Officer 
administering the said Government shall deem fit.
1. Ussher’s full Report, on the Expedition, to Kennedy, 8 July 
1870 No. 90 CO.96/8 5.
6 . It shall be lawful to the said Administrator, 
for misconduct or disobedience of instructions on 
Domprey's part, or for any other cause, to suspend 
for a time or permanently to discontinue the 
stipend and assistance above-mentioned to be 
given to Domprey.
7. It is to be understood by Domprey that in the 
event of a permanent peace being established by 
his aid, and by his obedience to the policy of 
the Gold Coast Government, his position at the 
close of the disturbances in the Eastern Districts 
shall, if possible, be better than before - and 
that in any case, the stipend of (£200) two hundred 
pounds sterling per annum, shall not be discontinued, 
in consideration of certain future services to be 
rendered by Domprey to the Government in protecting 
the interests of the Government in the Eastern 
Districts and River Volta.
8 . This agreement to be subject to the approval 
of the Legislative Council of Cape Coast and of 
the Govemor-in-Chief of the West African Settle­
ments. ^
Ussher signed for the government and Dompre, on 
his own behalf, put his mark to it. Those who witnessed to 
it were Captain W.J. Ross, the Acting Civil Commandant of 
the Eastern Districts, Dr. Thomas Jones of HMS Eyo and 
Messrs. Lebrecht Hesse, Edmund Bannerman and William Addo.
Dompre, Ussher, and Glover then laid immediate 
plans to implement the first Clause of the Convention. The 
immediate concern was to subdue the Dafo and Volo completely 
in order to allow the smooth flow of trade on the Volta.
Dompre would then be left to defend the Volta waterway and 
protect allies in trans-Volta against enemy attacks. The 
Dafo and Volo had the solid support of the Asante army 
under Adu Bofuo, Akwamu and Anlo. On 19th June the allies 
moved in on the enemy, with Dompre directing land operations
1. ’’Convention between His Excellency Herbert Taylor Ussher, 
Administrator of the Gold Coast Settlements, and Domprey, 
Commanding the Allied Accra and other Forces Defending 
the Eastern Districts and the Trans-Volta Districts,”
31 May 1870 (at ”Battoh”), CO.96/85, 1870 Vol. 2).
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whilst Captain Glover took charge of the marine manoeuvres
of the gun-boat, HMS Eyo. The Battle of the Volta began
at 1 p.m. the same day, and in about two hours it was all
over. Dompre and his land forces rushed in under the cover
of the guns of HMS Eyo. The enemy put up a stiff opposition
at the initial stages but was compelled to give in to the
heavy onslaught from land and mid-stream. The carnage must
have been horrifying. Ussher reported that of the fighting
men of the Dafo and Volo not a man escaped. 1 Glover was
more informative. According to him an Asante Captain, an
Akwamu Chief, and all their followers, when they saw that
the day was lost, "blew themselves up; of the men of Duffo
and Voloe none remained;" and about three hundred of these
2
people, mainly women and children, were taken captive.
So horrifying was the carnage that the Colonial Office
queried the British West African administration for
allowing the Gold Coast Administration to wage the war, in
the first instance. The losses of the Allies were put at
"a few dead;" and a few wounded whom Dr. Jones of SS Eyo
4
successfully treated.
1. Ussher (HMS Eyo on Volta) to Kennedy (SL), 22 June 1870
co.96/85. - . •
2. Capt. Glover (HMS Eyo on Volta) to Kennedy, 22 June 1870
co.96/85.
3. Metcalfe, Documents, p. 330. The Colonial Office had only 
stipulated a demonstration and not a hot war.
4. Ussher to Kennedy, 22 June 1870 CO.96/85. It is possible
that Ussher and Glover exaggerated their account of the
battle. Winwoode Reade, a British journalist who personally 
witnessed the Battle of the Volta suggests that only about 
thirty men, captained by an Asante chief, manned the island. 
Cf. African Sketch-Book, London, 1873, Vol. II, pp. 129-131; 
Claridge Vol. I p. 607. Claridge also gives the impression 
that it was the Ga alone who combined with the Hausa soldiers 
from Lagos to fight the Battle of the Volta.
Both Ussher and Glover were elated at the outcome 
of the expedition, and Ussher enthused that at long last the 
end to the Volta conflict was in sight. The indigenous 
allied forces clamoured for a direct invasion of Akwamu 
itself. The rationale behind the request for a direct 
invasion of Akwamu was that the enemy now had his back to 
the wall, having retreated into Akwamu, apparently to re­
assess the turn of events. Had the allies followed up the 
Battle of the Volta with an attack on Akwamu, the Akwamu- 
Anlo-Assante Alliance would have probably suffered a crushing 
defeat. Peace would have been restored completely to the 
Lower Volta. But Ussher and Glover thought the victory at 
the Battle of the Volta was enough to do this. Consequently 
on 27th June 1870 both men embarked on the Eyo for Accra, 
leaving Dompre to begin his role as a frontier policeman. 1
The failure of the Allies to invade Akwamu 
itself allowed the Asante army, rather what was left of it, 
to linger on in the trans-Volta area, though it no longer 
had venom.
Paradoxically the success of the Volta expedition 
proved fairly disastrous for the Akyem Kotoku army in 
particular and the Eastern Districts in general. Petty 
internal jealousies among the Allies soon destroyed their 
sense of unity, proved a barrier to Dompre in his role as 
a frontier policeman, and eventually claimed his life barely 
a month after the expedition. One piece of contemporary 
evidence shows that Dompre was killed in a battle apparently 
against the enemy.^ Writing in 1925* Welman was inclined to
1. Ussher (CCC) to Kennedy (SL), 4 July 1870 CO.96/8 5.
2. Kennedy (SL) to Kimberly (CO), 3 August 1870, GC No. 77*
co.96/8 5. -
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support this view, saying ,fAdu Boffo succeeded in defeating 
Dompre who met his death in battle in November or December
1870 at Afaotia” A Kotoku Stool tradition says it was the
2Ga who assassinated Dompre. A Krepi tradition asserts that
■5
Dompre was ambushed by the Akwamu. The assassination 
theory suggested by the two traditions seems to be nearer 
the truth. The Asante never claimed at that time, or after, 
that they defeated and killed Dompre in a battle. It is 
significant that both the African Times and the West African 
Herald, the latter an Accra newspaper, fully commented on 
what they called the untimely death of Dompre but failed, 
perhaps deliberately refused, to give details of the manner 
by which the Kotoku warrior chief came to meet his death. 
There is reason to believe that the Adoagyiri tradition, 
however biased it may seem, is nearest to the truth.
Ussher himself was suspicious of ,!the hot-headed and silly 
Chief of Accra, King Tackle” for ”if any mischief arises, 
it will be from him”, because he was a dangerous man and 
must not be trusted.^ Ussherfs opinion of Ga Mantse Tackie 
ties in well with the assassination theory. The Adoagyiri 
tradition remembers very well that it was ”Nkranhene Takyi
1. Welman, C.W. The Native States of the Gold Coast (London 
1925) p. 14.
2. AKT: Adoagyiri (1968/9). Cf. also Claridge, Vol. I
p. 607.
5. Claridge Vol. Ip. 613 n.
4. African Times, 24 October 1870; West African Herald,
31 March 1871.
3. Ussher (CCC) to Kennedy, 8 July 1870, CO.96/8 5. This 
source is reproduced in parts by Metcalfe, Documents,
No. 271 pp. 329-330.
(i.e. Tackie, the King of Accra) who bribed Dompre's wife, 
a Ga, to show how Dompre could be killed, since he seemed 
to possess a body that was bullet-proof.1 There is a 
proverb in Akan - and probably in Ga too - which says 
literally that no one’s walking stick is taller than him­
self. Dompre was a subordinate Akyem Kotoku chief whom the 
Ga had initially employed as a mercenary soldier. By 
signing the Convention of 31 May 1870 with him, Ussher had 
unwittingly elevated Dompre above his superiors. This 
obviously hurt not only the status and the personal pride 
of the Ga Mantse but also the ethnic feelings of the Ga 
people. It is reasonable to imagine the Ga, especially 
King Tackie, contriving Dompre*s death. The conflict which
subsequently developed between Kotoku and the Ga seems to
2
point out that the Ga were the assassins.
British reaction to the news of Dompre's death 
a
was sadness and/sense of loss as testified by the tributes
they paid to the memory of that great Kotoku warrior chief.
Kennedy, the Administrator-in-Chief of the British West
African Settlements, thought
"the subsidy........promised to Domprey was a
judicious outlay to a tried and influential man 
who would have acted as a Frontier Police, and 
would have had an interest in keeping peace.
This war-chief who had just established a 
character for courage and loyalty has unhappily 
lost his life in a skirmish, being the only man 
of his party, killed or wounded.
1. The tradition thus puts Dompre at par with Achilles of 
Greek mythology because the Kotoku warrior, like his Greek 
counterpart, could only be killed when shot at the heels.
2. See p. 337 below.
3. Kennedy to Kimberley (CO), 3 August 1870 GC No. 77*CO.96/8 5. 
The last bit of Kennedy's observation tends to reinforce 
the assassination theory.
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Ussher was not outdone in the tribute paying exercise. He
later presented to Oben Daako, Dompre's brother and
successor, a marble plaque with the single inscription
"DOMPREY" written on it.1 These tributes were as they
should be. Dompre was a dedicated collaborator with the
British in their efforts to establish colonial rule in
southern Gold Coast.
Dompre's untimely death adversely affected the
efforts of the Administration to restore peace to the Lower
Volta basin. Anlo was still hostile, possibly at the
2
instigation of Geraldo de Lima. Apparently the Asante
army under Adu Bofuo took courage from the death of their
arch bugbear and renewed their activities. This can be
inferred from the strong accusation which the merchants in
Accra in September 1870 levelled at the Administration that
"5 #it had failed in its Volta policy. Dompre s death may also 
partly account for Adu Bofuo's apparent relaxed attitude and 
implied agreement to a peace settlement, for he sent to Mr.
4
R. Bannerman:
"some important hostages as a pledge of his
intentions to abandon hostilities and .....
as security for the rendition of the
1. This plaque is carefully preserved at the palace, 
Adoagyiri, the town Dompre's people later founded when 
they abandoned Nsawam in early 20th century. It was shown 
to the present author in early 1969 when he visited the 
place to collect stool tradition.
2. Amenumey, T.H.S.G. Vol. IX p.71f.
3. Ussher (CCC) to Kennedy (SL), 5 September 1870 No. 117
co.96/85. -
4. When leaving the Volta for Accra on 27th June 1870,
Ussher appointed Mr. R. Bannerman as his representative.
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wlcaptive missionaries"
2Asante stood in need of peace. The war had gone against it.
By September 1870 the Allies had demobilized and 
were on their way back home. The peace moves from the Asante 
camp may have contributed to the demobilization. A greater 
contributory factor, however, was Dompre’s death: it deprived 
the Allies of inspired leadership, and destroyed their sense 
of purpose. But by far the greatest effect of Dompre’s demise 
was the conflict which it gave rise to between the Kotoku and 
the Ga. Aside from the loss of an excellent opportunity to 
carve a political prestige for themselves in the Gold Coast 
as a whole, the Kotoku of Nsawam sustained an irreparable 
loss in the death of Dompre. They became enraged at the 
assassination of their great warrior-chief, and determined 
to avenge his death on the Ga. Under Oben Daako, Dompre's 
brother and successor, and another Kotoku warrior-Chief 
called Asuman, the Kotoku army, which had campaigned in the 
Lower Volta, pursued the Ga to the outskirts of the Ga towns. 
They infested the Ga District and engaged in what was 
described as Ma very irregular jurisdiction over the inhabi­
tants .....  seizing and kidnapping in a very bold manner,
and /were/ otherwise guilty of violent acts."^ Thus the
1. Ussher (CCC) to Kennedy (SL) 11 October 1870 No. 145; cf 
also same to same, 5 and 12^September; Kennedy to 
Kimberley, 19 September 1870 CO.96/8 5. "Missionaries,"
i.e. Ramseyer and family and Kuhne.
2. David Asante (Begoro) to Widmann (Kyebi), 7 March 1870 
No. Africa 9, BMA-PJG. According to this source the 
Asante losses were many and it had not gained much. For 
identity of David Asante, see Chapter 8, p. 265 above.
5. West African Herald, 51 March 1871.
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Volta expedition which was intended to resolve the 
conflict in the Lower Volta area ended in still tearing 
the Eastern Districts further apart. The old friendship 
between Akyem Kotoku and Ga, much in evidence in the early 
l860s and intensified in 1869, had, by 1870, broken down, 
each was at the other’s throat.
As the scene of hostility was in their district 
the Ga felt the pinch more. Besides promoting insecurity 
to person and property, the activities of the Akyem Kotoku 
army blockaded the trade routes leading to Ga. The move­
ments of the Kotoku were bad enough for trade. That put 
them in great disfavour with the British whom they had so 
loyally served very recently. Captain Lees was then the 
Civil Commandant of the Eastern Districts. He quickly 
concluded that military suppression of the Kotoku Army 
under Oben Daako and Asuman could be the best means to 
resolve the Kotoku-Ga conflict. In early 1871 he organized 
what was described as a firm armed expedition against the 
Akyem army now regarded as bandits.'*' Once again obedience 
and loyalty played the Kotoku army into the hands of the 
British administration. The army submitted without a 
fight. Apparently they did not want to defy the government. 
Their leaders gave themselves up. These included Oben 
Daako; Kwame Dompre Kuma, Kwarae Afroten, Kwadwo Abokyi and
Kwasi Buo. They were marched to Accra and put in custody to
2
await court action against them.
It is not clear exactly when they were brought to
1. West African Herald, 31 March 1871.
2. Ibid.
court, but the West African Herald of 31 March vividly
described the scene at one stage of the court proceedings, a
description which underlined the Akyem-Ga tension, and pointed
to King Tackle's hand in Dompre's death. The Akyem 'prisoners'
were charged with a breach of public peace.”* "After hearing
the prisoners who spoke well for themselves," said the West
African Herald,
"his Honour ^ h e  Magistrate/ directed the inter­
preter (Mr. Addo) to ask the native /Ga/ Chiefs 
what they had to* say. Upon this Tackle, King of
Ussher town .....  spoke thus to the interpreter:
'Look here, tell our master (meaning the judge) 
that these people (meaning the prisoners) have- 
been making war against the Ashantees and the 
Aquamoos, and have secured plenty of plunder, 
and we want a share, we must have it too, other­
wise we shan't be satisfied, because we supplied 
the ammunition to fight. Besides, the Crepees 
have told us all about it. Therefore let's have 
our share at once."
It is clear that if there was any skirmish in which Dompre
was killed it was between Kotoku and Ga, and that it was
over the division of booty from the Krepi campaign. The
judge ignored King Tackle's request, but imprisoned Oben
2Daako and his colleagues for breach of public peace.
Kotokuhene Kwabena Fua had no doubt in his mind that the 
imprisonment of his subjects was nothing less than a travesty 
of justice. But all he could do was to plead leniency for 
his subjects.*^ His petition had a favourable reception,
1 . West African Herald, 31 March 1871.
2. Ibid.
3. "The Humble Petition of Quabinah Fuah, King of 
Inswaarmoon And Its Dependencies" to the Administrator 
(CCC), 17 July 1871, CO.96/88. "Inswaarmoon" is obviously 
a wrong spelling of Nsuaem, i.e. Oda today. For a full 
text of the "Petition" see Appendix B. pp. 375-378
below.
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however, it was not until December 1871 that Salmon, the 
Acting Administrator, detecting a miscarriage of justice, 
released Oben Daako and his colleagues.1
The imprisonment and release of Oben Daako and 
his colleagues must be seen as a long term effect of the 
i860 war between Kotoku and Abuakwa. The war had produced 
a rift in Kotoku leadership, with the larger section, headed 
by the Kotokuhene, founding Nsuaem in western Akyem, and the 
smaller part headed by Dompre, establishing Nsawara on 
Akuapem territory. Dompre*s residence here ultimately 
involved him in the violent trade and politics in the Lower 
Volta basin. Akwamu, old enemy of Kotoku, exploited his 
involvement as a pretext for seizing, robbing and killing a 
group of Kotoku subjects from Nsawam trading in the area of 
conflict. Dompre!s determination to retaliate ultimately 
made Nsawam and Kotoku as a whole principal party in the 
Volta war. Though this led to British recognition of him 
as a man fit to be used in effecting a military solution to 
the districtfs problems, he paid dearly with his life. And 
when his countrymen tried to avenge his death on the Ga who 
assassinated him, they won for themselves the opprobrium of 
the very British whose proto-colonial interests they had 
attempted to promote.
1. C.S. Salmon (CCC) to Kennedy (SL), 13 and 15 December 1871, 
CO.96/92. This may well have been the time when according 
to Metcalfe, Kotokuhene Kwabena Fua, by virtue of a treaty 
signed on 21 December 1871* submitted to the British. Cf. 
Documents p. 746. If this treaty was meant to confirm 
Kotoku acceptance of British authority, then it was not 
necessary. Since 1852 the Kotoku had at no time revolted 
against British authority. Possibly Kotoku had been 
threatening rebellion following the imprisonment of the 
five Kotoku war captains in March 1871.
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CHAPTER 10
AKYEM, ASANTE. AND THE BRITISH. 1871-1874
Akyem impact on political events in the Gold Coast 
did not stop with the disturbances in the Lower Volta 
District.1 It also helped in shaping the cause, course, and 
consequence of the conflicts which engulfed the British and 
Asante during the period between 1871 and 1874. Hitherto 
events during this period have been seen largely in the 
light of Anglo-Asante relations. For example Asante 
invaded the Protectorate in the last days of 1872 and much 
of l873« Since then there has been a general tendency among 
observers, both contemporary and subsequent, to attribute 
the cause of the invasion solely to British acquisition of
p
Elmina Castle and town from the Dutch in 1872. A close 
study of all available records shows unmistakeably that 
strained relations between the Akyem states, particularly 
Kotoku and Abuakwa, on the one hand, and Asante on the other 
were a contributory factor. Nor has it ever been pointed out, 
much less emphasized, that the Akyem immensely contributed to 
the success of the counter-British invasion of Asante in 1874; 
or that the effects of these events on Akyem were as far
1. See Chapter 9 above.
2. Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, I, Chapter 2; Ramseyer and 
Kuhne, Four Years, Chapter XXV; Ellis (1893) P* 283; Casely 
Hayford, Native Institutions, pp. 157 & 242; Claridge, II 
pp.3-4; Rev. Balmer, Akan Peoples, p. 154; Ward, History, 
p. 269; Kimble, Political History, p. 270; Coombs, The Gold 
Coast, pp.121-127. Hargreaves, J.D. Prelude to the Partition 
of West Africa, London 1963* P* 167; Agbodeka, African 
Politics, pp. 44-7; Wilks, Asante, pp. 230-235.
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reaching as they were on Asante and the British.
That the Dutch cession in April 1872 of Elmina
Castle and town to the British was a cause of the invasion
has been well established. 1 More recently it has been
suggested that fundamentally Asante desire to regain its
pre-1831 control over the southern states was another 
2
cause. Available evidence also suggests that Akyem 
hostility against Asante was yet another cause. In fact the 
evidence shows unmistakeably that without the cession the 
Asante attack on the Protectorate would have occurred all 
the same.
Events in the Lower Volta district did not end the
■5
strained relations between Kotoku and Asante. Relations 
rather worsened as the Western as well as the Eastern Akyem 
seized every Asante subject they could get hold of, obviously 
regarding such seizures as an aftermath to the Volta confronta­
tion. The effect of this hostile Akyem activity against 
Asante was underlined by the Asantehene himself in January 
1871 when he charged that:
"while the Assins were seizing and molesting my 
people on the main road to Cape Coast the Akims 
/i.e. Kotoku/ on the other hand seriously were 
molesting and killing my people. Are the Akims 
not under Your Excellency s protection? Why are 
they suffered to sacrifice the Ashantees for
their customs ..... May I ask my friend why should
the Akims murder my subjects for nothing .....  I
will ask Your Excellency that regarding the Akims, 
they now have in their possession more than one 
hundred of my people. May it please Your 
Excellency to send for them for my people, and 
if they refuse to deliver them, Your Excellency
1. See note 2 p. 341 above.
2. Boahen, in Ajayi & Crowder, Vol. Two p. 200.
3 . Cf. Chapter 9 pp. 311-333 above.
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will do me a favour to withdraw your protection 
from them and I will know how to get my people 
from those cruel and obstinate people.
There was considerable justification in the Asante accusation.
In mid-1871 when, in response to Asante importunities, Salmon
appealed to the Kotokuhene to free all Asante subjects
detained in Kotoku, at least twenty-nine of them were
released.2
It would seem that Kotoku even threatened Asante
with war. Kotokuhene Kwanbena Fua was accused of having
sent one of the detained Asante to tell Manhyia of his
intentions to fight Asante. This so angered the Asantehene
that the Kumasi Court saw no reason why Asante should not
3
accept the challenge. The tension still prevailed in late 
1871, for the Asantehene from time to time repeated his 
request to the British to ostracize Kotoku from the Protec­
torate so that Asante could go to war against Kotoku without 
violating its friendship with the British. King Karikari 
was the more bent on this because, as he said, the Kotokuhene
boasted of his ancestry to Frimpon Manso, a suggestion that
4
he Kwabena Fua enjoyed the tradition of warrior kings.
1. Asantehene to Ussher (CCC), 31 January 1871; cf also 
Ussher to Kennedy (Freetown), 17 March 1871* Confidential, 
CO.96/8 7. The Assin seized Asante subjects in support of 
Akyem Kotoku and others like Denkyera Wassa, Twifo and 
Komenda who were also at loggerheads with Asante.
2. Salmon (CCC) to Kennedy (Freetown) 3 August 1871* No. 94,
co.96/89.
3 . Asantehene to Ussher (CCC), 31 January 1871* CO.96/8 7 .
4. Asantehene to Salmon, 1 September; Crawford (Kumasi) to 
Salmon, captioned "Minute Details of Interview with H.M. 
King of Ashantee”, 7 August 1871* CO.96/8 9. Frimpon 
Manso was a powerful Kotokuhene who reigned from 1717 to 
about 1740. Cf. Chapter 2 p. 26f and Chapter 3 p.79-112 
above.
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There were occasional border clashes between Kotoku and the 
Asante palatine state of Kokofu.3' Kumasi apparently may 
have regarded such clashes as a prelude to a general Kotoku 
plan to attack Asante.
Kotoku also seems to have claimed authority over
certain portions of Asante subjects, possibly of Asante-
Akyem district, and this angered Kumasi. This is suggested
by Kumasi reference to a Kotoku claim, allegedly put forward
by King Kwabena Fua, that during the reign of his predecessor,
Agyeman, Asante seized one hundred Kotoku subjects. The
Kotokuhene was reported to have threatened that if Kumasi
did not return those Kotoku subjects he would order the
2
panyarring of every Asante citizen he could catch. Kotoku 
may have been guilty of all these charges. But it appears 
that Asante too was partly to blame for the tension. The 
Asantehene, Salmon detected, was looking for a chance to go 
to war with Nsuaem in order to make amends to the poor 
performance of Asante against Kotoku in the Krepi War.
So serious was the tension between Kotoku and 
Asante that in December 1871 Salmon, the Administrator at 
Cape Coast Castle, felt that it must be resolved diploma­
tically, and quickly too, if war was to be averted. The 
solution of the problem lay in both Nsuaem and Kumasi. He 
advised the Asantehene to drop his complaints against 
Kotoku, and other Protectorate states, because even if the
1. Salmon to Kennedy 21 December 18719 printed in Br. PP. 
(1873) Vol. XLIX.
2. Salmon, citing the Asantehene, in Salmon to Kennedy 
31 October 1871 No. 124. CO.96/8 9.
3 . Ibid. For a full account of the Krepi War see Chapter 9 
above.
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alleged excesses of Kotoku and the others were true, they 
were a direct reaction to similar deeds Asante had committed 
against them, deeds which the Asantehene had not cared to 
condemn and denounce. 1 It was not enough to take the 
Asantehene to task and leave the matter to rest there.
Salmon invited the Kotokuhene to come to Cape Coast to 
assist in invedtigations into the Asante charges against 
Nsuaem. King Kwabena Fua declined the invitation, pointing 
out that the attitude of Asante was hostile; this made it 
incumbent for him to be on the alert; if Asante relaxed its
attitude, it would be possible for him to proceed to Cape
2
Coast. That the situation was quite explosive was
reflected in early 1872 when the Kotokuhene declined a
second invitation to go to Cape Coast for the projected
investigation.^
The seriousness of the Kotoku-Asante tension was
also emphasized by events in Asante itself. Ramseyer and
Kuhne, the captive missionaries, and Bonnat, the French
trader, also captive in Kumasi, noted Asante plans to
invade the Akyem country as soon as the army under Adu
4
Bofuo returned from Krepi. The people of Asante-Akyem, 
however, revealed the plans to the Akyem states. Kinship
1. Salmon to Asantehene6 December; Salmon to Prince John 
Owusu Ansa (Kumasi), 7 December 1871 (Copy), CO.96/8 9.
2. Report of Mr. Bentsil on a mission to Nsuaem, cited in 
Salmon to Kennedy 7 December 1871 No. 140, CO.96/9 2.
3 . Kotokuhene to Salmon, dd. "Akim Daa", 24 January 1872, 
CO.96/9 2. This is the earliest reference to Nsuaem as
Da or Oda, known to the present author.
4. Ramseyer and Kuhne, op. cit., p. 1^2. The missionaries
wrongly called the first name of the Kotokuhene Kofi
instead of Kwabena.
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ties may have obliged the Asante-Akyem to divulge the
secret. 1 But they paid dearly for the action: four of
2
their chiefs were dragged to Kumasi and executed.
Kotoku was not the only Akyem state hostile to
Asante. Bosome and Abuakwa were equally unfriendly. For
Bosome it was just not easy to sit on the fence while
Kotoku, a close neighbour, was at loggerheads with Asante.
An attack on Kotoku was bound to affect her on account of
geography.^ As for Abuakwa its bitterness against Asante
compared with the Kotoku hostility against Kumasi. By
1869 enmity had replaced the entente cordiale which had
characterised Abuakwa-Asante relations in the early 1860s.
In that year King Amoako Atta was described as the most
h.
determined foe of Asante. Excruciating British pressure 
on Amoako Atta explains the change.^ Between 1869 and 
1872 there was no thaw in the tension. In 1870 the 
Abuakwahene banned all Abuakwa sales of salt to Kwawu
f i
because the latter resold to Asante. Besides, the Abuakwa, 
like the Kotoku and the Bosome, were wont to seize, rob, 
detain, and kill Asante subjects who fell into their hands.
1. See Chapter 5 above and pp. 357-8 below.
2. Ramseyer & Kuhne, op. cit. p. 183; Ellis (1893) P* 280.
3. See Chapter 8 p. 276 above.
4. Simpson (Accra) to Kennedy (SL), 22 March 1869 CO 96/79*
5 . See Chapter 7 p.234 above.
6 . David Asante (Begoro) to Widmann (Akropon), 7 March 1870
No. Africa 9; Schrenk to Basel, 26 August 1870, No.
Christiansborg 31a, BMA-PJC.
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In 1871 when the Asantehene appealed to him directly to
release all Asante detainees in Abuakwa, King Amoako Atta
insolently refused to comply. But for Salmon who, through
a delegation of Fante chiefs, secured the release of the
detainees, Asante would have immediately taken the field
against Akyem Abuakwa.^ In the third week of October 1871
the
Salmon proudly reportec/normalisation of relations between
2
Abuakwa and Asante. But the improvement was more apparent
than real. By April 1872 when the British formally took
possession of Elmina Castle the evidence from Kyebi was
that there was an order for the seizure of every Asante
subject who could be found in Abuakwa; and that the exercise
covered all Muslim visitors who were thought to be spies for
Asante.-'5 By the end of that year the Abuakwa were holding
4
over eighty Asante subjects in detention. If Asante did 
not officially remonstrate against Abuakwa it was just 
because she had decided on war as a better means of getting 
her grievances redressed.
Two issues, however, prevented Asante from effecting 
an immediate implementation of the attack. Negotiations were 
still going on between them and the British in connection with 
the release of the white captives. And there was the safety 
of the Resident Asante Commissioner for Elmina, Yaw Akyeampon,
1. Salmon to Kennedy, 3 October 1871 No. 108, CO.96/8 9.
2 . Salmon to Kennedy, 19 October 1871 No. 119, CO.96/8 9.
3 . B. Lodholtz (Kyebi) to Basel, 13 April 1872 No. 153>
BMA-PJC.
4. Dr. Fox (Accra) to the Colonial Secretary (CCC) 16 January 
1874; Administrator Harley’s munites on Fox’s report,
24 January; Harley to Kimberley, 10 April 1874 (all printed 
in B. PP. 1874 Vol. XLVI.
348.
to consider. These two issues were resolved in the last 
months of 1872. Akyeampon for example returned to Kumasi 
in the second week of December. The Asante Court now felt 
free to take up arms.
By the last week of December 1872 the advance
guard of the Asante army had had skirmishes with the Akyem
states. 1 On 29 December the Asantehene granted an interview
to Mr. Joseph Dawson, an agent of the British who had been
sent to Kumasi to assist Mr. Plange, another agent, in
negotiating for the release of the captive whites in Kumasi.
At this interview the Asantehene told Dawson that he would
go ahead with his war plans unless Dawson obtained
satisfaction for Asante. By satisfaction the King meant the
British restoring the Akyem states, Assin, Denkyera and Wassa
to Asante loyalty; British execution of Denkyerahene Kwakye
Afram; and the return of Elmina castle and town to Asante 
2
allegiance. Regarding the restoration of the Akyem and 
other states, the Kumasi court had in fact made an earlier 
hint of it; that was in September 1872 when they told 
Plange that if Cape Coast Castle could not pay the ransom 
fee of £2,000 .0 0 sterling which was demanded for the release 
of the white captives, Assin could be returned to Asante in 
lieu of payment. Of course this was a deal the Asante them­
selves knew too well that the British would not entertain. 
Hence the determination to use force to achieve the same goal.
1. See p. 330 below.
2. Joseph Dawson (Kumasi) to CCC, 29 December 1872, Br. PP 
(Vol. 49 p. 870).
3 . Plange (Kumasi) to CCC, 3 September 1872, (Br. PP. Vol. 49, 
1873, p. 6l4).
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In September 1872 the European captives in Kumasi
noted that the Asantehene himself was inclined towards
peace. But the Chiefs, by which they obviously meant the
Kotoko Council, were bent on war, and were likely to force
the hand of the King, in order to have the opportunity of
recovering the Asante military prestige which had been
tarnished in the Krepi war.1 Of course a full recovery of
this prestige could not be achieved without inflicting a
defeat on those immediately responsible for that ignominy,
namely the Akyem Kotoku. The missionaries and the French
trader were, however, not too sure who the immediate object
of the impending attack would be. In their published
memoirs they asserted that to measure themselves with the
white man for once was the secret desire of every Asante.
From this premise they postulated the British acquisition
2
of Elmina Castle as the cause of the attack. Coombs for 
example had set much store by this evidence to lend weight 
to the cession as the sole cause of the Asante invasion.
It is, however, crystally clear from the evidence adduced 
above that strained relations between Akyem as well as 
other more interior Protectorate states, and Asante were 
an additional cause of the invasion. The Asantehene himself 
made this clear in March 1873 when he said that the British 
returning
1. Kuhne & Ramseyer (Kumasi) to Pope Hennessy (CCC), 3 
September 1872, B. PP 1873 Vol. XLIX p. 6l4. Pope 
Hennessy, the Administrator-in-Chief of the British 
possessions in West Africa was then on visit to the Gold 
Coast from Freetown, Sierra Leone.
2. Ramseyer & Kuhne, Four Years, p. 205*
3 . Coombs, op. cit. p. 124.
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"Denkerahs, Akims, and Assins back to their former 
position as subjects /of Asante/and also /the 
British/ restoring the Elmina Port and people back 
in the same manner as they were before, will be 
the only thing to appease /Asante/.^
No wonder then that the Akyem states were the first
to be attacked by the Asante invading force; this was in the
last days of I8 7 2 .2 But it was in February 1873 that they,
together with Denkyera and Assin and other parts of the
Protectorate received the full force of the invader. The
Akyem district was attacked by a column of the invaders
headed by Yaw Nantwi, one of the Kumasi Chiefs.^
No further details of the war in Akyem appear in
the records so far consulted. Circumstantial evidence,
however, suggests that the encounter was brief. Judging
from the attitude of Kotokuhene Kwabena Fua, the Akyem states
had constantly been on the alert, and were therefore able to
repulse Nantwi. This made it possible for the Akyem states
later to send a force of between 3*000 and 4,500 strong to
assist in the defence of Assin and Denkyera.
Ultimately Asante did not achieve the aim of the
invasion. Worse still the attack led to a counter-invasion
of Asante itself by the British and the Protectorate forces
1. Asantehene to Harley (CCC), 20 March 1873, Br. PP; Further 
Correspondence respecting Ashantee Invasion, C 8o4.
Joseph Dawson acted as Secretary to the Asantehene, Cf. 
also Metcalfe, Documents, p. 349*
2. Harley to Asantehene. 24 December 1872; Abuakwahene to 
Harley, 11 January 1873* Br. PP: Papers Relating to the 
Ashante Invasion, pp. 308-9 •
3* Report of Dr. Rowe to Harley,?February 1873, as Sub-Enclosure 
No. 10 in Pope Hennessy to Kimberley, 10 February 1873 No. 
135; Evidence of Kwadwo Mensa before Foster, as Sub-Enclosure 
No. 6 of Enclosure No. 3 in Harley to Kimberley, 14 March 
1873 No. 135* Br. PP: Papers Relating.
4. Harley to Kimberley, 8 April 1873 No. 204, B. PP; Papers 
Relating; David Asante (Kyebi) to Basel, 9 July 1873 No.
Akim 21, BMA-PJC; Ameyaw, Oda Tradition; AAT: Kyebi (1968/9 ).
in early 1874. The Akyem Abuakwa refer to this counter­
attack as the Groba War . 1 It Is, however, popularly known
2
in Gold Coast history as the Sagranti War.
The Sagranti War is well documented from Anglo- 
Asante view points. What is not so well known is the 
important role the Akyem states played to make it a success 
for the British and the Protectorate. Of all the states 
and peoples of the Protectorate the Akyem co-operated best 
with the British during the invasion. They alone consti­
tuted two of the four native columns which assisted the 
British attack on Asante. The British adopted the strategy 
of converging attack so familiar to and popular with Asante. 
Sir Garnet Wolseley, at the head of the main British regular 
forces of about 15*000, wasto march directly on Kumasi, 
using the Cape Coast via Assin road. Captain Dalrymple 
had the command of the African forces comprising of 
Denkyera and Wassa, and was detailed to attack Asante from 
the middle reaches of the Ofin river. Captain Butler was 
given command of the Akyem Bosome-Kotoku force. His line 
of march was to cross the Lower reaches of river Birem in 
Western Akyem and then river Anuru after which he was to 
descend on the lacustrine Asante confederate states of 
Kokofu and Kontanase. Finally Captain Glover, assisted by 
Captain Sartorius, had the task of organizing a force 
from amongst the eastern districts and attack Asante from 
the direction of Akyem Abuakwa. Ultimately Abuakwa alone
1. Groba is a corruption of fGlover.*, the name of the 
Captain who commanded them.
2. Sagranti is Akan corruption of 'Sir Garnet1, the title and 
first name of Wolseley who had the overall command of the 
British invasion of Asante.
virtually made up this column.
There was a tendency to despise the conduct of the 
Akyem contingents and thereby play down their contribution 
to the success of the attack on Asante. For example they 
were accused of cowardice, untrustworthiness and despicable 
desertion. 1 What occasioned these damaging remarks ironi­
cally were their very efforts to make the British attack on 
Asante succeed. These efforts were geared towards a secret 
understanding between the Akyem forces and the Juaben section 
of Asante at a crucial stage of the War. The understanding 
came about in this manner. The Abuakwa forces, led by 
Glover and Sartorius, fought part of the Asante army at 
Juaso in Asante-Akyem on 24th January 1874. This section of
the Asante army mainly consisted of that part of Asante-
2
Akyem under the direct supervision of Kumasi. Then there 
were the forces of the other section of Asante-Akyem under 
Juaben jurisdiction.^ The bulk of the latter and the Juaben 
themselves were manning the Anuru river in the Oduraase- 
Nnobewam neighbourhood. Glover and the Akyem Abuakwa joined 
battle with them on 31 January. These battles were 
indecisive. Glover hoped to attack again in the first week
1. Wolseley (Fomena in Adanse) to Kimberley, 26 January 1874 
Br. PP: Latest Despatches of Sir Garnet Wolseley, No. 6 
Series; Glover (Obogu in Asante-Akyem) to Wolseley, 21 &
28 January and 4 February 1874; Butler (Trebe in Kokofu, 
Asante) to Wolseley, 2 February 1874, Br. PP: Further 
Correspondence; Butler, Akimfoo: A History of a Failure 
(London 1874) pp. 243-246; Ward, History, pp. 281-2.
2. Kumasi-controlled section of Asante-Akyem consisted of 
Bompata, Agogo, Krofa, Adomfe, Wankyi, Juansa, Amantena
and several other towns.
3* Towns making this section of Asante-Akyem Included Odumase, 
Konongo, Myabo, Nnobewam, Bomfa, Dwease etc.
of February. Then all of a sudden he became aware that the 
Akyem Abuakwa had started returning home. A few days later 
the Kotoku and the Bosome also did the same. The conduct of 
the Akyem so shocked Glover and Butler that they described 
the departure as a despicable flight at a crucial stage in 
the war.
But in reality the withdrawal was not a desertion
as such; it symbolised a secret disengagement arrangement
reached between Akyem rulers and the Juaben section of the
Asante army. The whites were not told of this. Commenting
on the cause of the departure of the Akyem forces Butler,
in connection with Bosome and Kotoku, thought that
"the statements of a blind Ashanti prisoner taken 
at Mansuah, coupled with a verbal message sent by 
King /Amoako7 Atta of Eastern Akim, the purpose 
of which I was not made aware, did much to induce 
the disgraceful flight.
The truth was that while the war was going on in the Asante-
Akyem district there was a secret correspondence between the
2
Abuakwahene and the Juaben leaders, a situation which Glover 
•3
found very odd. The outcome of the contact was the
4disengagement agreement between the Akyem and the Juaben.
As the Akyem left the field, the Juaben also abandoned 
their post along the Anuru river and ultimately submitted
1. Butler (Trebe, in Kokofu, Asant^, to Wolseley, 2 February 
1874, B. PP: Further Correspondence.
2. Brackenbury, The Ashanti War, Vol. II p. 275*
3 . H. M. Stanley, Coomassie and Magdala (London 1875) P* 183; 
cf. also Agbodeka, African Politics, p. 54.
4. Glover to Wolseley, 4 February 1874; Ellis (1893) P* 3^3*
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to Glover. 1 Old friendship possibly induced the under­
standing. Both parties may have reminded themselves of the 
treaty of non-belligerency signed in or about 1840 which
enjoined the Akyem Abuakwa and the Juaben never to take up
2
arms against each other. It has been suggested that the 
behaviour of the Juaben partly contributed to the defeat of 
Asante because, by refusing to fight on, the Juaben made it 
possible for a well-planned Asante strategy of resistance 
to miscarry. There is substance in the suggestion because 
the Juaben departure enabled Glover to march through eastern 
Asante to Kumasi with only a handful of carriers without 
meeting with the slightest opposition from any quarter of 
eastern Asante. It is therefore reasonable to conclude 
that Akyem (Abuakwa) diplomacy in Juaben partly contributed 
to the success of the British attack on Asante. This 
conclusion, however, does not lose sight of other contri­
butory factors such as internal troubles in Juaben itself 
and the centuries old rivalry between Juaben and Kumasi.
The contribution of the Akyem states to the success of the 
attack on Asante becomes even more significant when it is 
realised that it was only after the defeat of Asante that 
the British felt easy in their mind to formally declare 
the Gold Coast a British colony. That was in July 1874.
1. Glover (l!Essiemampon!f i.e. Asienimpon) to Wolseley, 10 
February 1874, in Stanley, Coomassie,- p. 251 and Brackenbury 
The Ashanti War, Vol. II p. 2b4.
2. Cf. Chapter 6 p. 214 above.
5. Agbodeka, African Politics, p. 54.
4. I am grateful to Professor Adu Boahen of the History 
Department, University of Ghana, for drawing my attention 
to them.
Hitherto the effect of the war has been seen only
from Asante and British view-points. 1 But its impact on the
Akyem was considerable if not equally great. Following the
war the population of the district increased and a new
state came into being. Let us examine the first point.
Just before, and during, as well as some twelve months
after the attack, numerous “refugees” arrived in Akyem from
Asante. In or about March 1874 the Asantehene described the
“refugees” as secessionists responding to the incitement of
2
Abuakwa and Kotoku rulers.
The view of the Asante monarch was not wholly
correct. Some of the so-called secessionists were full-
blooded Akyem citizens who had been resident in Asante for
several decades. This category had found their way there
either as prisoners-of-war or as part of the annual tribute
which Akyem states used to pay, in slaves, during the pre-
1825 period, and had become domestic slaves or manumited
members of Asante families. Others had gone there in the
early 1840s, having been drawn there by marital and other
social connections with the Juaben. As soon as rumours
began to circulate that the British might invade Asante,
hundreds of these Akyem residents in Asante decided to
4
return home, and many did. This class of migrants cannot 
be described as secessionists. It was probably for their 
sake that the administration at Cape Coast Castle decided
1. Ward, History, pp. 284-6; Agbodeka, African Politics 
pp. 77-103.
2. Maxwell (CCC) to the Earl of Kimberley (CO), 19 March 1874,
Br. PP: Further Correspondence on the Ashantee Invasion.
3. See Chapter 6 p. 213 above.
4. Lodholtz’s Report on the Basel Mission Station at Kyebi for
the 1st Quarter of 1873* dd. 29 April 1873 No. Akim 6; David 
Asante (Kyebi) to Basel, 29 April 1873 No. Akim 20 BMA-PJC;
AAT: Begoro, Kwaben, Pamen, and Ekoso (1925/6).
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in July 1874 not to inferfere, much less compel, any of the 
"migrants" already in Akyem to go back to Asante*1 To have 
done so would have meant consigning Akyem citizens 
indefinitely to an 'alien1 rule under which some of them 
would have remained slaves as long as independent Asante 
existed.
Another group of people who experienced family
reunion was a number of inhabitants from the eastern and
south-eastern district of Asante, that is to say Asante-
Akyem. Large numbers of these people flocked into Akyem
after the Sangranti War. Akyem instigation was held up as
2
the cause of the migration from Asante-Akyem. The posi­
tion of this group of "migrants" to Akyem was not as 
simple as the charge of defection suggests. Nor could 
Abuakwa and Kotoku be wholly blamed for their flight 
into Akyem. It will be recalled that until the 1820s the 
Asante-Akyem district had formed part of the kingdom of 
Kotoku.^ Political and military pressures from Asante in 
the 1820s, however, had forced the Kotoku dynasty and a 
large section of their subjects to migrate to and settle in 
Akyem south of the Birem. Those who for one reason or 
another were not able to migrate had looked forward to the 
day they would once again reunite with their migrated
1. Governor Strahan (CCC) to Canarvon, ~5 July 1874, B. PP: 
Further Correspondence.
2 . Maxwell (CCC) to Kimberley, 19 March 1874, B. PP: Further 
Correspondence; Maxwell to King Amoako Atta I, 31 March 
1874, ADM 1/7/10, cited by Addo-Fening, in THSG, Vol. XIV 
Pt.2 , p. 216, n. 1 7.
3 . See Chapter 5 PP* 192-193 above.
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kinsmen.^ To these, the 1874 war offered an opportune
moment to flee and join their kinsmen in the south. Maxwell,
the Acting Administrator, was not averse to seeing Asante
go on the rocks, as he clearly indicated in his letter of
19th March 1874, which has already been cited. But with
respect to the Asante-Akyem Refugees1 he did try to
persuade them to go back home. In May 1874 he appointed
Dr. Skipton Gouldsbury as a Special Commissioner for Akyem,
and instructed him to go to the Akyem country and ask the
Asante-Akyem refugees to return home. Gouldsbury was also
to tell Abuakwahene Amoako Atta and Kotokuhene Kwabena Fua
not to incite any defection from Asante-Akyem, or from any
2
other part of Asante, as charged by the Kumasi Court.
Gouldsbury met the bulk of the refugees in Akyem Kotoku.
At Nsuaem (now Oda) the spokesmen of the Asante-Akyem
refugees admitted that they had indeed
"escaped from Asantee during the British/ 
expedition; but they had returned to their
families in Akyem; and that  their
recent escape was the realization of a hope 
which had been handed down to them from their 
fathers and which had grown with their growth 
and strengthened with their strength.” ^
They therefore had no intentions to go back to Asante, even
li.
if the Cape Coast government forced them. Given the
1. AS-AKT: Bompata (1968/9).
2. Report of Dr. S. Gouldsburg on a mission to Akyem in May- 
June, 1874, dated Elmina Castle, 12 July 1874, CO.96/112.
3. Report of Dr. S. Gouldsbury on a Mission to Akyem in May- 
June 1874, dated Elmina Castle, 12 July 1874, CO.96/112.
4. Ibid.
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historical background of Asante-Akyem there is no reason to
doubt the accuracy of Gouldsbury*s report. By migrating to
Akyem these people were not merely trying to substitute
British protection for Asante domination. Many, if not all,
of them were attempting to reunite with relatives in Akyem
from whom they had been separated for about half a century.
To them the fact of coming under British authority was only
incidental to this aspiration; and whatever adverse effect
their migration could have on the Asante Kingdom was equally
inevitable. The very name Asante-Akyem given them pointed
1
to their incomplete integration with Asante. It was natural
that the Akyem states, especially Kotoku, should welcome the
refugees from Asante-Akyem.
It is, however, true that the Akyem states incited
2
secession from Juaben, and to a less extent Kwawu. Since 
1742 when the Akyem empire of which they had formed part 
fell, Kwawu had faithfully remained part of provincial 
Asante. They were the only people in the south who did not 
make use of the 1824-1831 upheavals to recover their indepen­
dence from that power. Now in 1874 they decided to part ways 
with Asante. Giving his reason for that decision the 
Omanhene of Kwawu in April 1874 said that he and his people
1. During my field work in 196 8 /9 to collect oral traditions, 
I was told at Bompata that some of the inhabitants of that 
Asante-Akyem town still retained family ties in Kotoku.
And there still is a family at Hwediem, also in Asante 
Akyem, members of which are linked with the Kotoku
royal family.
2. Maxwell to Kimberley, 19 March 1874, B.PP; Maxwell to 
Abuakwahene Amoako Atta I, 31 March 1874, ADM 1/7/10; Ag. 
Administrator CC Lees to Amoako Atta I, 12 May 1874, ADM 
1/7/10, both cited by Addo-Fening, in THSG, Vol. XIV 
Part 2 p. 216 notes 17 and 19*
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had suffered much from Asante. 1 Kwawu may have had its 
share of Asante oppression, but the real reason for its 
intention to withdraw from the Asante polity was that the 
people were impressed by the Anglo-Akyem victory over 
Asante in the Sagranti War. Hitherto many of the subject 
states had regarded Asante as invincible. Its defeat 
demonstrated the victors as a power more worthy to be 
served. It was for this reason that many Kwawu subjects 
migrated into Akyem (Abuakwa) with intentions of making a
2permanent home there; it was for the same reason that Abene 
sent an official delegation to Abuakwahene Amoako Atta, 
appealing to him to use his good offices to seek admission 
for Kwawu into the Protectorate. Kyebi obliged, though 
for reasons not readily known, Kwawu did not immediately 
become a member of the Protectorate. From 1874, however, 
Kwawu considered itself as no longer under Asante. Abuakwa 
probably encouraged this attitude in Kwawu, judging from 
the activities of Abuakwahene Amoako Atta in Juaben.
Akyem subversion against Asante was most 
conspicuous in relation to Juaben. After the withdrawal 
of the British and Protectorate forces from Asante, Kyebi
4
and Nsuaem incited Juaben to secede from the Asante polity.
1. David Asante (Kyebi) to Basel, 29 April 1874, BMA-PJC.
2. Capital of Kwawu.
3- Gouldsburyfs Report, 12 July 1874, CO.96/112.
4. The Asantehene, cited in Maxwell to Kimberley, 19 March 
1874, B.PP: Further Correspondence. Cf. also Juaben 
Tradition, in Rattray, Ashanti Law, p. 175*
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The charge against Abuakwa and Kotoku seems to have been 
well-founded. For one thing many of the Juaben started 
arriving in Akyem, especially Abuakwa, soon after the with­
drawal of the British forces from Asante: these Juaben 
refugees openly spoke of their plans to secede from Asante. 1 
It would seem that the plan of secession had been agreed 
upon by Abuakwa and Juaben leaders during the negotiations 
leading to the disengagement between them in January and
o
February. Kyebi efforts in 1875 to support Juaben in a
civil war with Kumasi substantiates this suggestion. As
soon as the Kumasi-Juaben war broke out in the last days of
October and early November 1875 Amoako Atta sent to inform
the Government that his kingdom was being threatened with an
invasion from Asante: the government should therefore supply
him with war stores to enable him defend his borders. These
were sent but the Government soon realised that Amoako Atta
was rather planning to attack Asante (i.e. Kumasi) forces,
apparently in support of Juaben. The Government therefore
quickly sent Hausa troops to Abuakwa with orders to prevent
him from carrying out his plans.^ The British took this step
apparently for fear that Kumasi might cite it as proof of
4British violation of the Fomena Treaty of Peace.
1. David Asante (Kyebi) to Basel, n.d. No. 213, BMA-PJC; cf. 
also "The History of New JudDen and the relation between 
the Chiefs" (Enclosure) in ADM IV 1437, cited by Addo- 
Fening, THSG Vol. XIV,^p. 217, n. 22.
2. Cf. p. 353 above. Initially the British also encouraged 
the Juaben secession. Cf. Agbodeka, African Politics, 
pp. 78-103*
3 . Strahan to Carnavon, 6 and 13 November 1875; Minutes on 
the 6 November despatch, dated 14 December 1875, CO*96/116; 
cf. also Agbodeka, African Politics, p. 108.
4. The treaty was signed between the British and Asante on 13 
February 1874 to end the Sagranti War.
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The Juaben were defeated by Kumasi.
The Juaben defeat had very far reaching conse­
quences for the Akyem district in general and Abuakwa in 
particular. In 1875 a large number of the Juaben, led by 
Chief Asafo Agyei, fled to Abuakwa for asylum and Akyem 
military assistance against Kumasi. Amoako Atta gave 
shelter to the Juaben refugees. Besides, he was determined 
to assist Asafo Agyei in fighting against Kumasi. Aided by 
Ga and Akuapem rulers, he helped the Juaben to build up 
arms caches in preparation for further war with Kumasi. 1
The British colonial government severely reprimanded
2
Amoako Atta and the other rulers for their conduct.
The reprimand symbolised a change in British 
policy in relation to Asante. Until the October 1875 
civil War in Asante this policy had had the disintegration 
of Asante as its goal, cleverly using Juaben as a tool.
With the Kumasi victory over Juaben such a policy was no 
longer tenable. The Kumasi success was proof of Asante 
resilience which, if not handled with care, might well 
lead to another war with that power. Akyem continued 
subversion against Asante could easily be seized upon by 
Kumasi as a pretext for a fresh war. And the British 
do not seem to have had the heart for another war with 
Asante coming so soon after Sagranti. It was to prevent 
such a war that the British ultimately exiled Asafo Agyei 
and a few of his councillors to Lagos in Nigeria in 1877.
The repressive measures which the British took
1. Strahan to Canarvon, 16 November 1875> CO.96/ H 6 .
2. Agbodeka, African Politics, pp. 83 & 108.
against the Juaben in Akyem did not relieve Abuakwa of the 
problems created by the Juaben refugee presence in the 
territory. Nor was the British colonial administration 
prepared to return the refugees to Asante, in spite of its 
exile of Asafo Agyei. In response to British appeals, and 
of course by viftue of their earlier support for Juaben the 
Akyem Abuakwa were obliged to grant to the Juaben refugees 
a piece of land between Kukurantumi and the border with 
Akuapem which was virtually uninhabited. The Abuakwa 
generosity enabled the refugees to found in the last days 
of 1875 a state which they called New Juaben with its 
capital at Koforidua.1 Thus the New Juaben State today is 
a living testimony to the role of the Akyem in the 
upheavals which engulfed the Gold Coast in the early 1870s.
Between the last days of 1872 and 1873 Asante 
invaded the Protectorate. Opinion then and later was that 
the Dutch cession of Elmina Castle and town to the British 
in early 1872 engendered the invasion. But it is now clear 
that strained Akyem-Asante relations dating back immediately 
to 1871 and remotely to the 1860s constituted another cause; 
that on this account the invasion would have taken place 
with or without the cession. Perhaps it was on that score 
that the Akyem, of all the Protectorate peoples, co-operated 
best with the British in the counter-invasion of Asante 
itself in early 1874. The wars had very far reaching effects 
on the Akyem district and its inhabitants, among these the 
founding of the new Juaben State in Eastern Akyem.




GOVERNMENT IN AKYEM : THE ABUAKWA EXAMPLE
The view prevailed in the late nineteenth century 
that government in Akan states Wlss "absolute monarchy in which 
the King or Chief has unlimited power” over ”the life and 
property of his subjects” . 1 This view is not borne out by 
the evidence on the Akyem states, at least during the nine­
teenth century. An Akyem monarch could indulge in acts which 
at first sight might seem tyrannical and dictatorial, for 
example ordering the execution or the confiscation of the 
property of a ”subject”. But absolutism could scarcely be 
ascribed to him: the constitution, the nature of internal 
administration, and the system of owning land, which was the 
basis of all property and wealth in Akyem, and several other 
limitations on his power, allowed the monarch little or no 
room to be absolute. Government in Abuakwa will be used to 
illustrate this point, but where there is any difference 
between what obtained in Abuakwa and the other two Akyem
states, this will be noticed and explanation offered if 
2possible.
1. Reindorf, History, pp. 103 & 105.
2. Contemporary evidence is more available on government in 
Abuakwa than Kotoku or Bosome. Hence its selection as an 
illustration. The present author, however, does not intend 
the discussion here to be regarded as a detailed disserta­
tion on governmental and administrative structures in pre­
twentieth century Akyem states, but as an introduction to 
the subject which requires further and wider research.
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Evidence on Abuakwa of our period of study is at 
present very scrappy, but it shows clearly that the Abuakwahene 
was a constitutional monarch. The outstanding feature of the 
constitution of this state*in the nineteenth century at least> 
was its system of checks and balances which was undoubtedly 
aimed at preventing the monarch from becoming a dictator and 
hold the people to ransom.^* As the sole head of state the 
monarch alone reigned, but he governed the country with the 
assistance of three councils. These were the State (or
p
Okyeman ) Council, the Kyebi Council and the Amantoo-
mmiensa Council.
The State Council was the ’national* assembly,
since its membership consisted of the ruler, the five
divisional chiefs, the chief of every town and village in
the state, all the members of the Kyebi and Amantoo-mmiensa
Councils most of whom were chiefs, and any person who was
thought fit, by the people, to sit on their councils. The
•3
State Council invariably met at the palace in Kyebi. It 
played the tripartite role of a legislature, a court of 
justice (in which capacity it could be a court of first
1. For a useful description of the Abuakwa constitution in 
the twentieth century see Danquah, Akan Laws, especially
pp. 11-2 0.
2. The Abuakwa sometimes use the term ’’Okyeman” in reference 
to the State Council or the Abuakwa state. The term 
literally means all Akyem. The present author has refrained 
from using it to avoid ambiguity and vagueness, as it does 
not apply to the other two Akyem states.
3 . The contemporary observers never used the terra ’’State 
Council” but you readily know the reference is to that State 
Council whenever they mention ”a large gathering” or 
’assembly” of chiefs, from all parts of the country, 
including ’the five main under-chiefs” three of whose names 
were often mentioned, namely ”Ampao”, Chief of Kukurantumi, 
”Feni” of Begoro, and ’’Duodu” or ’’Duedu” of Asiakwa.
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instance and an appellate)., and a sort of an electoral
commission. In 1865 and 1869 ”the Akim people”, as this
Council was then described, sitting as a court of justice,
adjudicated in a stiff land dispute between the towns of
Kukurantumi and Asafo (supported by Asiakwa and Maase).'1' In
1867 it acted as an electoral commission to confirm the
selection of the woman Sakyeraa as the new Abuakwahene, in
succession to Atta Obiwom who died in or about May 1867;
Sakyeraa ultimately declined the offer in favour of Kwasi
Kuma, the fourteen-year old son of her younger sister,
2
Ampofowaa. The council, whether it sat as a legislative
assembly, a court of justice, or an electoral commission,
was the highest political authority in the state: It was,
'‘before the advent of the all-masterful Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance of 1883, the greatest 
council whose decision was ever final on King, 
prince, or subject and imperative on native, 
stranger or foreigner who set foot in the kingdom 
of Akim Abuakwa."^
The execution of its decisions, laws, edicts, rules 
and regulations devolved on the King assisted by the Kyebi 
Council. The King was thus the Chief Executive.
The Kyebi Council^ consisted of selected "elders" or
1. Christaller (Kyebi) to Basel, 50 September 1865, No* Alcim 
25; Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 31 December I065, No.
Akim 51 and 29 January- 1869 No. Akim 1, BMA-PJC.
2. Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 7 and 14 July 1867, No. Akim 4, 
BMA-PJC. It appears that Sakyeraa was then the Queen- 
Mother because Dokuwa died in or about 1856.
5 . Danquah, Akan Laws, p. 14.
4. The sources often said "the elders" of Kyebi in reference 
to the Kyebi Council.
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councillors and counsellors who normally resided in Kyebi,
the capital, and could, by that fact, readily make themselves
available to assist and advise the Abuakwahene as (a) the
Chief Executive of the state and (b) the Kyebihene or Chief
of the Kyebi metropolitan district. Most of the "elders"
were on the council by virtue of their positions as heads of
their several mmusua (clans) in the capital. As such they
held their positions as "elders" in spite and despite of the
monarch. He could unseat them, as councillors, only with the
co-operation and consent of the mmusua of which the "elders”
were heads, as well as with the approval of the other members
of the Kyebi Council. In 1868 King Amoako Atta I could not
remove Kwasi Amoako from the council because the other members
thought the measure was not comensurate to the grievance or
1
offence for which the King sought to unseat Kwasi.
The King could co-opt to sit on the Kyebi Council
anybody of his own choice, as happened in 1870 when King
Amoako Atta I made the head of the muslims in Kyebi a member 
2
of the council. This type of councillor could be removed by 
the King at any time. But if the King arbitrarily sought to 
do the same to the "customary” councillor, then he ran the 
risk of destoolment. He faced the same danger if, without 
just grounds, he tried to remove a member of the State or the 
Amantoo-mmiensa Councils, or persistently and unduly showed 
disrespect to his elders.
The main members of the Amantoo-mmiensa Council^
1. Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 3 October 1868, No. Akim 10, 
BMA-PJC.
2. Kromer (Kyebi) to Basel, ? October 1870, No. Akim 13» 
BMA-PJC.
3. Whenever the contemporary observers (who were usually the 
Basel Mission personnel in Kyebi) mentioned "chiefs from the 
three neighbouring towns of Apapam, Tete and Apedwa" then 
the Amantoo-mmiensa Council was meant.
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were the chiefs of the three towns of Apapam, Apedwa, and
Tete and their followers. This is the only Estate in the
Abuakwa constitution which did not occur in those of the
other Akyem states. The circumstances surrounding the
origins of this council (p. 188) no doubt explains the
difference. The Council could sit as a court of justice,
but only in conjunction with either one or both of the other
two councils already mentioned. In 1868 it was invited to
assist the Kyebi council to decide the case in which the
Abuakwahene had complained against the elder Kwasi Amoako
for allowing Doku of the Amoako household to assault the
King. 1 The Council also helped the Kyebi Council in 1877 to
determine the case, the King v. David Asante, the Akuapem
2
born Basel missionary then working in Kyebi.
The council was described in 1928 as being primarily 
the watchdog of the Abuakwa constitution; with a customary right 
to censure the Executive, i.e. the King and the Kyebi Council, 
and that the State Council looked to it ”for direct informa­
tion on the true state of things in regard to actual results 
of the work of the administration”.^  Evidence is currently 
lacking but this was most probably the council's primary 
role in the nineteenth century. After all it seems to have 
come into being in the l820s when the chiefs of Apapam,
Apedwa, and Tete, who came to constitute the council, had
1. Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 3 October 1868, No. Akim 10, 
BMA-PJC. The alleged assault happened in the palace one 
evening when Doku was waving his hand without being aware 
that anyone was in his way and his hand accidentally hit 
the king.
2. David Asante to Basel, 20 September 1877> No. 231, BMA-PJC. 
See pp. 263-4 for a detailed discussion on the missionary- 
monarch conflict.
3 . Danquah, Akan Laws, p. 17•
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opposed the foreign policy of the monarchy in relation to 
Asante. 1 Democracy, both in theory and practice, was clearly 
the hall-mark of government in Abuakwa. Without just grounds, 
as seen and determined by the State or the Kyebi or the 
Amantoo-mmiensa Council or the joint session of any two or 
all three of tiem, the Abuakwahene could not and would not 
arbitrarily dispossess a free-born native of Abuakwa of his 
life and property.
Besides the constitution, the local government 
system in Akyem states also did not allow ample room for the 
King to become absolute. For example an Abuakwa native who 
did not hail from Kyebi owed allegiance first and foremost 
to the chief of his locality, and through the latter to the 
Abuakwahene. As long as his conduct did not in any way 
jeopardise the security of the whole state, as long as he 
was not guilty of any offence directly against the King which 
might warrant his being summoned to explain himself at the 
Kyebi Court, the King could have no direct access to him: he 
was answerable only to his local chief.
A subordinate chief could unilaterally terminate,
temporarily or permanently, his allegiance to the monarchy.
After the i860 Abuakwa-Kotoku war, a Kotoku chief transferred
his allegiance to the Abuakwa Stool, and the Kotokuhene could
2
not force him back to the fold. This right of the subject to 
transfer his allegiance acted as a sanction against royal 
absolutism and forced the King to exercise extreme caution in 
relations between him and his subjects, especially where the
1. See pp. 187-8 above.
2. Lodholtz (Kyebi) to Basel, 3 January 1871, No. Akim 19, 
BMA-PJC.
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life and property of the latter were at stake.
Land, slaves, and gold were the bases of property
and wealth in an Akyem state. Ownership of land in the state
was not the exclusive preserve of the monarchy.'*' He was not
even the greatest land-owner. In post-1783 Abuakwa for
example, it seems that the Tafohene, the Asamankesehene, and
especially the Oseawuhene of Wankyi were the great land- 
2
owners. The land-owner could dispose of his land as he
ttioaghtfit without the prior approval of the King. Between
i860 and 1863 the Oseawuhene (or the Wankyihene), one of the
five divisional chiefs of Abuakwa, gave the Kotoku ruling
house part of Wankyi land to settle on, though the Abuakwahene
was at odds with the Kotoku.
The King enjoyed only a customary and nominal
4
jurisdiction over all land in the state. This arrangement 
then
was/underlined by the custom whereby the King was entitled 
to one-third share in gold nugget, which was over nine 
dollars in value, found in any part of the state; the remain­
ing two-thirds were split by the finder or miner and the owner
1. Christaller (Kyebi) to Basel, 30 September 1865, No. Akim 
25 and 28 March 1866, No. Akim 4, BMA-PJC.
2. The Okyeremma (drummer) of the Tafohene used to emphasize, 
and still emphasizes, the claim of the town of Tafo to own 
large expanses of land in his drum language, f,Kuro wo asa- 
a-se” (Tafo is a great land-owner).
3* Cf. Chapter 8 p. 269 above.
4. It was not until as late as 1939 that the Abuakwa State 
Council officially vested the ownership of all land in 
Abuakwa jointly in the traditional owners and the Abuak­
wahene .
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of the land on which the find was made. 1
This entitlement of the King to the one-third part
of gold nuggets was a major source of revenue to the monarchy,
because asikadie (gold digging and washing) was a principal
2occupation in Akyem. Other main sources were fines for 
which the King "has a set of heavier /gold? weightd1;^ 
trading; and stool lands.
The ruler was expected to spend money from public 
coffers with great care, and to protect stool property. He 
ran the risk of being destooled if he was a spendthrift.
Extravagance and prodigality were only two of
1L
several causes of destoolment in the Akyem states. The
monarch could be deposed if his general policy brought
disaster and unhappiness to the people. In 1812 Abuakwahene
Asare Bediako was destooled and asked to commit suicide,
5
which he did, for waging a disastrous war with the Ga. He 
could also be deposed for drunkenness. King Atta Obiwom
(1858-1867) was threatened with deposition on several
£
occasions for habitually getting drunk. That he would have
1. Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 14 July 1868, No. Akim 8, 
BMA-PJC.
2. See p. 218 above.
3* Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 14 July 1868, No. Akim 8, 
BMA-PJC.
4. Danquah (Akan Laws, pp. 115-124) lists the various grounds 
of destoolment in Abuakwa.
5. See p. 117 above.
6 . Stromberg to Basel, 28 May l86l, No. Akim 8 ; Eisenschmid 
(Kyebi) to Basel, 5 May I062, No. Akim 7; Stromberg (Kyebi) 
to Basel, 2 March 1863, No. Akim 2, BMA-PJC.
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been destooled if he had not paid heed to the warnings is
indicated by the experience of Penin. In 1873* Fenin,
Benkumhene of Abuakwa and Begorohene, was deprived of his
office after his subjects haS^warSed him many times to stop
getting drunk always, 1 A ruler who contracted leprosy or a
disease of that type was liable to deposition. This happened
to Abuakwahene Atta Panin in 1858. He committed suicide by
2
drinking the gall of a crocodile. Apparently he had been 
asked to step down, a request which amounted to destoolment.
The Abuakwa stool scarcely remained vacant for 
long. Soon after the demise or deposition of a ruler, the 
Queen-Mother, as the mater-familias of the royal clan of 
Kyebi, would nominate one of the members to be enstooled as 
the new Abuakwahene. If her choice met with the peoplefs 
approval, then the formal installation quickly followed.
But if the people, as represented by the three councils 
mentioned above, rejected the nomination, then the Queen- 
Mother would make a fresh choice, or even choices, till the 
people were satisfied with her choice.
Every member of the royal clan, man or woman, was 
eligible to be elected, provided he or she had attained their 
majority. Danquah made the perceptive remark in 1928 that 
besides the will of the people, the character and personal 
influence of the candidate were also vital for a successful 
election. The Akyem tried to obtain easy and smooth succes­
sion by instituting the abediakyire system. This was the 
practice of recognizing one of the members of the royal clan
1. Haas (Kyebi) to Basel, 19 July 1873* No. Akim 9 BMA-PJC.
2. Christaller (Kyebi) to Basel, 1 October 1866, No. Akim 22, 
BMA-PJC.
as heir- or heiress- apparent to a reigning monarch. Between 
1728 and 17^2 Owusu Akyem was heir-apparent to Abuakwahene 
Baa Kwante.1 To all intents and purposes he would have 
succeeded to the stool if he had not died together with Baa 
Kwante in battle against Asante in 17^2. He virtually con­
ducted the foreign policy of Abuakwa during Baa!s reign.
"Kwabena Fa” (Fua) was abediakyire to Kotokuhene Kofi
0
Agyeman (1825-1867). He succeeded to the Kotoku stool when 
Agyeman died in 1867.
It must be pointed out, however, that an abediakyire 
did not automatically ascend the stool. Bad character could 
stand between him and the stool, as the experience of Asase 
shows. He was recognized as heir-apparent to the Abuakwa 
stool during the reign of Atta Panin (18^2 -1 85 8). When 
Panin died in 1858 Asase was passed over, on account of his 
bad character, and Panin's twin brother, Obiwom, was enstooled.^ 
This right of the people to short-list candidates to the stool 
was in itself a form of sanction against absolutism.
Admittedly there were occasions when Akyem rulers 
indulged in acts which on their face value appeared to b^ or 
bordered on, rank tyranny. These occurred mostly in master-
1.. See p. 88, n. 5* above.
2. Baum (Gyadam) to Basel. 14 July 1857* No. Gyadam 7; 
Stromberg (Kukurantumi) to Basel, 28 May l86l, No. Akim 8, 
BMA-PJC.
3 . Christaller to Basel, 1 October 1866, No. Akim 22, BMA-PJC. 
According to Christaller Asase was guilty of extortion, 
highway robbery, murder (one of his victims was his own 
wife), seizure and selling of Akyem citizens into slavery, 
interception of royal letters to and from the coast, and 
the harassment of royal messengers; in short so bad was 
his character that at one stage the Abuakwa people demanded 
his execution, that is to say, Asase killing himself. He 
eventually committed suicide.
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slave relationship. The evidence leaves room for no doubt 
that slaves and people of servile origins formed a substantial 
section of Akyem society, though the nature of the evidence 
makes it impossible to define the size in terms of figures.
In the 1730s it was said of the Akyem that of all the peoples 
in the Gold Coast they were the only group who scarcely sold 
their prisoners-of-war into the trans-Atlantic slave trade; 
they grafted the slaves on their families, manumitted them 
after a time, and made them full members of their household. 1 
In spite of this practice, a slave or a person of servile 
origin, to the native free-born Akyem, was an inferior person 
and never the equal of the freeborn; he was doomed to carry 
the stigma of being a slave till the day of his death. As 
long as he lived a slave, together with all his personal 
belongings, was the property of his master. If the slave 
was a woman, her children were the property of her owner who
could dispose of her and her children any how, any time, any
where.
In Abuakwa the paramount ruler seems to have been
the greatest slave-owner. This was most probably the case in
one
Kotoku and Bosome also. In 1875 when the/year-old British
Colonial Government abolished domestic slavery in the Gold
Coast, Abuakwa was the only place in the eastern sector where
it caused the greatest social upheaval owing to the large
number of slaves there. Hundreds and hundreds of slaves left;
the population of Kyebi, for example, was said to have dramati-
2
cally and drastically dwindled. The royal household suffered 
most: the slaves there left almost to a man,with the result
1. Romer, Tilforladlig, p. 158.
2. Asante, Mohr, and Wener (Akyem) to the Slave Emancipation 
Commission of the Basel Mission in the Gold Coast, 26 June
1875, BMA-PJC.
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that King Amoako Atta I contemplated resigning his office 
because there were not enough slaves to accord dignity to his 
household. 1
Until then, however, the Abuakwahene could dispose
of his slaves in any way he liked. Many of them were often
made sacrificial victims whose gore was expected to water
the grave of a deceased royal. Abuakwahene Atta Panin was
reported to have killed over thirty people in 1856 when the
2
famous Dokuwa died. Several human sacrifices were said to
have taken place in 1867 when Abuakwahene Atta Obiwom died.^
Many of these victims would be royal household slaves, but
also included would be any free-born, whether native or
stranger, who bafpned to fall into the hands of the royal
executioners. To the Basel missionary personnel resident
in Kyebi there could not have been greater proofs of rank
4
tyranny and absolutism.
1. Eisenschmid (?Akropon, Akuapem) to Basel, 25 June 1875* 
citing Mohr (Akyem; to Akropon, 28 May 1875* BMA-PJC.
2. Baum (Gyadam) to Basel, 14 July 1857* No. Gyadam 7* BMA- 
PJC.
3 . Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 7 July 1867, No. Akim 4, 
BMA-PJC.
4. Eisenschmid (Kyebi) to Basel, 3 October 1868, No. Akim 10, 
BMA-PJC.
APPENDIX B
“THE HUMBLE PETITION OP Q.UABINA FUAH, KING OF INSWAR-MOON 
AND ITS DEPENDENCIES HUMBLY SHOWETH:
(Unedited)
(cf CO 96/88,1871,Vol 2)
Sir,
The ancestors of your humble petitioner were 
originally subjects to the Kings of Ashantees but through 
tyranny and oppression of his conduct towards your humble 
petitioners ancestors, fought the King of Ashantees in their 
way to Akim, and declare independence in the year l8l6, in 
the reign of your humble petitioner's ancestor K0J0 Coomah, 
King of Geddam (now Insar-moon) from Ashantee crown, 
previous to the arrival of Sir Charles MacArthy.
He was succeeded by Agiman, your humble petitioner's 
predecessor from the year 1816 to the present time, your 
humble petitioner's ancestors and predecessors never offended 
Your Excellency's Government, neither your humble petitioner 
offended Your Excellency since your humble petitioner's 
ancestors sworn allegiance to the British Government - and 
they having become a protectorate to the British Government.
The Ashantees molested Your humble petitioner's 
subjects daily. That your humble petitioner in exercise 
and obedience to Your Excellency's command, humbly does 
represent to Your Excellency the grief, and sorrow your 
humble petitioner has been undergone for several months 




Kojo Aboki ) c Coast Jail
Quamin Dumprey (Jun.) ) y 
Obin Dalco )
Quasi Boar Accra Jail
were sentenced to imprisonment for such lines of misconduct 
towards your humble petitioner's protectors (the British 
Government) for crimes having been committed by them, of 
which crimes judgement preferred against them, of mis­
conducts and misdoings, and were sentenced to imprisonment 
for several years.
Your humble petitioner is aware of the crimes 
they have sinned against our British Government of which 
your humble petitioner is a loyal subject:- although they 
deserved punishment greater than the present ones, but Her 
Majesty's throne is a throne of mercy for the offender and 
the wicked, and Your Excellency's Government is a seat of 
mercy and justice, holding the one on Your Excellency’s 
right hand for pardoning offences of the wicked, and the 
left hand for punishment of the wickedness of the times 
for disobedience.
Your humble petitioner crave earnestly and 
entreats Your Excellency to pardon and forgive them (the 
prisoners) for their first offence, and bind them for 
future obedience of which your humble petitioner doubt not 
that they will commit such lines of misconducts and more, 
as their crimes will be a warning to your petitioner's 
subjects for the future. Your humble petitioner begs to 
entreat Your Excellency for release. Your humble 
petitioner and his chiefs humbly brings Your Excellency's 
observation that the prisoners were imprisoned on account 
of refusing summons from the Judicial Assessor's Court, but
no other guilty beside their disobedience of refusing 
summons.
Your humble petitioner and his chiefs had given 
up the Ashantee captives in his district, by Your 
Excellency's command and begs humbly to release your 
humble petitioner’s captains from imprisonment.
And as in duty bounds your humble petitioner and 
his chiefs ever pray.
(Sd) Quabina Fuah 
King of Inswar-moon.
Chiefs Marks:
Quabina X Essimen, Chief of Yinasi 
Quamin X Abanqua, Chief of Formasi 
Quacoe X Abrooqua, Chief of Insooasoo 
Quabina X Dumprey, Chief of Imoosasoo 
Quamin X Eyimpay, Chief of Abanasi 
Quabina X Apia Agay, Chief of Bancamee 
Acquassi X Dalco, Chief of Mansu 
Ambah X Coomah, Queen of Swaidol 
Quabina X Ampartah Chum of Asuboah 
Kojo X Moley, Chief of Inswarmoon 
Yaw X Dumprey, Chief of Inswarmoon 
Acquassi X Manu, Chief of Inswarmoon 
Acquassi X Enchee, Chief of Inswarmoon 
Quacoe X Okoree, Chief of Inswar-moon 
Cofee X Amanee, Chief of Inswar-moon 
Quacoe X Tooda, Chief of Inswar-moon 
Quamin X Accon Ennee, Chief of Inswar-moon 
CofeeX Tettay, Chief of Inswar-moon 
Cofee X Kessi (interpreter)
Quabina X Saikee, Chief of Inswar-moon
Acquassi X Effom, Chief of Inswar-moon 
Cofee X Asail, Chief of Inswar-moon
True
(Sd)





ABUAKWA RULERS OF THE EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES
TRADITIONAL REVISED
(After Reindorf & Danquah) (In the light of European sources
1 . Ofori Panin, c.1733* 1 . Ofori ^Panin/, c.1704-1727.
2 • Baa Kwante, died 1742 2. Baa Kwante, 1727-1742.
Pobi (1743) 3. Pobi, 1742-1765.
4. Owusu Akyem 4. Obirikoran, 1765-1784.
5. Twum Ampoforo (deposed 
and killed).
5. Ampofo or Ampofro /Twum7, 
1784-9$%
6. Obirikorane, died 1770. 6. Apraku, 179&-1807.
7- Apraku, died 1770. 7. Atta Owusu, l807“l8ll.
8 . Atta Wusu Yiakosan, died 
1811.
8. Asare Bediako, suicide l8ll.
9. Asare Bediako, suicide
l8ll.
9. Kofi Asante, l8ll-l8l6.
10. Kofi Asante, died l8ll. 10. Dokuwa or Dokuaa, 1817-1842. 
(Abdicated).
•1—1 1—1 Twum II 11. Atta Panin, 1842-1858.
•OJi—1 Queen Dokua (reigned
from 1817.
12. Atta Obiwom, 1858-1867.
13. Atta Panin 13. Amoako Atta I, 1867-1887.
•-=4“i—1 Atta Obiwom, died 1866. •
-=t1—1 Amoako Atta II, 1887-1911.
15. Amoako Atta I, 1866-1888.
16. Amoako Atta II, 1888-1911.
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APPENDIX D 
K0T0KU KING LIST TO 1876
TRADITIONAL TENTATIVELY REVISED LIST
(After Ex-Kotokuhene, Prempon (Reindorf and contemporary 
Manso III) sources)
1 . Yarawere 1 . Yarawere
2 . Boadi Nianim 2 . Boadi Nianim
Akrofi Brempon 3. Akrofi Brempon
4. Asiedu Apenten 4. Asiedu Apenten, died c.1701
5- Ofosuhene Apenten 5* Ofosuhene Apenten, c.1701-
1717
6 . Prempon Manso 6 . Frempon Manso, 1717-1740
7. Ampem 7. Apaw, 1740-1742
8 . Kwahene Broni 8 . Ampem
9. Gyamrankum 9. Broni
1 0. Kakari Apaw 10. Gyamrankum, died ?1744
11. Opoku 1 1. Kotoku Ampoma, ?1745-?1797
12. Kwakye Adeyefe 12. Opoku, 1798-1807
13. Kwadwo Kuma 1 3. Kwakye Adeyefe, 1807-1812 
(Pled his office)
14. Affrlfah Akwada 14. Kwadwo Kuma, I8l2-l8l6
15. (Abontendomhene as Regent) 15. Amoako, as Regent, 1817-1823
1 6. Kofi Agyeman 1 6. Affrifah Akwada, 1823-1824
17. Kwabena Pua 17. Kofi Agyeman, 1825-1867
1 8. Atta Pua I died 1926 1 8. Kwabena Pua, 1867-1876
19. Atta Fua I, 1876 -
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4. Oware Agyekum I
5. Kesse Taa
6 . Ntow Kroko
7. Bosompem Ntow
8 . Akrasi Panin
9. Koragye Ampaw
10. Kwame Marf o
211. Amma Amoakoaa
12. Kofi Ahenkora, 1877-
1. The virtual absence of contemporary documentary sources 
has not made it possible to attempt a close check on the 
traditional list. But the list seems to be incomplete, 
as suggested by the term TPanin* (meaning the Elder or 
First) attached to Ntiamoa and Akrasi.





A . BRITISH, (Public Records Office, London (PRO):
T 70/ Series :-
T 70/50 Letters from Africa, 1685-1698
51 ” " " 1698-1703
52 " ” " 1703-1715
53 " ,f " 1720-1728
5^ " ” " 1728-1740
T 70/29 Inward Letters from Africa, 1751-1755
30 ff " " ,r 1755-1762
31 ” ,f M w 1762-1775
32 " " ,f f’ 1775-1781
35 " " fT " 1781-1799
34 " ft " " 1799-1806
35 ” " ” " 1807-1813
36 ” " ” " 1813-1818
40 w n v l8l6-l8l8 Mission to
Asante
42 f n " ,f April-September 1817
T 70/1515 - T 70/1586 Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1726-1807  
T 70/974 Accra Day-books, 1752-1755
974A " " " 1756-1758
977-8 " " " 1762-1765
979 n " " 1759-1761
978-984 n " " 1768-1818
T 70 /1007 - T 70/1107. Cape Coast Castle Day-books, 1752-1815 
T 70/1468 Diary of Richard Miles, 1777-1778
383
T 70/1479 Letters to and from Richard Miles, 1750-1792
T 70/1182 Apam Day-book, 1784
CO Series :-
CO 98/1^ Minutes of the Council of Merchants,
CCC, 1829-1844
CO 98/1 Correspondence between CCC and Elmina
Castle, 1853-1856
2 Correspondence between CCC and the
Colonial Office 1842-1845
9 6 /4 .- CO 96 /16 Correspondence between CCC & CO, 1844-1849
96/18.- CO 96 /19 a t t tf 1850
/2 2 /23 n t f t 1851
25 t t t f 1852
27 28 t ft tf t 1853
30 31 t t ft t 1854
33 34 t t ft ft 1855
38 39 f» t ft t 1856
41 ft t f ft 1857
43 44 t t f tf 1858
45 ft t f t 1859
47 t t f f i860 Jan.- 
June
48 ft t Freeman & Governor 
i860 August.
49 t t CCC & 0 0 V i860 July 
Dec ember
53 55 t t tr f 1861
57 58 t t t ft 1862
60 62 t tf t t 1865
63 64 »t t t
t 1864
65 & 67 - 68 t t it tf 1865
70 72 ft t t ft 1866
384.
74 t t t t 1867
76 - 77 tt t t tt 1868
79 - 81 t t t t 1869
i-=t00 85 t t t t 1870
87 - 89 t t it t 1871
92 - 94 t t t t 1872
96 - 103 t it t t 1873
111 - 112 t t t t 1874
115 - 116 t t t tt 1875
CO 9 6 / 7 3 Individual Despatches 1866
78 tt t 1868
10 8 - 110 t t 1873
114 t it 1874
co 96 /356 ■- 357 Correspondence between CCC & CO, 1900
374 « t t n 1900
CO 402/1 Entry Books 1847
/2-3 t t 1847
A
t t 1852
co 267/117 Merchant Despatches from the GC, 1832
126 t» t t it t 1834
131 tt t t t n 1835
136 tt tt tt t t 1836
144 tt t t t t 1837
150 t t t t t 1838
162 it t t t t 1840
168 t t t t t 1841
CO 267/170 Dr Madden *s Report on the GC etc.
rHCO 
1—1
British Parliamentary Papers (BPP): 
Select Committee Report on West Africa, 1842
385.
Select Committee Report on West Africa, 1865
Corres. Relating to the Ashantee Invasion, 1875 Vol.
xLix
Further Corres. Relating to n " 1874 Vol.
xLvi
Corres. Relating to the Fante Confederation, 1873 Vol.
xLix
B . DANISH: Rigsarkivet, Copenhagen :-
Documents of the Danish West India and Guinea Company 
(VgK) etc.:
Breve og Dokumenter inkomme og udgaade, 1685-4, 1689, &
1698-1705 (Ipakt)
" " " " 1705-1722 (Ipkt)
ft r. « it 1722-1750
Dag-journaler fort paa Christiansborg Castle, Osu, 1968-1705
Sekretprotokoller " " " 1725-1754
Diarieboger f ff tf 1744.1754
Diverse arkivalier fra Guinea (DAFG), 1806, l8ll-l8l5
Guineiske Journaler (GJ) 1755-1768
Sager til Guineiske Journaler (STGJ) 1806, 1808-1817, 1819-1820 
Guineiske Journaler Vol. A, 1799-1804
" n B, 1804-1820
" " c, 1821-1827
" n D, 1828-1850
w " E, 1851-1854
" ff F, 1855-1840
" " G, 1841-1844
" " H, 1845-1846
" " I, 1847-1850
Sager til Guineiske Journaler, 1776-1849
it ft ft ft 1850-1895
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Departementer for udenrigske anliggender (DFUA), 1804-1847
C . DUTCH; Rijksarchief, The Hague; Balm Library, Legon :-
(i) The Purley Collections, Legon:
Dutch Records, Blue Books, 1 - 7  1610-1657
Dutch and other European Records 1658-1644,
1665-1679,
1680-1700.
Letters and Papers from Guinea 1699-1720
Miscellaneous Records l699-l8ll
Dutch Documents, WIC, transl. by E.F. Collins, 1700-1780
WIC 124A Journals and correspondence I8l0-l8l6
Diaries and correspondence 1815-1823
" " " 1830-1847
(ii) Govr.-Gen. H.W. Daendel’s Journal &
Correspondence 1815-1817
(iii) A. van Danzigfs Dutch Documents Relating to
the Gold Coast and the Slave Coast, Pt.I, 1860-1710
Pt.II, 1710-1740,
Legon.
With the exception of Van Danzigfs, all the Dutch sources con­
sulted in Ghana were cross-checked with the originals at The
Hague. Consequently the original references are cited, e.g.
WIC or NBKG.
D. GERMAN: Basel Mission Archives :-
Basel Mission Gold Coast Correspondence, c. 1844-1888
(Abstracts by Paul Jenkins (Legon, 1970), Balm Library, Legon.
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E. MISCELLANEOUS PRIMARY SOURCES:
i. Reports on Land Disputes in the Adansi Division of
Ashanti (Obusai District) L 448.
ii. Stool Lands Boundaries Settlement (Akwamu Order), in Gold 
Coast Gazette Extraordinary, No. 6, 1956
iii. Akyem Abuakwa Stool Lands Declaration, May 1939
iv. Nsawam Native Affairs, Case No. 76/191, Ghana National
Archives.
v. Documents Relating to Akyem Settlements in and Claims to
Asante-Akyem, File No. D 46, Kumasi Archives.
F. NEWSPAPERS:
London Times, 26 October l86l 
African Times, 24 October 1870 
West African Herald, 31 March 1871
G. ORAL TRADITIONS:
i. Akyem Abuakwa Traditions (AAT), gathered under the
auspices of Okyenhene Nana Ofori Atta I during the 1925 /6  
period.
ii. Akyem Abuakwa traditions, collected by author in 1968/9 .
iii. Akyem Bosome Traditions (ABT), compiled for author by
Bosomehene Nana Oware Agyekum II, 1968/9 .
iv. Akyem Kotoku Traditions (AKT), gathered by author in
1968/9 .
v. Asante-Akyem Traditions (As-AkT), collected by author,
1968/9 .
vi. K. Ameyaw, Akim Oda (Kotoku) Tradition, IAS acc. No. KAG/7
ff Asamankese Tradition, IAS acc. No. KAG/4
n Akwatia Tradition, IAS acc. No. KAG/2.
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vii. K. Y. Daaku, Oral Traditions of Adanse (Legon, 19©)
M Oral Traditions of Assin-Twifo (Legon, 19©)
" Oral Traditions of Denkyera (Legon, 1970)
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